Essay Flashcards

Question

SDP: right to birth control why dissent is wrong

Answer 1

Unlike abortion, contraception does not implicate potential life, and Dobbs explicitly distinguished it. Because this law burdens a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies. The state’s asserted interest in preventing population decline is neither compelling nor narrowly tailored.

Answer 2

Marriage is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny (Loving). This applies to same-sex marriage even though same-sex marriage was not part of our history and tradition, the right to marriage should be framed broadly. (Obergerferll). Neither may the freedom of choice to marry be restricted by invidious racial discriminations (Loving). However, “[R]easonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marriage relationship may be legitimately imposed” (Zablocki)

Answer 3

In Loving, we struck down a ban on inter-racial marriage as violating the due process clause. The state's interest in racial purity was purely based on inviduous discrimination and was not a compelling state interest.

Answer 4

The right in this situation should be narrowly construed to be the right to marry someone of another race. Under our current jurisprudence, a right is fundamental if it is deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States and implicit in the concept of ordered Liberty (Dobbs). The right to marry interracially is not deeply rooted in our history and traditions - such bans go back to pre-colonial times (Loving). Further, the liberty of marriage was historically understood within racial boundaries, so interracial marriage is not implicit in ordered liberty.

Answer 5

Even if the dissents argument had some weight, it is irrelevant - because the Equal Protection Clause prohibits classifications based on race.

Answer 6

In Zablocki, we overturned a law that prohibited an individual who owed money for child support from obtaining a license to marry. We held that although the state had a compelling interest in ensuring children received child support payments, the law was not narrowly tailored because the interest could be met with less restrictive means - e.g., garnishment of paychecks. Further, marriage creates stable households which may make it more likely the father could pay the back child support and future child support. By preventing marriage, the state may be impeding its own interests. (Redhail).

Answer 7

The court never recognized a right to marry without restrictions. Strict scrutiny should not apply to marriage restrictions because they have always applied (e.g., age restrictions, must get a license, prohibition on marrying close relatives. RBR should apply. The statute is rationally related to a legitimate interest.

Answer 8

The Court has drawn a clear line: regulations that protect health, safety, or prevent exploitation are permissible, but restrictions that deny marriage based on suspect classifications (race in Loving, sexual orientation in Obergefell) or altogether (Zablocki) are unconstitutional.

Answer 9

The liberty protected by the Due Process clause includes a right to privacy in matters pertaining to sexual intimacy. (Lawrence). We did not identify the standard of review to apply but held that the state had no legitimate interest in banning sexual activity the State deemed immoral. (Lawrence). Our test, therefore was a heightened form of rational basis review - which requires that a law have a rational relation to a legitimate state interest (Lawrence). The heightened reveiw stemmed from the fact we found the state's law was compelled by animus towards homosexuals. (Lawrence). A state does not have a legitimate interest in banning activity it deems immoral. (Lawrence).

Answer 10

In Lawrence, the law we struck down made it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in sexual intimacy. We said liberty protects consensual adult intimacy and that criminalizing such conduct demeans personal dignity and autonomy.

Answer 11

Agree that rational basis test applies, but the heightened review should not apply because state has legitimate reasons for x, unrelated to morality. Under rational basis review law does not have to be most rational or a perfect fit. Williamson. We give great deference to state legislatures under RBR. (Williamson).

Answer 12

Dissent is wrong because it forgrets that in Romer we held laws based on animus fail even regular rational basis review. As in Romer, the state's justifications seem inexplicable by anything but animus towards those who choose to engage in sexual behavior it despises. In addition, a review of history and tradition would find that engaging in sex with multiple partners is not new in the 21st century - there is a long history of this type of behavior.

Answer 13

Abortion is not a fundamental right (Dobbs). Rational basis review applies (Dobbs).

Answer 14

In Dobbs we overturned Roe and Casey which had incorrectly found the right to an abortion was within the penumbra of privacy rights found in the Bill of Rights. As such, we upheld a law prohibiting abortion after six weeks gestation as being reasonably related to a legitimate state interest in preserving life.

Answer 15

The right should be redefined as the right to procreate and right to contraception - both of which this Court has upheld as fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny.

Answer 16

The dissent is wrong. First, in Dobbs, we specifically stated that abortion is distinct from contraception because it involves the destruction of potential life. The pill functions to terminate the pregnancy after fertilization, so it falls within the abortion category, not contraception. Griswold involved access to medication to prevent conception, not terminating an existing pregnancy. The dissent's framing it as a right to procreate is misplaced as well. Banning the pill does not prevent individuals from procreating - it regulates the termination of pregnancy after procreation occurs. The right to procreate, which we established in Skinner, protects against state interference with the ability to have children, not the ability to avoid them by ending a pregnancy. Lastly, it defines the right broadly, which does not comport with our holding in Michael H that said rights should be construed narrowly, rooted in the most specific level of tradition that can be identified. The right at issue here, construed more narrowly, is the right to terminate a fertilized egg through the day-after pill. Historically, there is no deeply rooted tradition protecting that right.

Answer 17

The Constitution imposes no duty on the State to protect people from private harm. Instead, it only protects people from harm caused by the State. (DeShaney) A duty to protect arises when an individual is in custody of the state (DeShaney), or a property interest exists (Casetlerock). Because this is not an enumerated or fundamental right, rational basis review applies. (DeShaney).

Answer 18

In DeShaney, we addressed whether a child's liberty interests were violated when govt officials were confronted with evidence of child abuse but did not stop such abuse. We held that the language of the DPC does not against private harm (DeShaney). It limits state's power to deprive one of life liberty or property without due process of law. That right cannot be fairly extended to impose an affirmative obligation on govt to ensure those interests are not harmed through actions of another.

Answer 19

The majority has failed to recognize important facts in this case. The child had a legitimate expectation that the state would protect him.

Answer 20

The dissent defines the right too broadly, which is directly at odds with our statementin Michael H. that rights must be narrowly construed in accordance with history and tradition. History and tradition does not support a finding that individuals not in custody of the state had a legitimate expectation the state would protect them. Consider how the country grew after its founding - people literally picked up and moved across the country - many dying. There was no expectation of safety.

Answer 21

Competent individuals have a fundamental liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical care, thus strict scrutiny applies to laws restraining that right. (Cruzan). When a patient is incompetent and decision is made by a guardian, a balancing test applies - weighing the interests of the individual against the interest of the state in preserving life. (Cruzan). As such, govt can require clear and convincing evidence the individual would have rejected medical care if she were competent. (Cruzan).

