1
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Analytical Tools
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- Models that simplify reality and reduce complexity. - Analysts make choices on what to put in their model and what to leave out, therefore each model will paint a different picture
2
Q
Levels of Analysis
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- refer to different perspectives and scales at which a situation can be examined, to analyse and understand political phenomena from various dimensions.
- Beginning at a micro level and then moving away to the mezzo and finally macro level, the aim of this model is to reduce complexity through organising contributing factors into these three categories, determining what can be left out and what is essential to explaining the outcome.
3
Q
Micro/ individual level
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Examines U.S President JFK and characteristics unique to himself himself, how did his personality, personal motivations, opinions, influence his decisions and the overall outcome
4
Q
Mezzo/state level
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- Examines the environment in which the individual operated, in this case the U.S Gov. its characteristics, policies, national interests, security concerns, foreign policy objectives
5
Q
Macro/systemic level
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Examines the broader context of the Cold War, the opposing ideologies of the U.S and Russia towards communism, considering the impact of alliances and global power politics on the development and resolution of the crisis.
6
Q
According to Harmann (3 characteristics to a crisis)
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- A significant threat to something that we value
- An element of surprise → if you were expecting it, it was not a crisis
- Time constraints on our abilities to make decisions
7
Q
Harmann’s Decision Cube
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Three dimensions: Time, threat, and awareness.
- the box represents different environments which lead to different outcomes… the further away your get the lesser the level of the crisis and ultimate crises is at the corner of the box where all three variables intersect.
- the likelihood of good and bad decisions can differ depending on where you are in the box.
8
Q
Rational Policy
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- This model, used to analyse the process of decision making, focuses on the decision maker itself.
- It treats the government as a single, unitary actor, acting rationally in order to achieve clear and well defined goals through the most beneficial and least costly solution.
- The actor is able to implement the solution well and ultimately come to the correct decision.
9
Q
Bureaucratic Model
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- Decisions are made by government organizations.
- The state is a collection of bureaucrats, heads of departments, military, administration, each representing their own bureaucracy and influenced by their preferences that will further their own interests and bureaucracy.
- Each bureaucracy is competing for power, and thus the decision that is chosen was not necessarily the rational one, but the result of the balance of power and bureaucratic infights.
10
Q
Organizational Model
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- The model posits that the government is not a single, unified actor but a collection of various organisations with distinct interests and cultures.
- Organisations are not fully rational, when faced with a problem they don’t think about it rationally, instead they take an automatic response through standard operating procedures.
- These standard operating procedures are routine sets of actions that are regulated and pre-ordained, and cannot cover all eventualities or fit the particular conditions being faced in a given situation.
- In many decision environments organisations pair problems and solutions randomly, suggesting that the outcomes are completely random and organisations are significantly rational than originally thought
11
Q
March of Folly
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- As identified by Barbara Tuchman, a march of folly is defined by the pursuit of policies or actions by governments that are counter to their own self-interests, resulting in a lack of rational decision making.
- Tuchman states that there are three conditions for a march of folly;
1. The policy needs to be counter productive and recognized by people at the time. (Presence of a Cassandra)
2. Alternative Policies were available.
3. The decision is made by a group and over more than one political life-span. (Generational decision)
12
Q
Cognitive Model
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- provides a framework for understanding the mental processes that guide specific individuals through the various stages of decision-making, and ultimately what leads to deviations in rationality and why some actors behave in ways that lead them to make suboptimal choices.
- Crucial to this model is internal vs. external validity. - While internal validity focuses on the accuracy of causal inferences within a specific study, external validity concerns the extent to which study findings can be generalised to broader populations, settings, or time periods.
- Both are essential to ensure the robustness, relevance, and applicability of research.
13
Q
Clinical Psychology
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- Involves analysing an individual’s relationships throughout their life.
- This model relies on a psychological profile to be made to rationalise the way an individual actor behaves and explain their unique decision making and reasoning.
