1
Q
elimination v. reduction
A
- reduction involves trying to explain our everyday psychological concepts (beliefs, desires, emotions, etc) in terms of physical properties like brain states
- elimination involves showing that our everyday psychological concepts are flawed
- it is the claim that neuroscience shows that some of them are confused, and that others refer to things that do not exist
2
Q
folk psychology v. neuroscience
A
- according to Paul and Patricia Churchland, it is not the job of neuroscience to explain our everyday psychological concepts
- instead, folk psychology and neuroscience are rivals
- science has always been in competition with our common sense ways of seeing the world
- sometimes science confirms these views, but more often it shows them to b e muddled or completely in error
3
Q
problems with folk psychology
A
- most of our folk theories (folk physics/biology, etc) have turned out to be seriously flawed, so we shouldn’t be surprised if the same is true of folk psychology
- the Churchlands claim that as a theory it is not very useful
- it hasn’t really been changed in the last 2,500 years
- it has become stagnant
- it also fails to explain important phenomena like dreams, mental illness and learning
- we should be sceptical about ‘ evidence’ from introspection because such methods are heavily influenced by the theory of folk psychology itself
4
Q
Patricia Churchland on reduction
A
- ontological reduction: the claim that the things on one domain are identical with some of the things in another domain
- e.g. heat = mean molecular kinetic energy, electricity and magnetism both = electromagnetism
- what about mental properties, e.g. beliefs, being physical properties, e.g. patterns of neural connections
- science arrives at such reductive claims as part of the most powerful explanatory theory
- ‘a reduction has been achieved when the causal powers of the macrophenomenon are explained as a function of the physical structure and causal powers of the microphenomenon’
- we can explain everything about water in terms of the nature of molecules of H20, hence we reduce water to H20
- in making the reduction, we sometimes amend the concepts involved, e.g. ATOM meant ‘indivisible fundamental particle’, but then physicists split the atom
5
Q
Churchland on elimination
A
- sometimes empirical discoveries mean that instead of amending the concept, we should give it up
- the concept and what refers to are eliminated in the more powerful explanatory theory
- e.g. heat - caloric theory: heat is a fluid, passed from hot things to cold ones; but hot things don’t weight more - a weightless fluid?; you can generate heat by friction, indefinitely - a weightless, trapped, infinite fluid?; heat is mean kinetics molecular motion, caloric fluid does not exist
6
Q
Churchland on complexity
A
- scientific reductions can be very messy with no 1:1 correlation between the higher and lower level concepts
- e.g. genes (‘unit of heredity’ giving rise to observable characteristics)
- no correspondence with a single stretch of DNA, and contribution to observable characteristics can depend on many external factors
- yet DNA is a reductive explanations of genes (there is nothing in addition)
7
Q
Churchland on eliminative materialism
A
- not all mental concepts/properties will survive reductive neuroscientific explanation
- we will need intermediate theories, between level of ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ and neurological functioning
- cognitive science will provide this and challenge our common sense psychological understanding
- e.g. no such thing as ‘will power’?, just dispositions of the dopamine system
8
Q
intentionality
A
- intentionality: the ‘aboutness’ of something, e.g. the belief that Paris is the capital of France is about Paris
- physical states are not about anything
- this means intentional states from folk psychology cannot be reduced to physical states
- neuroscience will eventually eliminate all intentional states
9
Q
objection: our certainty about the existence of our mental states priority over other considerations
A
- some would claim that there is nothing more certain than the contents of your own mind
- we know directly what is going on, so no scientific theory can possibly convince us that we are wrong about this
- response: there are many examples from the past where science has overturned beliefs that people were equally convinced about, e.g. that the earth is flat
10
Q
objection: folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)
A
- Paul Churchland argues that folk psychology is not good at explaining things like mental illness, why we need sleep or how we learn
- but there are other things it is very good at explaining: e.g. explaining behaviour (e.g. that person is doing their homework because they want to do well on their A levels); predicting behaviour (e.g. if I shout ‘fire’ in a crowded area people will start to make a lot of noise and run around)
- this objection claims that folk psychology is still the best hypothesis because it does the best job of explaining the mental
11
Q
response to: folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)
A
- the eliminative materialist does not have to argue that neuroscience will dispense with all our folk psychological concepts
- but that ultimately it will be neuroscience that helps us decide which can be kept, which should be adapted and which should be eliminated
12
Q
objection: the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self refuting
A
- eliminativism tries to change our beliefs by presenting arguments - arguments are expression of beliefs and reply on the meaning of words (i.e. like in folk psychology)
- yet eliminativism claims there are no beliefs and no meanings
- so, any arguments for eliminativism refutes itself - its conclusion contradicts its own assumptions
13
Q
response to: the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self refuting
A
- Paul Churchland claims that this objection ‘begs the question’ (assumes the truth if what it is trying to prove)
- the objection assumes the truth of folk psychology in order to argue that eliminative is meaningless
- he compares this to the 18th century theory of vital spirits, a vitalist might argue: ‘the anti-vitalist says that vital spirits don’t exist, yet they can only make that claim if they are alive. this shows that their claim is self refuting’
