1
Q
Why might it be important to distinguish between rhetoric and actual policy when considering changes in education policy over time
A
Chitty (2014)
Although New Labour framed policies in new language of ‘social inclusion/cohesion’, actual policies revealed lack of substantive change
2
Q
Key reforms of 1988 Education Act
A
- Quasi-market system (more parental choice + school funding based on pupil numbers)
- School league tables
- National curriculum
- National testing
- Devolved school powers
3
Q
Different goals of education
A
- Economic (innovation, national competitiveness)
- Political (citizenship, social and cultural integration)
- Equity (social mobility, social inclusion)
4
Q
Definition of high-stakes testing
A
Testing w/direct consequences for pupils and/or schools based on results (incl. streaming of pupils, or certificates at end of compulsory education)
5
Q
Arguments FOR high-stakes testing
A
- Measure effectiveness of educational system and individual schools
- Identify learning needs and assess individual progress
- Inform policy reforms
6
Q
Arguments AGAINST high-stakes testing
A
- Narrow curriculum
- Cream-skimming
- Focus on pupils at margins of success
- Devalue professional ethos
7
Q
Centralising changes to education system
A
- National curriculum and assessment
- Increased powers for Secretary of State and decreased powers for local authorities (via expansion of academies)
- Publication of school league tables
- Public Ofsted reports
- Funds increasingly tied to central government initiatives
8
Q
Decentralising changes to education system
A
- Devolved school budgets
- Schools able to ‘opt out’ of LEA control and become directly funded by central government
- Parental choice (in principle) over which schools children go to, w/right of appeal against decision (strictly a ‘right to express a preference’)
- Greater diversity of schools
9
Q
When was Ofsted introduced?
A
1992
10
Q
When were academy schools introduced?
A
2000
11
Q
Education policy - extent of consensus in choice and quasi-markets?
A
- Consensus:
(i) Blair kept 1988 reforms and extended parental choice
(ii) 2005 White Paper aimed to establish what “would in one sense be a market” in education
Conflict:
(i) Some minor policy reversals by New Labour (e.g. abolished nursery school vouchers, ended assisted places scheme)
12
Q
Examples of minor policy reversal by New Labour in choice/quasi-markets (education policy)?
A
New Labour:
- Abolished nursery school vouchers
- Ended assisted places scheme
13
Q
What did 2005 education White Paper aim to establish?
A
What “would in one sense be a market” in education
14
Q
What are academy schools able to do?
A
Opt out of LEA control and get central government funding
15
Q
Education policy - extent of consensus in school diversity?
A
- Broad consensus on academy schools
- Though Labour focused academies on failing schools in deprived neighbourhoods, whereas now expanded massively
- Rapid acceleration of academy programme and introduction of free schools represented “step change” in school diversity (Furlong and Lunt 2014)
16
Q
Furlong and Lunt (2014)
A
Rapid acceleration of academy programme and introduction of free schools under Coalition represented “step change” in school diversity
17
Q
Rapid acceleration of academy programme and introduction of free schools under Coalition represented “step change” in school diversity
A
Furlong and Lunt (2014)
18
Q
Evidence on expansion of academy programme under Coalition?
A
By 2012, > ½ secondary schools had/were about to become academies
19
Q
What are free schools?
A
Schools created by voluntary groups/non-profit organisations, with government funding
20
Q
How do academies and free schools have increased freedom? Constraints?
A
Freedoms:
- Don’t have to follow national curriculum
- Can vary teacher pay
Constraints:
- Subject to Ofsted inspections
- Curriculum followed must be “broad and balanced”
- Generally take same exams (GCSEs and A-Levels)
21
Q
Education policy - extent of consensus in school spending?
A
Thatcher - significantly tightened public education spending
New Labour - rapidly increased education spending by 1% of GDP from 1999 to 2008 (doubling school budget)
Coalition - education budget protected, though planned school refurbishments cancelled and less investment vs New Labour
22
Q
What was one of the only areas of real departure of Coalition education policy from New Labour, according to Chitty (2014)?
A
Slowdown in spending and investment, with planned refurbishments cancelled
23
Q
Under New Labour, education spending rapidly increased by …..% of GDP from ….. to ….. (representing a ….. of the budget)
A
Under New Labour, education spending rapidly increased by 1% of GDP from 1999 to 2008 (representing a doubling of the budget)
24
Q
Evidence of increased education spending and investment under New Labour?
A
- Education spending rapidly increased by 1% of GDP from 1999 to 2008 (representing a doubling of the budget)
- Building Schools for Future programme
(i) Equipped schools w/computers + electronic whiteboards - No. full-time teachers increased 11% 1997-2010
25
Under New Labour, the number of full-time teachers increased by .....% from ..... to ....., reducing class sizes
Under New Labour, the number of full-time teachers increased by 11% from 1997 to 2010, reducing class sizes
26
Evidence of increased teacher numbers under New Labour?
No. full-time teachers increased by 11% from 1997 to 2010
27
Education policy - extent of consensus in university funding?
1. Labour recently called for the abolition of tuition fees following sharp increases under the Coalition government
2. Despite recent conflict, can place this policy in context of broad continuity, w/Coalition arguably building on New Labour policy
3. New Labour – initially introduced tuition fees in 2001 (£1k), followed by increase in 2004 (£3k)
28
Furlong and Lunt (2016)
DIVERSITY OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY WITHIN UK
1. English educational policy assumed to be UK educational policy, but this assumption is flawed
2. Reason – distinctive history of educational policy in different parts of UK means, accentuated further since formal devolution in 1999
29
How is education policy different in Northern Ireland?
1. Faith schools have and continue to play far more significant role
2. Almost ½ of 15 year-olds taught in grammar schools
3. University tuition fees capped at £4k
30
How is education policy different in Scotland?
1. Separate Scottish curriculum (much less prescriptive and detailed)
2. Only 2 schools opted out of LEA control
3. Less emphasis on competition
4. More uniform school provision (mostly comprehensive)
5. No tuition fees
31
How is education policy different in Wales?
1. Far smaller private sector (~ ¼ of size of English private sector)
2. Different national curriculum
3. Fewer schools opted out of LEA control
4. Significant tuition fee grants available
32
Paterson (2003)
1. Developmentalist streak to New Labour education policy not emphasised by Conservatives (which aims to increase UK’s international competitiveness in context of globalisation)
2a. New Deals – almost 50% more young people entered full-time training and education option than expected)
2b. Individual Learning Accounts – signalled more interventionist role in lifelong learning policy (though later disbanded following evidence of fraud)
33
1. English educational policy assumed to be UK educational policy, but this assumption is flawed
2. Reason – distinctive history of educational policy in different parts of UK means, accentuated further since formal devolution in 1999
Furlong and Lunt (2016)
34
Why, according to Chitty (2009), did Blair largely retain Thatcher's education reforms?
Wanted ‘voter-friendly’ policy that modernised party, reached out to middle-class voters and broadened appeal
35
Chitty (2009)
Blair largely kept Thatcher's education reforms because he wanted ‘voter-friendly’ policy that modernised party, reached out to middle-class voters and broadened appeal
36
Examples of New Labour's 'developmentalist' streak in education policy? (Paterson 2003)
1. New Deals
| 2. Individual Learning Accounts
37
Evidence that school choice popular with voters
Flatney et al (2001)
1. 90% of parents satisfied w/outcome of school choice
2. 70% of parents satisfied w/process of school choice
3. Attempt in 2007 to replace parental choice w/lottery scheme met w/local outcry
38
Flatney et al (2001)
POPULARITY OF PARENTAL CHOICE
1. 90% of parents satisfied w/outcome of school choice
2. 70% of parents satisfied w/process of school choice
3. Attempt in 2007 to replace parental choice w/lottery scheme met w/local outcry
39
..... (2001)
1. .....% of parents satisfied w/outcome of school choice
2. .....% of parents satisfied w/process of school choice
3. Attempt in ..... to replace parental choice w/lottery scheme met w/local outcry
Flatney et al (2001)
1. 90% of parents satisfied w/outcome of school choice
2. 70% of parents satisfied w/process of school choice
3. Attempt in 2007 to replace parental choice w/lottery scheme met w/local outcry
40
Example of education policy stopped due to electoral incentives
1. Indications that, privately, Gove wanted to expand grammar schools
2. But electoral incentives + historical unpopularity prevented expansion
41
How did New Labour promote school diversity?
1. Extra funding for specialist schools (extra £500k every 3 years)
2. Launched 1st academies in 2002 (legislation in 2000)
42
How did Coalition promote school diversity?
1. Rapid acceleration of academy programme
| 2. Introduction of free schools
43
How did Thatcher increase central control of schooling?
1. National curriciulum
| 2. National testing
44
How did New Labour increase central control of schooling?
1. National literacy and numeracy strategies (all primary schools required to allocate, w/content and method of teaching prescribed by central government)
2. Academy programme
45
How did Major increase central control of schooling?
Introduced Ofsted in 1992
46
Difficulties in measuring improvements in educational standards
1. Grade inflation (e.g. sudden jump in pass rates in 1988 following move from O-levels to GCSEs)
2. Time lags
3. Subjects/curricula themselves change
4. Teaching to the test
5. Schools’ attempts to manipulate exam performance (e.g. by encouraging pupils to take easier subjects)
6. Difficult to control for changing social factors over time
47
Example of grade inflation
Sudden jump in pass rates in 1988 following move from O-levels to GCSEs
48
Empirical evidence that competition improves school exam results
1. Bradley and Taylor (2002) – increased competition between schools led to significant improvement in exam results
2. Bradley and Taylor (2009) – 20-25% of improvement in exam performance 1992-2006 attributed to quasi-market reforms
3. Belfield and Levin (2002) - literature review found reasonably consistent positive effect of competition (though effects modest and over 1/3 estimates not statistically significant)
49
Bradley and Taylor (2009)
SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT AND QUASI-MARKET REFORMS
20-25% of improvement in exam performance 1992-2006 attributed to quasi-market reforms
50
Bradley and Taylor (2002)
EFFECT OF SCHOOL COMPETITION
1. Increased competition between schools led to significant improvement in exam results
2. Size of effect much greater w/larger number of schools within 1km radius
3. Some evidence of widening gap in social composition of school, but strength of effect = small
51
Bradley and Taylor (2009)
......% of improvement in exam performance from ..... to ..... attributed to quasi-market reforms
Bradley and Taylor (2009)
20-25% of improvement in exam performance from 1992 to 2006 attributed to quasi-market reforms
52
1. Evidence that competition more effective in areas with greater geographic concentration of schools
2. Why?
1. Bradley and Taylor (2002) – competition boosts exam performance overall, but size of effect much greater w/larger number of schools within 1km radius
2. In rural areas, geographical dispersion means there’s little effective competition between schools
53
What proportion of pupils have no other school than their own within a reasonable travel distance?
Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006)
1/4
54
Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006)
1. ¼ of pupils have no schools other than their own within reasonable travel distance
2a. No association between changes in competition between primary schools and exam performance
2b. Result could be due to focus on primary education
2c. Young kids less independent, so travel distance more important vs educational quality when choosing school
55
Eyles and Machin (2014)
PRE-2010 ACADEMY PERFORMANCE
1. GCSE performance increased for pupils who spend 4 years in academy school
2. Gains twice as large if schools converted from community school (least autonomy), suggesting increased school autonomy may be at least partly responsible for improved results
3. Size of effect – large on average (~20 PISA points)
4. Distribution of effect – concentrated among pupils of medium/high prior attainment, w/little effect for lowest achievers
5. Caveat – pre-2010 academy converters concentrated in disadvantaged areas w/much higher proportion of pupils on FSMs (i.e. may not have helped lowest performers, but did improve results for generally disadvantaged population)
56
Eyles and Machin (2014) - how much did pre-2010 academies improve exam performance, in terms of PISA score?
~20 PISA point increase (large effect, on average)
57
Eyles and Machin (2014) - distribution of improvements due to pre-2010 academies? Caveat?
1. Distribution of effect – concentrated among pupils of medium/high prior attainment, w/little effect for lowest achievers
2. Caveat – pre-2010 academy converters concentrated in disadvantaged areas w/much higher proportion of pupils on FSMs (i.e. may not have helped lowest performers, but did improve results for generally disadvantaged population)
58
Why is it difficult to extrapolate evidence from pre-2010 academies under New Labour to Coalition academy expansion?
Post-2010 academy converters located in more advantaged areas and intakes have higher prior performance, on average
59
Why is robust evaluation of the impact of the national curriculum not possible?
Policy introduced simultaneously at national-level, so not possible to robustly identify causal effect
60
Machin and McNally (2004)
EVALUATION OF LITERACY HOUR PILOT SCHEME
1. Pilot – children exposed to literacy hour for 2 years before national roll-out
2. Evidence – substantial improvements in reading and English (even though policy not v. costly)
3. Caveat – potential danger that, although literacy skills improved, could simply be due to extra time allocated, which may have been at expense of other skills (e.g. numeracy skills)
61
Evidence of impact of national literacy hour
Machin and McNally (2004)
1. Pilot – children exposed to literacy hour for 2 years before national roll-out
2. Evidence – substantial improvements in reading and English (even though policy not v. costly)
3. Caveat – potential danger that, although literacy skills improved, could simply be due to extra time allocated, which may have been at expense of other skills (e.g. numeracy skills)
62
How might economic resources allow high SES parents to gain educational advantages for their children?
1. Private schooling
2. House close to better state schools
3. Greater educational resources at home (e.g. books, toys, study space)
4. Private tutoring and online educational packages
63
Laureau (1987)
Parents of low SES less likely to:
1. Attend parents evening
2. Cultivate high educational and labour market aspirations
3. Be able to help w/reading and homework
64
Parents w/low SES less likely to:
1. Attend parents evening
2. Cultivate high educational and labour market aspirations
3. Be able to help w/reading and homework
Laureau (1987)
65
Evidence that low SES of parents impacts education of children
Laureau (1987)
Parents of low SES less likely to:
1. Attend parents evening
2. Cultivate high educational and labour market aspirations
3. Be able to help w/reading and homework
66
Evidence of association between poverty and low educational attainment
Alcock et al (2012)
~1/2 the proportion of children eligible for free school meals obtained 5/more GCSE A*-C, compared to those not eligible
67
..... (2012)
..... of children eligible for free school meals obtained 5/more GCSE A*-C, compared to those not eligible
Alcock et al (2012)
~1/2 the proportion of children eligible for free school meals obtained 5/more GCSE A*-C, compared to those not eligible
68
Alcock et al (2012)
~1/2 the proportion of children eligible for free school meals obtained 5/more GCSE A*-C, compared to those not eligible
69
1. Why might SES fail to have effect on educational attainment after controlling for school quality?
2. What is the problem with doing this?
1. If lower SES parents forced to send children to worse school, then effect of SES might disappear after controlling for school quality
2. Problematic because SES still driving poor educational outcomes, but merely via school choice
70
Strand (2011)
Social background still the strongest predictor of educational attainment in UK
71
Social background still the strongest predictor of educational attainment in UK
Strand (2011)
72
What is the strongest predictor of educational attainment in the UK?
