Policy questions/ concerns raised by the fact that
storms of Sandy’s strengths are expected to occur more
frequently:
-Is federal flood insurance that complements land use
management still an appropriate method to manage
flood risk? Does it distribute the burden effectively between the insured and the general public
-Is flood risk possible for the private market to underwrite?
-Could flood risk be effectively transferred to the private
sector (via reinsurance) or the capital markets (via
catastrophe bonds)
-Should the NFIP debt to the Treasury be forgiven
-Are the consequences of flood risk and the level of
protection offered by hurricane protection systems effectively communicated to the public?
4 reasons that Flood insurance is considered to be
uninsurable in the private market:
3 uses of the flood hazard maps developed by FEMA
for NFIP:
What are two conflicting objectives of policymakers:
2. Maintaining the program’s solvency & mandate to provide affordable flood insurance to the public
List some questions raised by the conflicting
policymaker objectives:
Issues with the current NFIP:
-Even though residents who have a federally backed mortgage and live in a floodplain need to have flood insurance, many do not purchase
-Many individuals misunderstand flood risk, thinking that if a 100 year flood occurs, there will be no more floods of the same magnitude for 100 years.
-Many individuals misunderstand the risk spreading function of insurance, and are too optimistic about the chance of damage to their property
-NFIP rates may not adequately reflect the flood risk, because Congress requires that the coverage is widely available and affordable
-FEMA’s new digital maps may not meet appropriate
flood hazard data quality standards.
-The public cost of post disaster recovery financing is
increasing.
2 reasons that hazard mitigation is not always
incorporated into the risk management decision making
of the government and private sector:
3 responsibilities of FEMA regarding hazard maps:
2 changes made to the NFIP by the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012:
2. Reducing incentives for rebuilding in flood risk zones
List some issues of contention that still exist after the
Biggert-Waters Act:
-It is difficult for FEMA to assess the levee-specific risk and corresponding risk premium
-The premium adjustments necessary to strengthen the
financial solvency of the NFIP could result in property
owners dropping their policies
-Experts believe that even if FEMA increases the rates up to the maximum amount allowed (20% per year), they would still have insuffcient funds to cover the obligations.
-FEMA owes $17.5B to the Treasury for losses due to Katrina. Many experts do not believe that FEMA will be able to repay this within 10 years.
List some examples of questions that policymakers ask
when deciding whether to intervene in private insurance
markets:
-Do economic markets provide a sufficient amount of
insurance against flood hazards?
-Are the insuring firms (that cover flood) sufficiently
capitalized so that widespread insolvency would not occur?
-Would federal disaster insurance crowd out the private
market and create unintended liabilities for taxpayers?
-Would insurers cherry pick the most appealing risks, leaving the unprofitable business for the government?
2 ways that the government became a de facto regulator
of economic activity in flood prone areas under NFIP:
List the 4 causes for economic regulation:
3 reasons that premium subsidies are often thought to
be appropriate for flood risk:
List some actions that FEMA has taken to address the
problem of Repetitive Loss Programs:
2 ways that the premium subsidies to RLPS have been
phased out:
2. charging full actuarial rates to owners who do not accept FEMA’s offer to mitigate the impact of flood damage
List some explanations for the low market penetration
of NFIP:
List an argument for expanding the NFIP to offer
optional wind coverage.
This is necessary because of diculties of property owners
obtaining affordable private wind coverage along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts
List an argument against expanding the NFIP to offer
optional wind coverage.
-there is already adequate coverage capacity via the private market or state residual market.
-Adding coverage to the NFIP will increase the financial
exposure to taxpayers.
-NFIP may not necessarily be able to determine actuarially sound rates
-even actuarial rates will not be sufficient to cover
administration costs and losses in the event of a catastrophic event.
List some potential obstacles to offering wind coverage,
as stated by GAO:
-Potential adverse selection
-Communities would have to adopt wind hazard prevention standards
-There is uncertainty about the adoption of programs to
accommodate wind coverage
-Difficulties in establishing a new rate setting process
-Enforcement of new building codes
-Administration & oversight of the program
List some issues that still remain for future
congressional consideration, following the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012:
-The increasing flood risk vulnerability due to frequent
extreme weather events and population growth in flood prone areas
-Affordability of insurance coverage in era of actuarial
premium pricing
-Debt forgiveness
-Accuracy of flood hazard maps and risk assessment methods
-Movement toward a comprehensive integrated watershed management framework of risk perception, risk management, and disaster response strategy
-Feasibility of catastrophe disaster insurance
-Federal disaster assistance and moral hazard
3 questions regarding the increasing flood risk
vulnerability due to frequent extreme weather events
and population growth in flood prone areas
4 questions regarding the Affordability of insurance
coverage in era of actuarial premium pricing
3 questions regarding Debt forgiveness: