Accountability

Question 1

Define Vertical accountability

Answer 1

the role of voters in holding public officials accountable via elections

Question 2

Define Horizontal accountability

Answer 2

the role of public institutions in holding public officials accountable e.g. court systems which can overrule corrupt decisions

Question 3

Define Social accountability

Answer 3

communities and civic groups can act as a intermediary of voters and solve collective issues

Question 4

Explain the principle agent model of vertical accountability

Answer 4

A politician (agents) would like make credible promises to voters (principles) in exchange for votes but the problem is that it is not credible, as once voted for candidates don’t have to fulfil promises

Electoral “contracts” are not credible for two reasons
- Misaligned incentives – Politicians & voters have different preferences
- Incomplete Information – politicians performance was not fully known

Leads to outcomes which differs from the voters (agency slack) which results in a commitment problem
- This reverse equilibrium leads to voters now having no incentive to believe promises and politicians have no incentive to keep promises
* So voters never re-elect politicians and politicians steal as much as they can

Question 5

2 ways in which we can address agency shock

Answer 5

Selection process – finding politicians with aligned incentive

Sanctioning – voting for politicians that keep their promises

Question 6

What did Ferraz & Finan (2008, 2011) find out about the effectiveness of sanctioning measures in dealing with agency shift. READING

Answer 6

Main finding is that political institutions affect corruption. (BRAZIL)

Finds that when a political leader is aiming for re-election they will be less corrupt. Mayors who aren’t up for re-election are more likely to be corrupt but that also exists at every level but during their second term they don’t bother hiding it.

The rule of politics is political institutions which dedicates who can run and affects politicians accountability

2 types of institutions- formal and informal (not legally binding- social norms)

Question 7

Explain how Klasnja (2005) supports the idea of an incumbency disadvantage

Answer 7

• Mayors salary in Romania is dependent on the population of the towns
• So those who have a higher salary are less likely to commit corruption as they do not need to the extra money
• However there is a visible incumbent disadvantage for the mayors who don’t earn that much, as they are more likley to be corrupt in order to earn more but this would come at a cost of not being re-elected

Question 8

What explains strong and weak accountability mechanisms?

Answer 8

• Information Problems: when voters are poorly informed about politicians behaviour or qualification, sanctioning and selection mechanisms become weaker
• Open and competitive elections; when politicians can limit competition or voting, both sanctioning and selection are ineffective
• Demographic diversity; If there are strong ethnic and religious lines within voting with party and identity being closely aligned people find it difficult to vote
• Credibility; When politicians have a reputation for credible promises sanctioning measures are the most effective

Question 9

What did Ofosu (2019) find out about how a competitive election impacts politicians performance

Answer 9

• Found that 20% more of constituency development funds were used in high observation areas
• Strong evidence that competitive elections are better for policy

Question 10

What does Keefer & Khemai (2005) find about accountabilty
READING

Answer 10

Lack of information for voters- more challenging to place blame, hard to prove as a citizen, (e.g.who destroyed the NHS- what policy did it?)

Influence identity politics- will support a candidate whose similar to them regardless of their policies/actions (e.g. Trump- non-college graduates, white, but Trump’s policies undermine them economically)

Credibility- politicians can underperform as they won’t be caught, a consequence of lack of information