R v Jordan [1956] (English CCA)
Hallett J:
- General principle with normal medical treatment
- Stab wounded mainly healed at TOD
- Two errors = Distinctive feature
R v Smith [1959] (Courts-Martial Appeals Court)
Lord Parker CJ:
- Operating cause and substantial cause
- Distinguished R v Jordan
R v Cheshire [1991] (English CCA)
DPP v Davis [2000] (CCA)
Hardiman J:
- Causation test = More than minimal contribution to the death test
- Present case = Heart failure COD secondary to the severe shock caused by the injuries and the severe pain associated with them
DPP v Dunne [2013] (CCA)
O’Donnell J:
- Had died at scene of shooting - Appellant would have been guilty of murder
- Davis - “More than a minimal contribution” test; Applies whenever it is alleged that a victim’s injuries or death were not caused by the wrongful acts of the accused; the test for causation in this jurisdiction is whether the injuries caused by an accused related to the death in more than a minimal way.” ; Decisions lawful and proper so chain not broken
Dunne v DPP [2016] (SC)
O’Malley J:
- Causation Test - Charleton et Al, Wong Tat Chuen, Smithers, Endorses Davis test
- Novus Actus Interveniens Principles:
i) Jordan, Smith, Blaue
ii) LS withdrawal where brain death - Still original injury where operational COD (R v Malcherek and R v Steel)
iii) CR Life with withdrawal of invasive medical treatment (Re a Ward of Court), Let nature take its course/non-curative effect - Still OI unless true NAI
iv) Something that is so independent of the act of the accused that it should be regarded in law as the cause of death. Immediate COD is a reasonable and lawful act of a third party not NAI (R v Pagett)
R v Blaue [1975] (English CCA)
Lawton LJ:
- Reasonable by whose standards including jury?
- Take your victim “the whole man” as you find them
- Stab wound = COD
- Chain not broken even where the victim choose to not stop this end coming about
R v Roberts [1971] (English CCA)
Stephenson LJ:
- Lewis – Jumping from window
- Beech – Act of jumping natural consequence of conduct (Darling J)
- Test – Natural result of assailant’s actions and RF and daft qualification
R v Williams & Davis [1991] (English CCA)
Stuart-Smith LJ:
- Evans – Wife jumped from window to avoid further violence by husband believing endanger her life, husband answerable to consequences of fall
- Roberts – Stephenson LJ’s test – Victim response RF or daft?
- Mackie – Stephenson LJ – Not fatal cases = Escape must be a natural consequence of the assault charged, reasonable action; Fatal cases – Escape as natural consequence of unlawful act 2. Reasonable person would think that the act subjects the individual to risk of consequential harm, albeit not serious harm
- Fatal case – Two requirements – 1. Reasonable and foreseeable act 2. Physical harm reasonably recognizable e.g. Dawson
- Conduct proportionate to threat but victim may do the wrong thing in the moment
- Current case – Violence may not occur in robbery if item handed over and judge’s direction on causation
R v Harvey [2010] (English CCA)
DPP v O’Loughlin [2021] (CoA)
Isobel Kennedy J:
- Ingredients of murder a) a killing b) killing = unlawful; c) accused person caused killing d) accused intended to kill or seriously injury someone
- Manslaughter ingredients = a, b, c
- Causation = Objective assessment, finding of fact for a jury
- Davis test, Joel test for manslaughter, Dunne cases – Davis test applies
- O’Malley J “emphasises the natural consequences approach to causation and does not consider foreseeability as a relevant test”
- Charleton and McDermott’s Criminal Law and Evidence – But for idea, accused’s actions must be substantial/not minimal and operating cause; even if bad choices, if not substantial cause, then not liable
- Same authors – Chain of causation not broken if natural consequence; break if “a supervening and unconnected event”
- Questionable statement – “however, an intervening act is an act which occurs after the actions of the accused person. In the present case, no act on the part of any third party intervened so as to operate as a novus actus interveniens, thus relieving the appellant of criminal responsibility