Strand (2011)
Social background
73
Evidence that social background = strong predictor of educational attainment in the UK
1. Strand (2011)
Social background still the strongest predictor of educational attainment in UK
74
Evidence of impact of social background vs schooling
1. Mortimore (1997)
Home background effects much greater than effects of formal schooling institutions
2. Sammons et al (1993)
(i) Social background accounted for over 20% of variation in primary school reading scores and over 10% variation in maths scores
(ii) School effects accounted for less than 10% of variation
75
Home background effects much greater than effects of formal schooling institutions
Mortimore (1997)
76
Mortimore (1997)
SCHOOLING IMPORTANT, BUT CAN'T NECESSARILY OVERCOME IMPACT OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND
1. Multi-level studies find that school typically accounts for ~10% of variation in exam results (difference between 7 GCSE E grades and 7 C grades)
2a. Working class students at most effective schools made better progress and had higher attainment than middle class in least effective schools
2b. But middle class still outperformed working class in same schools
3. Home background effects much greater than effects of formal schooling institutions
77
Sammons et al (1993)
SOCIAL BACKGROUND VS SCHOOLING
(i) Social background accounted for over 20% of variation in primary school reading scores and over 10% variation in maths scores
(ii) School effects accounted for less than 10% of variation
78
...... (1993)
(i) Social background accounted for .....% of variation in primary school reading scores and .....% variation in maths scores
(ii) School effects accounted for .....% of variation
Sammons et al (1993)
(i) Social background accounted for over 20% of variation in primary school reading scores and over 10% variation in maths scores
(ii) School effects accounted for less than 10% of variation
79
What % of variation in outcomes is explained by schooling? What does this mean in terms of grades?
1. Sammons et al (1993)
(i) School effects accounted for less than 10% of variation in primary school reading and maths scores
2. Mortimore (1997)
Multi-level studies find that school typically accounts for ~10% of variation in exam results (difference between 7 GCSE E grades and 7 C grades)
80
Can schooling overcome impact of social disadvantage?
Mortimore (1997)
1. Schooling matters, but doesn’t mean it can overcome powerful impact of social disadvantage
2a. Working class students at most effective schools made better progress and had higher attainment than middle class in least effective schools
2b. But middle class still outperformed working class in same schools
81
Schooling matters, but doesn’t mean it can overcome powerful impact of social disadvantage
Mortimore (1997)
82
Heath et al (2013)
NARROWING SOCIOECONOMIC ATTAINMENT GAP
1. Since late 90s, evidence in UK of narrowing socio-economic gaps in educational attainment
2. Particularly fast progress made in London
83
Jerrim (2012)
SOCIOECONOMIC GAP IN HIGH ATTAINMENT
1. Significant gap socio-economic gap remains for higher levels of attainment
2. No change in socio-economic gap for top 1/5th of GCSE attainment
3. Socioeconomic inequalities in education high by international standards
DOMESTIC EXAM IMPROVEMENTS
1. Domestic exam improvements not reflected in international PISA scores
84
Evidence of changes in socioeconomic gap in educational attainment
Heath et al (2013)
1. Since late 90s, evidence in UK of narrowing socio-economic gaps in educational attainment
2. Particularly fast progress made in London
Jerrim (2012)
1. Significant gap socio-economic gap remains for higher levels of attainment
2. No change in socio-economic gap for top 1/5th of GCSE attainment
85
Sims (2012)
From 1988, ~80% of total school funding linked to number of pupils enrolled
86
From 1988, ~80% of total school funding linked to number of pupils enrolled
Sims (2012)
87
...... (2012)
From ....., .....% of total school funding linked to number of pupils enrolled
Sims (2012)
From 1988, ~80% of total school funding linked to number of pupils enrolled
88
What % of school funding was linked to no. pupils enrolled following 1988 reforms?
~80% (Sims 2012)
89
What mechanism of parental choice did the 1988 Education Act introduce?
gave parents power to appeal against LEA decisions to allocate child to school that wasn’t 1st preference (strictly a ‘right to express a preference’)
90
What restricts parental choice in practice?
1. Wealth - houses within catchment areas of best schools significantly more expensive
2. Geography – physical constraints of how far it’s possible to travel
91
Gillborn and Youdell (2000)
Education rationing - describes strategies schools use to maximise performance in terms of A*-C grades at GCSE
92
What is 'education rationing'?
Gillborn and Youdell (2000)
Describes strategies schools use to maximise performance in terms of A*-C grades at GCSE
93
Gorard et al (2003)
1. Market forces don’t necessarily lead to increased stratification
2a. Reason - New Labour central admissions code limited freedom in admissions policies
2b. Reason – pupil premium also reduced incentives for cream-skimming
94
Why has use of market forces in British education not led to significant increase in stratification?
1. New Labour central admissions code limited freedom in admissions policies
2. pupil premium also reduced incentives for cream-skimming
95
Evidence that school competition affected social composition of schools/segregation?
1. Bradley and Taylor (2002)
(i) some evidence of widening gap in social composition of schools, but strength of effect = small
2. Gorard et al (2003)
(i) extensive research of British schools showed that market forces don’t necessarily lead to increased stratification
96
Why might parents care more about raw exam data than value-added measures?
Peer effects
97
Leckie and Goldstein (2009)
1. League table data misleading because it shows the performance of kids 3/5 cohorts ahead of new joiners
2. e.g. new headteacher might have joined, not yet reflected in exam data
98
Why can league table data be misleading?
Leckie and Goldstein (2009)
1. League table data misleading because it shows the performance of kids 3/5 cohorts ahead of new joiners
2. e.g. new headteacher might have joined, not yet reflected in exam data
99
Evidence for importance of peer effects
Rothstein (2006)
100
Rothstein (2006)
1. Parents value best peer group more than most effective school
2. Large peer effect on test scores found
101
Institute for Government (2012)
1. Parents of high SES place most weight on exam results when choosing school
2. Parents of low SES place more weight on proximity
102
Evidence that parents of high SES place most weight on exam results when choosing school
Institute for Government (2012)
103
Belfield and Levin (2002)
LITERATURE REVIEW - EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES
1. Reasonably consistent positive effect
2. Size of effect = modest
3. > 1/3 estimates not statistically significant
104
Literature review on effect of competition on educational outcomes
Belfield and Levin (2002)
1. Reasonably consistent positive effect
2. Size of effect = modest
3. > 1/3 estimates not statistically significant
105
How did the Coalition government change teacher training?
Radical changes, w/move to direct training by schools rather than universities (whose education departments viewed with suspicion)
106
How did the Coalition change Ofsted inspections?
Schools could no longer be graded ‘satisfactory’ and must either be good/outstanding or ‘requiring improvement’
107
Evidence to doubt whether improvements in domestic exam results in recent years represent real progress
Jerrim (2012)
Domestic exam improvements not reflected in international PISA scores
108
Lupton and Thomson (2015)
IMPROVING GCSEs AT BOTTOM END DUE TO VOCATIONAL SUBJECTS
1. Improving GCSE attainment for low attainers in recent years largely due to increased uptake of vocational courses
2. Evidence schools pushed students towards these to boost overall points scores, despite them generating lower returns in labour market than traditional GCSEs
109
Key reason for improving GCSE results for low attainers in recent years?
Lupton and Thomson (2015)
1. Largely due to increased uptake of vocational courses
2. Evidence schools pushed students towards these to boost overall points scores, despite them generating lower returns in labour market than traditional GCSEs
110
How have GCSEs been recently reformed?
Made more rigorous:
1. Exam assessment at end of course, instead of modular system
2. New 1-9 scale
111
Why have GCSEs recently been reformed?
1. Grade inflation
| 2. Low international standards
112
What simultaneous policy change makes assessing impact of quasi-market education reforms on educational standards difficult?