14
Q
Social Psychology
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Group decisions in a social setting affects the way in which individuals behave.
15
Q
Obedience
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- In this context, people will always obey the directions of an authority figure, even if they are pushed to do acts that they know are wrong.
- This model explains that, through authority, people are driven to kill, and commit some of the worst acts known to man.
Ex: Stanley Milgram Shock Experiment
16
Q
GroupThink
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-claims that deviations from rationality can occur when a group conforms to the consensus of the group rather than the best option.
-It assumes that, in group settings, people are reluctant to voice their concerns and raise objections
- Ex: During the ExComm deliberations, Kennedy removed himself from the committee because he acknowledged that his presence could persuade other members to conform to his ideas and seek his approval.
17
Q
Fundamental Attribute Error
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- Attribution describes how we explain the behaviour of others.
- This theory relies on two opposing forms of attribution.
- Dispositional attribution credits behaviour to the actors character, while situational attribution credits behaviour to the situation in which the actor operates.
- Generally, we tend to assign dispositional attribution to our enemies and situational attribution to our friends, leading to a misreading of a situation, biases, and deviations from rationality.
18
Q
Cognitive Psychology
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- Examines the cognitive processes used to make decisions - perception, memory, reasoning, judgement - and how they contribute to biases and heuristics.
- This theory assumes that we are all working with the same “hardware” when making decisions.
19
Q
Prospect Theory
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- Developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, this theory posits that the way in which we frame things is extremely important.
- It proposes that individuals evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point, with losses having a greater psychological impact than equivalent gains, in other words,
- We tend to be more risk averse in the domain of gains, and more risk acceptant in the domain of losses.
- Ex: Iran Hostage Crisis. Jimmy Carter was operating in the domain of extreme losses - Inflation, Oil crisis, Afghanistan, Iran - making him more risk averse and likely to gamble, ultimately leading to the disastrous “Operation Eagle Claw”.
20
Q
Cognitive Closure
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- posits that when an actor has made their decision, even in the face of uncertainty or incomplete information, they tend to stick to this decision, so much so that information is made to fit this theory and all other information that does not fit is rejected.
- Ex: Yom Kippur War. Eli Zeira became married to the idea that war was impossible, so much so that he ignored clear and open signs given by Hamas and even his own intelligence. The cognitive closure reached in this case could perhaps be because his professional reputation was hinged on this idea, and couldn’t accept he could be wrong or else his reputation could be tarnished. Another explanation could be arrogance or hubris, and the undeniable uncertainty of the situation.
21
Q
Organizational/ Corporate Culture (Deal and Kennedy)
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- mapped all organisations based on two variables, the first examining high or low risk, the second examining rapid or slow feedback.
- based on this organizations can be out into four categories through which we can predict the culture of the organization
22
Q
Work Hard Play Hard Culture
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Feedback is fast and risk is low. There is a quick pace of work with a focus on achieving results. Often has a friendly and social atmosphere, with a strong emphasis on teamwork
Ex. Waiters, customer service workers
23
Q
Tough Guy, Macho Culture
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Feedback is fast and risk is high. fast pace of work and a high tolerance for risk.
There is a competitive and aggressive environment where employees are expected to take bold actions to achieve success.
Ex. Special forces, first responders, doctors, law enforcement
24
Q
Bet The Company Culture
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- Feedback is slow and risk is high. Decision-making is slow, and there is a high tolerance for risk.
Leaders are willing to take significant risks for substantial gains, and the company’s future may depend on a few critical decisions.
This culture often exists in industries with high uncertainty.
Ex: Engineers, oil drilling, high level politicians
25
Process Culture (deal and kennedy)
- Feedback is slow and risk is low.
- These organisations have a slow pace of work, and there is a low tolerance for risk.
- Decision-making is methodical, and there is a strong emphasis on following established procedures and protocols.
- Stability and consistency are valued in this type of culture.
Ex. Office workers, librarians, bureaucratic workers
26
Organizational Culture (Schien)
Different classes behave different from each other due to the concept of culture.
