R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012]
- The two claimants suffered from irreversible physical disabilities and wanted medical assistance to commit suicide
- Through judicial review, they sought declarations that section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 criminalizing the encouragement or assistance of another person’s suicide was incompatible with article 8 of the ECHR, which establishes the right to respect for private and family life
- The Courts may make a declaration of incompatibility even if the legislative provision in question is within the state’s margin of appreciation based on Strasbourg jurisprudence, but it may be institutionally inappropriate to do so
C v DPP [1996]
- this case was about doli incapax and the age of criminal responsibility
- 12 year old boy caught and tried for interference with a motor vehicle with the intention to commit theft
- he had run away when he saw the police -> Court inferred that he knew what he was doing was wrong & that he’d get in trouble
- Defence could provide no evidence to support the presumption that a child between 10-14 is doli incapax -> this rule stated that unless presumption was rebutted, the child is acquitted
- s.34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 abolished doli incapax for children aged 10 and over
R v Larsonneur (1934)
- Larsonneur was deported from the UK and went to Ireland
- She was deported from Ireland and forced to return to UK
- She was then arrested and charged with breaching the Aliens Order 1920 for “being an alien to whom leave to land in the United Kingdom has been refused was found in the United Kingdom,”
- highlights the harshness of “state of affairs” offences where the offence is merely to be found in certain circumstances -> no requirement for voluntary action from D
R v Robinson-Pierre [2013]
- An offence of allowing a dog to be dangerously out of control in a public place, contrary to section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
- considered a strict liability offence -> nevertheless required proof by the prosecution of an act or omission on the part of D (with or without fault) that to some (more than minimal) degree caused or permitted that prohibited state of affairs to come about
- if Parliament wants to create “state of affairs” offences, it needs to make its intention very clear
R v G and R [2003]
2 boys (Ds) aged 11 and 12 found some newspapers, set fire to them and placed them under a wheelie bin
fire caught and spread, leading to £1 million worth of damage
boys were charged with arson contrary to s.1(1) CDA 1971 -> question was whether they had the mens rea
trial judge (relying on Caldwell [1982]) directed the jury that a defendant would be ‘reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged’ if (a) they were to perform an act that, in fact, creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged, and (b) when doing so, they had either given no thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or not recognized that there is some risk involved and had nonetheless gone on to perform the act
HoL rejected this test, saying test needed to have element of subjectivity to account for young people and mentally incapacitated people
defined ‘recklessness’ as:
A person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to—
(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur;
and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969]
- D was told by a police constable to back up his car but unintentionally drove onto the constable’s foot
- When V told him to drive off his foot, D turned off the ignition of his car instead
- D was convicted of assault on a constable
- issue was that he didn’t have mens rea initially -> D is guilty if the MR arises later, whilst the AR is still ongoing
- provided the definition for assault:
- where D “intentionally, or possibly recklessly, causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence”
SW and CR v United Kingdom [1996]
- applicants complained that they had been held retrospecively liable for a crime (this is against art. 7 ECHR)
- at the time of the offfence, there was still an excuse for rape if you were married
- ECtHR held that it was not unlawful
- UK courts were simply expanding the scope of an existing crime -> this was foreseeable and in line with the evolution of the law -> thus it was possible for applicants to foresee that they could be held liable
R v Kingston [1995]
- D was a paedophile, drugged by P and left in bed with a V (15yrs)
- P wanted blackmail material on D -> D did indecently assault V
- D was convicted -> appealed arguing that he was drugged
- HoL upheld conviction -> drunken intent is still intent
- HoL stated that his intoxication should be taken into account in terms of sentencing, but it doesn’t acquit him if mens rea was present (even if MR was induced by the alcohol/drugs)
