2.1 Accounting Manipulation Flashcards

(50 cards)

1
Q

What are the 5 major domains covered in corporate fraud studies?

A

1) Fraud Detection Models (statistical), 2) Accounting Manipulation Schemes, 3) Banking & Securitization Fraud, 4) Rogue Trading, 5) Root Causes & Prevention

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2
Q

What are the three fundamental statistics about corporate fraud pervasiveness and impact?

A

1) ~10% of large publicly traded firms commit securities fraud yearly, 2) Only 1/3 of corporate frauds are detected in normal times, 3) Corporate fraud destroys 1.6% of equity value annually ($830 billion in 2021)

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3
Q

For accounting restatements (2003-2022): what are the top 5 sources and their percentages?

A

1) Debt/Equity (27%, 4,709 cases), 2) Revenue Recognition (13%, 2,195), 3) Expenses (12%, 2,068), 4) Cash Flow (12%, 2,041), 5) Liabilities (11%, 1,957)

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4
Q

What are the three key timeline and impact statistics for accounting restatements (2008-2020)?

A

1) Average length ~520 days, 2) 30% disclose impact on net income, 3) Average negative income impact was -$50.3 million per restatement in 2020

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5
Q

===FRAUD DETECTION MODELS: What are the 3 main quantitative tools for detecting financial manipulation?===

A

1) Altman Z-Score (bankruptcy/distress prediction), 2) Beneish M-Score (earnings manipulation detection), 3) Montier C-Score (accounting fraud red flags)

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6
Q

Altman Z-Score: What’s the complete formula and what do the three zones indicate?

A

Z = 1.2(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3(EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6(Market Value Equity/Total Liabilities) + 1.0(Sales/Total Assets). Zones: <1.81 = distress, 1.81-2.99 = caution, >3.0 = safe

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7
Q

Beneish M-Score: List all 8 components, the formula structure, and the manipulation threshold.

A

Components: DSRI (Days Sales Receivables Index), GMI (Gross Margin Index), AQI (Asset Quality Index), SGI (Sales Growth Index), DEPI (Depreciation), SGAI (SG&A Expenses), LVGI (Leverage Index), TATA (Total Accruals to Total Assets). Formula: -4.84 + 0.92DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI + 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI - 0.172SGAI + 4.679TATA - 0.327LVGI. Score > -2.22 indicates likely profit manipulation

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8
Q

What’s the logic behind the Beneish M-Score? Match the 4 fraud incentive triggers to their manipulative reactions.

A

1) High sales growth → Accelerating sales recognition, 2) Deteriorating gross margins → Increasing cost deferrals, 3) Rising operating expenses → Raising accruals, 4) Rising leverage → Reducing depreciation

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9
Q

How effective is the Beneish M-Score? Cite the 3 detection success rates from different studies.

A

76% of earnings manipulating firms subject to SEC enforcement, 71% of prominent US financial reporting scandals pre-announcement, 82% (14 of 17) Malaysian listed companies charged with fraudulent reporting

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10
Q

Montier C-Score: List all 6 red flag components and what score signals potential fraud.

A

1) Growing divergence between net income and cash flow, 2) Increasing receivable days, 3) Increasing inventory days, 4) Increasing other current assets, 5) Declines in depreciation relative to gross fixed assets, 6) Total asset growth >10%. Score of 5 or 6 = potential fraud sign

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11
Q

What was the score distribution when Montier C-Score was tested on 3,000 Asian companies (2011-2015)?

A

Score 0: 3%, Score 1: 11%, Scores 2-4: 75% (23%, 29%, 23%), Score 5: 10%, Score 6: 1%

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12
Q

Who are activist short-sellers, and how does their business model work? Name 3 prominent firms.

A

Firms: Hindenburg Research, Quintessential Capital Management, Argonaut. Model: Identify companies with accounting fraud via financial analysis → Take short positions → Publish detailed reports exposing fraud → Profit when stock prices collapse

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13
Q

What were 5 of QCM’s most devastating fraud campaign results with their price impacts?

A

Akazoo (NASDAQ, 100% loss, liquidation, SEC sued), Bio-on (Italy AIM, 100% loss, liquidation, management arrested), Aphria (Canada NYSE, 43% loss, conflicted acquisitions), Folli Follie (Greece Athens, 100% loss, management arrested), Globo (Greece London AIM, 100% ceased as commercial entity)

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14
Q

===ACCOUNTING MANIPULATION SCHEMES: Real-World Cases===

A
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15
Q

Super Micro case (SEC 2020): What were the 3 revenue recognition tricks used?

