Final Flashcards

(102 cards)

1
Q
  1. Who held power at the beginning of the 20th Century?
A

The European Empires.

Power was held by the “Concert of Europe” (Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia)1. They operated on a “balance of power” system where stability came from equilibrium between states, not international law2.

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2
Q
  1. What was the “European Rule” of diplomacy?
A

Raison d’état (National Interest).

European states acted based on national interest, viewing the world as a “cold-blooded game of power politics”3. A “loaded gun” was seen as more potent than a legal brief4.

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3
Q
  1. What major event shattered the old European order?
A

World War I and World War II.

WWI shattered the European balance of power5. By the end of WWII (1945), Europe was in ruins, and the U.S. emerged as the dominant power, holding 35% of the world’s economic production6.

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4
Q
  1. How did the U.S. approach differ from Europe’s?
A

Wilsonianism (Values-based).

Unlike Europe’s “balance of power,” the U.S. (led by Woodrow Wilson) sought a world order based on “collective security,” “ethnic self-determination,” and international law7777.

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5
Q
  1. When did power stop being only about armies?
A

The Post-Cold War Era.

After the Cold War ended, military force became less relevant to daily issues8. The world moved away from simple military domination toward economic competition and interdependence9.

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6
Q
  1. Why is the U.S. less able to “dictate” global affairs today?
A

Power has become “Diffuse”.

Even though the U.S. is the only superpower 10, power is now shared with other centers (Europe, China, Japan) and relies on economic/institutional cooperation111111. The U.S. cannot simply impose its will unilaterally12.

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7
Q
  1. What replaced “Containment” as the new challenge?
A

Managing Interdependence & Globalization.

Instead of just containing a military enemy (like the USSR), nations now face global issues like “nuclear proliferation, the environment, and the population explosion” which require cooperation, not just force13.

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8
Q
  1. What is the “New World Order” composed of?
A

A mix of Power & Values.

It resembles the 18th/19th-century state system (many powers like China, India, Europe balancing each other) 14but operates in a globalized economy where communications are instantaneous15.

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9
Q
  1. How would Nye explain the shift from 1900 to 1945?
A

“Power Transition”

This is the shift of hegemonic power from the declining European Empires (specifically Britain) to the rising United States. (Kissinger describes this as the U.S. replacing the European balance of power with American Wilsonianism 16161616).

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10
Q
  1. How would Nye explain the shift from 1990 to Today?
A

“Power Diffusion”

This is the shift where power spreads out. It is no longer just “unipolar” (one superpower); it is distributed among many players (states, economies, institutions). Kissinger calls this a world where “power has become more diffuse”17.

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11
Q

What were Stalin’s two main historical fears that shaped his postwar vision?

A
  1. Western invasions (Napoleon 1812, WWI, Allied intervention 1918–20).
  2. Capitalist encirclement and betrayal (e.g., Hitler’s 1941 invasion, delayed second front).
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12
Q

How did Stalin define “peace” after losing ~20 million Soviets in WWII?

A

Peace = territorial security, buffer states, and Soviet-controlled governments in Eastern Europe to prevent future invasions.

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13
Q

What territorial gains did Stalin insist on after WWII?

A
  • Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)
  • Eastern Poland up to Curzon Line
  • Bessarabia (from Romania)
  • Parts of Finland and Karelia
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14
Q

What was Stalin’s policy for Eastern European countries after Red Army occupation?

A

Impose communist governments loyal to Moscow. “Whoever occupies a territory imposes his own system.” — Stalin to Djilas.

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15
Q

How did Stalin view Germany in the postwar world?

A

Germany must be weakened, divided, and stripped of industrial capacity to pay reparations and prevent rearmament.

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16
Q

What was Roosevelt’s postwar vision called, and what did it propose?

A

“Four Policemen” — USA, USSR, UK, China would enforce global peace through the UN, based on collective security and cooperation.

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17
Q

How did Roosevelt’s view differ from Stalin’s on spheres of influence?

A

Roosevelt rejected spheres of influence and balance of power; believed in universal peace through great-power unity. Stalin saw spheres as essential for security. Roosevelt rejected spheres of influence and balance of power; believed in universal peace through great-power unity. Stalin saw spheres as essential for security.

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18
Q

What was Churchill’s main postwar goal for Europe?

A

Restore a balance of power by rebuilding France and Germany as counterweights to the USSR, and maintain British influence. Restore a balance of power by rebuilding France and Germany as counterweights to the USSR, and maintain British influence.

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19
Q

What did Churchill propose in his “percentages agreement” with Stalin in 1944?

A

Divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence using percentages (e.g., USSR 90% in Romania, UK 90% in Greece).

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20
Q

How did Stalin’s wartime strategy reflect his postwar aims?