Artifacts- material culture
Values- cultural beliefs
Basic Assumptions- the underlying, often unconscious, assumptions and rituals that guide the organisations behaviour
Ex: Boeing 737 design and distribution failures
27
Deviation Spiral
- examines how deviance can become normalised through acceptance of risk.
- The centre represents the status quo, the certain level of risk that we accept, however if a small deviance occurs that does not lead to a fatal outcome, this becomes the new normal.
- This cycle continues and we start to accept levels of risk that we would have never accepted initially, eventually lead to failure
28
Operational Drift
- refers to a gradual and unintentional shift or deviation from established standard operating procedures (SOPs) or operational protocols within an organisation.
- It occurs when there is a gradual departure from the intended processes, practices, or guidelines over time.
- This model can compromise efficiency, safety, and overall performance if not identified and corrected.
29
Moral Hazard
- Asserts that we are more likely to take risky decisions when we are protected from consequences of risk. Full insulation from the consequences of risk creates its own risks through the dynamics of moral hazard
- Example: Banks During the Financial Crisis
30
“Seeing Like a State”
- This metaphorical model was put forth by James C. Scott, and explores the consequences of state-driven, high-modernist projects that seek to simplify and rationalise complex social systems.
- Scott discusses the imposition of abstract principles by the state, the unintended consequences of such interventions, and the resilience of local, informal practices. The book emphasises the importance of practical, local knowledge, and highlights the limitations and potential pitfalls of top-down, authoritarian approaches to social organisation
31
High Modernism
Science and technology on top/ is superior
- An ideology that at its core has a desire to re-engineer both society and nature. It stands on an excess of belief and overconfidence in the power of modernism, that modern science can provide us with the tools to rebuild and control society, human nature and nature itself. With this comes the rejection of and disregard for historical and social context.
- Example : The Great Chinese Famine
This devastating famine was the direct result of political decisions, a poor distribution of resources rather than a supply issue. Food was distributed in a way that favoured certain communities over others, starving some and satisfying others.
32
The Banality of Evill
The key idea is that evil actions can be committed not necessarily by monstrous individuals but by ordinary people who become accomplices in oppressive systems through bureaucratic roles, conformity, and a lack of critical thinking.
Hanna Arendt characterised Eichmann as a bureaucrat who followed orders without questioning the morality of his actions, suggesting that evil deeds can be perpetrated by individuals who, in their pursuit of organisational goals, abandon personal responsibility and moral reflection, becoming mere cogs in a larger, morally reprehensible system.
33
The Tragedy of the Commons
When we have a common or public good it is inevitable that this public good will be overused, the tragedy of the commons.
Public good:
Non-excludable and non rivalrous
There is no incentive for those making the decisions to change because they are not the ones paying for the decisions, coined the “free rider” problem. “Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit– in a world that is limited”.
Example: The Dust Bowl
The decision to not invest in top soil management, instead deciding to maximise their resources for profit, impacted the entire population of the midwest.
34
Game Theory
An analytical framework that mathematically models social interactions among competing actors.
The concept likens life and every social interaction to a game in which actors behave rationally in order to maximise benefit and minimise cost, in other words winning the game, thus making it a subset of rational choice.
35
Rational Choice
Central is the assumption that actors are rational. Each round of the “game” , each actor makes a strategic choice, the outcome dependent on their decision.
The actor aims to maximise utility through considering the likely action of the other actor and what to do based on each potential outcome. From this deliberation they are able to make the optimal choice and have the best response/outcome.
36
Prisoners Dilemma
- Two individuals, unable to communicate, must decide whether to cooperate or betray each other when faced with criminal charges.
- The dilemma arises from the conflict between self-interest and collective interest, impacting the outcome on varying scales for each prisoner.
- Co-operation is the best outcome for both parties, however carries the highest risk, so actors are more likely to choose to defect.
37
Future Discount
Outlines how we are asked to make decisions now that may or may not lead to benefits in the future.
