1
Q
Explain the distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and propositional knowledge.
A
Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge of. (i.e. I know James).
Ability knowledge is knowledge how. (I.e. I know how to ride a bike).
Propositional knowledge is knowledge that (I.e. I know that Paris is the capital of France).
2
Q
What are Zagzebski’s four pitfalls to avoid when giving a definition?
A
- Circular. This means they should not include the term being defined.
- Obscure. The terms in any definition should not be more obscure than the original term.
- Negative. Defining a term by what it is not does not help.
- Ad hoc. This means coming up with a definition that is specific to meeting a particular problem.
3
Q
Define ‘individually necessary’ and ‘jointly sufficient’.
A
An individually necessary condition is something that you need in order to have the thing in question. Sufficient conditions, when met, mean that you will always have the thing in question.
4
Q
Explain the Tripartite view of knowledge.
A
Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S knows that p if and only if:
S is justified in believing that p,
p is true and
S believes that p
(these conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient)
5
Q
State two criticisms of the Tripartite view of knowedge.
A
The conditions are not individually necessary.
The conditions are not sufficient – cases of lucky true beliefs (Gettier’s original two counter-examples)
6
Q
Give an example of where ‘belief’ is not necessary for knowledge.
A
Some equate knowledge more with a sucsessful action than a belief. For example, if you hesitantly get the answer correct to a quiz question (having been taught it correctly, but do not remember being taught). In this case you might have known it even if you didn’t believe it.
7
Q
Explain the distinction between the correspondence & coherence theories of truth.
A
Correspondence: This theory says that truth consists in a correspondance between a claim and the relevant fact.
Coherence: The coherence theory of truth has different varieties, but one kind proposes that a belief is true if it is one of the web of beliefs held by a society to be true.
8
Q
Give an example of where ‘truth’ is not necessary for knowledge.
A
According to the coherence theory of truth, what is true is relative to the beliefs of society at that time. This allows for views like ‘the earth is flat’ to count as knowledge when it was a dominant theory in society. ‘Truth’ as we know it now may not be a condition of knowledge of the past.
9
Q
Give an example of where ‘justification’ is not necessary for knowledge.
A
John has a rare gift. If you give him any date in the future he is able to tell you what day of the week it’ll be. This is a case of true belief without justification. However, John is very reliable. (See Reliabilism).
10
Q
Outline Gettiers first original counterexample.
A
- Smith and Jones are interviewing for the same job
- Smith hears the interviewer say “I’m going to give Jones the job”
- Smith also sees Jones count 10 coins from his pocket
- Smith thus forms the belief that “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket”
- But Smith gets the job, not Jones
- Then Smith looks in his pocket and, by coincidence, he also has 10 coins in his pocket
Smith’s belief “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” is:
- Justified: he hears the interviewer say Jones will get the job and he sees that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket
- *True: *the man who gets the job (Smith) does indeed have 10 coins in his pocket.
But despite being a justified true belief, we do not want to say that Smith’s belief counts as knowledge because it’s just luck that led to him being correct.
11
Q
Outline Gettiers second original counterexample.
A
- Smith has a justified belief that “Jones owns a Ford”
- So, Smith forms the further justified belief that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona”
- Smith thinks his belief that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is true because the first condition is true (i.e. that Jones owns a Ford)
- But it turns out that Jones does not own a Ford
- However, by sheer coincidence, Brown is in Barcelona
So, Smith’s belief that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is:
- True: “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” turns out to be true. But Smith thought it was true because of the first condition (Jones owns a Ford) whereas it turns out it is true because of the second condition (Brown is in Barcelona)
- Justified: The original belief “Jones owns a Ford” is justified, and so disjunction introduction means that the second belief “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is also justified.
But despite being a justified true belief, it is wrong to say that Smith’s belief counts as knowledge, because it was just luck that led to him being correct.
12
Q
What are the four post-Gettier definitions of knowledge?
A
Strengthen the justification condition (ie infallibilism)
Add a ‘no false lemmas’ condition (J+T+B+N)
Replace ‘justified’ with ‘reliably formed’ (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)
Replace ‘justified’ with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B).
13
Q
Explain the ‘no false lemmas’ definition of knowledge.
A
JTB + N says that James has knowledge of P if:
P is true
James believes that P
James’s belief is justified
James did not infer that P from anything false
This avoids the problems of Gettier cases because Smith’s belief “the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket” is inferred from the false lemma “Jones will get the job”.
14
Q
Outline an issue with the ‘JTB + N’ definition of knowledge.
A
Fake Barn County:
- In ‘fake barn county’, the locals create fake barns that look identical to real barns.
- Henry is driving through fake barn county, but he doesn’t know the locals do this.
- Henry often thinks “there’s a barn” when he looks at the fake barns.
- However, on one occasion Henry looks at the one real barn and thinks “there’s a barn”
- This time the belief is true
- It’s also justified by his visual perception of the barn
- And it’s not inferred from anything false.
According to the no false lemmas definition, Henry’s belief is knowledge. But this shows that the no false lemmas definition must be false. Henry’s belief is clearly not knowledge – he’s just lucky in this instance.
15
Q
Explain the reliabilist definition of knowledge.
A
Reliabilism says James knows that P if:
P is true
James believes that P
James’s belief that P is caused by a reliable method
A reliable method is one that produces a high percentage of true beliefs.
16
Q
Suggest an advantage of the reliabilist definition of knowledge.
A
An advantage of reliabilism is that it allows for young children and animals to have knowledge. All the other definitions of knowledge considered here imply that animals and young children can not have knowledge. For example, a seagull or a baby can’t justify its beliefs and so justified true belief rules out seagulls and young babies from having knowledge.
However, both young children and animals are capable of forming beliefs via reliable processes, e.g. their eyesight, and so according to reliabilism are capable of possessing knowledge.
17
Q
Outline an issue with the reliabilist definition of knowledge.
A
Fake barn county again. Henery has perfect eyesight , good memory etc. and so forms his beleif via a reliable method. But it still isn’t knowledge because it’s still just lucky that he’s right this time.
18
Q
Explain the infallibilist definition of knowledge.
A
Infallibilism argues that for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be true and justified in such a way as to make it certain beyond rational doubt.
So, even though Smith has good reasons for his beliefs in the Gettier case, they’re not good enough to provide certainty. Certainty, to philosophers like Descartes, means the impossibility of doubt.
19
Q
Outline an issue with the infallibilist definition of knowledge.
A
Too strict! By this definition we can’t know “grass is green” or “London is the capital of England” even though we clearly do know such things. In other words, certainty of doubt is not necessary for knowledge.
20
Q
Explain Linda Zagzebski’s argument against ‘true beleif + x’ definitions.
A
Philosopher Linda Zagzebski argues that definitions of knowledge of the kind we have looked at so far (i.e. ‘true belief + some third condition’) will always fall victim to Gettier-style cases. She provides a formula for constructing such Gettier cases to defeat these definitions:
- Start with a situation where there is a belief that fits the definition (‘true belief + some third condition’) but is false due to bad luck
- Then change the situation to one where the belief fits that definition (‘true belief + some third condition’) but is true due to good luck
- In the second case, the belief will still fit the definition (‘true belief + some third condition’) because it’s basically the same as the first case
- But the second case won’t be knowledge, because it’s only true due to luck
21
Q
Explain Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge.
A
Zagzebski’s analysis of knowledge is that James knows that P if:
James believes that P
James’s belief that P arises from an act of intellectual virtue
Acting with intellectual virtue is acting with the correct motivation (e.g. you want to find the truth) and succeeding by utilising intellectual virtues. (i.e. your belief turns out to be true because you acted virtuously).
22
Q
Explain Sosa’s definition of AAA & knowledge.
A
Sosa argues that the following key elements are essential in defininf knowledge. Beliefs with all three are Triple A (AAA) rated.
- Accuracy: the belief is true
- Adroitness: the believer is intellectually virtuous and has used their virtues effectively.
- Aptness: The belief is true because of the believer’s intellectual virtues.
Sosa goes on to define knowledge as ‘apt belief’. For a belief to be apt, it must also be accurate (true) and adroit (formed in a virtuous mind), however it must be accurate because the believer is adroit.
23
Q
How does Sosa’s definition of knowledge respond to fake barn county?
A
Sosa’s virtue epistemology could (correctly) say Henry’s belief “there’s a barn” in fake barn county would not qualify as knowledge because it is not apt. He only formed the true belief as a result of luck, not because he used his intellectual virtues.
24
Q
Outline an issue with virtue epistemology.
A
Animals and children. If virtue epistemology is the correct definition, it is hard to see how a seagull or a newly born baby could possess intellectual virtues of care about forming true beliefs and thus possess knowledge.
25
Explain Direct Realism.
Direct realism is the view that:
* The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism)
* And we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct)
26
What are the four key supporting arguments for direct realism?
1. In tune with common sense.
2. Avoids scepticism. It gives us a clear account of how we come to have knowledge about the world.
3. Has explanatory power. It is true that I am directly aware of physical reality and this explains why I am able to execute a whole range of practical actions.
4. Coherence of senses. It explains why we agree about what we perceive, why our own senses agree and we can agree with others.
27
What are the four issues with direct realism?
* the argument from illusion
* the argument from perceptual variation (Russel & Berkely)
* the argument from hallucination
* the time-lag argument
28
Outline the argument from illusion against direct realism.
P1. Direct realism says that we perceive the external world directly as it is.
P2. However, in the case of illusions, there is an obvious difference between our perception and reality.
P3. For example, when a pencil is placed in a glass of water, it can look crooked. But it isn’t really crooked.
P4. If direct realism is true, the external world would be exactly as we perceive it.
C. Direct realism is false.
29
How would a direct realist respond to the argument from illusion?
Direct realism can respond by refining the theory and introducing the idea of relational properties. The direct realist could reply that the pencil has the relational property of looking crooked to certain perceivers (even though it isn’t really crooked).
30
What is a relational property?
A relational property is one that varies in relation to something else. For example, being to the North or South of something, or being left or right of something, are all real and mind-independent properties that something can have – but they vary relative to other objects.
31
Outline Berkeley's argument against direct realism.
Perceptual variation:
P1. Direct realism says that we perceive the external world directly as it is.
P2. However, in the case of perceptual varitatons, there is an obvious difference between our perception and reality.
P3. For example, when I stand on one side of the room, a shiny wooden table may have a white spot where the light is shining on it. But to someone standing on the other side of the room, there may be no white spot.
P4. If direct realism is true, the external world would be exactly as we perceive it.
C. Direct realism is false.
32
Outline Russel's argument against direct realism
Perceptual Variation:
P1. Direct realism claims material objects possess mind-independent properties (such as heat/cold, tastes, smells etc.) which we directly perceive.
P2. But material objects are perceived to have incompatible properties (cold and hot at the same time)
P3. They cannot possess incompatible properties in reality.
C. Therefore direct realism is false: material objects do not posess such properties.
33
How would a direct realist respond to the argument from perceptual variation?
Direct realism can respond by refining the theory and introducing the idea of relational properties. The object itself does not change, but the perceiver does – and thus the perceived properties of the object change.
34
Outline the time-lag argument against direct realism.
P1. The sun is 149,600,000 km from earth.
P2. Light travels at 299,792,458 metres per second.
P3.This means it takes approximately 8 minutes for light to reach earth.
C. So, when you look at the sun, you are seeing it as it was 8 minutes ago – i.e. there is a difference between the sun itself and your perception of it. In other words, you are not perceiving the sun directly.
35
How would a direct realist respond to the time-lag argument.
The direct realist can argue that this response confuses what we perceive with how we perceive it. Yes, it takes time for light and sound waves to travel through space. But what we are perceiving is still a mind-independent object.
36
Outline the argument from hallucination against direct realism.
P1. Direct realism says that we perceive the external world directly as it is.
P2. However, in the case of Hallucinations, there is an obvious difference between our perception and reality.
P3. For example, I might perceive a goblin on my sofa. But there’s clearly not a goblin on the sofa in (mind-independent) reality.
P4. If direct realism is true, the external world would be exactly as we perceive it.
C. Direct realism is false.
37
How would a direct realist respond to the argument from hallucination.
The direct realist could argue that hallucinations are not perceptions at all – they’re imaginations. Ordinarily, what we perceive are mind-independent objects. But in cases of hallucination, we confuse imagination for perception – a bit like in a dream.
38
Explain Indirect Realism.
Indirect realism is the view that:
* The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism)
* But we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect)
Indirect realism says the immediate object of perception is sense data. This sense data is caused by, and represents, the mind-independent external world.
39
Define Sense Data.
Sense data can be described as the content of perceptual experience. It’s not a physical thing, it exists in the mind. However, sense data is said to be caused by and represent mind-independent physical objects
40
Explain Locke's primary / secondary quality distinction.
Primary qualities: Properties inherent in the object itself. (I.e. size, shape, motion, number). Objective.
Secondary qualities: Powers of an object to cause sensations in humans. (I.e. colour, taste, smell, feel). Subjective.
Like sense data, this distinction explains the difference between reality (primary qualities) and our perception of it (secondary qualities).
41
What are Locke's two arguments for indirect realism?
1. Primary qualities are essential
2. Perceptual variation
42
Outline Locke's argument that primary qualities are essential. What is the nature of the argument?
P1. If you continually divide an object, the parts must retain the primary qualities even when they are too small to be perceived.
C. Therefore primary qualities must exist mind independently.
This argument is deductive.
43
Outline Locke's argument from perceptual variation
P1. The same water can produce the idea (sense data) of cold to one hand and warmth to the other.
P2. But the same thing cannot be both cold and warm at once.
C1. Therefore, the cold or warmth cannot be intrinsic to the object.
C2. So cold and warmth are purely sensations produced in th perceiver.
C3. Secondary qualities exist.
44
What are the two issues with indirect realism?
1. Indirect realism leads to scepticism
2. Ideas cannot be like material objects (Berkeley)
45
Outline the argument that indirect realism leads to scepticism.