A

Improperly recognized revenue by: 1) Recognizing revenue on goods sent to warehouses not yet delivered to customers, 2) Shipping goods prior to customer authorization, 3) Misusing marketing program to improperly reduce liabilities accrued

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16
Q

Capital Round Tripping: Describe both types and how they work.

A

Type 1: Bank gives customer favorable loan requiring portion be used to finance bank’s capital increase (90% loan, 10% capital). Type 2: Bank finances asset manager with customer deposits, who then uses them to finance bank capital increase. Value of capital guaranteed through complex structure

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17
Q

What are the 4 types of fraud committed in capital round tripping schemes?

A

1) Market abuse (shares kept off exchanges, manipulated valuations), 2) Mis-selling (clients misled about investing vs conduit role), 3) Breach of prudential norms (loans tied to equity purchases violated credit/capital rules), 4) Artificial capitalization (regulatory capital inflated)

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18
Q

PMC Bank scandal: Key statistics and the fraud mechanisms used.

A

108-year-old institution, >600 branches, 12 overseas offices. Frauds: >70% assets were loans to shareholders/associated companies, ~22,000 fake current accounts created to conceal info, NPA figures manipulated, shareholder account IT info restricted to few colluded employees. Detected by whistle-blower credit department employees

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19
Q

How do you investigate round tripping? List the 8 steps (6 off-site, 2 on-site).

A

Off-site: 1) Trigger (e.g., unclear own shares deduction), 2) Shareholders/Bondholders ID, 3) Fund mandate analysis (liquidity), 4) Jurisdictions analysis, 5) Management connections analysis, 6) Insider movements analysis. On-site: 7) Cross interviews, 8) Onsite supervision investigation

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20
Q

===BANKING & SECURITIZATION FRAUD: Lehman and the 2008 Crisis===

A
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21
Q

Repo 105/Tobashi Scheme: Explain the accounting treatment vs. the reality and what Lehman achieved.

A

Accounting: Treated as sale at price 105 (off-balance sheet). Reality: Costly repo to cut leverage at end of month, unwind at price 100. Lehman used this to temporarily reduce reported leverage each quarter-end without disclosure to investors/regulators/rating agencies despite being technically enabled by legal loopholes

22
Q

Lehman’s asset growth 2003-2008: Show total assets, leverage growth, and what drove the expansion.

A

Total assets: Q4’03: $312bn → Q1’08: $786bn (152% growth). Gross leverage: 23.7x → 31.7x (34% growth). Key growth areas: Mortgage/Asset-Backed Securities (175%), Derivatives (253%), Securities borrowed (208%). Financed primarily by repurchase agreements (repo market), particularly heavy reliance compared to other investment banks

23
Q

Contrast the two banking models: Originate-to-Hold vs. Originate-to-Distribute.

A

Originate-to-Hold (EU/Asia): Bank collects deposits, makes loans, keeps loans on balance sheet, bears credit default risk directly. Originate-to-Distribute (US): Bank originates loans, transfers to SPV, SPV issues securities (CDOs/CMBS/RMBS) to investors, credit risk transferred off bank balance sheet

24
Q

Level 3 assets: What are they, and what are the 9 AVA adjustments that should prevent manipulation?

A

Level 3: Assets valued using company’s own assumptions/internal models (no observable market prices). AVA adjustments: 1) Market Price Uncertainty, 2) Close-out cost, 3) Model risk, 4) Unearned credit spread, 5) Investing and funding cost, 6) Concentrated positions, 7) Early termination, 8) Future administrative costs, 9) Operational risk

