cognitivism
view that ethical language can be true or false
Non-cognitivism
view that ethical laguage can’t be true or false
Ethical Naturalism
ethical facts are reducible to natural facts
(cognitivist)
Moral realism
view that moral properties exist in reality
moral anti-realism
view that moral properties don’t exist ii reality
Utilitarianist naturalism
-Bentham claims that goodness = pleasure.
-human nature to find pleasure good
-pleasure is a natural property
“Nature has placed us under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.”
supported by Mill
->happiness is our sole ultimate desire, which is the ‘only proof’ that happiness is good.
Aristotelian naturalism
Aristotle, through his function argument, suggests since it can be observed that all things in the universe have a “function” which is “good”, humans must also have a good function which he claims to be eudaimonia
Hume’s criticism
Hume- is-ought gap-> moral inferences normally made from facts are invalid because they make assumptions rather than justified deductions
We cannot suggest something is ‘good’ and we ought to do it because of an observable fact.
For example, it would be incorrect to assume that ‘donating to charity is morally good’ because of the fact ‘people feel pleasure when they donate to charity’ as the pleasure people receive from donating may not be ‘good’.
Moore’s argument
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy which proposes that it is a fallacy to assume that something being natural means that it is good as there is no valid way of knowing this
Moore’s open-question argument
Aims to show good is a simple, unanalysable quality
Using utilitarianism if the definition is good means achieving the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of ppl Moore asks Is whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number good? Since the question is meaningful the definition cannot be correct
If ethical naturalism was true it wouldn’t make sense to ask an open question
(non-naturalist)
Moore’s argument (2)
Through intuitionism, Moore argues that ethical terms can be objective through our prior knowledge. This is because when we observe or reflect on a moral action and its consequences, we intuitively know whether it was right or wrong.
-> see in society through creation of laws which prohibit acts like stealing and murder
Prichard adds to moore’s arguement by introducing general thinking (thinking which clarifies moral concepts) and moral thinking- reveals what we ought to do-> rationality alone cannot be used to create a moral standard as we intuitively know what is right and wrong
ev- Hare- ‘we should be able to say the reasons behind our moral beliefs’ therefore intuitionism cannot be supported through rationality as our morals created by our intuition are based on emotions.
(Non-cognitivist?)
Criticism of Moore
Mackie argument from relativity
-we have have no reason to think there is a non-natural moral property influences our moral views, esp when there r better explanation for our moral views of social conditioning such as relativism
ev-could explain the moral agreement through evolution and the universal practical requirements for a society to exist.
He is a moral anti-realist is not arguing abt natualism
hume’s argument (2)
theory of motivation-> aims to show moral judgements can’t be caused by reason
reason is “the slave of the passions”. Reason can only create beliefs about how to satisfy/achieve our desired ends.
desire is the foundational motivator of moral judgements, not reason. Ethical language thus expresses non-cognitive desires.
Counter for intuitionism
Haidt criticism of Hume
argues Hume goes to far with callig reason a ‘slave’.
compares emotions to elephant a d reason to a rider-> rider can control the general direction of the rider of the elephant like human’s reason can control their general behaviour despite their emotions
cognitive
Ayer argument
Through emotivism, Ayer argues that moral judgements come from our feelings rather than reason, so when we use ethical terms to describe something, we are simply expressing non-cognitions (such as disapproval). He illustrates this with the boo/hurrah theory: saying ‘X is wrong’ is equivalent to saying ‘boo to X,’ and ‘X is good’ is equivalent to saying ‘hurrah to X.’ This means ethical language expresses emotions and cannot be true or false. This aligns with human psychology as moral debates seem like emotional conflict which is why moral debates are often described as ‘heated’.
Hume’s arguement
Synthetic judgements, only known a posteriori.
Analytic judgements, only known a priori.
Ayer’s verification principle expanded this to become the criteria of meaningful cognitive language. A statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable through experience.
’ Ethical statements are not synthetic nor empirically verifiable. Moral properties like ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ do not exist in experience as they are not observable.
-> moral judgements are neither analytic nor synthetic (Hume), nor empirically verifiable (Ayer).
Philippa Foot argument
supported aristotelian virute ethics through belief in objective morality
believe humans have natural normativity- living beings should be evaluated based on how well they perform their functions and for humans this rationaliy, social cooperation and moral reasoning
Argues moral judgements are types of natural evaluations similar to saying a plant is healthy
Moral defects are natural defects-> if a person is morally ignorant they have a natural defect in their social and moral functioning
cognitive
Hare’s argument
moral statements are like universal recommendations as they are non-cognitive and cannot be true or false. For example, ‘stealing is wrong’ means ‘don’t steal’ which isn’t an objective fact but prescribing a universal rule
non-cognitive
Kant’s argument
cognitive
Cultural Relativism
some action tht are seen as bad by other countries are seen as good by others
e.g. polygamy- from a western standpoint is seen as wrong but many west african societies see it as good- status symbol
Golden nugget
‘The limits of my language are the limits of my world’ – Wittgenstein