According to indirect realism, we are directly aware only of sense data and must infer the existance of objects beyond the mind. It is conceivable that our sensa data does not correspond with any material reality. For example if I am a brain in a vat or being deceived by an evil demon.
Sense data is much like a 'veil of perception'.
46
What three arguments respond the the sceptic's view of indirect realism?
1. Locke: Involuntary nature of our experience
2. Locke: The coherence of various kinds of experience
3. Russel: The external world is the 'best hypothesis'.
47
Outline Locke's response to scepticism from the involuntary nature of experience.
One response from Locke involves pointing out that we are not in control of our sense data. If I open my eyes I will receive certain sense data and this is not something I have any choice about. Because perception is not subject to my will, It can not come from me and must be external.
48
Outline Locke's response to scepticism from the coherence of senses.
We can confirm different things with the same senses. E.g. when you see fire, you can touch it with your hand and feel it too. This coherence suggests that there is a common reality between both senses.
49
What issue does locke aknowledge with his defence against scepticism?
Neither argument is deductively valid. The fact that I cannot control my sense experiences and that they cohere with each otherdoes not garentee that they must be caused by a material reality.
However, Locke argues that he provides enough evidence to show that his inference of mind-independent objects is reasonable. The reality is that this is the best possible explaination. (See russel).
50
Outline Russel's argument that an external world is the 'best hypothesis'.
Like Locke, Russel also accepts that there is no deductive proof of material reality under indirect realism. However, Russel argues that we have an instictive belief in the existance of one and so the onus is on a sceptic to prove otherwise. It is the most likely hypothesis.
51
Outline the argument against indirect realism that 'ideas cannot be like material objects'.
P1. All sense data, including those of so-called primary qualities, depend on the mind.
P2. The qualities we perceive in objects, therefore, require a perceiving mind to exist.
C1. Since matter is said to be unperceiving, it cannot maintain the properties of material objects in existence.
C2. Material objects do not exist.
52
Explain Idealism
Idealism is the view that:
* There is no external world independent of minds (so it rejects realism – both direct and indirect)
* We perceive ideas directly
In other words, the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent ideas.
53
What does Berkeley's idealism suggest causes our perceptions?
* Berkely does not beleive that ideas exist only when perceived by finite human minds. Rather, he argues that the universe is sustained in existance perceived by the infinite mind of God.
* God thus directly causes our ideas or sense data.
54
What two arguments support an idealist theory of perception?
1. Berkely: Master argument.
2. Berkely: An attack on primary / secondary qualities.
55
Outline Berkely's master argument.
P1. Try to conceive of a tree which exists indepenent of any mind.
P2. In doing so, the tree is being conceived by you.
C. Therefore the tree is in your mind and not independent of any mind after all.
56
Explain Russel's objection to the master argument.
Russel argues that Berkely's error is to confuse the mental act of conceiving a thing with the thing being conceived. So it is true that my idea of a tree must be in my mind but it doesn't follow that what my idea is about, namely the tree itself, must be in my mind.
57
Outline Berkleys attack on Locke's primary / secondary qualities.
So called 'primary qualities' are also subject to perceptal variation. For example:
P1. What looks small to us will look big to an ant.
P2. A material object cannot be small and big at the same time.
C. Size is not an intinsic property of material objects.
OR
P1. The perceived shape of an object changes depending on the angle of observation
P2. But an object cannot have different shapes at the same time.
C. Shape is not an intrinsic property of material objects.
Berkley thus demonstrated that Primary qualities are mind-dependent, just like secondary qualities.
58
How would Locke respond to Berkely's attack on primary / secondary qualities?
We must distinquish the 'apparent' shape and size' from the real 'shape and size'. What something looks like is a seconary quaility and thus is subjective.
59
What are the three issues with Berkely's idealism?
1. Arguments from illusion and halliucination
2. Idealism leads to solipsism
3. Problems with the role of God in Berkely's idealism
60
Outline the argument from illusion against idealism and Berkely's reply.
Idealism says that in perceiving ideas, we are perceiving reality directly. But we may perceive a pencil in water as looking crooked, but we don't think the pencil is actually crooked in reality. So, idealism is false: our perception is different from reality.
Reply: Berkely would argue that the pencil IS crooked in reality. Just as real as our perception of a normal pencil. We only label them illusions because they incline us to make false inferences about what we might perceive next.
61
Outline the argument from hallicination against idealism and Berkely's reply.
Hallucinations / imaginations occur when there is nothing in 'reality' corresponding with the sense data. These perceptions are distinct from normal perceptions. Why are they distinct if we only perceive mind-dependent ideas anyway?
Reply: Berkeley argues that hallucination and imagination are caused by our own minds and so we can see that these perceptions are not real. Real ideas are caused directly by God.
