How would Bentham’s quantitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to eating animals?
Animals experience pleasure and pain, so this needs to be included in the calculation (as pain and pleasure are the only things with moral value). ‘The question is not can they reason, but can they suffer?’
How would Mill’s qualitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to eating animals?
Animals are not capable of higher pleasures - so the higher pleasures of humans should be given more weighting. However, it can be questioned that eating animals involves any higher pleasure as eating is a lower pleasure - therefore the pleasure and pain of animals should not be completely ignored.
How would preference utilitarianism respond to eating animals?
Animals have preferences. This means that they must be included in the calculation (as fulfilling preferences is the thing that has moral value) and if we didn’t include it then we would be being speciesist. However, animals have preferences that are more current and not based on future plans - so killing an animal that does not have future-based preferences is not so bad as killing a human who does.
How would act utilitarians and rule utilitarians respond to ethical problems such as lying and stealing?
In general, act utilitarians would judge each choice, of whether to eat meat for example, based on the individual context. Rule utilitarians would judge the utility-maximising effects of the general rule of ‘don’t eat meat’ to see if it should be established as a general moral rule.
In response to the issue of lying, some rule utilitarians might argue that there is obvious value to having the rule ‘do not lie’ because it means there can be trust between people - which results in happiness and much more utility than lies.
In response to the issue of stealing, rule utilitarians might argue that there is an obvious value to having property as it gives people security which is a requirement for our happiness.
What are the implications of breeding animals solely for the purpose of meat?
For:
- If animals are treated well, there is perhaps a net gain in utility from eating them - especially is they have no higher pleasures. Humans can make a living from agriculture. Furthermore, it results in the existence of pleasure-experiencing animals that wouldn’t have existed otherwise..
Against:
- Any distress caused to the animals alongside any stress caused to humans that disagree with this practice will count against eating meat. Furthermore, by killing an animal we are also losing the possible future pleasures that an animal with a full life could have had.
How would Kantian deontological ethics respond to eating animals?
Animals are not rational beings as they cannot pursue their own ends. So we do not have duties towards them and therefore eating animals is morally permissible.
In relation to the first and second formulations:
- ‘We should not act on a maxim which we would not at the same time will to be universal law’. This applies to humans universally but not animals. Maxims to eat animals can be universalised without contradiction in conception. So it is not morally wrong according to the first formulation.
- Humans are rational so Kant thinks we have absolute moral value. Because of this, Kant says humans should not be used merely as a means to an end but as an end in themselves. In contrast, animals are not rational beings. This means that they have no absolute moral value so it is morally permissible to use them merely as a means to an end (i.e eating them to satisfy our hunger). So it is not morally wrong according to the second formulation.
Kant believes that animal nature has similarities with human nature - so treating animals in a cruel way will make us more likely to treat humans badly. Even though it is morally permissible to eat animals according to Kant, he thinks we should not be cruel to animals in order to stop us from potentially treating humans badly. This is an ‘indirect’ duty.
How would Aristotelian ethicists respond to eating animals?
In short, there is no problem but they should be treated well.
Animals are not capable of reason so cannot make moral decisions and are not relevant in the conversation about Eudaemonia.
Aristotle believes that animals are created for the sake of humans (i.e to eat or provide clothes). However, as they do have characteristic functions such as to perceive and to reproduce, there is such a thing as a good life for an animal. Therefore while we can use them for food, it is important that we enable these functions during their life so that the animal can flourish as much as possible for them.
In relation to the doctrine of the mean, some virtue theorists say that treating animals badly means that we do not display the correct virtues (so we might display vices such as greed). However, some say that it depends on the context of the situation.
How would Bentham’s quantitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of simulated killing?
There is no distinction between the quality of pleasures; only the amount. Enjoying a violent computer game is just as morally valuable as any other action that results in the same amount of pleasure.
How would Mill’s qualitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of simulated killing?
Simulated killing is a lower pleasure. Therefore, it must be taken into account when deciding what to do that this kind of pleasure has less weight when calculating. In contrast, simulated killings within the context of some artistic demonstration such as a play could be considered a higher artistic pleasure
How would preference utilitarianism respond to simulated killing?
We would need to see which decision (engaging in simulated killings or not) satisfies the most preferences
How would utilitarians respond to the implications of simulated killing?
For:
Computer generated characters do not experience pleasure or have preferences so no harm can be done. Therefore the total utility caused would show that it is a morally good action.
Against:
There are many other things that people could be doing to make them just as happy that do not involve violence. If there is any link between simulated violence and real violence then it would result in less utility which would be a problem.