A

He delayed political talks until the Red Army occupied Eastern Europe, creating facts on the ground that determined postwar borders.

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21
Q

Why did Stalin want a second front in France, not the Balkans?

A

To keep Western armies away from Eastern Europe, where he planned to establish Soviet control.

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22
Q

How did Stalin interpret the “free elections” promised at Yalta?

A

As Soviet-style elections with communist control—not Western-style democracy—since the Red Army would oversee them.

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23
Q

What did Stalin demand in Asia at Yalta, and why?

A

Return of southern Sakhalin, Kurile Islands, ports in Manchuria—to regain tsarist-era privileges and secure the Far East.

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24
Q

How did Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s views on colonialism differ from Stalin’s?

A

Roosevelt opposed colonialism; Churchill wanted to preserve the British Empire; Stalin was indifferent to colonies, focused on contiguous land control.

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25
What was the key difference between Stalin’s “peace” and Roosevelt’s “peace”?
Stalin’s peace = territorial control, military security. Roosevelt’s peace = legal agreements, UN, great-power harmony.
26
How did Stalin use ideology to justify his foreign policy?
Ideology (Marxism-Leninism) justified expansion as “historical inevitability” and portrayed capitalist states as inherent enemies.
27
What lesson did Stalin draw from the interwar period (1919–1939)?
The West could not be trusted; collective security (e.g., League of Nations) was a fantasy; only Soviet strength and buffer zones guaranteed safety.
28
How did Stalin view the Atlantic Charter (1941)?
As Western propaganda—irrelevant to Soviet security needs. He preferred direct territorial agreements.
29
What was Stalin’s attitude toward postwar cooperation with the West?
Deeply distrustful; cooperation was temporary and tactical until Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe was secured.
30
What phrase summarizes Stalin’s approach to postwar peace?
Peace through control, not trust.
31
1. What was the geopolitical situation in Europe in 1939 that set the stage for the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
The Versailles order had collapsed. Britain and France pursued appeasement and ineffective collective security, excluding the USSR. Hitler was set on invading Poland, and Stalin distrusted the West.
32
2. What was Stalin’s primary strategic goal in 1938–1939?
To avoid being dragged into a war between capitalist powers while expanding Soviet buffersand regaining lost territories (e.g., Eastern Poland, Baltics, Bessarabia).
33
3. What was Hitler’s primary strategic goal in 1939?
To invade Poland without a two-front war. He needed to neutralize the Soviet Union temporarilyto avoid a repeat of WWI.
34
4. Why did Stalin distrust Britain and France before the Pact?
They excluded the USSR from the Munich Conference (1938), refused serious military talks, and seemed to be directing Hitler eastwardtoward the USSR.
35
5. What was the name of Stalin’s strategy of playing both sides before the Pact?
“Stalin’s Bazaar” – He offered Soviet cooperation or neutrality to the highest bidder (Germany or the Allies) to maximize gains and delay war.
36
6. What did Hitler fear most if he invaded Poland without a pact with Stalin?
A two-front war – fighting Britain/France in the west and the USSR in the east, which had doomed Germany in WWI.
37
7. What did Stalin gain territorially from the secret protocol of the Pact?
Eastern Poland, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Finland (in sphere), and Bessarabia(from Romania).
38
8. What did Hitler gain immediately from the Pact?
A free hand to invade Poland (Sept 1, 1939) without Soviet opposition, and Soviet raw materials (oil, grain) via trade agreements.
39
9. Why was the Pact a shock to the world?
Because Hitler and Stalin were ideological archenemies (Nazi vs. Communist). It showed that geopolitical interests could override ideology.
40
10. What was the short-term consequence of the Pact for Poland?
Fourth Partition of Poland – Germany invaded from the west on Sept 1, 1939; USSR invaded from the east on Sept 17, 1939.
41
11. Why was the Pact inherently unstable?
Long-term goals were incompatible: Hitler wanted Lebensraum in Soviet lands; Stalin wanted security buffers in Eastern Europe – areas Hitler also coveted.
42
12. What event in 1940 shifted the balance and increased Hitler’s sense of urgency?
Fall of France (June 1940) – With the West defeated, Hitler turned his focus eastward. The USSR was now the main obstacle to continental domination.
43
13. What happened during Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940?
Stalin’s demands (control of Bulgaria, bases in Turkey) clashed with Hitler’s plans for the Balkans. Talks failed, convincing Hitler that diplomacy with Stalin was futile.
44
14. What was Hitler’s ultimate strategic reason for breaking the Pact?
Operation Barbarossa – The ideological and geopolitical drive for Lebensraum (living space) in the East, and the belief the USSR could be quickly defeated.
45
15. What was Stalin’s key miscalculation in 1941?
