Behaviourism (Mind)

Question 1

Physicalism def + aim

Answer 1

Everything is ultimately physical

Aims to show how consciousness and mental states can be explained in purely physical terms

Question 2

Philosophical behaviourism def

Answer 2

the mind can be analytically reduced to behaviour

• analytic reduction: occurs when it’s shown that the meaning of talk in one area (e.g. the mind) is equivalent in meaning to talk of another area (e.g. human behaviour)

Question 3

Anti-Dualist argument for behaviourism

Answer 3

Solves problem of interaction

By denying that the mind is a distinct substance from the physical body, the problem of how they interact dissolves

Question 4

Hard behaviourism

Answer 4

• Hempell felt for science of the mind to be respectable, it had to be measured using purely scientific (empirical) methods. Since behaviour is publicly available and introspection is not, psychology should be based on that alone.
• All talk about mental states can be translated into observational statements of people’s physical states and behaviour, therefore, mental states are reducible to physical behaviours
• “Paul is in pain” is the same as saying “Paul weeps and cries”

Question 5

Problem of Multiple Realisability

Answer 5

Particular mental states can be realised by different behaviours

e.g. if you are angry, you may start shouting, or cry, or go quiet, or start punching people

• There’s no knowing how many ways a certain mental state could manifest itself into behaviours.
• This is a problem as a complete analysis of behaviour would have to include all possible ways mental states might be manifested into behaviour
• This would take indefinitely long and could not be completed

Question 6

Soft behaviourism

Answer 6

Says mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions, not actual behaviours.

Because as previously seen, a mental state (for example being thirsty) may not manifest into a behaviour (getting a drink) for whatever reason (there may not be a drink available etc).

These dispositions can be expressed as hypothetical propositions in the form of “If…then…so”.

So, “You are thirsty” translates to “If you were in the right circumstances, you would have a drink”

In this way, mental states can be rendered in terms of actual behaviour and potential behaviour. (what the person would do as well as what they are doing)

Question 7

Problem of perfect actors + Ryle’s response

Answer 7

Perfect actor: Someone who can show the behaviours of a mental states but not actually have it (e.g act like they’re in pain when they’re not)

Problem: Suggests we cannot capture someone’s mental state just by observing their behaviour.
Therefore observation of behaviour is not sufficient for explaining mental states.

Ryle’s response: Mental states are “dispositions” to act in a certain way, rather than simply acting in that way.

However, still issue of that we don’t think of pain as a “disposition to wince and cry etc”, but there is an important part of the qualia of pain (What it is like) which behaviourism doesn’t account for

Question 8

Problem of Super Spartans

Answer 8

Super spartan: One who can feel a mental state and not show it (e.g. pain)

Problem: Metaphysical possibility of a SS shows it’s possible to conceive of there being mental states with not pain behaviour or dispositions. Therefore, pain can’t be purely understood in terms of behaviour.

Question 9

Problem of Asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of the mental states of others

Answer 9

To know others mental states: Observation of behaviour

To know own mental states: No need for behavioural observation

Behaviourism doesn’t account for this Asymmetry and says i should discover my own mental states in the same way i discover others; through behavioural observation.

Since i don’t have to do this, behaviourism is galse

Question 10

Qualia Objection (Chalmer’s Philosophical Zombies argument)

Answer 10

1. Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical.
2. Therefore, if there was an identical world it must also contain consciousness.
3. However, a zombie world (physically the same but without consciousness) is metaphysically possible as it makes logical sense.
4. What’s conceivable is metaphysically possible.
5. Therefore a zombie world is metaphorically possible, meaning physicalism is false

Physicalism is shown to be false here as a world ,that is completely physically identical, is able to exist without consciousness while physicalism says consciousness is 100% physical.