62
Outline the argument against idealism from solipsism and Berkley's reply.
If everything is mind-dependent, I cannot know the existance of any reality beyond it. Berkley argues that the very idea of a mind-independent object is self-contridicatary and so impossible. But if this is correct, how do I know anything else exists? Or anyone? Everything could just be dependent on my mind.
Reply: Berkley's proof of God.
63
Explain how Berkley attempts prove the existance of God.
P1. Everything we perceive is mind-dependent
P2. There are three possible causes of these perceptions:
* Ideas
* My own mind
* Another mind
P3. It can't be ideas because ideas by themselves don't cause anything.
P4. It can't be my mind, because I cannot control what I perceive.
C1. Therefore, the cause of my perception must be another mind.
C2. Given the complexity, variety, order and manner of my perceptions, this other mind must be God.
64
How can one object to Berkley's God argument and how might Berkley reply?
P1. Berkley claims that what we perceive is in the mind of God.
C1. It follows that the idea of pain is in the mind of God; in other words, God can feel pain
P2. But if God suffers pain, then he is imperfect
P3. God is defined as a perfect being
C2. Berkley's proof of God involves a contridiction
Reply: God knows what it is to suffer pain but does not feel pain himself. Humans can suffer because our pains are caused in accordance with the laws of nature and we have no control over them. God, on the other hand, doesn't have a body and will not suffer pain or any other sensations against his will.
65
Define Empiricism.
Empiricism is the claim that experience and evidence from the senses provide us with all of our knowledge.
66
Define Rationalism.
Rationalists claim that reason, by itself, can be a sourse of knowledge. It suggests that if we were completely cut off from the world, it would be possible to work out substantial truths through reason.
67
Define Innatism.
Innatism is the claim that we are born with some amount of knowledge. Innatists usually believe that this knowledge can be revealed through reason.
68
Define a priori knowledge.
* Justification is independent of experience
* Known with certainty in advance of experience
* 2+2=4
69
Define a posteriori knowledge.
* Justification is based on experience
* Cannot be known with certainty in advance of experience
* France won the World Cup in 2018
70
State Platos three defining features of innatism.
1. Innate ideas are 'in' us although we might not be aware of them (like a forgotten memory is in us).
2. We can realise these innate ideas through reason.
3. Innate ideas provide timeless truths.
71
What two arguments support innatism?
1. Plato: Slave boy argument
2. Leibniz: Argument from the necessity of truth
72
Outline Plato's slave boy argument.
To prove his theory, Plato shows how Meno’s slave – a boy who has never been taught geometry – is able to understand a geometry proof. The key facts of the argument are as follows:
* Socrates draws a square on the ground that is 2 feet x 2 feet
* Meno’s slave agrees its area is 4 square feet
* Socrates then draws another square on the ground that has an area of 8 square feet
* Socrates then asks: What are the lengths of the sides?
* Meno’s slave incorrectly guesses 4 feet initially (the area would be 16 square feet, not 8)
* But Socrates asks Meno’s slave a series of questions
* Meno’s slave answers the questions correctly and realises that the sides of a square with an area of 8 square feet will be equal to the diagonal of the original 2 feet x 2 feet square
73
Explain Leibniz's distinction between contingent and necessary truths.
Contingent truths:
* What is the case.
* Could have been false in some other possible world
* E.g. "Paris is the capital of France" is a contingent truth because they could have chosen to make Lyon the capital instead.
Necessary truths:
* What must be the case.
* True in every possible world.
* E.g. "2+2=4" is a necessary truth because there is no possible world where "2+2" equals 7 or some other than 4.
74
Outline Leibniz's argument from the necessity of truth.
Leibniz argues that experience can only tell us what is the case, not what must be the case. However, we know that necessary truths such as “2+2=4” must be the case. This knowledge cannot come from experience and therefore must be innate. For example, we know from experience that adding two pairs of apples gives us four apples, however, the underlying truth is much deeper than that. Experience only tells us that in that instance we get four apples. The underlying truth, “2+2=4” is not contingent on experience; it is a necessary truth. Leibniz argues necessary truths like are both universal and innate.
75
Does Leibniz beleive that we are born with fully formed innate knowledge?
No. Leibniz argues that our mind is like a block of marble which had 'veins' running through it in such a way that it will readily take a specific shape. The marble does not contain a fully formed statue but has the tendency to take shape when struck. Our minds will recall innate knowledge when prompted by the senses.
76
State a difference between Plato & Leibniz' innatism.
Both beleive that innate knowledge needs to be 'realised'. However, Plato believes that we realise innate ideas through reason, whereas, Leibniz argues that innate ideas apear once prompted by the senses.
77
What are Locke's three arguments against Innatism?
1. No universal assent.
2. Transparency of ideas.
3. How can we distinguish innate ideas from other ideas?
78
Outline Locke's argument that innate knowledge has 'No universal assent'.
P1. Any idea, x, if it exists, would be universally held.
P2. Children and idiots do not have the idea of x.
C1. So, x is not universally held.
C2. Therefore x is not innate.
79
How might an innatist respond to Locke's 'No universal assent' argument.
* Leibniz claims that children and idiots do actually employ innate principles in their everyday actions. For example, a child knows that her teddy cannot be in her hand and in the loft at the same time. Instead, Leibniz claims that 'children and idiots' do not have the empirically learned tools to articulate this knowledge, even if it is present in their minds.
* Leibniz also claims that innate ideas require experience to be revelaed to us. In other words, children and idiots may not have had the required experience to reveal their innate knowledge.
80
Outline Locke's argument from the 'Transparency of ideas'.
Responding to Leibniz' claim that children and idiots are not yet aware of the innate ideas in their minds, Locke presents the following argument:
Locke argues that if we did have innate ideas then they must be present in our minds. Not constantly, but we must have been conscious of them at some point. He claims that our minds are transparent and we can perceive all the ideas they contain.
81
How might an innatist respond to Locke's 'Transparency of ideas' argument.
Ideas / memories can be 'in' you mind even if you've never been conscious of them.
* For example, you could have 'absorbed' a song on the radio, without being consciously aware of it. The song is not 'transparent' in your mind, but it may be recognisable if you heard it again. So it must be 'in' your mind somewhere.
* Likewise, an innate idea could be 'in' your mind, without you being aware of it yet. This is the foundation of Leibniz' innatism.
82
How can we distinguish innate ideas from other ideas? (Locke)
Locke argues that is some of our ideas are innate and some gained from experience, how can we tell them apart? Why not say the idea of blue was in you from birth, but only when you saw the colour blue you realised it. Likewise, with the idea of a cat or geometry.
83
How does Leibniz suggest we can distinquish innate ideas from other ideas
Leibniz suggets that we can distrinquish innate ideas as those which are necessary truths. A contingent truth cannot be innate knowledge.
84
What does Locke mean by simple and complex ideas.
Simple ideas cannot be divided further into other ideas while complex ideas are composities of simple ideas and can be analysed into their parts (simple ideas).
85
Explain the theory of knowledge that Locke argues for instead of innatism.
The mind as tabula rasa. Lock argues that the mind is born empty like a tabula rasa and he can show how all our ideas' concepts are derived from the senses / experience.
Locke argues that simple impressions (i.e. a colour or smell) cause simple ideas in our minds (i.e. the idea of red). Whereas, complex impressions (i.e. a painting) cause complex ideas in our mind (i.e. a unicorn). Complex ideas can be broken down into simple concepts.
86
Define Ockhams razor and explain how Locke uses it to disprove innatism.
Ockhams razor: If competing arguments explain some phenomenon equally well, go for the simpler one.
P1. Innatism claims that we are born with some innate innate knowledge and other knowledge is learned from experience.
P2. Tabula rasa shows that all of our ideas can be shown to be derived from experience.
C. The theory of innatism is redudant.
87
Explain the two critisisms of tabula rasa
Do all ideas come from impressions?
* Maybe I can create a new shade of blue in my mind by merging ones I have already seen. This is a new simple idea that has not come from a simple impression. Also, I have the concept of UV light but have not experienced it.
Relational concepts
* What about concepts such as sameness? 'Sameness' does not have a corresponding impression. Or laws of identities; I know that a=a without reference to experience.
88
Outline Hume's fork
Hume claims that human understanding can be divided into two distinct categories:
Relations of ideas:
* Known by thinking alone (a priori)
* Absolute certainty
* Cannot be denied without a contridication
* Analytic
Matters of fact:
* Known through experience (a posteriori)
* Not certain
* Can be denied without a contridiction
* Synthetic
89
Does Hume's fork cohere with tabula rasa?
Hume agrees that the mind is born as a blank slate (tabula rasa). However, unlike Locke, Hume argues that not all knowledge must be learned through experience. Instead, substantial knowledge can be generated by reason alone (relations of ideas). Whereas, other knowledge requires experience (matters of fact).
90
What does Descartes mean by clear and distinct ideas?
Having a clear and distinct idea is not simply a feeling of certainty, it is a recognition that it’s impossible for the proposition to be false. Descartes claimed that we can use our intuition alone to arrive and clear and distinct ideas.
91
What are Descartes' four rules for gaining knowledge?
1. Accept only beliefs that can be recognised clearly and distinctly to be true.
2. Break down problems in the smallest parts.
3. Build up the arguments systematically in the right order (deduction).
4. Check carefully to ensure no steps are left out.
92
Outline Descartes' intuition and deduction thesis.