He believed Hitler would not attack the USSR before defeating Britain. He ignored invasion warnings, thinking Hitler would issue demands first.
46
16. When did the Pact formally end, and how?
June 22, 1941 – Germany launched a massive surprise invasion of the USSR (Operation Barbarossa), shattering the non-aggression agreement.
47
17. What is the main historical lesson of the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
In international relations, shared geopolitical interests can create temporary alliances between even ideological enemies, but without common long-term goals, such pacts are doomed to collapse.
48
Kennan's Long Telegram (1946) - Core Argument
- The Soviet Union is inherently expansionist & hostile, not due to insecurity but due to its communist ideology + historic Russian imperialism. - Conflict is systemic, not a misunderstanding. Appeasement won't work. - Prescription: Containment—use unwavering political, economic, and military counter-pressure at points of Soviet expansion to block them without triggering total war.
49
Containment Strategy (Born from the Long Telegram)
- Goal: Halt Soviet expansion, not liberate already controlled areas. - Method: Build "positions of strength" (alliances like NATO, Marshall Plan) to create unbreachable barriers. - Mindset: Long-term, patient struggle; wait for internal flaws of USSR to evolve.
50
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) - The Trigger
- Soviet Action: Placed nuclear missiles in Cuba (U.S. sphere of influence). - U.S. Interpretation (via Kennan's lens): A probing move for weakness. If unanswered, would embolden further aggression (e.g., Berlin). Required a firm response to maintain containment's credibility.
51
How the Long Telegram Shaped U.S. Reaction in Cuba
- Firmness: Kennedy chose a blockade/quarantine—a strong, coercive act showing resolve, aligning with Kennan's "counter-force." - Avoiding Total War: Rejected immediate airstrike/invasion (too escalatory), seeking a path that contained the threat without starting WWIII. - Credibility: The goal was to make USSR back down, proving containment required risk-taking.
52
Danger of Military Power (Shown by the Crisis)
- Brought world closest ever to nuclear war (brinkmanship). - Any military clash risked rapid, uncontrollable escalation to mutual annihilation. - Showed military power, once used, could destroy the very thing it was meant to protect.
53
Limits of Military Power (Shown by the Crisis)
- U.S. nuclear superiority did NOT enable a "win." Military victory was impossible without self-destruction. - Crisis was resolved secretly via diplomacy (missiles out of Cuba for missiles out of Turkey + no invasion pledge), not military action. - Ultimate Limit: In the nuclear age, the ultimate role of military power is to create space for a diplomatic exit, not to achieve total victory.
54
"Exhausted Rivals" Context
U.S. was drained by Vietnam; USSR had military parity but a stagnant, "bloated" economy.
55
Nuclear Reality
Mutual destruction meant total victory was impossible; survival required a "structure of peace."
56
The Rule of "Linkage"
Connecting different issues: Soviet restraint in one area (like Berlin) earned them benefits in another (like trade).
57
Triangular Diplomacy
U.S. opening relations with China to force the USSR to be more cooperative to avoid isolation.
58
SALT I & Berlin Agreement
Turned the Cold War from a series of unpredictable crises into a predictable, managed competition.
59
"Adversary & Collaborator"
Détente wasn't friendship; it was a way to coexist ideologically while cooperating to prevent nuclear war.
60
The Helsinki "Trojan Horse"
Gave the USSR border security but introduced human rights rules that eventually destabilized their empire.
61
Historical Importance
It allowed the West to recover from Vietnam and shifted the war from military conflict to an economic/moral race.
62
What is International Political Economy (IPE)?
The study of how politics and economics interact at the global level.
63
What are the TWO main concerns of IPE?
1. How international forces shape domestic politics/economics. 2. How domestic forces shape global politics/economics.
64
What are the THREE main approaches to IPE?
1. Economic Liberalism 2. Neo-mercantilism 3. Neo-Marxism
65
What is the core belief of Economic Liberalism?
Free markets, minimal state interference, and global cooperation create maximum wealth for all.
66
What is the main goal of Neo-mercantilism?
To maximize national power and security through state management of trade and industry.
67
What is the primary focus of Neo-Marxism?
Global inequality and class conflict; the system exploits poor countries (Periphery) for rich ones (Core).
68
How would an Economic Liberal view a trade deficit?
As a natural market outcome—not problematic if markets are efficient.
69
How would a Neo-mercantilist view a trade deficit?
As a threat to national power—must be reduced through policy.
70
How would a Neo-Marxist view a trade deficit?
As a symptom of structural exploitation and unfair global rules.
71
In the café debate, what big question are all three economists trying to answer?
What is the relationship between money (economics) and power (politics) in the global economy, and what should the rules be?
72
What is the key disagreement about the role of the state? (cafe)
Liberal: minimal state Mercantilist: protective state Marxist: state as tool of the elite
73
What is the FIRST key economic concept behind neoliberal thinking and global free trade?
