definition of promissory estoppel
doctrine that prevents a party from acting in a certain way because the first party promised not to, and the second party relied on that promise and acted upon it
“Estoppel is a mechanism for enforcing consistency; when I have said or done something that leads you to believe in a particular state of affairs, I may be obliged to stand by what I have said or done, even though I am not contractually bound to do so” Per E Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel
when is promissory estoppel relevant?
when the apparent agreement between the parties or a promise made by one of them is ineffective due to the lack of consideration.
Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Company (1877)
If parties “enter upon a course of negotiations which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who might have enforced those rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties”.
Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd (1947)
Long Foo Yit and anor v. Mobil Oil Singapore Pte Ltd (1997)
Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad bin Talib and ors v. A Formation Construction Pte Ltd (2006)
Tee Soon Kay v. AG (2007)
clear promise - Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Company (1877)
reliance: change of position
The Post Chaser (1982) (reliance: change of position)
it is not necessary to show detriment. The promisee may have benefitted from the representation and yet it may be inequitable, at least without reasonable notice, for the promisor to enforce his legal rights.
To establish reliance:
Promisee has committed himself to a course of action he would not otherwise have adopted.
Promisee would be prejudiced if the promisor were to resile from the promise.
The nub of this is the promisee’s inability to resume his original position due to the reliance.
inequitable to go back on promise
Inequity is an independent requirement (though often overlapping with Reliance) and other factors are also relevant.
D & C Builders v. Rees (1966) (inequitable to go back on promise)
the extent of enforcement: suspensory or extinctive?
Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscoe (1964) (extent of enforcement)
“When one party to a contract, in the absence of fresh consideration, agrees not to enforce his rights, an equity will be raised in favour of the other party. This equity is, however, subject to the qualifications that [1] the other party has altered his position, [2] the promisor can resile from his promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position and [3] the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume his position.”
Birmingham & District Land Co. v. LNWE (1888) (extent of enforcement)
It is not equitable to forfeit the promise to forbear “if the persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe that such rights will either not be enforced or will be kept in suspense or abeyance for some particular time”. The promise can only be revoked only if the parties were in the same position as they were before.
QBE Insurance (International) Ltd v. Winterthur Insurance (Far East) Pte Ltd (2005) (extent of enforcement)
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Ludlum (2008) (extent of enforcement)
Once D had altered his position (by borrowing money off friends and family in an attempt to reduce the overdraft) in response to the P’s undertaking that it will not commence enforcement before the end of the three month period, P cannot then revoke its promise and is estopped from claiming.
only operates defensively: “shield not a sword”
Combe v Combe (1951) (shield not sword)
Walton’s Stones v. Maher (1988) (shield not sword)
recent developments
Collier v. P & M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007)
(reliance in part payment as consideration)
Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v. James Cobbe (2008) (reliance as unjust enrichment (restitution))
“When a property developer had reached an oral agreement “subject to contract” in principle with a property owner to buy its property and expended substantial amount of time and money in obtaining planning permission pursuant to the agreement but the owner subsequently refused to proceed on the agreed terms and entire into a binding contract, the developer is entitled to quantum meruit payment for his services in obtaining the planning permission. The owner was unjustly enriched because it had obtained the value of the developer’s services without having to pay for them.”
types of estoppel
promissory and proprietary (‘reliance based estoppel’, Halsbury Laws 2003)