The thesis is hinged on the claim that we can learn substantial truths about the universe through reason alone. The big idea is that we can arrive at clear and distinct ideas, which the mind intuits are true. Then, by using deduction, the mind can arrive at further truths.
93
Explain three criticisms of Descartes' intuition and deduction thesis.
Terms are not clear and distinct enough
* Leibniz criticised Descartes suggesting that a more detailed account of 'clear and distinct' is needed is these terms are to be used as criteria of truth. Relying on a feeling is not enough of a definition.
Quick generalisation
* Descartes derives his 'clear and distinct' condition from the cogito argument. He then generalises the principle and says that anything clear and distinct is true. How can he justify this gerneralisation?
Only internal criteria for truth
* Descartes claims that we can tell if a belief is true using internal means alone. Ryle suggests that this is an error. Ryle suggests a true belief is contingent on its correspondence with the external world. A bit like working out if you have scored a goal by how well you kicked the ball.
94
Outline Descartes' cogito.
Descartes' begins his entire thesis in global doubt. Descartes' doubts all his beliefs until he finally reaches a point of certainty. The cogito is his starting point:
P1. I doubt
P2. Therefore I think
C. Therefore I am
"dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum"
95
Is the cogito a deductive argument?
No. Descartes' explicitly denies the cogito is a deduction. Rather, it is an intuition of the mind and thus a clear and distinct idea. Descartes uses the cogito to make other deductive arguments.
96
What three arguments does Descartes' use to prove the existance of God?
1. Trademark argument
2. Contingency argument
3. Ontological argument
(4. Cosmological argument)
97
Outline Descartes Trademark argument.
P1. I have the concept of God
P2. My concept of God is the concept of something infinite and perfect
P3. But I am a finite and imperfect being
P4. The cause of an effect must have at least as much reality as the effect
C1. So, the cause of my idea of God must be an infinite and perfect being
C2. So, God exists
98
Explain two criticisms of Descartes trademark argument.
Causal principle
* Descartes argues that it is self-evidently true that 'the cause of something must contain at least as much reality as its effect'. Whilst this may apply to the physical world (Thermodynamics, conservation laws etc. Descartes does not offer any evidence that this also applies to the world of ideas. In fact, our minds can easily create better versions of real objects. Hume argues that our idea of God is derived from considering virtues in other people and augmenting them.
Not a priori
* Hume argued that we can never deduce the cause from examining the effect alone or vise versa. We need experience of both to establish their connection. In other words, the causal principle is a matter of fact because it can be doubted without contridiction. Therefore, the trademark argument is not a priori.
99
Outline Descartes' cosmological (contingency) argument.
P1. The cause of my existance as a thinking thing must be a) myself, b) I have always existed, c) my parents or d) God.
P2. I cannot have caused myself to exist for then I would have created myself to be perfect.
P3. Neither have I always existed, for then I would be aware of this.
P4. My parents may be the cause of my physical existance, but not of me as a thinking mind.
C. (By elimination) Therefore, only God could have created me.
100
Explain two criticisms of Descartes' contingency argument
The options are not exhaustive
* Could we not have been created by a less perfect being? Could we not have been created by another conscious being less great than God? Prehaps an evil scientist, an angel or the process of evolution? These options are not exhaustive
Not a Priori
* This argument starts from a state of affairs in the world and attempts do deduce the cause. Because it starts from obersvations about the world, it should be classed as an a priori deduction.
101
Outline Descartes' ontological argument
P1. I have the idea of God as a perfect being.
P2. A perfect being must have all perfections.
P3. Existance is a perfection.
C. God exists.
102
Explain two criticisms of Descartes' ontological argument.
Existance is not a predicate
* Kant argues that existence is not a property (predicate) of things in the same way, say, green is a property of grass.
* To say something exists doesn’t add anything to the concept of it.
* Imagine a unicorn. Then imagine a unicorn that exists. What’s the difference between the two ideas? Nothing! Adding existence to the idea of a unicorn doesn’t make unicorns suddenly exist.
Gaunilo's 'perfect island'.
* The perfect island is, by definition, an island greater than which cannot be conceived
* We can coherently conceive of such an island i.e. the concept is coherent
* It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind
* Therefore, this island must exist
The conclusion of this argument is obviously false.
103
Outline Descartes proof of the external world.
1a:
P1. The will is part of my essence.
P2. Sensation is not subject to my will.
C. Sensations come from outside of me.
1b:
P1. My nature or essence is unextended.
P2. Sensations are ideas of extended things.
C. Sensations come from outside of me. (Causal principle).
2:
P1. There are two possible sources for the origin of sensation: God or matter.
P2. I have a strong natural inclination to beleive they come from matter and I have no faculty by which to correct this belief.
IC. So if their origin were in God, God would be a deceiver.
P3. God is not a deceiver.
C. Sensation originates in matter.
104
How might an empiricist criticise Descartes' proof of the external world?
Reply to Step 1a: Prehaps sensarions come from a part of me which I am not conscious. After all, dreams are not subject to our will any more than sensations are, yet they certainly come from within us.
Reply to Step 2: Is everyone inclined to believe that sensations come from matter? Prehaps God feeds the ideas of material things directly into our minds. This is a simpler solution since it produces the same effect without having all the bother of creating and maintaining a material world.
Reply (God might not exist): Descartes' proof relies on the success of his earlier proofs for God's existance. Valid criticisms to these arguments (Hume) may invalidate Descartes' proof.
105
Define local and global scepticism.
Local scepticism: concerns some particular and restricted domain of our knowledge, but do not raise doubts about knowledge as a whole. E.g. doubting a fact.
Global scepticism: seems to raise doubts about all of our knowledge. These arguments conclude that knowledge in any area is impossible. E.g. brain in a vat.
106
What are Descartes' three waves of doubt?
Descartes' builds his system of beliefs on the method of doubt. Descarte suggests that we should suspend any all all beliefs unless they are indubitable (cannot be doubted).
1. Illusion
2. Dreaming
3. Evil Demon
107
Outline Descartes' first wave of doubt and a reply.
Illusion. Descartes suggests that because his senses have sometimes deceived him, Descartes argues it would be best not to trust them. The possibility of perceptual error is sufficient to lead him to doubt his entire sense experience.
Reply: We are only able to tell that our senses sometimes deceive us because on most occasions we take them to be accurate. In the same way, just because some paintings are forgeries does not mean that all painting are forgeries. In fact, this is not possible - forgeries can only exist if there are originals.
108
Outline Descartes' second wave of doubt and a reply.
Dreaming. I might think I’m awake when I’m actually dreaming. I might believe I’m looking at a computer screen, but if I’m simply dreaming that I am, then my belief is mistaken. We must therefore doubt all of our perceptions.
Reply: Descartes' doubt relies on the premise that some dreams are indistinguishable from real life, but how can he know this? If this were true then we wouldn't know that dreams are indistinguishable because they are indistinguishable. Further, if this isn't true that dreams are not indistinguishable and therefore distinct. So, either dreams are distinct from reality or we wouln't know about them.
109
Outline Descartes' third wave of doubt and a reply.
Evil demon. Descartes imagines the possibility of an extreamly powerful and malicious demon who employs all his energy to deceive him. Such a demon would be powerful enough to make him doubt all his perceptions and even the basic operations of reasoning, such as maths.
Reply: If Descartes' evil demon can deceive his reason, Descartes' cannot trust his reason to show that an evil demon is conceivable
Reply 2: If the evil demon's trickery is entirely undetectable, what difference does it make wether or not it is deceiving us. For example, imagine a counterfit £10 that is completely undetectable. What is the difference between this and a real £10 note.
110
Explain the brain in a vat hypothesis.
This is the theory that I am actually just a disembodied brain in a vat being simulated artificially to believe I am living in the real world. Thus, all my beliefs about the external world are false.
111
What chain of arguments does Descartes' use to discount his three waves of doubt?
1. Cogito
2. Existance of God (Trademark, ontological etc.)
3. Proof of the external world
112
Outline Russel's response to scepticism.
Russel argues that we cannot demonstrate conclusively the existance of the material world, or that is does not exist. Russel argues that when presented with a choice to believe either theory, the physical world hypothesis is by far the best option. The existance of a physical world can explain why our sense experience behaves in regular predicable ways.
113
State Locke's two responses to scepticism.
1. Coherence of senses
2. Involuntary nature of experience
114
Outline Berkeley's response to scepticism.
Most scepticism thrives because of the gap between our perception and reality. This gap allows for dreams, errors or demons to be the possile cause of our perceptions. In Berkely's idealist view of perception, there is no gap between perception and the object. There is no mind-independent reality. No room for scepticism
115
Outline how reliabilism responds to scepticism.
Reliabilism defines knowledge as true belief produced by a reliable cognitive function. Importantly, reliabilism does not deem justification a necessary condition for knowledge. Scepticism stems from our inability justify our perceptions in case we are being decieved.
If I am not a brain in a vat, my perception is reliable because it produces true beliefs, so I am able to know about the external world. This would be true.
If I am a brain in a vat, my perceptions are not reliable because it does not produce true beliefs, so I don't know anything about the external world. This would be true.
116
Explain a criticism of the reliabilist response to scepticism.
Assumes that reliabilism is the correct definition of knowledge. Fake Barn county would suggest otherwise.
Philosophy A-level
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