25
How did major US investment banks' Level 3 exposure compare in Q1 2008 (as % of shareholder equity)?
LEH: 170%, MS: 225%, GS: 130%, MER: 184%. Lehman had 60% of Level 3 in derivatives/mortgages, significantly higher concentration than peers
26
What are the 3 main types of securitization fraud? Give real-world examples for each.
1) Fake/Inflated Assets: Stuffing pool with non-existent/defaulted loans (Lehman subprime RMBS), 2) Hidden Guarantees/Side Agreements: Secret liquidity lines/buyback guarantees (Japanese banks 1990s), 3) Misstating Credit Enhancement: Manipulating subordination/reserves while betting against deal (SEC vs US IB 2011 - handpicked poor-quality subprime, sold to investors, took short position)
27
Abacus synthetic CDO fraud: Describe the structure, the deception, and the outcome.
Structure: IB let hedge fund select reference portfolio of subprime RMBS, HF simultaneously took short position (CDS), investors thought portfolio was independently/fairly constructed. Reality: HF designed portfolio to fail, other investors took long exposure. Outcome: HF's short made huge profits when defaults surged, equity/mezzanine tranches collapsed immediately
28
What are the 5 red flags auditors/supervisors should watch for in securitization deals?
1) Unusually high day-1 profit recognition, 2) Rapid derecognition but persistent economic exposure (liquidity lines, buybacks), 3) Mismatch between loan performance and investor reports, 4) Repeated securitization of poor-quality/circularly funded assets, 5) SPV financed via shell companies (potential money laundering/layering)
29
Hin Leong Trading fraud: Key facts, the red flags that were missed, and regulatory response.
Facts: Singapore oil trader, $300m+ exposures at 23 banks, admitted $800m losses concealed, same oil pledged multiple times, >$3.5bn total losses. Red flags missed: Unverified cargo inspections (paper only), concentration risk (same traders, 10+ banks), repeated short-term rollovers despite negative cash flows, opaque unaudited family ownership. Response: Central collateral registries, independent cargo inspectors, blockchain bills of lading, Singapore MAS tightened trade finance guidelines
30
===ROGUE TRADING: Individual Trader Frauds===
31
What are the typical characteristics and behavioral patterns of rogue traders?
Demographics: Male, mid-thirties, former trade support/back office (knows controls), undetected >2.5 years. Motives: No personal gain except bonus. Behavior: Winner effect (success → higher hormones → more risk), mental trap (losses accumulate → deadline approaching → double-or-quits mentality)
32
List the 5 common techniques rogue traders use to hide unauthorized positions.
1) Booking fake trades with deferred settlement dates (cancel before settlement), 2) Profit smoothing via umbrella/reserve accounts, 3) Trade price manipulation, 4) Unauthorized use of client margin accounts, 5) Use of model adjustments
33
What are the 3 categories of failures and early warning indicators for rogue trading?
Behavior: No vacation, concentration of tasks/power. Controls: Accounting irregularities, limits breached. Check & Balance: Risk management lacks understanding, managers lack experience/know-how
34
===THE KERVIEL CASE: Société Générale's €4.9bn Loss===
35
Kerviel's background and P&L progression: How did he move from back office to major fraud?
Background: Joined 2000 in Back Office (trade support), moved to Delta One front office 2005 as junior trader. P&L: 2006 real earnings ~€6m (reported much less), 2007 real earnings €43m+ (reported €11m). Started with unauthorized Allianz positions after 2007 London attacks (€500k profit), expanded to options, futures, forwards, equities
36
Kerviel's fraud techniques: Describe the 3 types and how many transactions of each.
Type 1 (947 transactions): Fictitious trades with deferred settlement dates canceling positions/earnings - used off-market counterparties (CLICKOPTIONS, CLICKCLT, etc.), forwards/OTC options/shares/futures on DAX/ST50E/CAC/FTSE, canceled before settlement. Type 2 (115 transactions): Pairs of reverse trades at off-market prices (e.g., buy 2.27m SOLARWORLD @€63, sell same @€53 = -€22.7m fake earnings, zero position). Type 3 (9 transactions): Provision flows ("flux pro") - modified front office valuations, canceled before month-end controls
37
When Kerviel's fraud was discovered: What was his position size, and what happened during unwinding?
Position: ~€50 billion (exceeded bank's total capital) discovered Jan 19-20, 2008. July 2007: $42bn short DAX futures (unwound by year-end). Jan 2008: $72bn long index futures (NOT HEDGED). Unwinding: Jan 21-24, liquidated over 3 days per AMF Art 233-2, stayed within 10% market volume. Loss: €4.9bn final. Market impact: DAX -30%, Eurostoxx 50 -16%, SG stock -30%
38
How many market risk alerts occurred for Kerviel (2006-2007), and why didn't they detect the fraud?
25 alerts from RISQ/RDM/EQY for margin limits, delta validation, stress test result increases. Controls attributed anomalies to recurring system recording problems, only notified Kerviel and immediate superiors, ensured limits returned to normal. 2 counterparty risk alerts (€2.3bn CVAR for Counterparty 5) transmitted but not investigated. 1 Cooke weighted average alert (8 transactions creating €3bn RWA) - THIS ONE detected the fraud
39
How did Société Générale's CIB division perform 2003-2007, and what was the Kerviel impact?
2003: €1,052m (40.4% of net income), 2004: €1,453m (40.1%), 2005: €1,841m (37.5%), 2006: €2,340m (40.4%), 2007: -€2,221m loss (-138.5%). Note: In 2007 CIB's loss turned total bank net income from profit to €1,604m, down from €5,785m in 2006
40
Société Générale's balance sheet changes 2003-2007: Show the key metrics and growth rates.
Total Assets: €539bn (2003) → €1,072bn (2007, +99%). Derivatives: €6.47tn → €17.24tn (+166%). Loans: €178bn → €305bn (+71%). Deposits: €160bn → €270bn (+69%). Equity: €17bn → €27bn (+59%)
41
Compare the major rogue trading cases: Kerviel vs. Adoboli - institution, year, time to detect, loss, and market.
Kerviel (Société Générale, France, 2008): 2y 6m to detect, €4.9bn/$6.9bn loss, European Stock Index Futures. Adoboli (UBS, UK, 2011): 2y 11m to detect, $2.3bn loss, S&P 500/DAX/Euro Stoxx Futures
42
===SOVEREIGN DEBT FRAUD: When Countries Cook the Books===
43
Greek cross-currency swap scheme: Explain the mechanism, accounting treatment, and real impact.
Mechanism: Greece needed <3% deficit/GDP to join Euro (actual ~12%). Used non-typical cross-currency swap with Goldman using "historical implied FX rate" (weaker Euro), allowed Greece to exchange Yen/Dollars for greater number of Euros. Accounting: European rules didn't require reporting as credit/loan, took $1bn off balance sheets. Reality: Resembled loan - Greece would repay at swap end, manipulated reported deficit from 12% to 3%
44
Argentina's 2001 securitization fraud: Describe the 2 main schemes used.
Example 1: "Bonds for Patents" or "Bonds for YPF" - sold off future government revenues or state-owned enterprise profits to investors for immediate cash. Example 2: Currency swaps - exchanged dollars for pesos with agreement for future peso payments, but swaps not fully reported/transparent, leading to underreported liabilities and inflated reserves. Both appeared off-balance sheet but created future liabilities
45
===ROOT CAUSES & PREVENTION: Why Fraud Happens and How to Stop It===
46
According to FSB analysis of Société Générale: What were the 4 root causes of the fraud?
1) Internal control system failures (lack of knowledge, inadequate conflict of interest management), 2) External pressure/growth strategy responding to perceived outside pressures, 3) Poor senior management oversight (profit-driven motives, lack of compliance/risk awareness), 4) Organizational culture flaws (disregard for compliance, lack of professional ethics, inappropriate incentives)
47
What are the 3 weaknesses in compensation incentive structures that enable fraud?
1) Variable component based on short-term performance, 2) Improper balance between fixed and variable components, 3) Uncertainty in enforceability of claw-back clauses and treatment of golden parachutes
48
Define these 3 concepts in financial misconduct culture: 'rolling bad apples,' 'similar selection,' and the 'Gekko effect.'
Rolling bad apples: Employees who leave one firm following misconduct/allegations and are later hired by another firm. Similar selection: Recruitment process where successful candidates are picked by the traders they'll work for (self-selection bias). Gekko effect: Corporate cultures that transmit negative values ("greed is good," "money never sleeps") making financial malfeasance significantly more probable
49
What are the 4 dichotomies in 'the smell of the place' framework for positive corporate environments?
1) Constrain vs Stretch, 2) Compliance vs Discipline, 3) Control vs Support, 4) Contract vs Trust. Positive workplace created through stretch, discipline, support, and trust rather than constraint, compliance, control, and contract
50
FSB governance framework: List all 7 suggestions to mitigate misconduct risks.
1) Clear organizational structure, responsibilities, accountabilities, robust decision-making with adequate challenge, 2) Tone from top, standards/policies, compensation practices, 3) Accountability, senior management oversight, three lines of defense, 4) Operational risk management, internal controls, compliance guidelines, 5) Separation of functions, collegial decision-making, 6) Code of conduct, discipline committee, 7) Embed values in recruitment/training/performance; clear committee responsibilities with overlap so conduct isn't neglected