Essay Bomber Command

Question 1

Intro

Answer 1

Following the fall of France in 1940, Britain stood isolated against Nazi Germany as the threat of invasion became imminent.

In this precarious position, PM Winston Churchill looked to the Royal Air Force as the nation’s strongest offensive and defensive weapon, famously asserting that victory depended upon “an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by heavy bombers… upon the Nazi homeland”, which Ovary describes as “the supreme instrument of total war”.

The bombing offensive thus emerged as a central aspect of Britain’s strategy against Germany, though its strategic value and effectiveness remain subjects of intense debate.

Despite certain limitations, Bomber Command was ultimately a justified use of manpower and resources as it weakened German industry, forced the Luftwaffe into a defensive stance and strengthened the Allied war effort, proving this to be an inaccurate assessment.

Question 2

Impact On Germany K1

Answer 2

Bomber Command was ultimately a justified use of manpower and resources as evidenced by its detrimental impact imposed on Germany.

The allied bombing offensive was crucial in depleting German production with Ovary asserting that the campaign
‘placed a ceiling’ on the expansion of Germany’s war effort. In 1943, Germany lost approximately 9% of their production, with this figure increasing to 17% in 1944.

Therefore, Bomber Command managed to reduce the scale of the German industrial base, subsequently hindering Germany’s military operations and highlighting a strong reason why the bombing campaign was justified.

Question 3

Impact On Germany K2

Answer 3

The damage the Luftwaffe faced from the bombing offensive was detrimental, as the German airforce lost the equivalent of its entire fighter pilot strength between January and May of 1944.

The ensuing battles resulted in crippling losses, totalling a massive 13,000 pilots and 37,000 fighters, which significantly impaired the German campaign.

To further the damage to the Luftwaffe, pilot training was particularly limited due to the bombing raids on oil production, causing a fuel scarcity between March and September 1944.

This meant that German pilots could only receive 80 hours of flying time compared to the Allies’ 225 hours of flying time before combat, therefore showcasing the vast disparity in preparedness that the German pilots faced.

Question 4

Impact On Germany K3

Answer 4

While the bombing offensive was ultimately a justified use of manpower and resources as it dealt a significant blow to Germany, some may question whether the bombing raids were as effective as they could have been.

Raids conducted on cities by the RAF were often not consistent enough and not revisited, therefore limiting their impact which is evidenced by the 1943 Hamburg Bombing, a strike that killed c. 40,000 Germans through the use of incendiary bombs.

Despite this raid having a serious impact on Germany’s production output, the decision to not revisit this site allowed Germany to build back up its military capacity within a mere 6 weeks which allowed them to remain in the war as Albert Speer’s commented “that six more raids of that nature and the war would have been over.”, highlighting how poor decision making, in some cases, limited the effectiveness of Bomber Command.

Question 5

Impact On Germany Eval

Answer 5

In evaluating, the damage inflicted by the allied bombing offensive was ultimately a justified use of manpower and resources due to the powerful and immense impact it had on German industry and military.

While it could be argued that Bomber Command would have been more effective if it consistently targeted heavily industrial cities that were key to the war effort, such as Hamburg, the bombing campaign was still able to limit Germany’s output and strength while simultaneously inflicting heavy losses on the Luftwaffe. Ultimately, this proves Bomber Command’s vital role in shortening the war and aiding the Allies, and for this reason it can be argued that it was justified.

Question 6

Investment K1

Answer 6

The bombing of Germany was an effective use of investment.

The aim of bomber command was, according to Hastings, to “destroy the capacity of Germany to make war”. However, to achieve this goal it required enormous economic investment from Britain with 30% of military spending going towards Bomber command.

With such large investment, the value of bomber command could be called into question. However, the results of Bomber command was so significant it led to Speer to posit that “bombing {was} the single greatest threat to German armaments”.

Therefore, this illustrates that the use of resources was effective as bomber command was key in disrupting the German war effort, showing mass area bombing contributed to the allies’ advantage.