Comparative Advantage
74
What is the SECOND key IPE concept behind neoliberal thinking and global free trade?
Open Markets
75
How does Comparative Advantage explain why free trade benefits everyone?
Countries specialize in what they produce most efficiently, increasing total global output and wealth for all trading partners.
76
What does the concept of Open Markets mean in practice?
Removing government barriers to trade (tariffs, quotas, subsidies) to allow free flow of goods, services, and capital across borders.
77
What institution manages the rules of Open Markets according to the lecture?
The World Trade Organization (WTO)
78
What is the MAIN goal neoliberals believe Open Markets achieve?
Efficiency through competition, leading to innovation, productivity, and higher living standards.
79
What is ONE thing neoliberals believe governments should NOT do in trade?
Protect domestic industries with tariffs or quotas (protectionism).
80
What is ANOTHER thing neoliberals believe governments should NOT do in the economy?
Control prices or impose heavy regulations that interfere with market efficiency.
81
In the post-crisis rebuilding story, what do neoliberals see as the path to prosperity?
More global integration and trade liberalization, not retreating behind national barriers.
82
How do the two concepts work together in the neoliberal worldview?
Comparative Advantage provides the theoretical reason for trade; Open Markets provide the practical framework to enable it.
83
What is the first major challenge to the WTO's enforcement system?
The Dispute Settlement Crisis (U.S. blocking Appellate Body appointments, paralyzing the trade court).
84
How does the US-China rivalry challenge the WTO?
Both powers use tariffs/subsidies in legal gray areas, bypassing WTO rules and settling disputes bilaterally, undermining the multilateral system.
85
What is the core conflict between developed and developing WTO members?
The developed vs. developing country divideover "Special and Differential Treatment" (SDT) and fair market access obligations.
86
What major negotiation round has failed, symbolizing the WTO's inability to update rules?
The stalled Doha Development Round (since 2001), deadlocked mainly over agriculture subsidies and market access.
87
Why is the paralyzed Appellate Body a critical problem?
It allows countries to appeal rulings into a void, leaving disputes unresolved and letting unfair trade practices continue unpunished.
88
How do US-China tensions specifically undermine the WTO's relevance?
The two largest economies often settle disputes through power politics and unilateral measures, not through WTO rules and arbitration.
89
What do developed countries want from major developing economies (like China/India)?
More market access and an end to what they see as unfair use of "developing country" status to avoid trade obligations.
90
What do developing countries want from developed countries in return?
Cuts to agricultural subsidies and fulfillment of past promises for fairer trade terms.
91
What is the main consequence of the Doha Round's failure?
The WTO's rulebook remains outdated, not covering modern issues like digital trade, environmental goods, or state capitalism.
92
How do these four challenges connect to create a "perfect storm"?
Geopolitical rivalry (US-China) erodes trust, which paralyzes enforcement (Dispute System) and prevents new agreements (Doha), all while members remain divided (North-South).
93
What is the MAIN ROLE of the EU Council of Ministers (FAC) in EU Foreign Policy?
It is the primary decision-making body for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), holding both legal and political authority.
94
Who sits in the Council of Ministers for foreign policy meetings?
All 27 member states' Foreign Ministers, the EU High Representative, and relevant European Commissioners.
95
What is the KEY VOTING RULE for major CFSP decisions, and why is it a limitation?
Unanimity (consensus). It gives each member a veto power, making agreement difficult and leading to lowest-common-denominator policies.
96
What is the "smallest common denominator" problem?
EU policy is often watered down to the weakest position all 27 members can accept, resulting in vague or weak collective stances.
97
How does the rotating 6-month Presidencycreate difficulties?
It disrupts continuity and strategic priority, as each new Presidency may shift focus to its own national agenda.
98
What is a major procedural difficulty due to the Council's workload?
Overloaded agendas and pre-negotiated positions from lower committees (Coreper, PSC) turn high-level meetings into rubber-stamp sessions.
99
What is "constructive abstention" and how does it limit action?
A member can abstain and not block a decision, but is not bound to implement or fund it. This preserves unity but reveals fragile consensus.
100
What is the "silent procedure" and why is it used?
An urgent written procedure where a proposal is adopted if no member objects within 48 hours. It allows for diplomatic face-saving.
101
How do national interests fundamentally limit the Council's effectiveness?
Ministers prioritize domestic agendas, leading to blocking, dilution, or vague compromises that prevent strong, unified EU action.
102
What is the core contradiction in the Council's role?
It is both the engine (authority to decide) and the primary brake (unanimity rule, national interests) of EU foreign policy.