Which things does Locke try to distinguish the identity conditions for at the start of the chapter?
It being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity:
What does Locke say about what animal identity consists in?
An animal is a living organized body; and consequently, the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form: since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot.
What colourful example does Locke employ to show that the conditions for men differ from those of persons?
The prince, ’tis plain, who vouches this story, and our author who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot; and I ask any one else who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked as we have a prince’s word for it, this one did, whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals, but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be men and not parrots? For I presume ’tis not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea of a man in most peoples’ sense; but of a body so and so shaped joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must as well as the same immaterial spirit go to the making of the same man.
What is a person?
This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.
What is person identity?
In this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and ’tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.
What example does Locke use to distinguish the identity conditions of souls and humans?
But yet the soul alone in the change of bodies would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to every body determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself.
What is the text in the Essay where Locke discusses the drunk and sober man?
But is not a man drunk and sober the same person, why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge: because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet humane judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.
What does Locke say about how the significance of personal identity as a forensic term?
It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present.
What does Locke say about the significance of divine judgement?
For supposing a man punished now, for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the apostle tells us that at the great day, when every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open. The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them.
How does Allison explain the Molyneux objection?
Locke’s analysis of the drunkard and the sleepwalker was criticized by Molyneux, who insisted upon distinguishing between the two examples. The sleepwalker, Molyneux argued, is not responsible for his condition, and should not therefore be punished for anything he might do while in it. But since drunkenness is itself a crime, the drunkard is subject to punishment for any further crimes committed while in this condition. To this Locke replied that whatever merit this argument may have, it is irrelevant to his purpose since it has nothing to do with consciousness, and moreover, he adds: “. . . it is an argument against me, for if a man may be punished for any crime which he committed when drunk, whereof conscious, it overturns my hypothesis.” However, when Molyneux restated the argument, and contended that drunkenness is a voluntarily induced state, and thus the drunkard should be punished for the consequences thereof, while sleepwalking therefore the somnambulist should not be held accountable for his actions, Locke capitulated. He admits that “want of consciousness ought not to be presumed in favor of the drunk.
What is Butler’s objection?
One should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity.
How does Winkler respond to Butler’s objection?
Butler fails realize that for Locke, consciousness of a past act is merely a representation of it as one’s own; it is not knowledge of the preexisting fact that the act was one’s own. If it were, Butler would be right to reply that consciousness cannot constitute identity. It might seem that Locke is no better off if consciousness is merely a representation of a past act, because circularity is then avoided only at the price of insufficiency: merely representing a past act as mine cannot make it mine. But it is enough on the notion of the self I have identified. So Locke avoids both circularity and insufficiency.
What is Reid’s brave officer objection?
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows…that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far as his flogging—therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore, the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at school.
How does Winkler defend Locke from the brave officer objection?
However, this does not undermine Locke’s claim that consciousness constitutes the self. It shows only that a momentary consciousness is insufficient. The self is constituted over time: past actions once appropriated cannot later be disowned without threatening personal identity. The self thus retains authority, but as a continuing rather than instantaneous consciousness, limited only by the logic of identity.
How does Jolly characterise Reid’s objection of internal inconsistency?
Reid argued that Locke’s theory was internally inconsistent. Reid observes that in denying that sameness of person entails sameness of substance Locke implies that persons are not substances, and thereby embroils himself in contradiction. For Locke also defines a person as a ‘thinking thing’ and, according to Reid, Locke’s basic meaning for ‘substance’ is simply that of thing.
How does Jolly suggest a general defence to Reid’s objection?
Reid is clearly right that a person is, by Locke’s definition, a thinking thing, but he is wrong in his account of what it is to be a substance for Locke. The reply to be made on Locke’s behalf is that when he denies that persons are necessarily substances, what is at issue is a stronger sense of the term ‘thing’ than when he calls persons things. Such a defence of Locke might take two complementary forms.
What is the first defence that Jolly suggests involving the substratum?
In the first place, we might come to his rescue by invoking his famous account of the substratum, which is supposed to be an ingredient of our concept of any kind of substance. When Locke denies that personal identity over time entails the identity of a substance, he may be denying that it entails the identity of a substratum (where a substratum is supposed to be unobservable even in principle). By contrast, to say that a person is a thinking thing of some sort is not to say that there is an unobservable substratum or bare particular in which its mental properties inhere.
What is the second defence that Jolly suggest involving substances as things which persist through time?
Secondly, and more promisingly perhaps, we can mount a defence of Locke by invoking the traditional definition of substance. From Aristotle onwards, a substance is not just the bearer of properties, or ultimate subject of predication; it is that which persists uninterruptedly through changes of qualities. But of course, as we have seen, Locke has dropped the requirement of strict temporal continuity for personal identity over time; persons, for Locke, are beings of the sort which may have gappy histories. Thus, if persons are things, it is in a weaker sense than that which is implied by the traditional Aristotelian understanding of what it is to be a substance.
How does Jolly suggest that a person is a ‘thing’ in the sense that the monarchy is a ‘thing’?
It seems accurate to say that a person, for Locke, is less like a substance than it is like an institution. A monarchy, for example, is not intuitively a substance, but it is in some weak sense a thing; the term is at least a substantive, and it is perfectly coherent to say that it is a thing of which people can approve or disapprove. The analogy can be developed further. Just as the same monarchy may be successively realised in different human beings, so for Locke, it seems, a person can be successively realised in different immaterial substances. And further, we can say that the English monarchy in 1660 was the same institution as the monarchy in 1640, despite the fact that it ceased to exist in the Interregnum.
How does Jolly suggest a problem for Locke’s account on the basis of genuine versus merely apparent memories?
Although Locke tends to speak of stretching consciousness backwards, it is generally accepted that his theory offers an analysis of personal identity in terms of memory. It is then said that, in order to be remotely plausible, it must be genuine remembering which is at issue; otherwise his theory will have wildly counter-intuitive consequences. For example, if honest pseudo-memories are allow to count, it will follow that George IV was indeed the same person as the one who led British troops to victory at Waterloo, for towards the end of his life this monarch honestly suffered from the delusion that he had done just this. But in that case Locke’s theory may be in trouble. The worry takes the following form. Philosophers have pointed out that the concept of genuine memory is a causal one; genuine remembering is causally related to the original experience which is recalled. Now the causal links which are involved in such genuine remembering must run through one and the same body. But then the memory criterion simply collapses into the criterion of bodily continuity. Employing one of his own strategies of argument, we can thus confront Locke with a dilemma, either his theory is wildly counterintuitive in its consequences or it does not offer an analysis of personal identity which is independent of bodily continuity.
What potential solution does Jolly suggest for Locke to go through the horns of the dilemma?
Some philosophers have sought to respond to this objection on Locke’s behalf by going through the horns of the dilemma. According to this line of defence, we should agree that his theory needs to be couched in terms of genuine memory and that the concept of genuine memory is indeed a causal one. None the less, there is no need to accept the further thesis that the causal links require sameness of body. It is conceivable that there should be transfers of consciousness across different bodies such that the later consciousness is caused by an earlier consciousness in a different body. In this way, then the memory criterion does not simply collapse into the criterion of bodily continuity. This is at least conceivable. However, this does not seem suitable for the purposes of divine justice. Any causal theory seems to have a problem explaining how the memories that someone has in heaven could be causally related to an original action caused in another world and a body that no longer exists.
What is wrong with Butler’s objection to Locke?
Unfortunately for Butler, it seems that he has misread Locke. Locke does not mean by ‘consciousness of a past act’ that one has preexisting knowledge that it was one’s own. It is merely representation of it as one’s own (Winkler 1991, 205-06). However, Locke’s view here is not plausible. I can represent in my memory myself walking down the street. I can represent in my memory my friend walking down the street. I distinguish the first by it being me, it is the same person as I am now. While Butler’s interpretation of Locke is poorly supported textually, it is the more plausible interpretation of memory than that which Locke himself gives.
Perhaps it is distinguished by sameness of perspective?
What reason does Locke provide as to why we punish the drunkard although he might be a different person to the one that committed the crime?
Human courts cannot distinguish truth from lies. Someone might say that they had no memory while they actually did. So this defence cannot be allowed.
However, on the Day of Judgement, we will be punished only for what we can remember.
What reason does Molyneux provide as to why we punish the drunkard?
Drunkenness is a voluntary act and the law holds us responsible for the consequences of our voluntary acts.