Answer 22

In Cruzan, we upheld a state law requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes regarding whether she wanted to be on life support.

Answer 23

The right at issue here is not framed correctly. This should be framed as a right for parents to make decisions regarding their children. The requirement that the individual give prior consent is at odds with our strong support of parental rights.

Answer 24

The dissent is wrong because the individual at issue here is an adult. We have never held that parents have right to control their adult children.

Answer 25

An individual has no right to assisted suicide (Washington). States may prioritize life, protect vulnerable persons and maintain medical ethics. (Washington)

Answer 26

In Washington we upheld a state law that prohibited physician assisted suicide. We said there was no history and tradition supporting a right to assisted suidice - quite the opposite in fact. Washington. History and tradition shows that suicide has commonly been treated as crime.

Answer 27

Rights should be defined at narrowest level of tradition. Michael H meaning you don’t frame the right broadly (e.g., “the right to family integrity”), but as specifically as possible (e.g., “the right of a biological father to have visitation with a child born into a marriage between the mother and another man”).

Answer 28

In Michael H. we upheld a law that presumed a child born to a married woman is the child of the marriage, and prevented biological father from having parental rights. There is a longstanding protection of the marital family that displaced the biological father's asserted liberty interest (Michael H).

Answer 29

Procedural due process regulates the procedures or steps the government must follow before depriving any person of life, liberty or property.

Answer 30

The essential elements of PDP are notice and an opportunity to respond. (Goldberg). No processes due if an individual has not been deprived of life, liberty or property interest by the govt (Roth). Liberty interests include freedom from bodily restraint (Roth), freedom in intimate decisions (Meyer). Property interest is defined by state law not the constitution (Roth). To have a property interest, individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just an abstract need or desire (Roth). Property interest can be created by informal rules, practices or mutual understandings. (Sindermann). PDP is flexible, and the Court applies the *Mathews* balancing test to determine whether the appropriate level of due process has been given: 1. Nature of private interest affected 2. Ability of the new procedures to increase accuracy of decision 3. Government interest: burden of additional proceduresd

Answer 31

In Roth, we held a non-tenured professor did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. He had a one-year contract and had no expectation of renewal beyond that year. Therefore he had no property interest that was deprived. Thus no notice or hearing of any kind was required.

Answer 32

In Sinderman, we held that a professor had a property interest in continued employment because there was a faculty guide stating teachers with four years of service had permanent tenure unless there was cause for dismissal. P had more than 4 years so he had an expectaton of continued employment. Thus, he was entitled to a hearing to prove existence of his property interest.

Answer 33

In Mathews we upheld the denial of disability benefits without a pre-termiation hearing. First, P's had a private interest in continued receipt of disability benefits, but not as urgent as welfare benefits as we found in Goldberg. Second, the risk of error was relatively low because decisions were based on medical records rather than credibility disputes as in welfare hearings. An oral hearing would add little value to reducing errors. Third, the government had a strong interest in efficient administration of the program - it would be costly and burdensom to provide pre-term hearings for all disability claims. Post-termination hearings also mitigated risk. Balancing the three factors we found pre-termination hearing was not required.

Answer 34

Goldberg can be distinguished from Mathews because welfare recipients need immediate benefits to survive and oral hearings were crucial to avoid erroneous deprivation.

Answer 35

In Cleveland, we said due process required notice and a chance to be heard before termination when there is a property interest in continued employment. Because state law allowed termination only for cause, and P had no chance to explain the discrepancy, the risk of erroneous deprivation was high. The employee’s livelihood interest outweighed the government’s efficiency concerns, so a brief pre‑termination hearing was required.

Answer 36

In Castlerock, we held that a restraining order saying the police shall arrest an individual violating the order did not create a property interest. We emphasized that police officers traditionally retain discretion in deciding how to allocate resources, whether to arrest and how to respond to calls. They cannot guarnantee protection in ever case. Even in mandatory statutes, officers must make judgment calls based on circumstances.

Answer 37

The Equal Protection clause of the 14th amendment provides that no state may "deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Answer 38

Equal Protection principles are incorporated to the Federal Government through the 5th amendment's Due Process clause (Bolling).

Answer 39

In addition to protecting fundamental rights, equal protection limits government action that is based on classification of groups or individuals. Suspect classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Quasi-suspect classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Laws based on nonsuspect classifications are subject to rational basis review.

Answer 40

Classifications based on race are suspect classifications subject to strict scrutiny (Loving). Laws that are facially neutral regarding race but have disparate impact are subject to strict scrutiny if plaintiff shows discriminatory intent or purpose. (Washington). If a law is administered in a discriminatory manner, there is an intent to discriminate (Yick Wo). Disparate impact may be evidence of intent but it is not sufficient by itself (Washington).

Answer 41

In Yick Wo we struck down a facially neutral law requiring laundries not be in wood buildings unless a permit was issued. We found that mostly Chinese operators were denied permits for laundries in wood buildings which was sufficient to find the law was enforced in a discriminatory manner. This case pre-dated our modern strict scrutiny doctrine but our analysis mirrors it. We acknowledged that state had an interest in regulating laundries due to public safety concerns - namely fire hazards from laundries in wooden buldings. However, the discriminatory enforcement showed the law was not narrowly tailored to the safety interest.

Answer 42

In Brown, we struck down state laws that mandated racial segregation in public schools holding that separate but equal is inherently unequal.

Answer 43

In Washington we upheld the use of a test used in hiring decisions for the police force even though African Americans failed the test, and thus failed to be hired, more often than white individuals. Even though there was disparate impact, there was no discriminatory intent - the test was designed to measure verbal skills relevant to police work and ther was no evidence of discriminatory intent.

Answer 44

In the jury case we held that prosecutors purposefully using premptory strikes to exclude African American jurors was violation of EP clause.

Answer 45

In Loving we struck down a ban on interracial marriage as violating EP clause, rejecting the state's argument that equal application to all races (i.e. whites could not marry black either) did not cure the Constitutional classification because the classification is inherently racial.

Answer 46

Strict scrutiny shoud apply because of the disparate impact even without proof of discriminatory intent. EP clause was adopted in wake of slavery and reconstruction to dismantle racial subordination. Past discrimination has entrenched disparities that facially neutral laws can perpetuate. We acknowledged the effects of segregation in Brown. Requiring proof of intent ignores the structual nature of racial inequality. Even without proof of intent, disparate impact reflects the legacy of past discrimination. Otherwise states can mask discriminatory practices behind neutral language.

