cornell realism essay prep

Question 1

defence of CR in the face of Putnam’s twin earth / timmons MTE

Answer 1

1. Disagreement does not discount moral truth – it just means we do not have epistemic access to it – in this way, moral language is very much like natural kind terms
2. Personal bias and education level may affect our ability to understand moral truth – again like with the scientific discoveries
3. It may not be as simple as one singular property being tracked, which may disguise it better, but it may instead be a homeostatic cluster property –

Question 2

critique of CR through MTE and TEE

Answer 2

1. Different societies reach different conclusions on moral discussions based on their context and circumstance – this is very similar to how a knife’s function varies by the circumstance.
2. I believe moral terms function to co-ordinate societal approval or disapproval rather than track specific “moral facts” – real-world examples
3. We do not need to be discovering moral facts to understand other frameworks of societal function – we can understand why muslims under shariah law would react differently to abortion than liberal activists.
4. If moral facts are being tracked, how is it that there is still moral disagreement centuries on?

Question 3

which side is more convincing - CR or rejecting moral realism?

Answer 3

Overall, although the moral twin earth initially poses a convincing critique, it does not eliminate the possibility of moral truth,
- intuition is not the most reliable thing to base this discussion off, given the complexity of the discourse
- the nature of disagreement does not invalidate the existence of moral truth, it just highlights an epistemic lack

Question 4

“How does the Twin Earth thought experiment’s emphasis on natural kind terms inform the debate about the referential basis of moral terms in Cornell realism?”

structure

Answer 4

asking whether moral terms have specific referents like natural terms do - no its more functional basis
- p1 - the variability of morality better reflects the functional language like knife - it explains the functional role moral terms play in societal co-ordination and may explain the context-dependency better - explains why there is no stable referent
- cp1 - the complexity of moral language might be better understood by homeostatic cluster properties - similar to natural kind terms

• p2 - moral disagreement suggests moral terms dont have stable referents
• cp 2 - might not mean we dont have stable referents, might just mean we are epistemically lacking due to personal bias, culture or educational differences

it informs us that there might not be a reference for moral terms as clearly as there is one for natural terms - more like functional terms

point for no stable, against, point for no stable, against