Functionalism

Question 1

What is functionalism?

Answer 1

All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.
Functional roles can be interpreted as causal roles (Role played within a network of cause and effect)

‘Ontologically agnostic’ - mental states should be understood functionally but doesn’t imply reduction to the brain.

Question 2

How does functionalism link to philosophical behaviourism?

Answer 2

Recognises stimulus - response.
Can’t allow for mental states without behaviour and can’t allow for multiple realisability.

Question 3

How does functionalism link to MBTIT?

Answer 3

Recognises the role of the brain.
Can’t account for multiple realisability.

Question 4

How are functions defined?

Answer 4

Functions are defined by inputs, outputs and the internal causal connections between them.
1. Inputs include sensory information
2. Outputs include behaviour.
3. Mental states play a causal role systematically connecting inputs to outputs.

Question 5

What is machine state functionalism?

Answer 5

Machine tables ; a table outlining every possible combination of input and output -> mental states could hypothetically be analysed with machine tables.

This is referred to as a ‘computational account’ of the mind.

Question 6

What is a functional duplicate with inverted qualia?

Answer 6

A functional duplicate is something which carries out the same function as something else (exactly or systematically), where the 2 qualia are swapped systematically.

Question 7

What does Churchland say about inverted qualia?

Answer 7

1) if inverted qualia objection were empirical, then it would be i) false ii) bad science. ( i) no evidence and ii) undetectable - no possible evidence)
2) So, inverted qualia is a conceivability argument AND it will face the same issues as other conceivability arguments.

I) IQ is either an empirical hypothesis (i) or an argument from conceivability (ii)
II) If (i), it is false or bad science
III) If (ii), it has the same issues as other arguments of this type.
IV) So, IQ should be rejected.

Question 8

Explain the critique of a functional duplicate with absent qualia (CHINA BRAIN EXAMPLE)

Answer 8

Imagine, the function is realised entirely by the population of China BUT there is no qualities of pain ( function DOES NOT EQUAL qualia ).
Qualia are an intrinsic part of pain.
Therefore, functionalism cannot account for all mental states without behaviour- functionalism is guilty of liberalism; ascribing mental states to beings that cannot possess them.

The objection is that the Chinese system can’t duplicate your mind because some mental states are qualia and the system cannot have qualia as they are not functional states.

Question 9

Functionalist reply to the China brain example

Answer 9

• The Chinese system won’t be functionally identical to you e.g, it could be disrupted by things that your mind isn’t disrupted by like bad weather, running out of batteries.
• Block responds; irrelevant; these disruptions don’t count as inputs/outputs and it isn’t part of the actual action of functioning.
• Functionalists can object that the China brain system is much slower than our brains - Block says that this doesn’t matter as it has nothing to do with them being mental states; a Chinese system that operated as fast as our brains is still metaphysically possible.

Question 10

Explain the Chinese room example

Answer 10

imagine a man is sat in a room with a book and a box of tiles with symbols drawn on. There is a slot in the wall where small trays of symbols are passed through. In the book he finds instructions on what to do, which involves putting together combinations of symbols from the box and passing them back through the slot depending upon what he has been handed. The man does not recognise the symbols he is being passed or that he is passing back. Outside, the people passing the symbols into the room are native Chinese speakers. They pass in questions and receive answers. To them, they are holding a conversation with a competent speaker of Chinese. However, we would not say that the man inside the room speaks that language.

Question 11

Analogy and conclusion of the Chinese room example

Answer 11

The man is like the processor in a computer, using a programme (the book) to formally manipulate the symbols. The symbols are like the database of the computer. If the man does not understand Chinese, then neither does the computer.

Question 12

Block’s response to the Chinese room and Searle’s reply

Answer 12

Block -> The man in the room is one part of an entire system. It is fair to say that the man does not understand Chinese (the intuition is right) but that is not how computers work. Computers function as a whole system, and it is invalid to say that the system does not understand Chinese on the grounds that part of the system doesn’t.

Searle -> we can imagine the man in the room internalising the system (i.e. memorising the programme and database). Just because he has done this and the man himself is the system, he is still just manipulating symbols and still doesn’t understand Chinese.

Question 13

Fodor’s response to the Chinese room and Searle’s reply

Answer 13

Fodor -> Developing an understanding of language involves causal processes (i.e. there is a causal link between things in the world and how we use language). The man in the room (or the computer) are not finding causal links between the symbols they use and the world around them, so they cannot develop an idea of semantics. If the computer was placed inside a robot that could interact with its environment, then we would have something closer to the human development of language.

Searle -> this still involves the manipulation of symbols. To begin with, if there was a camera used to pick up visual information, those images would need to be converted into zeroes and ones so that the zeroes and ones were linked to the symbols in the data base. This is just another layer of the manipulation of symbols, not causal contact with reality. It is not possible for the computer to have our experiences.

Question 14

Describe what is meant by strong and weak AI

Answer 14

Strong AI -> the production of instrinsic intentionality through artificial means. (E.g, computers actually have human intelligence)
Weak AI -> the production of as-if intentionality (the appearance of directedness) through artificial means (e.g, computers imitating human intelligence)

Question 15

Searle’s overall criticism on functional duplicates without intentionality

Answer 15

The formal manipulation of symbols (syntax) cannot produce semantics, so computers can only have as-if intentionality. Strong AI is not possible.

Question 16

Linking multiple realisability and functionalism

Answer 16

Mental properties are multiply realisable because functional properties in general are multiply realisable e.g, being an eye is multiply realisable.
-> Functionalism is compatible with dualism and physicalism because mental states are mental states in virtue of what they do, not in virtue of the nature of the substances or properties that realise those mental states.

Question 17

How is functionalism compatible with physicalism?

Answer 17

Functional properties in general supervene on physical properties - internal structure, inputs and outputs can all be described in terms of its physical properties.
However, functional properties are properties which are realised by physical properties operating in causal relationships,
Functionalism claims that what is true of ‘being an eye’ is true of ‘being a pain’ or ‘being a belief’. Thus, if physicalism is true, then it is a physical substance and its physical states e.g, the physical states of a brain, that realise mental states.

Question 18

Explain the argument that functionalism cannot explain phenomenal properties

Answer 18

P1) Qualia, by definition, are instrinsic, non-intentional properties of conscious mental states.
P2) Intrinsic, non-intentional properties cannot, by definition, be completely analysed in terms of their causal roles.
C1) Therefore, if qualia exist, some mental properties cannot be analysed in terms of their causal roles.
P3) Functionalism claims that all mental properties are functional duplicates which can be completely analysed in terms of their causal roles.
C2) Therefore, if qualia exist, functionalism is false.
P4) Qualia exist.
C3) Therefore, functionalism is false.