Answer 47

The dissent ignores our holding in Davis that stated disparate imapct alone does not warrant strict scrutiny. Applying strict scrutiny to every facially neutral law with unequal outcomes would radically expand equal protection beyond its scope. Davis. This would constitutionalize disparate impact theory which is not the role of the EP clause. The dissent also ignores that laws can be struck down even under rational basis (e.g., Romer).

Answer 48

Laws that attempt to rectify past racial discrimination, are subject to strict scrutiny. (Richmond) Govt entities can set-aside a portion of contracts to be awarded based on race if the entity is attempting to correct injustice resulting from its own past racial classification. (Richmond). However, this practice is not allowed to address general societal discrimination (Richmond).

Answer 49

In Richmond, we struck down a rule requiring a percentage of contracts go to minority-owned firms. The city cited general past discrimination, but showed no evidence of bias in its own contracting or local industry. The set-aside lacked a compelling interest and was not narrowly tailored—it covered multiple minority groups and ignored race-neutral alternatives.

Answer 50

Evidence of past discrimination does not automatically justify broad racial quotas. The solution must be narrowly tailored to the identified victims, not generalized race groups (Richmond). Further, like in Richmond, the city did not consider race-neutral remedies to address the past discrimination, thus the quotas are not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.

Answer 51

In Richmond, we did not hold that all quotas are forbidden, only those withou concrete evidence.

Answer 52

Classifications based on race in schools, even benign ones, are subject to strict scrutiny (Parents). Use of race for assigning students to k-12 public schools not subject to a desegregation degree is not a compelling govt interest. (Parents) The only compelling interests for race classifications in public schools we have recognized in a majority opinion are the the interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination (Parents Involved) and the interest of promoting student-body diversity in higher education (Grutter). However, we have since called into question whether promoring diversity in higher education is a compelling interest. (Harvard)

Answer 53

In Parents Involved, we struck down rules that assigned students to schools that consider race to ensure that the racial balance in any given school fell within a pre-determined range. We held the assigned plans were unconstitutional because they were not enacted to remedy past discrimination. One school district had never operated legally segregated schools, and the other had become unified - meaning the past discrimination was already remedied. The fact that de facto housing issues had caused segregation was not sufficient to support racial balancing.

Answer 54

Strict Scrutiny applies to affirmative action in higher education (Harvard). We have called into question whether diversity is a compelling interest (Harvard). Programs must avoid sterotypes, negative use of race, and include endpoints (Harvard). Students can still discuss how race shaped their personal experiences, and schools may consider those experiences as part of an individualized review - but not race itself as a category. (Harvard).

Answer 55

In Harvard, we struck down race-conscious admissions, finding it violated the Equal Protection Clause because: 1) It relied on racial classifications and lacked measurable objectives. 2) Goals like “training leaders” and “robust exchange of ideas” were too vague to be compelling. 3) Tracking racial composition resembled racial balancing, which is unconstitutional. 4) Individualized consideration was insufficient; race wasn’t just one factor in a holistic review. 5) Not narrowly tailored—no logical endpoint.

Answer 56

Sex classifications are quasi-suspect and subject to intermediate scrutiny (Craig v. Boren). Laws based on sex stereotypes or administrative convenience or cost are not substantially related to an important interest (Frontiero v. Richardson). If a law completely excludes women, the government must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” (United States v. Virginia; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan). Laws favoring women to remedy past discrimination may be permissible under intermediate scrutiny (Califano v. Webster).

Answer 57

Use of peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude jurors based on race violates the 14th Amendment (Batson) 1> Defendant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 2. Prosecutor must offer race neutral explanation. 3. Court decides if the race neutral explanation is persuasive or if the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination.

Answer 58

In Reed we struck down a statute that preferred women over men as estate administrators holding that administrative convenience was insufficient to be an important government purpose.

Answer 59

In Craig, we struck down a law that had different drinking ages for men and women. The state's purported interest was to reduce DUIs, citing that 2% of men, versus only .18% of women were likely to drive drun. However, we said that the correaltion between sex and traffice safety is not substantial enough to justify the classification. The law as not narrowly tailore because it was both overinclusive (barred all men even those who did not drink and drive) and underinclusive (allowed young women who drink and drive to purchase alcohol.

Answer 60

We struck down VMI’s male-only military school admissions policy. A separate women’s program was not an equal substitute—less rigorous and based on stereotypes that women wouldn’t want VMI’s challenges. Under intermediate scrutiny, the state needed an exceedingly persuasive justification because it excluded all women, but its reasons were vague, stereotypical, and unsupported, so the policy was unconstitutional.

Answer 61

In Califano, we upheld a law that slightly favored women when calculating social security because it was designed to remedy past economic discrimination. Congress’s method in doing this through the SSA is substantially related to achieving this purpose because it provides direct economic benefits to women who were traditionally able to seek out only the lowest-paying jobs.

Answer 62

In Hogan we found a women's only nursing school unconstititonal because it excluded male applicants. The justification was that it was remedying past discrimination, but the univ failed to provide evidence that women were discrimated against when the nursing school was formed. Most nurses were women, and the univs. policy furthered the stereotype that nursing is from women only. Further men were allowed ot audit nursing classes but not enroll n the actual school which had no impact on their ability to learn.

Answer 63

Age is a non-suspect classification subject to rational basis review (Murgia). Rational basis review is satisfied if the law is rationally related to a legitamite governmental intetest. (Murgia) Classification does not have to be a perfect fit to be substantially related to an important government interest (Murgia).

Answer 64

In Fronterio, we struck down a law letting male service members automatically claim wives as dependents while requiring women to prove husbands’ dependency. The law was unconstitutional because it relied on gender stereotypes, failing the requirement that sex-based classifications be substantially related to an important government interest.

Answer 65

In Murgia we upheld a law that provided a mandatory retirement age for police officers. We stated that the state can rationally believe that physical ability declines with age, even if not true for every individual. Mandatory retirement is a proxy for fitness because individualized testing would be administratively burdensome. Classification was rationally related even though not a perfect fit because it directly connected age (a general indicator of declining phyiscal capacity) to the legitimate government interest of maintaining a fit police force.

Answer 66

Heightened scrutiny should apply because age classifications can be arbitrary and harmful. Rational basis review is too deferential because other fundamental interests (like employment, livelihood and dignity) are at stake. (Murgia). Age, like sex has also been used as a proxy for stereotypes rather than actual ability (Murgia). Like sex based classifications, age classifications rely on broad classifications which do not reflect individual abilities. The concurrence said in FN 4 of Carolene that heightened scrutiny should able to lack political power. political powerlessness should be understood functionally - older workers cannot easily organize to resist age-based classifications.

Answer 67

The dissent's argument that older workers lack political power because they often cannot easily organize to resist age-based exclusions is misrepresents reality. The AARP is one of the most politically active organizations and is consistently involved in lobbying Congress, regulatory agencies and other groups to support the rights of the elderly. Further, this classification would likely survive even heightened scrutiny whether it be rational basis with bite or intermediate. There is no indication this rule is built on animus - so rational basis with bite would not appropriate. Second, even under intermediate scrutiny we do not require a perfect fit to the asserted important government interest, and a law mandating retirement at 50 in order to ensure a fit workforce is substantially related to the governmental interest.

Answer 68

Lawful alienage is a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny (Richardson). However, the govt may exclude lawful aliens from things that are intimately related to the process of democratic government. (PPT)

Answer 69

Right to vote, right to be a candidate/access ballot, right to migrate between states, right to marry and procreate, right to live as family unit, and equal access to courts for indigents

Answer 70

Historically we have treated classifications based on sexual orientation as non-suspect, subject to rational basis review. (Romer). However, laws rooted in animus or prejudice towards the group do not have a legitimate purpose. (Romer).

Answer 71

State voters passed a Constitutional amendment that prohibitied any state or local government from action that would protect gay, lesbian or bi-sexual individuals from discriminaton. We struck it down as unconstitutional because the law was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govt interest.

Answer 72

In Obergerfell, we said marriage is a fundamental right under both DP and EP and the same sex couples enjoy that right just like opposite sex couples. This is important to know because the classification and liberty we we analyze this case under was the right to marriage, and how that applied to homosexual couples.

Answer 73

Laws involving classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Like race (Loving) and sex (Craig), sexual orientation is an immutable trait that individuals cannot change. LGBTQ individuals have faced a long history of discirmination, exclusion, and criminalization as we recognized n Lawrence. Under Carolene Products FN 4, groups that are discrete and insular minorities warrant heightened scrutiny. In VMI, we required "exceedingly persuasive justification" for some sex classifications when the other sex was excluded entirely. Because sexual orientation is closely tied to sex, as we recognized in Bostock, intermediate scrutiny should apply. Further, in Murgia, we denied heightened review for age because the elderly were not politically powerless. However, the same is not true for LGBTQ individuals who remain politically vulnerable to shifting majorities and targeted legislation. Here, as in VMI, the classifications rest on stereotypes about roles, relationships, and capabilities.

Answer 74

The dissent is wrong for several reasons. First, LGBTQ are not politically powerless; they have achieved significant legislative and judicial protections (Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell). When sexual orientation classifications burden fundamental rights, like marriage in Loving and Obergefell, heightened review is warranted. That is not the case here. Expanding suspect classifications risks turning courts into super-legislatures. Rational basis review that finds laws rooted in animus as not having a legitimate government interest is sufficient to protect the rights of LGBTQ individuals.

Answer 75

The Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law repsecting the establishment of religion.

Answer 76

This clause has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state and local governments. (Everson)

Answer 77

.Establishment Clause now interpreted by historical practices and understandings. (Kennedy) • Still a violation for Government to coerce religious practices. (Kennedy) Coercion test: Does government seriously endorse religion, causing pressure to conform? (Lee) • Government cannot mandate or suppress religious expression. (Kennedy)

Answer 78

Under Lemon, a law violates the Establishment Clause if it 1) lacks a secular purpose, 2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or 3) fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion.

Answer 79

In Kennedy v. Bremerton (2022), the Court held that Coach Kennedy’s midfield prayer satisfied the history‑and‑tradition test because voluntary, private religious expression has long been tolerated in public settings. The practice fit within the Nation’s historical accommodations of religion, resembled traditions such as legislative prayer, and was not coercive since students were neither required nor pressured to join. Thus, allowing Kennedy’s prayer aligned with constitutional tradition rather than violating the Establishment Clause.”

Answer 80

In Everson, held that the government cannot aid religion, but upheld neutral reimbursements for bus transportation to parochial schools.” The program was neutral because it applied to all children who used public buses to transport children to school - either public or private - and the parents were reimbursed directly, not the schools. So no extensive entanglement.

Answer 81

In Engel, the Court struck down state‑sponsored school prayer at the start of each day even though students could opt-out. We emphasized that government may not compose official prayers or coerce religious observance.

Answer 82

“In Lee, the Court invalidated clergy‑led prayer at graduation, reasoning that subtle coercion in schools violates the Establishment Clause.” Subtle and indirect pressure on students to stand respectfully or join created coercion; students are impressionable and attendance at graduation is obligatory

Answer 83

In Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), the Court upheld legislative prayer, rejecting coercion claims. It reasoned that adults at town meetings were not legally compelled to participate, no penalties were imposed for abstaining, and mere exposure or social pressure does not constitute coercion under the Establishment Clause. Legislative prayer was viewed as ceremonial and consistent with historical tradition.”

Answer 84

In Zelman, the Court upheld a school voucher program that allowed funds to flow to religious schools through parental choice, emphasizing neutrality and private choice rather than government endorsement.

Answer 85

In Wallace, the Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing a moment of silence for ‘meditation or voluntary prayer,’ finding its purpose was to endorse religion, violating the secular‑purpose prong of Lemon.

Answer 86

In Good News Club, the Court held that excluding a religious club from after‑school use of school facilities was viewpoint discrimination, ruling that equal access for religious groups is required under the Free Speech Clause and does not violate the Establishment Clause. The group was not sponsored by the school, no child was required to attend, and children needed parental permission to attend. There was no compulsion or coercion by the school.

Answer 87

In Stone, the Court invalidated a Kentucky law requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms, finding no secular purpose and thus failing the Lemon test.

Answer 88

In Lynch, the Court upheld a city’s Christmas display that included a crèche, reasoning that the display had a legitimate secular purpose of celebrating the season and did not amount to government endorsement of religion.

Answer 89

In County of Allegheny, the Court struck down a courthouse crèche as an unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity, but upheld a menorah displayed with a Christmas tree, distinguishing between impermissible endorsement and permissible recognition of plural traditions.”

Answer 90

In Van Orden, the Court upheld a Ten Commandments monument on Texas state capitol grounds, emphasizing the Nation’s history and tradition of acknowledging religion in public life and finding the display part of a broader secular context.

