Define categories, concepts and categorisation.
Category: Sets of things in the world that we represent as alike in some way, or treat as equivalent for some purpose
e.g. birds, plants, odd numbers, victims
Concept: Mental representation of a category/Mental category.
- Not interchangeable
Categorisation: Act of recognising commonalities amongst these sets of things, or that the commonality applies to a new thing, and builds/adds to the concept
What does categorisation of objects or forming concept change our experience? (5)
FEATURE-BASED
What assumption underlies feature-based approaches of category representation?
Categories are represented by unstructured collections of features, describing the properties of individual objects
(e. g. Dog: four legged, furry, mammal, barks, friendly)
- similar to assumptions of Tversky (1997)’s Feature model of similarity
Feature-based approaches: Classical rule-based view
Rosch: Prototypes are the collection of the average features across examples
How do the two experiments conducted by Rosch and Mervis (1975) on natural and artificial categories support the Prototype theory of category representation?
Experiment 1: Natural categories
Participants either
- Rated typicality of given examples of categories “How typical is X and Y to categories A?”
- List properties of exemplars of categories and contrast between two categories
FOUND: Higher typicality ratings when exemplars had a) many features in common with other category exemplars, and b) fewer features common with contrast categories
Typicality as function of overall “cue validity”
Experiment 2: Artificial categories
Participants learnt to classify 6-letter strings as members of two categories
- Category exemplars had different letters in common with its own kind and with the other category
High cue validity –> better learning and accuracy
Not all/nothing - no singular defining features of categories. Therefore supports prototype theory.
How does Ponser and Keele’s (1968) experiment support the prototype theory for category representation?
Participants told to categorise dot patterns distorted from prototype. However, during learning, participants never saw the prototype
FOUND: After learning, participants were just as fast and accurate (if not more so) at classifying prototype than the other exemplars.
–> discovered prototype from learning?
- Were able to deduce the rules for the category without seeing the prototype
Supports more graded categorisation?
Feature-based approach of representation: How does Exemplar theory respond to Prototype theory?
Agrees with prototype theory - graded membership, classification based on similarities and not rules
Doesn’t agree with abstraction: Categories are represented as the collections of encoded exemplars
Posner and Keele’s (1968) unseen-prototype adv can be explained as the generalised collective similarity across all exemplars
People generalise to things that are superficially quite similar to past experiences - which often includes irrelevant info.
E.g. Doctors’ generalisation of diagnoses are aided by past cases, even when similarity is based on attributes irrelevant for the diagnosis
Novel atypical stimuli - classified as members if similar to even a single encoded exemplar (e.g. Ostrich = weird bird –> helps classifying Emu)
“Why would a system be designed like this? Why not just store what is useful?”
But not sure what will be useful later - Storing lots of info may allow for greater variety of info to be used if it becomes important (no storage costs, because LTM)
We make abstractions AND store exemplars.
As exemplars are encoded, system predicts their category membership
This forms prototype-esque summary representations of highly similar exemplars that all lead to the same accurate classification
If a new exemplar is dissimilar enough from summary of previous exemplars (but is part of same category) system is surprised –> forms new cluster
Then if more exemplars are like the odd one in the new cluster, it becomes its own local summary representation. If not, exemplar remains an exemplar.
Focuses more on importance of borders between categories
- Less focused on summary representation from the middle of the category
Many categories are represented in opposition to each other - easy to highlight border (e.g. conservative/liberal, fruit/veg)
“Caricatures” are important - exaggerates features away from the category boundary
- predicted by error-based mech
Same error-based learning can lead to new cluster recruitment
What did Daris and Love’s (2010) experiment reveal about feature-based categorisation?
Category learning distorts our understanding/memory
Summary of Feature-based models (If you’re not super lost by this stage)
STRUCTURED KNOWLEDGE APPROACHES: RELATIONAL
What do the Structured knowledge approaches posit about the way concepts are mentally organised?
We represent knowledge as relational structures - knowledge elements are bound by how we relate
Concepts not isolated from each other, but are parts of large knowledge structures that make them coherent and systematic.
e.g. Bachelor: not just “unmarried man” but is a particular phase within a male hetero-normative life trajectory
- Pope doesn’t violate the definition, he is just not on the same trajectory
What does the Theory theory posit about how categorisation works?
Categories are represented as theories = structured causal relations defining category membership
Similarity in features not sole basis for categorisation, and is not what often drives sense of coherence - Similarity is derived to the object’s relation to past objects
- Prior knowledge can make categories coherent, and easier to learn
Individual categories are coherent, but theories also help to organise domains of knowledge
Feature-based accounts focus on hierarchical taxonomies defined by increasing generality, and feature-inheritance (e.g. dog more specific than mammal, and mammal animal, etc.)
Theories go further by prescribing causal connections within domains
What are some arguments that support the Theory theory?
Conceptual knowledge is theoretical from early on
E.g. Categorisation of living things - Life as a higher-order concept, not merely featural
Children restructure their overarching theories of what life is to learn true biology
- See causal similarities between plants and animals (energy, expelling waste, offspring etc)
Johnson and Carey (1998): William Syndrome adults knew many biological facts, but had child-like concept of life/nature
- Lack of understanding that lungs breathe, but don’t understand its role in supporting life
Accruing new facts is easy. Conceptual change/theory change is harder
How does the Theory theory relate to featural categorisation?
Theory theory: theoretical knowledge in categories = causal reasoning among features
E.g. Guitar: has hollow body and strings to make music, or other way around?
Causal theories vs unstructured features:
What is the Causal status effect, and what did Keil (1992) and Ahn et al. (2000)’s experiments
Causal status effect: