1
Q
Explanations for the Ukrainian Conflict (Fomin)
A
- International reputation & great power politics (Держава) (NATO enlargement)
- Ukrainian domestic politics (complex ethnic identities)
- Russian domestic politics (poor decision-making, domestic support)
- Putin’s worldview (Russian empire/neutral buffer)
2
Q
Mearsheimer’s Argument
A
Western strategy to expand NATO has triggered Putin’s red-line; Ukraine is a “de-facto member of NATO”
3
Q
Timeline of the Ukrainian Crisis (Mearsheimer)
A
- 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit = Russian red-line
- 2014 U.S.-backed regime change –> Russian annexation
- 2021 Russian draft-treaties on Ukraine-NATO relations rejected –> war
4
Q
Kotkin’s Argument
A
The Ukraine Crisis is predictable Russian behavior (autocracy, militarism, imperialism, suspicion); NATO has actually helped West be in a better position
5
Q
War was a miscalculation (Kotkin)
A
Bad information pipeline due to autocracy; “силовеки” cautious of Western involvement
6
Q
Beauchamp’s Argument
A
1) Putin believes Ukraine is rightfully part of Russia separated by historical accident
2) Ukraine’s illegitimate pro-West, anti-Russian stance is unacceptable (views Ukraine as oppressing Russian speakers; fearful of U.S.-backed regime change)
7
Q
Gelman Argument
A
Russia invaded Ukraine due to poor autocratic decision-making errors (“pockets of efficiency (not caring about long-term costs; placement of loyal & incompetent advisors)
8
Q
Marten Argument
A
Putin is rational even w/ the information shortage, but miscalculations are increasingly likely w/ more Western involvement
9
Q
Rationality Requirements (Marten)
A
1) Rational actor has a set of goals that they act on
2) The actor’s goals are more or less consistently prioritized
3) The actor searches for information before taking action
10
Q
Putin’s Goals (Marten)
A
1) Stay in control of Russia for as long as possible
2) Go down in history for making Russia great again
11
Q
Causes of Information Shortage (Marten)
A
1) Messengers fear personal consequences of delivering uncomfortable truths
2) Putin has personally isolated himself & ignores facts he doesn’t want to believe
3) Russian leadership itself is very old & unlikely to be inventive
12
Q
Why Russia is a large player in international affairs
A
Largest country by landmass, #1 war participator, epicenter of 20th cen. death
13
Q
Security Dilemma
A
Anarchy, self-help & uncertain motivations –> mutual insecurity
14
Q
O-D balance
A
More or less costly to attack vs. defend (offensive/defensive advantage); Russia = offensive advantage
15
Q
O-D distinguishability
A
Degree to which defense can be differentiated (low vs. high distinguishability); Russia = low distinguishability
16
Q
Grand Themes in Russian FP
A
Expansion Autocracy Prestige/Great Power status Backwardness Ambiguity of identity
17
Q
Poe Timeline
A
- Slavs come to east-central Eurasia → Kievan Rus’ → Mongols (taxers)
[Mongols did not alter course of Russian history (did not settle/alter culture)] - Rise of Muscovy (favored by Mongols) → “gathering up” of lands
[Ivan the Great exploited backwardness to extract resources from conquered lands; Muscovite Russia not historical successor of Rus’ (location/time/Mongols)] - Gathering up of non-Russian lands (Mongols, Tartars)
- Alexander II defeats Napoleon’s army (peak Russian moment)
[Romanovs massively expand borders of Russian Empire & give legitimacy; “Russia’s competitors had empires, Russia was an empire”] - Soviet Union industrialized & developed Russia into a superpower
18
Q
Poe Argument (The Russian Moment)
A
Distinct, different civilization to neighboring countries; stood up to empires due to…
1) Autocracy
2) Closed economy
3) Geography (inaccessible by sea)
4) Competition w/ West & threat of Europe
19
Q
Timeline of Revolution–>WWII
A
- Bolshevik Revolution (1917)
[Appealed to minority ethnic groups by granting federal republic (SSR) status; backwardness → rapid top-down industrialization & collectivization of agriculture] - Operation Barbossa: Hitler invades the USSR on June 22, 1941
[Killed ~30 million Soviets; divisions (~10,000) wiped out in a day] - Soviets defeat Germany → bipolarity of US & USSR
20
Q
Soviet post-war aims
A
1) Making sure Germany & Japan are kept down
2) Securing buffer zone in E. Europe (“defensively-motivated revisionist”
3) Attempting to cooperate w/ war allies (needed legitimacy & aid)
21
Q
Cold War Triggers
A
1) Atomic power imbalance
2) Marshall Plan & NATO
3) U.S. refuses to back pro-Soviet govts; need for buffer zone
22
Q
End of WWII thoughts (Pechatnov)
A
- USSR was devastated yet incredibly optimistic
- Belief that WWII showed ultimate success of communism (legitimacy)
- Destroyed both Japan & Germany; held military control of Europe
- New status as great power & member of Grand Alliance
23
Q
Soviet post-war aims in E. Europe (Pechatnov)
A
- Wanted to expand to defend itself from hostile world (“Barbarossa Syndrome”)
- Believed it deserved compensation
- Attempted to appease West to negotiate new borders & German issue
24
Q
Negative shift in U.S.-Soviet realtions (Pechatnov)
A
- Hiroshima (global balance of power shift)
- Truman Doctrine & Marshall Plan
- Stalin announces “war preparations” –> Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech
- NATO
- Sovietization of E. Europe (Warsaw Pact )
25
Post-war difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations (Pechatnov)
1. Postwar treatment of Germany
2. Western propaganda against USSR
3. Future of Eastern Europe
26
Long Telegram Argument
1. Soviet Union does not see peaceful coexistence w/ West
- Fears & expects "capitalist encirclement""; battle w/ communism inevitable
- Neurotic view of world affairs” due to “innately Russian sense of insecurity”
- Deeply suspicious of all nations; power only be achieved by total control
2. USSR will attempt to expand its sphere of influence
- Comintern spreading world communism; infiltrating West
- Attempting to weaken influence of West in post-Soviet space
3. Stalin understands military inferiority & is rational
- Soviet expansionism can be countered w/ containment
27
Cold War Debate
1. Orthodox: US was deterring an expansionist USSR (containment, “Long Telegram”)
2. Revisionist: USSR was deterring an expansionist US (Soviet view)
3. Post-revisionist: security dilemma (desire for security, defense misinterpreted)
28
Underlying conditions of the Cold War
1. Bipolarity
2. Nuclear deterrence/arms race
3. Loss of Russian ‘marchland’ advantage (rise of Asian powers)
4. Soviet expansionism into Third World (Cuba, Africa, China, Vietnam, Korea)
29
Cold War events
1. Berlin Crisis (GDR's intellectual drainage --> Berlin Wall --> Cuban Missile Crisis)
2. 'Mature' Cold War (proxy wars, nuclear parity, detente)
3. 'New Cold War' (Afghanistan invasion, US embargo, "Able Archer" war scare)
30
Khrushchev's final years (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- 1960 harvests dissapointing --> import grain from West
- declining living standards & ↑ interaction w/ West
- Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) largely failed
- End of terror & new cultural thaw → seeds of eventual disintegration
31
Brezhnev (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- Originally wanted to coexist w/ West; less dependent on ideology
- Rapid military buildup in mid-60s due to nuclear inferiority
- Prague Spring invasion to prevent domino effect → “Brezhnev Doctrine”
32
Detente Timeline (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- 70s nuclear parity + need for economic aid --> push for detente
- CSCE Helsinki Accords legitimized Soviet borders, yet assured human rights
- Despite SALT talks, USSR continued proxies in Vietnam & Angola
33
Brinkmanship (Hershberg)
Displaying confidently the nerve to risk nuclear war; i.e. pushing U.S. to evacuate W. Berlin by threatening routes to W. Germany
34
Nuclear status @ time of Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
U.S. = 27,300; Soviets = 3,300 (capability to destroy world in just
35
Explanations for Cuban Missile Crisis (Hershberg)
1. Nuclear inferiority: needed to move nukes closer to U.S.
2. Cuban Defense: missiles were intended to protect Castro from U.S. aggression
3. Cold War Politics: wanted to swap missiles in Cuba for Turkish nukes
4. Berlin: missiles in Cuba increased bargaining power in Berlin (trade)
5. Communist Leadership: signal of retaking communist leadership from China
6. Living Standards: nuclear deterrence → military ↓ & focus on ↑ living standards
36
Cuban Missile Crisis Timeline (Hershman)
1. Kennedy blockades Cuba & announces quarentine to pressure Khrushchev to de-arm island (airstrike & military invasion too risky)
2. "Black Sunday": Khrushchev demands missiles withdrawn from Turkey
3. Cuba gets Khruschev to remove missiles for promise to not invade island
4. Crisis averted; age of relative stability (hotline, arms control, Berlin cooled)
37
Khrushchev-Kennedy relations (Zubok & Pleshkov)
- Khrushchev originally supported Kennedy, wanted peaceful coexistence
- Bay of Pigs immediately soured relations (Moscow tipped off Castro)
38
Khrushchev's Strategies (Zubok & Pleshakov)
1. Brinkmanship
2. Strategic deception (hiding of nuclear imbalance; warning of new "superbomb")
3. Diplomacy (defensive line on Bay of Pigs)
39
Factors in Fall of USSR
1. Fall of Soviet growth rate
2. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
3. Gorbachev’s new thinking
4. Helsinki Awards (Soviets agreed to human rights provisions)
40
End of the Cold War Debate
- Orthodox: containment worked
- Revisionist: Western & U.S. expansionism triumphed
- Post-revisionist: Gorbachev transcended the security dilemma
41
Caveats to the "Gorbachev Revolution" (Brown)
- Not the work of Gorbachev alone
- Not popular/bottom-up due to strict Soviet hierarchy
- Did not truly transform the Soviet system, only reformed
- By the time actual reforms occurred (‘88), it was too late
42
Perestroika (Brown)
- Needed to increase living standards
- Cut military troops; withdrew from Afghanistan
- Ended Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty
43
"Common Security" (Brown)
Cannot gauruntee security at the expense of someone else (U.S.) (nuclear weapons are a threat & not strength)
44
Implications of trust (Kydd)
1. Cooperation requires a certain degree of trust between states
2. Conflict is a sign that one or more states are untrustworthy
3. Hegemony can promote trust if the hegemon is trustworthy
45
Application of trust in Cold War (Kydd)
1. Soviet expansion → mistrust → failure to cooperate
| 2. Gorbachev’s “costly signaling” led to cooperation & end to Cold War
46
Proposed alternatives to NATO (Sarotte)
1) Gorbachev’s new post-Cold War pan-European security structure
2) Expansion of the Warsaw Pact into Germany
3) Reformed & reinforced CSCE
4) Rejection of all military alliances
47
Timeline of NATO Expansion (Sarotte)
1. Bush pushes to maintain U.S.'s influence in Europe
2. Bush promises Gorbachev he won't expand NATO eastward (for agreeing to unify Germany)
3. NATO expands; U.S. succeeds
48
Use of seperatism
Seperatism = lever of Russian influence in E. Europe (deters states from joining NATO/EU, increases Russian power)
49
Rise of Russian oligarchs
- Smart investors sold products for huge profits in new market economy
- "Loans for Shares" allowed rich business-owners to loan $ to gov. in exchange for more shares in businesses
50
1990s identity reformulation (Tsygankov)
1) Radical economic reform (U.S. aid & “shock therapy”)
2) Rapid joining of Western intl. institutions
3) Isolationism from former Soviet states (< relationship w West)
51
Shift away from pro-West stance (Tsygankov)
- Chechnya crisis
- Economic crisis → avg. income plummets
- NATO expansion (perception of West taking advantage of Russian weakness)
52
Democratization efforts of early 1990s
1) Promote civil society, rule of law, elections, free media
2) Economic reform & privatization
3) Denuclearization
53
Opposing Domestic Forces in NATO expansion (Goldgeier)
1. Liberalits want to develop democracies & market economies --> NATO enlargement
2. Realists wary of triggering Russia --> no NATO enlargement
54
Timeline of NATO expansion (Goldgeier)
- Partnership for Peace (1994) offered as a compromise to include Russia
- Open Door Policy --> E. Europe reforms to potentially join NATO
- NATO expands in 1990s
55
Level III Foreign Policy Analysis
International System (Systemic): anarchic structure of int. system drives behavior [Russia vs. NATO/West]
56
Core Assumptions of Realism (Wohlforth)
1. Groupism: humans naturally categorize themselves into groups
2. Egoism: humans act out of self-interest
3. Power-centrism: humans want power
57
Main Beliefs of Realism (Wohlforth)
1. States respond to external (not internal) threats
2. IR is oriented towards states of great power
3. “Side goals” besides achieving power & security are rarely legitimate
4. With no central authority (anarchy), politics is innately conflictual
58
Schools of Realism (Wohlforth)
- Neoclassical realism: attempt to explain complexities & patterns
- Defensive realism: geography & technology change war & defense potential
- Offensive realism: peace & defensive barriers will never last
59
Balance of Power Theory (Wohlforth)
States prevent dominating states by balancing their power
60
Balance of Threat Theory (Wohlforth)
States respond to the threat of others (geography/hostile intentions)
61
Hegemonic Stability Theory (Wohlforth)
Hegemonic states will seek to establish international order & hierarchy
62
Power Transition Theory (Wohlforth)
As states become stronger, they will seek leadership and will clash
63
Wohlforth Argument ("The Russian-Soviet Empire")
- Russia has a bias toward expansion; forced into costly wars & rule over people with developed identities
- Decisions are often “path-dependent” on past decisions (high cost of switching back: suboptimal policy or sudden reverses)
64
Themes in Russian & Soviet policy
1. Security problem (vulnerability, offensive advantage, “conquer of be conquered”)
2. Relative backwardness (autocracy, expansion > modernization, top-down economy)
3. Security dilemmas (“vulnerable but provocative”)
65
Kropatcheva Argument
Realism can explain the Ukraine crisis (i.e. West/NATO), but domestic factors can tilt FP (i.e. perception of power)
66
Tooze Argument
- Realism has its origins in imperialism & colonialism, opposed to universal, fundamental rights
- We should be wary of normalizing & legitimizing war
67
Level II Foreign Policy Analysis
The State (Domestic): structure & nature of government/preferences of domestic actors [Putin invaded Crimea to raise popular support & distract from other issues]
68
McFaul Argument
Putin himself chose the path to Russian authoritarianism; has always sought to weaken checks on his power
69
Putin's authoritarian actions
1. Nationalizing media; promoting state ownership & patronage system
2. Increasing censorship, persecution & cracking down on dissent
3. Weakening regional leaders, opposing parties & NGOs
70
Putinism
1. Views U.S. as hostile & antithetical to Russian national interests (KGB)
2. Championing sovereignty (mad about U.S. imperialism & foreign adventurism)
3. “Illiberal, conservative nationalism”; traditional, Christian view on world
71
Russian authoritarianism (Gelman)
1. Unfair & fraudulent elections
2. Weak political parties w/ a dominant ‘party of power’
3. Unchecked power → ability to use violence to achieve goals
4. Heavily censored media & state-sponsored propaganda
72
Critical junctures in Russian authoritarianism (Gelman)
- 1993: Yeltsin violently attacks parliament; unchecked powers granted to president
- 2007-2008: Medvedev serves as front for Putin; presidential terms extended
- 2014: Yanukovych ousted; Russia annexes Crimea; further perversion of democracy
73
Timeline of Putin's Rise (Zygar)
1. Yeltsin names Putin (KGB) as opponent against hard-line communist Primakov (communists had lots of support against unpopular 'Family')
2. Yeltsin retires --> Putin becomes president
3. Unity party (Putin & Yeltsin) allies w/ communists against FAR (Primakov)
74
Timeline of Putin's first term (Zygar)
1) Putin attempts to build good relations w/ West (meetings w/ Blair & Bush, "fat decade")
2) Begins loosing popular support (Crack down on oligarchs (Gusinsky), Kursk submarine disaster --> media crackdown, debt crisis, Nord-Ost attack)
3) Increased frustration w/ U.S. (keeps base in Kyrgystan, War in Iraq)
75
Level I Foreign Policy Analysis
The Individual/Psychology: human characterists & psychology of leader (Putin invaded Crimea because he is a bold, military-trained risk-taker)
76
Heuristics
Decision-makers are cognitive-misers & develop heuristics to reduce complexity; heuristics are often collective (i.e. FP belief systems or group decision-making)
77
Groupthink
Groups can reach suboptimal & irrational conclusions when consensus > best solution
- Often includes omitting clear facts & ignoring unwanted information
- Heightened w/ Putin's concentrated "siloveki" group
78
Prospect Theory
People are risk-avese in gains & risk-seekers in losses
| -When framed as avoiding the loss of neutral buffer, Putin took big risks
79
Operational Codes/Strategic Culture
ideological group notions/rules
- for Russia, focus on great power status, historical vulnerability & internal secrecy
- for Putin, rooted in military/KGB eye-for-an-eye vengeance
- following old international norms, i.e. treaties, military land power
80
Personal Psychology
'Putinism': stoicism & rationality; prone to combat
81
Larson & Savchenko Argument
Russia's inability to gain status has led to frustration and vengefulness, especially in light of Western consolidation
82
Self-concept (Larson & Savchenko)
Set of all individual's beliefs about their personal qualities
-We group ourselves w/ individuals w/ similar qualities (ingroup)
83
Ways states strive for a positive, distinctive identity
1. Social mobility (moving up in established hierarchy/order (i.e. 1990s))
2. Social creativity (revising standards of status (i.e. territory, history, hegemon)
3. Social conflict (competition w/ higher-ranked states)
84
Russian strategic preferences
1. Strong preference for loss avoidance relative to pursuit of opportunistic gain
- Russia seeks to mitigate deteriorating situations by restoring status quo
- Takes greater risks to prevent defeats than for opportunities (Prospect)
2. Heavy concern for confrontation with NATO
- Uses coercion (gradual low-intensity “coercive force”) before full military
85
Russian decision-making
1. Decisions made by Putin & his tight-knit "siloveki" inner circle
- belief in central control, military power & one ruling group
- Groupthink & confirmation bias --> suboptimal decisisons
86
Russian strategic culture
1. View of post-Cold War history (geopolitical)
2. Russia's place in international system
3. Role of Russia in Eastern Europe
87
Russian view of post-Cold War history (geopolitical)
- West took advantage of Russian weakness to expand into Europe
- Intervention in Serbia → statehood = OK to use force to change borders
88
Russia's place in international system
1. Russians seek to restore great power status (primus inter pares)
- Seeks to have sphere of influence & have privileged interests
- Believe that great power status is inherited, not earned economically
2. Sees U.S. as adversary who seeks to weaken, contain & break up Russia
- Viewed as a revisionist power & unconstrained by intl. Norms
3. International system = hostile & threatening (Russia is vulnerable)
89
Role of Russia in Eastern Europe
- Maintains buffer states in post-Soviet space (“extended defense”)
- “Limited sovereignty” maintained via economic integration
- Seeks to prevent expansion of Western blocs into Russia’s border
90
Russian Strategic Objectives
1. Maximizing security
2. Quest for hegemony (i.e. privileged sphere of influence)
3. Ending American primacy (unipolar intl. System → multipolarity)
91
Russian vulnerabilities
1. Manpower limitations (not enough troops to hold territory; lack of reserves)
2. Horizontal escalation (large amount of territory needed to defend)
3. Lack of alles
4. Structurally dysfunctional economy
92
Discourse Types
1. Thematic (nuclear safety, environmental, human rights, etc.)
2. Ideological (conservative, racist, leftist, etc.)
3. Personal (Putin’s, Patrushev’s, Merkel’s, etc.)
4. Institutional (State Duma, European Commission, US Senate, etc.)
5. By mode (visual, verbal, etc.)
93
Discursive Strategies
1. Nomination: construction of social groups (in/out groups, tropes)
2. Predication: specific social actors/events/processes
3. Augmentation: questioning of claims of truth & rightness
- Topoi: premises necessary to move from an argument to conclusion
- Fallacies: logic-breakers in argument
94
Nominization Strategies in Putin's Speech
1. “External forces”/”The West”/”Ukraine’s Western patrons”/”Foreign advisors”
2. “Radicals & nationalists”/”Neo-Nazis”/”Terrorists”/”Local Elites”
3. “Compatriots”/”Bound by blood”/”Historically Russian”/”Law-abiding”
95
Predication Strategies in Putin's Speech
1. Bill Clinton & the West: “cheaters”/”dishonest”/lied about NATO expansion
2. Ukrainian oligarchs/radicals: took advantage, funded by US, robbed Ukrainians
3. Soviet leaders (i.e. Bolsheviks): split & destroyed the Russian Empire
96
Augmentation Strategies in Putin's Speech
1. Ukraine was never an independent state
2. Neo-Nazism & radicalism in Ukraine
3. Right to pick own security systems/alliances is not inalienable
97
Topoi in Putin's Speech
1. Culture (“right to speak their own language, preserve culture & traditions”)
2. Human rights (“Ukrainian military cracked down on freedom of speech, dissent”)
3. Law (“Article 17 of Constitution of Ukraine”; “equal & indivisible security)
4. History (Bolsheviks responsible for separating Russia & Ukraine)
98
Karagnov Argument
The Ukrainian conflict is the West's fault and will only end if Ukraine is demilitarized & neutral
99
Timofeev Argument
The Ukrainian crisis was a bad idea, but there may be hope
100
Lukyanov Argument
Russia is using Ukraine as a chance for Russia to reconstruct the unfavorable global order (make a new order where Russia is at the lead) using "old political thinking"
101
Kortunov Argument
Ukraine is the "last act" of Russia coming to terms with its dissolving imperial legacy
102
Causes of the Ukrainian Conflict (Karagnov)
1. NATO’s militarization of Ukraine to be closer to Russia
2. Russophobia & neo-Nazism in Ukraine & West
3. Distrust in promises to not expand NATO; pre-emptive first strike
103
Russian view of the Ukrainian Conflict (Karagnov)
- Need to secure at least a portion of Ukraine that is friendly to Russia
- Russia is on same moral playing field as America, who has committed many crimes
- Desire to build a new international system from post-Cold War world order
104
Threats to Russia (Timofeev)
1. External threats (geographical & historical vulnerability, consolidated West)
2. Underdevelopment (lack of public administration & independent economy)
3. Statehood crisis (potential for popular revolution or overhaul of elites)
[Sanctions → resource scarcity → resentment among society & elites]
105
Ukrainain Crisis (Timofeev)
1. NATO poses an existential security threat to Russia
2. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine → West has escalated even more militarily
3. Could turn out favorable for Russia
- Russia no longer has to conform to U.S.-led international system
- Anti-Russian sentiment makes Russia a “haven” for Russian speakers
106
Lukyanov's view of world order
- Russia gave up trying to be part of the Western international order in 2022
- Western hegemonic structures never truly wanted Russia incorporated
- West went back on intl. agreements (Serbia, Iraq/Afghanistan, etc.)
107
Old Political Thinking (Lukyanov)
Emphasis on balance of power & classical military conflict
| -Opposite of Gorbachev's liberalist perestroika
108
Dissolution of the USSR (Kortunov)
1. Dissolution of the USSR was strangely peaceful because it did not actually collapse; only initiated gradual disintegration
2. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meant to consolidate post-Soviet space, but failed
3. Identity formation of post-Soviet states --> anti-Russian nationalism & creation of false histories
109
Causes for the failure of CIS (Kortunov)
1. Differing trajectories of post-Soviet states
2. Western suspicion
3. Big brother syndrome
110
Why Russia is not a regional leader (Kortunov)
1. Failed to find an effective model for social & economic modernization
2. Conflicts in post-Soviet space damaged relations
3. Growing economic connections away from Russia
111
Factors that can effect O-D balance
- technology
- geography
- nationalism
- accumulation of resources
112
Most important factor in causing Cold War
Marshall Plan
113
Carter Doctrine vs. Reagan Doctrine
Carter: placement of off-shore forces to defer Soviets in Persian Gulf
Reagan: supporting Third-World countries in "resisting Soviet-supported aggression"
114
Perestroika vs. Glasnost
Perestroika: economic reform & liberalization
Glasnost: liberalization of society, opening of society, promotion of civil society
115
Examples of Gorbachev's "costly signaling"
- Giving up more missiles than US
- Agreeing to human rights provisions
- Withdrawing from Afghanistan
116
Russian Political Divides of early 1990s
- Liberals: Russia should join Western institutions; non-democratic states = threat
- Social Democrats (Gorbachev): main threat = disrespect for pluralism & rights
- Statists (Primakov): maintaining great power status; threat = revisionist states
- Communists: restoring the socialist US; main threat = West
- Eurasianists: main threats = sea-based powers
Russian Foreign Policy Midterm
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