Answer 91

In McCreary County v. ACLU (2005), the Court struck down courthouse Ten Commandments displays because their purpose was religious, violating the Establishment Clause under Lemon. By contrast, in Van Orden v. Perry (2005), the Court upheld a longstanding Ten Commandments monument on Texas Capitol grounds, reasoning that in historical context it was a passive display reflecting tradition rather than proselytization.”

Answer 92

In American Legion v. American Humanist Association (2019), the Court upheld a 40‑foot cross war memorial, holding that longstanding religious monuments are presumed constitutional under a history‑and‑tradition approach. The Court rejected the Lemon test, reasoning that the cross had acquired secular commemorative meaning and removing it would show hostility toward religion.”

Answer 93

The Free Exercise Clause of the 1st amendment states that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.

Answer 94

Under the Religious Freedom Act, federal laws that burden exercise of religion are subject to strict scrutiny. (Boerne). State/local govt laws that are both neutral and generally applicable are presumed constitutional and subject to rational basis review. (Smith) Otherwise strict scrutiny applies. (Smith) A law is not neutral if it discriminates against or targets some or all religious beliefs or regulates conduct because it is undertaken for religious purposes. (Lukimi) A law is not generally applicable if the govt prohibits religious conduct but allows similar secular conduct. (Lukimi, Kennedy) State/local govt unemployment laws that substantially burden religious practice are subject to strict scrutiny requiring a compelling governmental interest and use of the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. (Sherbert). State/local govt laws that burden religious exercise and infringe on another fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny (Yoder, Muhmad)

Answer 95

Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause bar government interference in a church’s internal decision about who will “minister” its faith. (Hosanna) Application this rule is not limited to just those with the title of minister . (Hosanna)

Answer 96

A government policy will not qualify as neutral if it is “specifically directed at ... religious practice.” A policy can fail this test if it “discriminate[s] on its face,” or if a religious exercise is otherwise its “object.” Lukumi. A government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way,” or if it provides “a mechanism for individualized exemptions. (Kennedy)

Answer 97

In Zorach, we upheld a program allowing students to leave school for off-campus religious instruction. It was not coercive—attendance was voluntary, and no officials pressured participation—so there was no Establishment Clause violation. The Court emphasized that accommodating free exercise is permissible, unlike prohibiting it, which is unconstitutional.

Answer 98

Whether a public employee's religious speech is protected is determined by balancing their free exercise and free speech rights against the employer's interest in maintaining an efficient workplace and avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. Kennedy

Answer 99

The Free Exercise Clause protects both belief and practice. A policy is not neutral if it targets religious conduct, nor generally applicable if it bans religious activity while allowing similar secular acts. The district’s policy burdened Kennedy’s sincere postgame prayer, which was private speech unrelated to his coaching duties. The policy was not neutral (targeted prayer) and not generally applicable (allowed secular postgame chats, phone calls, etc.). The district’s interest in avoiding perceived endorsement was insufficient to override Kennedy’s free exercise and free speech rights.

Answer 100

In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), the Court rejected the old balancing of employee religious rights against employer efficiency and Establishment Clause concerns. It held that Kennedy’s midfield prayers were private speech protected by Free Speech and Free Exercise, and that accommodating such non‑coercive religious expression does not violate the Establishment Clause under the Court’s history‑and‑tradition approach.” Mere exposure to religion is no establishment.

Answer 101

Denial imposed a severe burden on religious practice, so the state needed a compelling interest—none was shown. Fraud risk was speculative, and administrative burden of checking sincerity was insufficient. Uniform rule application was legitimate but not compelling when weighed against free exercise.

Answer 102

In Luhimi we overturned a city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice because it specifically targeted one group's religious practices. The ordinances singled out religious sacrifice while permitting comparable secular conduct. City council meetings explicitly discussed stopping Santería practices. Statements revealed hostility toward the religion, confirming discriminatory intent. The law could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to the stated interest - preventing animal cruelty. They were underinclusive (allowed secular killings) and overinclusive (banned religious ones).

Answer 103

In Yoder we struck down the prosecution of Amish parents for not sending children to school past 8th grade. We held compulsory education law violated Free Exercise rights of Amish parents. Amish way of life deeply rooted; “state interest in education not compelling against Amish religious practice.”

Answer 104

In Smith, we upheld the firing and denial of unemployment of an Native Americans fired for peyote use. The law criminalizing peyote use was neutral and applicable to all. Allowing religious exemptions from neutral laws would make “each conscience a law unto itself.” If exemptions are desirable, legislatures can create the religious accomodation statutes. Courts should not constitutionalize exemptions because that would force judges to weigh religious sincerity and government interests in every case.

Answer 105

In Boerne, we struck down the Religious Freedom Act as applied to the states, stating Congress cannot redefine Free Exercise.

Answer 106

In Hosanna, after a religious school teacher was fired after disability leave in violation of the ADA, we recognized that the free exercise and establishment clauses protect church autonomy in ministerial employment. While employment laws serve important purposes, they must yield when they conflict with the church’s constitutional right to select its ministers.

Answer 107

In Locke we upheld a law that provided recipients of a govt scholarship could not use the funds to obtain a theology degree. We held there was plahy in the joints between the establishment clause free exercise to avoid funding religious instruction. The restriction did not violate free exercise because the student was free to study theology, just not with state funds. Further, he could use scholarship for religious studies that were not devotional training.

Answer 108

In Trinity we struck down a law that denied funding for playground enhancements if the organization was a religious one. We stated that secular safety improvements do not violate Establishment Clause, so the state's interestin avoiding EC concerns was not compelling, Religious entities cannot be excluded from neutral public benefits.

Answer 109

We struck down a state tuition program that provided funding for families in districts without a public high school to attend private schools so long as they were not religious schools. states cannot withhold public benefits from people or organizations due to religious beliefs. The two forms of discrimination, status- and use-based, are equally offensive to free-exercise principles. Not narrowly tailored because use of govt money to fund religious schooling does not violate establishment clause when based on individual choice.

Answer 110

In Mahmoud, Parents challenged LGBTQ-inclusive books, arguing lack of opt-out violated Free Exercise. The Court agreed: denying opt-outs substantially interfered with parents’ fundamental right to direct upbringing (see Yoder, Pierce). Books promoted same-sex marriage and gender fluidity, conflicting with sincere religious beliefs, and young children were impressionable. Strict scrutiny applied; the no-opt-out policy was not necessary to prevent disruption or stigma since other opt-outs exist and show no evidence of harm.

Answer 111

The Free Speech Clause says Congress shall make no law abriding the freedom of speech or of the press. (Const 1st Amend) The Free Speech clause protects both pure speech and expressive conduct. (O'Brien). For conduct to qualify as expressive conduct, the speaker must intend to communicate and the audience must understand that the speaker is communicating. (Ppt)

Answer 112

The 1st amendment is incorporated to the states through the due process clause of the 14th amendment.

Answer 113

Free speech clause restricts government regulation of private speech. The government is free to regulate its own speech. Walker

Answer 114

Content-based laws on pure speech are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govt interest. (Gilbert) Content-based laws are presumed invalid. (Gilbert) Content-based laws regulate speech based on the content of the message. (Gilbert) This includes laws that suppress all points of view on a particular topic or those that suppress one viewpoint while implicitly endorsing another (viewpoint-based). (RAV) This is true even if the government's motive is benign, or if the justification for the law is content-neutral. (Gilbert)

Answer 115

Laws regulating the location or time, place, and manner of adult entertainment are treated as content-neutral, even if they are facially content-based. (Renton) The court treats them as content-neutral because the purpose is viewed as targeting the secondary effects of the establishment (e.g., crime, reduced property values), rather than suppressing the content. (Renton) This exception applies only to the zoning of adult establishments. (Renton)

Answer 116

Viewpoint discrimination is the most problematic type of content-based law. Viewpoint discrimination is never allowed. (RAV)

Answer 117

A law is content neutral if it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. (Ward) Laws that restrict the time, place, or manner of protected speech are treated as content-neutral. (Ward) TPM restrictions must satisfy a form of intermediate scrutiny, which generally requires three elements: 1) restriction must be **justified without reference to the content **of the regulated speech, 2) restriction must be **narrowly tailored** to serve a **significant** state interest; and 3) restriction must** leave open ample alternative channels **of communication.(Ward) While the law must be "narrowly tailored," we have indicated that this test is not as strict as requiring the least restrictive means. (Ward) The law is deemed constitutional as long as the burden imposed is not substantially more restrictive than is necessary to further the governmental interests. (Ward)

Answer 118

Regulation of expressive conduct (symbolic speech) is valid if 1) it is within constitutional **power** of the govt, 2) it furthers and **important** or substantial governmental **interest,** 3) the interest is** unrelated** to the suppression of free expression, and 4) the incidential restriction on 1st amendment freedoms is no greater than **essential** to further the interest. (O'Brien)

Answer 119

The presumption of invalidity and the strict scrutiny requirement do not apply if the speech falls into one of the established categories that the court has determined is not protected by the First Amendment.

Answer 120

Govt may forbid advocacy of lawless conduct only when the speech is: 1) intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and 2) is likely to actually incite or produce such action. (Brandenburg)

Answer 121

Government may regulate obscene speech (Miller). Speech is obscene if: - The average person, using community standards, finds it appeals to **prurient interest**; - It depicts sexual conduct, as defined by state law, in a **patently offensive** way; and - Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific **value.** (Miller)

Answer 122

Under Ferber, child pornography is categorically unprotected; any depiction of minors in sexual conduct may be banned regardless of Miller. By contrast, virtual child pornography does not involve actual children and is protected unless it meets the Miller obscenity test. (Ashcroft)

Answer 123

Fighting words are unprotected speech. (Chaplinsky) Fighting words are words which are inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. (Chaplinsky)

Answer 124

True threats are unprotected speech (Virginia). True threats are a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence against a person of group. (Virginia)

Answer 125

If government regulates a specific subject within an unprotected category, it has a content‑based restriction requiring strict scrutiny (R.A.V.). But targeting the “worst of the worst” — the core reason the category is unprotected (e.g., child pornography) — may be permissible. (R.A.V.)

Answer 126

Commercial speech is unprotected if it involves illegal transactions or false/misleading ads (Central Hudson). To regulate truthful, non‑misleading commercial speech, the government must show that the regulation **directly advances** a **substantial interest** and is no more **extensive than necessary**. (Central Hudson) Commercial speech = expression proposing a transaction or tied to economic interests. (Central Hudson)

Answer 127

The regulation of speech may vary depending upon the forum. (Perry)

Answer 128

In traditional public forums, like streets, sidewalks and parks, govt may impose only content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions. (Perry). Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. (Perry) Viewpoint discrimination is never allowed. (Perry)

Answer 129

In desiganated public forums (those not traditionally open for speech but which the govt has made open for expressive activity) are subject to the same rules as trad public forums as long as the designation lasts. (Perry). Govt can later close the forum. (Perry).

Answer 130

In limited public forums (those opened for certain groups, or for govt meeting rooms opened for specific topics), govt may restrict speech to certain subjects or speakers, but must remain viewpoint-neutral. (Good News Club)

Answer 131

In non-public forums,government may enact reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on non-public forums. (Perry). In addition the state may reverse the space for its intended purpose as long as the regulations are reasonable and viewpoint neutral (Perry).

Answer 132

Speech made as part of official duties is unprotected (Garcetti). Speech as a private citizen on matters of public concern is protected if, the employee’s interest outweighs the government’s interest in workplace efficiency and avoiding disruption (Pickering)

Answer 133

A law is overbroad if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech along with unprotected speech it legitimately targets. (Coates)

Answer 134

A law is constitutionally vague if it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or if it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Coates)

Answer 135

Freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak (Barnette). Compelled speech is generally unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny (Wooley). The key issue is whether the government forces expression (protected) or regulates conduct (less protected), determined by whether the act is **inherently expressive **and reasonably **attributed to the speaker** (Barnette).

Answer 136

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine says govt cannot deny benefits based on requirents that infringe a constitutional rights (Rust). It may set funding conditions to promote its own message (Rust), But cannot attach conditions that censor or interfere with private speech (Legal Services).

Answer 137

The First Amendment protects the right of groups to associate for expressive purposes. (Jaycees) The state can regulate only if it has a **compelling interest** that cannot be achieved through **means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms** (Jaycees). The state cannot force inclusion in expressive events if it alters the message (Hurley) Groups may exclude members if inclusion significantly burdens their ability to convey message (Dale).

Answer 138

Students retain free speech rights at school (Tinker). On-campus speech is protected unless it causes **substantial disruption** or **infringes on others**’ rights. (Tinker) Schools may restrict lewd speech, school‑sponsored speech for pedagogical reasons, and pro‑drug messages. (Mahoney). Under Mahaney, we extended Tinker to off‑campus speech in limited serious cases. We declined to give an exact test, but said serious cases might include **threats, bullying, or cheating**; but that vulgar criticism alone is protected. (Mahoney)

Answer 139

Political campaign contribution limits are subject to intermediate scrutiny - must be **closely drawn **to an **important** interest. (McConnell) Only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance justifies restrictions. (Valeo) Valid to limit contributions to candidates to prevent quid pro quo corruption. (Valeo) May not limit amount person spends on his own campaign. (Valeo). Aggregate limits are unconstitutional (McCutcheon). May not limit independent expenditures on political speech. Valeo Independent expenditures by corporations and unions protected. (Citizens United)

Answer 140

Although the First amendment protects freedom of the press, the press has no greater fredom to speak than does the public. (Cowles)

Answer 141

In F.A.I.R. we said hosting recruiters is not inherently expressive; the listener would not automatically assume the university endorses the military's discriminatory policies. The schools remained free to express their disagreement

Answer 142

In O'Brien we upheld the law prohibiting burning draft cards by finding that Congress had constitutional authority to regulate the draft, that preserving draft cards served a substantial administrative interest, that the law was unrelated to suppressing anti‑war views, and that the incidental burden on protest was no greater than essential since O’Brien could express opposition in other ways.

Answer 143

In Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court held that flag burning is inherently expressive conduct. Texas’s law was content‑based, aimed at suppressing the message conveyed, and thus subject to strict scrutiny. The asserted interests in preserving the flag’s symbolic value and preventing breaches of the peace were insufficient, so the statute was unconstitutional. - Unlike O’Brien, where the law protected the draft system, Texas’s interest was directly tied to suppressing expression.

Answer 144

In Barnette, we struck down a requirement that public school students salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, even though non-participation led only to expulsion (not a legal penalty enforced through criminal law). The student is literally forced to confess faith by words and acts; the message is clearly attributed to the speaker.

Answer 145

In F.A.I.R., we upheld a law requiring law schools to give military recruiters equal access as a condition of federal funding. The law regulated conduct, not speech, so the O’Brien test applied. Hosting recruiters is not inherently expressive—observers wouldn’t assume endorsement of military policies—and schools remained free to voice opposition. The law satisfied O’Brien: Congress acted within its power, served a substantial interest (raising armed forces), was unrelated to suppressing expression, and imposed no greater burden than necessary.

Answer 146

In another case we said a state cannot require state citizens to use license plates that bear the state motto "Live Free or Die."

Answer 147

In 303, we struck down a law requiring a graphic designer (website creator) to create custom expressive wedding websites for same-sex couples, despite religious objections. We held that the custom website design was pure speech because compelling the artist to create a message contrary to her beliefs amounts to compelling her to say something

Answer 148

In Garcetti, we concluded that a prosecutor's internal memorandum to a supervisor was made “pursuant to [his] official duties,” and thus ineligible for First Amendment protection. We relied on the fact that the prosecutor's speech “fulfill[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case.”

Answer 149

In Coates an ordinance criminalized “annoying” assemblies on sidewalks. We struck it down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, reasoning that “annoying” is subjective and fails to give fair notice, chilling protected assembly and speech.

Answer 150

In Gilbert, a town ordinance imposed different sign restrictions based on subject matter (political, ideological, directional). We held this was content‑based regulation, triggering strict scrutiny, and struck it down because the town’s interests in aesthetics and traffic safety could be achieved through content‑neutral means.

Answer 151

In Brandenburg, a KKK leader was convicted under a criminal syndicalism law after giving a speech that made conditional threats of revenge. We reversed. Brandenburg’s speech was abstract, conditional, and future‑oriented, with no evidence of imminent violence at the small symbolic rally.

Answer 152

Miller mailed explicit brochures—commercial ads appealing to erotic interest, graphically depicting sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, with no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value

Answer 153

Ferber sold cp. The Court upheld the law, holding that cp is categorically unprotected because the state has a compelling interest in protecting children, and the material is intrinsically harmful.

Answer 154

A store sold “girlie magazines” to minors. The Court upheld the law, recognizing a variable obscenity standard: material not obscene for adults may be obscene for children. Protecting minors justified the restriction.

Answer 155

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), we struck down a law because it criminalized ‘virtual’ c.p. that did not meet the Miller obscenity test: the material was not prurient, not patently offensive, and often had serious artistic or literary value, such as works like Romeo and Juliet or Lolita. The statute was therefore overbroad and unconstitutional.”

Answer 156

In Free Speech Coalition, we upheld a state law requiring age verification for adult sites. The law aimed to protect minors from adult content without blocking adult access, imposing only an incidental burden on adults and does not limit more speech than necessary - adults still have access to the materials after verifying age.

Answer 157

In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1994), the Court held the must‑carry rules were content‑neutral because they applied to all local stations regardless of programming. It served an important interest—preserving local broadcasting and media diversity—unrelated to suppressing speech. The burden on cable operators is incidental and limited; they retain editorial discretion over remaining channels. Thus, the rule satisfied O’Brien.

Answer 158

In Minnesota, the state barred judicial candidates from announcing views on disputed issues. The Court struck it down, holding judicial campaign speech is core political speech subject to strict scrutiny. The rule was not narrowly tailored: it was overinclusive, banning all issue statements even when impartiality wasn’t threatened, and underinclusive, allowing pledges and promises that posed similar risks. Less restrictive alternatives—like banning actual commitments—were available.

Answer 159

In Central Hudson (1980), the Court struck down New York’s ban on utility advertising. Although the speech was lawful and the state’s interest in energy conservation was substantial, the ban failed steps 3 and 4 of the Central Hudson test: it did not directly advance conservation (since it even prohibited ads promoting efficiency) and was more extensive than necessary, as less restrictive alternatives were available.

Answer 160

In 44 we struck down a law prohibiting advertising of alcohol prices. The speech—truthful liquor price ads—was lawful and protected. The state’s interest in promoting temperance and reducing alcohol consumption was substantial. However, the ban failed steps 3 and 4: it did not directly advance temperance because the link between price ads and consumption was speculative, and it was not narrowly tailored—a blanket ban suppressed all price information. Less restrictive alternatives, like educational campaigns or limiting ads that encourage excessive drinking, were available.

Answer 161

In Renton, a city zoned adult theaters away from residential areas. We said it was content-neutral because it addressed secondary effects—crime, property decline, urban blight—not film content. It was narrowly tailored to preserve neighborhood quality without banning adult theaters, and it left alternative channels since theaters could operate elsewhere in the city.

Answer 162

In Pickering, a teacher’s letter to a newspaper on school funding was private speech addressing a public concern. He spoke as a citizen on a public concern because the letter addressed funding not his job duties, did not interfere with his job duties or cause any disruption at work. The board’s efficiency interest didn’t outweigh his and the public’s interest in open debate, especially since his statements weren’t knowingly false and caused no disruption.

