“Différance”
- Instead of the metaphysics of presence. The present moment is not a “pure and autonomous given”. Because “if motion is to be present, presence must already be marked by DIFFERENCE AND DEFERRAL. We must, Derrida says, “penser le présent a partir du temps comme différance” [think THE PRESENT starting from/in relation to time as DIFFERENCE, DIFFERING AND DIFERRAL].” (Culler, 95)
Culler writes with relation to Zeno's arrow that is meant to demonstrate the impossibility of motion, but works to show the difficulties of a system based on presence.
- “The term différance alludes to this UNDECIDABLE, NONSYNTHETIC ALTERNATION between the perspectives of structure [la langue] and event [parole].”
- “the verb différer means to differ and to defer. DifférAnce sounds exactly the same as différence, but the ending ‘-ance’, which is used to produce verbal nouns, makes it a new form meaning “DIFFERENCE-DIFFERING-DEFERRING.” Différance thus designates both a ‘passive’ difference already in place as the condition for signification [because meaning is found in a system of differences] and an ACT of differing which produces differences.”
- an analogous english term is ‘spacing’, which designates both an arrangement and an act of distribution or arranging. Derrida occasionally uses the corresponding French term espacement.
- It captures – inaudibly – both of the meanings of the French word différer, which in turn comprises the English meanings of “to differ” (to be different, but spatially synchronic) and “to defer” (being delayed, but identical). (Culler, 97)
- “In the one case, ‘to differ’ signifies non-identity; in the other case, it signifies the order of the same…. We provisionally give the name différance to this sameness which is not identical: by the silent writing of it’s ‘a’, it has the desired advantage of referring to differing, both as spacing/temporalizing and as the movement that structures every dissociation…. With it’s ‘a’, différance more properly refers to what in classical language would be called the origin or production of differences and the differences between differences, the play [jeu] of differences [undecidability]. Its locus and operation will therefore be seen whenever speech appeals to difference” (279).
- Différance thus enables differences to occur; it is the non-original (since differential itself) “origin” of differences.
- Saussure had written: “a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language, there are only differences without positive terms.”
- The differences we are asked to think are then differences that exist without two positive terms being present. Their very presence is undermined by the spatio-temporal chain of supplementation that makes presence impossible. These differences are, in turn, the “effect” or the “trace” of différance which, consequentially, cannot ever be present, either.
Austin on Saussure
Austin’s deconstruction of Saussure.
- Saussure posits that the meaning of a sentence is not determined by the speaker’s intentions but by the rules of the linguistic system [la langue].
- But Austin works with the system of speech acts. He argues that the meaning of utterances is not determined by the rules of the linguistic system, but rather by the rules of the system of speech acts.
- Austin decides to shift the analysis of meaning/ the source of meaning onto another system, the system of ‘speech acts’, which allows the speech acts to take on meaning within a PARTICULAR CONTEXT.
- Austin moved away from Saussure’s linguistic system because he wanted to move away from the intentionality of the speaker at the moment of an utterance (which becomes the meaning).
- Austin believed that Saussure still incorporates consciousness/metaphysics/intentionality in his theory. Because he believes that the speaker INTENDS a specific meaning by stating an utterance.
- Austin shows that Saussure’s understanding of language still allows a role for the subjects consciousness:
- because when the speaker speaks they intend for a specific meaning to be realised, and because Saussure treats the SIGNIFIED CONTENT OF A SIGN AS PRESENT IN THE MIND OF THE SPEAKER.
- Although Saussure’s aim was to rid language of consciousness, by insisting on the psychological unity between the signifier and the signified, we see that he reintroduces consciousness. Since for Saussure, the signifier must be present.
- So Austin shifts the focus to the system of speech acts, which exists only in context (and not in the mind).
- Austin then posits that CONTEXT BECOMES THE SOURCE OF MEANING.
(Derrida believes that Austin misunderstands context and then also reintroduces a role for the subject’s consciousness)
Austin deconstructs hierarchy between constative (describes a state of affairs or a state of facts, can be true/false) & performative language (performative utterances perform the actions they refer to, for example a promise; these utterances can be successful or unsuccessful) by making use of supplementation.
- Constative/ descriptive utterances are seen as the central form and performative utterances as the marginal form.
- A shows that constative utterances can be performative.
because these statements are enacting declarations/ statements/ or are naming. Saying “the sun is shining” is the same as saying “I declare that the sun is shining” but the performative word has been dropped.
- So the performative is not a flawed or marginal aspect of the supposed ‘perfect’ central form of the constative, rather the constative is a special case of the performative.
- We shift from the intention of the speaker (locutionary force of which I utter certain statements) to the language conventions within a specific, contingent context (illocutionary force).
Derrida deconstructs Austin & introduces notion of Iterability
Derrida questions whether A really evades the idea of meaning as intention present to the speaker.
- Austin claims that performative speech acts are evaluated in terms of whether or not they failed or were successful; i.e., whether the performance came about.
- Thus, the possibility of failure is integral to the logic of the system of speech acts.
When A shifted the focus of meaning from constative locutionary speech acts to performative illocutionary speech acts, the criterion for the success of speech acts shifted from truth/falsity to whether the performative acts succeeded or failed.
- Austin denounces language acts that are not ‘seriously’ intended as parasitic.
- This suggests that we again have a relationship of supplementarity between serious (central) and non serious (marginal/supplement) speech acts.
- Austin wants to guard against these parasitical performatives that lead to failure, so he sets out certain conditions that must be met for a performance to be successful:
1) A conventional procedure with conventional affects must exist.
2) The particular person and circumstance must be appropriate for a particular procedure to be invoked.
3) The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly and completely.
