In a sale of goods contract, what is the ‘title’ term and why does it matter?
The law implies a term that the seller has the right to sell the goods (good title). If the seller does not have title, this is a serious breach: the buyer can reject and claim damages. This protects buyers from buying stolen or encumbered goods.
What does the implied term ‘goods must match description’ mean in practice?
If goods are sold by description, they must correspond with that description. It protects buyers who rely on what they are told they are buying. Even if the goods are usable, a mismatch with description is a breach and may allow rejection (especially in consumer contexts).
What is ‘satisfactory quality’ for goods (consumer/sale context)?
Goods must meet the standard a reasonable person would consider satisfactory, taking account of description, price, and other circumstances. This includes appearance, finish, freedom from minor defects, safety, and durability. It is not perfection, but it is a baseline standard.
What does ‘fit for purpose’ mean and when does it apply?
If the buyer makes known a particular purpose (expressly or by implication) and relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, the goods must be reasonably fit for that purpose. It prevents sellers from supplying goods that cannot do the job the buyer reasonably made clear.
How do statutory terms differ between consumers and businesses?
Statutory terms exist in both, but consumers get stronger protection: key rights cannot be excluded and remedies are structured (repair/replace, price reduction, final right to reject). In business-to-business deals, exclusion may be possible but is often controlled by UCTA reasonableness.
What is the basic consumer remedy structure for faulty goods under the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015?
If goods are faulty, the consumer typically has: (1) a short-term right to reject within a limited period; (2) the right to repair or replacement; and if that fails, (3) a price reduction or final right to reject. The CRA sets a clear ladder of remedies.
What is the statutory standard for services under CRA 2015 / SGSA 1982?
Services must be performed with reasonable care and skill (the classic professional/service standard). This is a care-based obligation: if breached, damages may be available and contributory negligence can sometimes reduce damages if the customer also acted carelessly.
Can a business exclude statutory consumer rights for quality or reasonable care?
Generally no. Consumer core rights under the CRA cannot be excluded or reduced by contract terms. Any term trying to remove those rights is not binding on the consumer.
What is a term implied in fact, in the ‘business efficacy’ sense?
A term implied in fact is inserted into this specific contract because, without it, the deal would not work in a practical or commercial sense. The court implies it to make the contract workable, not to make it fair or improve the bargain.
Example: When might a ‘business efficacy’ implied term be necessary?
Example: A ship is hired to unload at a jetty, but the contract is silent on whether the berth must be safe. If the jetty is unusable without a safe berth, the court may imply a term that the berth will be reasonably safe, because otherwise the contract cannot sensibly operate.
What is the ‘officious bystander’ idea for implied terms in fact?
If an imagined bystander asked the parties at the time of contracting: ‘Of course this term is part of your deal, right?’, and both would respond ‘obviously’, the court may imply it. This captures terms that are necessary and so obvious they go without saying.
What is a term implied in law, and how is it different from implied in fact?
Implied in law terms are imposed across a category of contracts as a matter of policy (e.g., landlord–tenant, employment), even if not obvious to these parties. Implied in fact terms are inserted only for this contract and require necessity and obviousness.
In landlord–tenant type relationships, why might courts imply obligations even without express wording?
Because some relationships cannot function without basic mutual obligations (e.g., maintaining common parts). Courts imply these terms in law to make the relationship workable and to reflect minimum standards expected in that contract type.
What did the modern Supreme Court emphasise about implying terms (the ‘not just reasonable’ point)?
That implication is a strict test. A term is not implied simply because it would be reasonable or fair. It must be necessary for the contract to work and must fit the contract as a whole. Courts resist using implication to rewrite bargains.
How should you treat the idea that ‘interpretation and implication are the same thing’?
Treat it cautiously. While both involve understanding the contract, implying a term is an extra step with its own strict limits. You first interpret what is already there; only if a true gap remains and necessity is shown will a term be implied.
When will courts imply a term to fix an incomplete price/remuneration term?
If it is clear the parties intended to contract and it is necessary to make the agreement workable, courts may imply a reasonable price or reasonable remuneration. This is more likely where work was actually done and both sides behaved as if there was a deal.
What is the risk-allocation point in implied terms (why courts are strict)?
Implying terms shifts risk. If courts implied ‘fair’ terms too easily, contracts would become uncertain and parties could escape bargains. So courts imply only what is necessary, not what a judge thinks is preferable.
How can an implied term interact with an express term (e.g., leases and consent clauses)?
An implied term cannot contradict an express term. But it may control how express powers are exercised (e.g., requiring cooperation or preventing one party from undermining the contract’s scheme). The key is consistency with the contract’s structure.
What is ‘intention to create legal relations’ and why does it matter?
It is the requirement that the parties intended their agreement to have legal consequences. It stops courts from treating every social promise as a contract. In commercial contexts intention is presumed; in domestic/social contexts it is usually not.
How do courts decide intention in commercial arrangements that are informal or ‘subject to contract’?
Courts look at objective conduct and context. ‘Subject to contract’ suggests no legal commitment yet, but if the parties act as though they have a deal (performance, payments, reliance), a court may find intention and a binding contract despite informality.
What is the main exam trap with intention to create legal relations?
Assuming that because something is ‘not written’ or ‘friendly’, it is not legally binding. In business contexts, intention is strongly presumed and informal deals can still be contracts if the objective evidence shows commitment.
How are domestic agreements treated differently?
Domestic/social agreements are presumed not intended to be legally binding unless there is clear evidence of seriousness (e.g., written terms, money at stake, clear reliance, separation arrangements). The idea is to keep courts out of everyday family life unless needed.
What is ‘usual’ or ‘customary’ authority in agency (in plain English)?
It is the idea that someone appointed to a recognised position (like a manager) may have authority to do the kinds of things people in that position usually do, even if the principal privately restricted them. It is about protecting third parties who deal normally with that role.
How is ‘usual/customary authority’ different from apparent authority?
Apparent authority depends on a representation by the principal that the agent has authority and the third party relying on it. Usual/customary authority focuses more on the agent’s position itself and the ordinary authority attached to it, sometimes even without a clear representation.