Answer 163

In Connick, an assistant DA was fired after circulating a questionnaire criticizing office management. We held most questions were not matters of public concern, so her firing was permissible. Only speech on public concern triggers Pickering balancing. We did not address whether she spoke as a citizen.

Answer 164

In Chaplinsky, the phrase “damned fascist” was likely to inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of peace because it was a direct, face-to-face personal insult during a heated encounter. The Court reasoned that such epithets have minimal social value and are inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction, fitting the definition of fighting words—words that by their very utterance cause harm or trigger immediate retaliation.

Answer 165

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the we struck down an ordinance that prohibited placing symbols (like burning crosses, graffiti) or objects that would provoke anger based on race, religion, or gender. Although fighting words are unprotected, the law was unconstitutional because it banned only certain fighting words tied to specific topics, amounting to impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Answer 166

“In Virginia v. Black (2003), the Court held that cross burning may be banned when intended to intimidate because it constitutes a true threat, but struck down the statute’s presumption that all cross burning equals intimidation. The presumption swept in protected political expression, making the law unconstitutional in part.”

Answer 167

United States v. Stevens (2010), the Court struck down the federal ban on depictions of animal cruelty as overbroad. The statute criminalized a substantial amount of protected speech — including hunting videos and documentaries — beyond its narrow aim at dogfighting, and the exemption for works of ‘serious value’ was too vague to cure the defect.”

Answer 168

In Brown, we struck down a ban on selling violent video games to minors. The speech was not an unprotected class (obscenity applies only to sexual content). The law was a content-based restriction on speech, triggering strict scrutiny. It failed because: 1) The state provided no persuasive evidence that violent games harm minors so interest not compelling. 2) The statute was not narrowly tailored. It was underinclusive (ignored other violent media) and overinclusive (restricted all minors regardless of context).

Answer 169

In Alvarez, we found that Alvarez’s lie about military honors did not cause any legally cognizable harm—meaning: It didn’t defraud anyone. It didn’t result in tangible injury (like financial loss or reputational damage). It was just a false statement without direct consequences.

Answer 170

In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Court upheld restrictions on abortion counseling in federally funded clinics, reasoning that doctors were acting as government employees when delivering Title X services. Because the government may define the scope of its own program, doctors’ speech within that program was treated as government speech, not private expression.”

Answer 171

“In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (2001), the Court struck down restrictions on legal aid lawyers that barred them from challenging welfare laws. Unlike Rust, where doctors spoke as government agents, lawyers represent private clients in adversarial proceedings. The restriction distorted the judicial process and imposed viewpoint discrimination, making it unconstitutional.” The restriction was seen as crossing the line where the conditions were not merely defining the scope of the government program, but instead censoring the client's ability to receive full legal representation

Answer 172

In Perry, we upheld a school district’s policy granting the exclusive bargaining representative access to the school’s internal mail system while denying access to a rival union. This was reasonable because the mail system was a nonpublic forum and the restriction served the legitimate purpose of preserving labor peace and administrative efficiency. It was not viewpoint discrimination because the policy was based on union status (exclusive representative vs. non-representative), not on the union’s views or opinions.

Answer 173

In Ward, we upheld NYC’s rule requiring performers at Central Park’s bandshell to use city sound equipment and technicians. The rule: 1) Was content-neutral (applied to all performers regardless of message), 2) Served a significant interest (controlling noise, protecting residents), 3) Was narrowly tailored (directly advanced that interest without burdening more speech than necessary; least restrictive means not required), 4) Left ample alternatives (performers controlled music and lyrics; only volume regulated).

Answer 174

“In Tinker we said that wearing black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam War was protected symbolic speech because it expressed a message. We found no evidence of interference with classes or discipline - the speech was silent, passive, and non-disruptive. We struck down the ban on the armbands as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.”

Answer 175

“In Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021), the Court held that a cheerleader’s off‑campus Snapchat criticizing school and cheer was protected speech. Applying Tinker, the Court emphasized that schools have diminished authority over off‑campus speech, which is primarily the responsibility of parents, and may regulate it only in narrow categories such as threats, harassment, or cheating. Because B.L.’s crude message caused no material disruption and targeted no one, the punishment violated the First Amendment.”

Answer 176

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Court upheld limits on contributions to candidates to prevent corruption but struck down limits on a candidate’s own expenditures and independent expenditures as unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech. The Court also upheld disclosure requirements, creating the enduring contribution/expenditure distinction that shapes campaign finance law.

Answer 177

“In McCutcheon v. FEC (2014), the Court struck down aggregate limits on individual contributions to all federal candidates and committees, holding they violated the First Amendment. While base limits prevent quid pro quo corruption, aggregate limits did not further that interest and instead penalized individuals for supporting multiple candidates, making them unconstitutional.”

Answer 178

In Citizens, we struck down limits on corporate and union independent expenditures, holding that political speech is protected regardless of the speaker’s identity. We rejected the argument that corporations could “distort” the marketplace of ideas because they have more resources, saying the First Amendment does not permit equalizing voices or restricting speech

Answer 179

A source sued a newspaper for breaking a confidentiality promise. The Court held the First Amendment does not bar enforcement of generally applicable laws (promissory estoppel) against the press.

Answer 180

“In Hurley v. Irish‑American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995), the Court held that parade organizers could exclude a gay rights group because a parade is expressive, and compelling inclusion would alter its message, amounting to unconstitutional compelled speech.”

Answer 181

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), the Court held that forcing the Boy Scouts to retain a gay scoutmaster would significantly burden their right of expressive association. Because the organization defined opposition to homosexual conduct as part of its moral message, Dale’s inclusion as a leader would directly conflict with that message and compel the Scouts to endorse values they rejected, violating the First Amendment.”

Answer 182

In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), the Court upheld Minnesota’s anti‑discrimination law, holding that the Jaycees was not an intimate association and admitting women did not impair its expressive message, so the state’s compelling interest in eliminating gender bias outweighed associational claims.”

Answer 183

First Amendment prohibits a state from making it a crime to join a group. * Doing so poses a risk that legitimate political expression would be impaired * To punish association with a group, the government must show 1) knowing affiliation, 2) organization with unlawful goals, and 3) specific intent to commit crime (conspiracy).

Answer 184

Liability cannot be imposed on a group for the actions of some of its members. * Need action from an authorized agent to bind group * Otherwise, the group could be bankrupted if it could be sued because of the actions of any one member

Essay Flashcards

(208 cards)