Rule Free exercise
IF government action substantially burdens a sincere religious practice, THEN it violates the Free Exercise Clause only if the action is not a valid, neutral, and generally applicable regulation(Smith)—meaning it either (a) targets or discriminates against religion (Lukumi), (b) lacks general applicability through selective exemptions or individualized assessments (Fulton), or (c) imposes a historically recognized undue burden on religious exercise, such as coercion or penalties for religious observance (Yoder; Mahmoud).
Sherbert v. Verner
Facts (2 sentences)
Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired for refusing Saturday work and then repeatedly denied new jobs because she could not work on her Sabbath. When the state denied her unemployment benefits for failing “without good cause” to accept Saturday work, she challenged the denial as an unconstitutional burden on her free exercise of religion.
Holding (applying established legal principles to the facts)
The Court held that denying Sherbert unemployment benefits imposed a substantial burden on her religious exercise by forcing her to choose between observing her Sabbath and receiving essential state support, and because the state offered no compelling interest sufficient to justify that burden, the denial violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Facts (2 sentences)
Members of the Old Order Amish and Conservative Amish Mennonite communities were convicted under Wisconsin’s compulsory-attendance law for refusing to send their children to school past eighth grade, claiming that secondary schooling conflicted with core religious tenets and threatened the survival of their way of life.
Holding (applying established legal principles to the facts)
The Court held that applying compulsory high-school attendance to the Amish violated the Free Exercise Clause because it imposed a grave burden on a sincere, centuries-old religious practice central to their way of life. Wisconsin failed to show a compelling interest or a narrowly tailored need to override that religious obligation.
Employment Division v. Smith
Facts (2 sentences)
Two members of the Native American Church were fired for ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony and were denied unemployment benefits under Oregon’s rule disqualifying employees terminated for work-related “misconduct.”
Holding (1 sentence)
The Court held that Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because neutral and generally applicable criminal laws may burden religious conduct without a compelling interest, permitting the State to deny unemployment benefits to individuals dismissed for religiously motivated peyote use.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah
Facts (2 sentences)
After the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye announced it would open a Santería house of worship in Hialeah, the city enacted emergency ordinances banning animal “sacrifice” and “ritual” slaughter while broadly exempting comparable secular killings such as hunting, kosher slaughter, and licensed food production. These ordinances, passed in direct response to the church’s arrival, effectively prohibited Santería’s central religious practice.
Holding (1 sentence)
The Court held the ordinances unconstitutional because they were neither neutral nor generally applicable, targeting Santería animal sacrifice through text, structure, and exemptions that singled out religious conduct while allowing analogous secular conduct, thus failing strict scrutiny.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia
Facts (2 sentences)
Philadelphia stopped referring foster children to Catholic Social Services after learning that CSS, for religious reasons, would not certify same-sex or unmarried couples as foster parents. When the City conditioned renewal of CSS’s contract on agreeing to certify same-sex couples, CSS sued under the Free Exercise Clause
Holding (1 sentence)
The Court held that Philadelphia violated the Free Exercise Clause because the foster-care contract allowed discretionary exemptions, rendering the policy not generally applicable under Smith, and the City failed strict scrutiny since its interests were not compelling as applied and were not pursued through the least restrictive means.
Mahmoud v. Taylor
Facts (2 sentences)
Montgomery County Public Schools introduced LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks in K–5 and then eliminated its prior notice-and-opt-out policy, requiring all students to participate in instruction that parents from Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox traditions said conflicted with core religious teachings on sex, gender, and marriage. The parents sued, arguing the mandatory, normative presentation of these materials substantially interfered with their ability to raise their children in their faith.
Holding (1 sentence)
The Court held that the mandatory, no-opt-out curriculum violated the Free Exercise Clause because it imposed a Yoder-type burden by substantially interfering with children’s religious formation, triggering strict scrutiny, which the school board failed since its interests were not compelling and its refusal to allow opt-outs was not narrowly tailored.