Director X owns a parcel of land. Director X is a member of the board of directors of Corporation C. Director X sells his land to Corporation C. That sale is:
Delaware General Corporations Law Section 144 (Interested Directors; Quorum) creates a safe harbor for interested transactions if:
Under Subchapter F of the MBCA, a qualified director may be:
A director who personally receives a benefit from the challenged transaction, a benefit that is important to him, and not generally shared with all shareholders of the corporation, is ________________; a director who is beholden to, and dominated by, another director is ________________.
Under Subchapter F of the MBCA, a director conflicting interest transaction is immune from attack if it is authorized by:
Subchapter F of the MBCA clarifies when self-dealing transactions are appropriate, in part by defining director conflicting interest transactions as transactions by the corporation in which the director
A transaction in which a director has a conflict of interest implicates the director’s duty of:
loyalty
Peter is both a director and an officer of SmallCo, Inc. SmallCo, Inc., is to be merged into BigCo, Inc. One of the terms of the merger agreement is that Peter will be an officer in BigCo. However, Peter is independently wealthy and a world famous mathematician and does not need or even really want the officer job in BigCo. Peter votes to recommend shareholder approval of the merger. Peter’s vote is challenged by a shareholder. Will the shareholder’s challenge likely to be successful?
The corporate opportunity doctrine:
forbids a director, officer or managerial employee from diverting to himself any business opportunity that belongs to the corporation
Assume A, B, C, D, E, F and G are all of the directors of Small Corp., a Delaware corporation. When Small Corp. is looking to open a new factory in Kansas, C suggests that Small Corp. purchase a large piece of property in Topeka. A, B, C, D, E, F and G together own the piece of property in question. The Small Corp. Board votes unanimously to approve the sale, and A, B, C, D, E, F and G share the $1 million profit on the sale of the Topeka property. The shareholders do not vote on the transaction. If this transaction is challenged, then…