Martin v. Evans (Pa. 1998) PI suit (Evan's Tractor-Trailer backed into Anthony Martin (appellee)
- Just because an Accident happens, doesn’t establish Negligence.
- Plaintiff’s Burden = Establish by POE that the D engaged in conduct below the standard of care (absence of ordinary care)
- Jury concluded Evan’s = Not Negligent. (BREACH = FACT FINDER’S DUTY TO DETERMINE)
JONES v. PORT AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY (PA. Comm. 1990)
- Common Carrier = Highest Duty of Care.
- Plaintiff was awarded a new Trial b/c TC did not sufficiently explain the heightened SOC.
Adams V. Bullock (NY 1919)
Injury: Boy swinging a wire crosses the bridge and gets shocked.
SOC: duty to adopt all reasonable precautions to minimize danger.
Cardozo: finds that trolly company acted reasonably.
Analysis 1:
“Defendant in using an overhead trolling was in the lawful exercise of its franchise. Negligence therefore cannot be imputed to it because it used this system and not another.”
Analysis 2:
There was, of course, a duty to adopt all reasonable precautions to minimize the resulting perils. We think there was no extraordinary casualty, not fairly within the area of ordinary prevision, could make it a thing of danger.
Analysis 3:
Injury was not foreseeable.
Analysis 4:
Economic Tort Law - not economical to create a system that would be safer…a entirely new system would be needed. (Not economical)
Vaughn V. Menlove (132 Eng. Rep. 490 (CP 1837)
Haystack that spontaneously combusts
- helps to define “Ordinary Person”
Reasonable care vs. Acted with Best of His own Judgment - Best of Own Judgment = subjective, and extremely variable.
- Final Judgment REJECTS SUBJECTIVE STANDARD.
- SOC = Care which a prudent man would take.
TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE
Under 7 Years Old: Incapable of Negligence.
Between 7-14 YO:
- presumed incapable of negligence, but the presumption is rebuttable and weakens as the child approaches 14
Over 14: Presumptively capable of Negligence; BOP on minor to prove incapacity.
Modern Restatement Approach (Children / Negligence)
Standard of Care For Children of All Ages
- the level of care that a Reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience would exercise under similar circumstances.
- Adult Activities = Adult standard of reasonable care. e.g. shooting a gun, driving a car – then child will be held to an Adult Standard.
Section 283A Restatement (Second) Torts
children’s standard of care
- Similar to the Massachusetts rule = “any child can be found capable of negligence if Fact finder determines the child failed to use a reasonable degree of care that is reasonable for similar children.”
- Age cannot be fixed in all cases.
The TJ Hooper (US 1932)
Judge Learned Hand:
- Custom NOT Reasonable Care.
- Courts must decide the Standard of Care (industry cannot set its own standard)
o Tugs were unseaworthy because there were no radio sets.
o Barges also unseaworthy.
Therefore:
• Tugs and Barges jointly liable for loss of cargo.
• Tugs are liable for half cost of Barges.
Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Associates (GA. 2002)
(Anti- TJ Hooper Rule)
Custom in Professional Liability DOES = Standard of Care.
- The standard of care the degree of care ordinarily employed by the medical profession generally under similar conditions and like circumstances.
- Professional Negligence cases: If D acted consistently with ways in which other qualified members of her profession act, then no breach of duty.
Condra v. Atlanta Orthapedic Group (GA 2009)
Expert’s Personal Practices
“evidence regarding an expert witnesses’ personal practices is admissible both as substantive evidence and to impeach another expert’s opinion of the applicable standard of Care.”
Prudent Patient Rule or “materiality of risk standard”:
Largey v. Rothman (N.J. 1988)
(Overrules Kaplan: Professional SOC for Disclosure)
The Doctor must disclose all material risks associated with a medical procedure.
- A “material” risk is a risk that a reasonable patient would be likely to consider important to a decision of whether to go through with a treatment.
UNITED STATES V. CARROLL TOWING CO. (2ND CIR. 1947)
NO GENERAL RULE – from precedent.
Owner’s Duty to Prevent Injuries (3 Variables)
1) Probability that a vessel will break away
2) Gravity of resulting injury
3) Burden of adequate precautions.
P – Probability of Injury / Harm (0-1.0) L = Gravity of Injury ($) B = Burden of precaution (#of$) B < PL = Liability (Cost is/is not less than Potential Harm)
B > PL
proper care does not require taking precaution
Grimshaw Et All v. Ford Motor Company
Ford Motor Company
• Knew that the fuel system could be made safe, but instead decided to delay correcting the problem to save money and enhance profits.
• Grush-Saunby Study safety benefits were not cost effective.
Res Ipsa Loquitur:
Res Ipsa Loquitur: “the thing speaks for itself”
- doctrine providing that, in some circumstances, that the fact that an accident occurred is enough to infer negligence that establishes a Prima Facie Case.
RES IPSA 3 Conditions :
1) Event does not ordinarily occur without someone’s Negligence.
2) The event was within the exclusive control of the defendant.
3) Plaintiff did not contribute.
- Jury to presume Carelessness (presumption is rebuttable – Byrne)
- Still must prove Causation and Damages.
Byrne v. Boadle 159 Eng. Rep 299 (Exch. 1863)
Injury Stands in Place of the “BREACH”
Kambat V. St. Francis Hosp. 678 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1997)
Medical malpractice
• Not necessary to conclusively eliminate any other possibility of the cause of injury
o Evidence supporting Three Conditions shows “more likely than not” that injury was caused by plaintiff
Event ordinarily does not occur without negligence
Caused by agency / instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.
Injury not do to any voluntary or contributory action on part of plaintiff
• Factually simple medical malpractice cases require no Expert witnesses for a jury to conclude an accident would not happen without negligence.