In 1988, quasi-markets reforms introduced AND move from O-levels to GCSEs (w/significant immediate jump in attainment)
113
Evidence of decreased education spending under Thatcher
Public education spending as % of GDP saw biggest cutbacks of century, unseen in other countries, falling ~1.5%
114
Evidence of decreased education spending under Thatcher
Public education spending as % of GDP saw biggest cutbacks of century, unseen in other countries, falling .....%
Evidence of decreased education spending under .....
Public education spending as % of GDP saw biggest cutbacks of century, unseen in other countries, falling ~1.5%
115
Theoretically, what are the necessary conditions for quasi-market reforms to improve educational outcomes?
1. Parents must value and be able to correctly identify educational success as a school characteristic
2. Choice must be meaningful and capable of affecting allocation of pupils to schools
3. Schools must find it beneficial to be popular and grow
4. Best way for schools to be popular must be to raise education quality
5. Schools must have autonomy over drivers of educational outcomes or must be variety of school types
116
Evidence parents of low SES place more weight on proximity when choosing school
Institute for Government (2012)
117
Evidence that parents value best peer group more than most effective school
Rothstein (2006)
118
Although New Labour framed policies in new language of ‘social inclusion/cohesion’, actual policies revealed lack of substantive change
Chitty (2014)
119
IMPROVING GCSEs AT BOTTOM END DUE TO VOCATIONAL SUBJECTS
1. Improving GCSE attainment for low attainers in recent years largely due to increased uptake of vocational courses
2. Evidence schools pushed students towards these to boost overall points scores, despite them generating lower returns in labour market than traditional GCSEs
Lupton and Thomson (2015)
120
SOCIOECONOMIC GAP IN HIGH ATTAINMENT
1. Significant gap socio-economic gap remains for higher levels of attainment
2. No change in socio-economic gap for top 1/5th of GCSE attainment
3. Socioeconomic inequalities in education high by international standards
DOMESTIC EXAM IMPROVEMENTS
1. Domestic exam improvements not reflected in international PISA scores
Jerrim (2012)
121
NARROWING SOCIOECONOMIC ATTAINMENT GAP
1. Since late 90s, evidence in UK of narrowing socio-economic gaps in educational attainment
2. Particularly fast progress made in London
Heath et al (2013)
122
School effects accounted for less than 10% of variation in primary school reading/maths scores
Sammons et al (1993)
123
Multi-level studies find that school typically accounts for ~10% of variation in exam results (difference between 7 GCSE E grades and 7 C grades)
Mortimore (1997)
124
~1/2 the proportion of children eligible for free school meals obtained 5/more GCSE A*-C, compared to those not eligible
Alcock et al (2012)
125
1. Developmentalist streak to New Labour education policy not emphasised by Conservatives (which aims to increase UK’s international competitiveness in context of globalisation)
2a. New Deals – almost 50% more young people entered full-time training and education option than expected)
2b. Individual Learning Accounts – signalled more interventionist role in lifelong learning policy (though later disbanded following evidence of fraud)
Paterson (2003)
126
¼ of pupils have no schools other than their own within reasonable travel distance
Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006)
127
1. Multi-level studies find that school typically accounts for ~10% of variation in exam results (difference between 7 GCSE E grades and 7 C grades)
2a. Working class students at most effective schools made better progress and had higher attainment than middle class in least effective schools
2b. But middle class still outperformed working class in same schools
3. Home background effects much greater than effects of formal schooling institutions
Mortimore (1997)
128
Income = most significant variable enhancing children’s academic achievement
Cooper and Stewart (2013)
129
Cooper and Stewart (2013)
Income = most significant variable enhancing children’s academic achievement
130
When were tuition fees first introduced? What were fees?
2001 - £1k p.a.
131
History of tuition fees
2001 - £1k p.a.
2004 - £3k p.a.
Coalition - £9k p.a.
Social Policy
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