How would Kantian deontological ethics respond to simulated killing?
In short, there is no issue from the formulations but rather from how actions in simulations might impact how you treat humans.
Maxims to kill in simulations can be universalised without contradiction in conception or contradiction in will (as it does not conflict with anything that I would want as a rational being). So it is not morally wrong according to the first formulation.
Simulated humans are not rational beings so they cannot pursue their own ends and don’t have any absolute moral value. Therefore it is morally permissible to use them as a means to an end, for example killing them as a means to give us pleasure. So it is not morally wrong according to the second formulation.
However, some might argue that simulated killing makes us more likely to treat others badly. We have an imperfect duty to treat other humans well - so maybe we shouldn’t kill in simulations in order to help us fulfil our imperfect duty to treat real humans well.
How would Aristotelian virtue ethics respond to simulated killing?
In short, it depends on whether it is developing virtues or vices.
The cumulative effects of playing games which involve simulated killing may lead to the development of characteristics that are not virtuous. Simulated killing is wrong if it does prevent the development of a virtue and so of eudaimonia as character development is a lifelong activity.
Is it possible for playing games involving simulated killing to fit with the golden mean? Is there a right way or a right motive? It depends on the storyline or maybe the desire to win.
Aristotle also made the case that simulations can be cathartic. We are inevitably going to experience negative emotions in the real world - simulations allow us to engage these feelings in a fictional and non harmful context.
How would Bentham’s quantitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of telling lies?
It is a morally good action if the lie causes more pleasure than it does pain.
How would Mill’s qualitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of telling lies?
The pursuit of truth could be argued to be a higher pleasure as truth and knowledge is important for human beings. Therefore telling lies is more likely to be morally bad after calculating the utility.
How would preference utilitarianism respond to the issue of telling lies?
Whichever decision satisfies the most preferences is the morally good action.
How would a utilitarian respond to the implications of lying?
Some lies avoid seemingly unnecessary distress for people. This needs to be weighed up against the distress people would feel if they found out they were lied to.
How would Kantian deontological ethics respond to the issue of lying?
In short, lying to others fails to treat them as a rational being; it is our perfect duty to not do so.
Universalising the maxim of ‘do not lie’ results in a contradiction in conception because if everybody lied about everything then lies would have no value because everybody would know you were lying. Therefore it is our perfect duty to not lie.
Lying to someone is using them merely as a means to an end (i.e to get money). Therefore you are not respecting their absolute moral value as a being that can reason and is free to choose their own ends - as they cannot use reason sufficiently if they are misinformed. So we have a perfect duty to not lie.
However, there is a possible exception. If the action would treat someone as a means to an end and we can prevent this result by lying then it is morally acceptable.
How would Aristotelian ethics respond to the issue of lying?
Some suggest that lying is an act that is always morally wrong - just like murder - and so it does not sit on or between vices at all. While Aristotle does discuss truthfulness as a virtue, he is referencing being honest in the context of yourself. The vices would be false modesty and boastfulness. Furthermore, Aristotle saw lying as a result of a lack of control over your life, as people often lie in order to get something for themselves or to get out of trouble. A true virtuous person would ‘care more for truth than for people’s opinions’.
Others would argue that sometimes lies can be appropriate if they are done with the right motives - and that practical wisdom would enable us to work out when lying is justified.
How would Bentham’s quantitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of stealing?
The moral decision (to steal or to not steal) is the one that results in the most pleasure and least pain.
How would Mill’s qualitative (hedonistic) utilitarianism respond to the issue of stealing?
The idea of property could be seen as an expression of the higher faculties of human beings and so is a higher pleasure. Property brings security and structure to our lives and so leads to happiness.
How would preference utilitarianism respond to the issue of stealing?
The actions which results in the most preferences being satisfied is the right action
How would Kantian deontological ethics respond to the issue of stealing?
Universalising the maxim of ‘do not steal’ results in a contradiction in conception. This is because if everybody could steal then nothing would belong to anybody - therefore there would be nothing to steal. Therefore we have a perfect duty to not steal.
Furthermore, stealing from somebody is using them as a means to an end. You are not respecting them as a rational being who is free to choose their own ends because by stealing you are depriving them of the ability to choose what to do with their own property. Again, we have a perfect duty to not steal.
How would Aristotelian ethicists respond to the issue of stealing?
Some actions do not have a ‘golden mean’ way to act, but instead are just wrong. Stealing is one of these as it always results in injustice.
However, a modern virtue ethicist might say that there are times when people might steal without it resulting in injustice. Also, there could be situations where some other more important virtue might mean stealing is ok (i.e stealing to save someone’s life).