Question 7

Investment K2

Answer 7

Although bombing in the early stages of the campaign did display some inaccuracy, Harris stated that “bombing anything in Germany is better than bombing nothing”.

Therefore, even though many bombs may have missed their target, their overall use was still effective as the campaign still “opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe” (Speer) and also caused the German war effort to shift into a more Defensive stance, weakening German offences, thus proving bomber command to be worth the investment it cost and a valuable use of resources.

Question 8

Investment Eval

Answer 8

In evaluation, whilst the area bombing campaign was admittedly expensive, it was an effective use of funds and manpower as it hindered German armament production and diverted German military efforts through a “second front”, proving to be deserving of the cost and resources it entailed. The campaign became “the nightmare of the directors of the German war effort” (Speer) and was therefore a just and effective investment.

Question 9

Origins K1

Answer 9

Due to the campaign origins and rationale behind policies regarding the bombing of Germany, Bomber Command was able to stunt Germany’s ability to continue in a war leading to an eventual victory for Britain, thus making it an effective use of resources.

The British government had been steadfast in their declaration that if they were to use a strategy of unrestricted air warfare, then they would aim to limit attack on German civilians. However, it soon became clear that a new, more aggressive approach was needed and so to support this change, Churchill employed Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris in an attempt to increase the momentum of the campaign.

Harris’s ruthless approach was evident as he stated “You destroy a factory, and they will rebuild it. Kill the factory workers and it will take them twenty years to replace them.”

After this, the focus turned to destroying entire civilian populations in order to destroy the ability of the Germans to keep themselves in the war. This new war ideology was contended by Stewart as he argued “Civilian casualties were no longer the by-products of war: they were now often the direct aims.”

This new strategy was a justifiable use of resources as the civilian attacks were vital in disrupting the German labour force and production levels, making them instrumental in ensuring the victory of the Allied bombing campaign.

Question 10

Origins K2

Answer 10

Issues were discovered early in the deployment of Bomber Command, as seen in the Butt Report which identified that by August 1941, only 20% of Bomber Commands aircrafts were hitting within 5 miles of their targets, specifically those military and industrial.

This became the driving force in Churchill’s change to area bombing, allowing a higher volume of bombs to drop while targeting entire cities and towns.

This stark change was evident as in 1943, ‘thousand bomber raids’ were launched in places such as Hamburg. Here, tonnage grew from 40,000 to 120,000 in only a year evidencing the vast escalation that took place.

In doing this, the RAF were able to exhaust the German war effort by damaging a major industrial city, making it an effective use of manpower and resources.

Question 11

Origins Eval

Answer 11

In evaluating the campaigns origin and rationale, it is clear that bomber command was a valuable use of men and resources as it was successful in keeping Germany from winning the war by denting Germany’s industrial capacity through the destruction of cities and factories.

It can be argued that there were issues concerning inability to hit targets in the beginning, however these were solved efficiently, as shown by the addition of Pathfinder forces which resulted in 86% of Bomber Command’s planes bombing within 3 miles of their targets.

Overall, the bombing campaign’s strategic importance was key to Britain’s victory, making it an effective use of men and resources.

Question 12

Conclusion

Answer 12

In conclusion, despite certain limitations, Bomber Command was ultimately a justified use of manpower and resources through its impact on Germany, investment, and origins.

In terms of impact, the bombing campaign significantly weakened Germany by limiting industrial expansion and inflicting devastating losses on the Luftwaffe, thereby directly contributing to the depletion of German war capability.

Regarding investment, although Bomber Command consumed a considerable share of Britain’s military spending, its ability to constrain German armaments and force the opening of a defensive “second front” shows that the economic cost delivered proportionate strategic benefit.

Finally, the origins of the campaign reveal that despite early shortcomings, **the shift to a more aggressive and expansive bombing strategy successfully weakened the German position.
**
Ultimately, the bombing campaign cannot be dismissed as wasteful when it played a decisive role in shortening the war by reducing Germany’s capacity to resist and thus emboldening the Allied war effort. While imperfect, it was not waste: it was, in strategic terms, indispensable.