Ex: Climate Change
38
Preparedness Paradox
When preparedness efforts are successful in averting a significant negative event, nothing happens. However, if nothing happens, people question the importance and necessity of the investment in preparedness.
Ex: climate change
39
Goldilocks Policy
not too little, not too much, an equilibrium of not over-investing and under-investing in the present which has the potential for underpreparedness and disaster.
40
Predictable Surprise
This is a clear oxymoron, as if something was predictable then it couldn't also be a surprise. This concept questions how we can be surprised by the outcome of a disaster when most of them are predictable.
41
Austerity
Default response in a financial crisis by reducing government spending by cutting private spending and re locating the burden onto the tax payer.
This allows ants to be fully insulated from the consequence of their risks allowing for another financial crisis in the future
Ex: 2008 financial Crisis
42
Risk vs. Uncertainty
There are three levels in future thinking - Certainty, what we know we know, Risk, what we know we don't know, and Uncertainty, what we don’t know we don’t know.
Risk allows us to assign probabilities and ask questions about these variables, while uncertainty provides no variables or models and is outside our realm of analysis.
Ex: Black Swan Theory: underestimating the existence of black swans until you see one
43
Policy Reform
There is initial pain and costs too pay when implementing a new policy, however after overcoming this we are able to reap long term benefits.
44
J curve
Illustrates when we move away from the status quo and implement new reforms, resulting in a dip performance as we adjust to the costs, however, in the long term we are able to create a new status quo that is entirely superior.
Explains how policies fail without causing improvements. Time spent in the “valley of death” tests the tolerance of decision makers in the face of criticism, and also explains how abandoning policies can result in sacrifices without the rewards of reform.
45
NewTech
- Like policy reform, new tech introduces a new status quo with a short term decline.
- This status quo comes from the need to integrate new tech safely to enjoy its benefits. In the context of nuclear weapons, this new tech has the ability to end human life on a large, unprecedented scale, thus there is no room for error requiring a new status quo.
Example: Emergence of Nuclear Weapons
46
Deterrence
- Refers to preventing an adversaries actions through the threat of painful retaliation. In other words, the threat of even greater punishment is used to deter bad behaviour.
- Deterrence relies on a few key aspects. Firstly, actors must be rational to be deterable, capable of a cost benefit analysis in order to recognise the threat.
- If actors are irrational and fanatic they will not be deterred. Next, deterrence relies on clear signs and communication of their threat in order to be taken seriously.
Ex: West believed China would not intervene on the Western peninsula, therefore Chinese attempts at deterrence failed because their threat was not taken seriously
47
Nuclear Deterrence
Refers to Preventing an adversary's actions through the threat of painful retaliation. In order to limit the danger and use of nuclear weapons, we rely on deterrence.
48
Counter Force
Refers to attacking an enemy's military forces, disabling their nuclear capacity. Counter force must be 100% accurate, if the adversary is left with even just one nuke, they will use it in a counter value way. Further, counter force asserts that you must be the first to strike to destabilise the other side. The most effective ebay to deter counter force is mutually assured destruction.
49
Counter Value
Refers to deploying nuclear weapons to attack and punish an adversaries' most important assets, such as capital cities and important economic centres. Counter value is the second strike, coming as a result of counter force.
50
Fox Vs. Hedgehog
Foxs know a little about a lot, but never delve deep into any specific topics, while hedgehogs know one thing very well.
Foxes do better in a social context.
Ex: this course is a fox course
51
The Dunning Kruger Effect
The less you know, the more confident you are that you are correct and the more you know, the less confidence you have (the middle are between ignorant and expert).
52
Rejection Of Experts
Rise of ignorance leads to the disregard of experts is attributed to modern factors:
1. The internet
2. Social media:
3. Political polarisation:
4. Higher education
Ex: Anti-Vaxxers
53
Boiling frog
Change will happen too gradually for us to appreciate the likelihood of catastrophe and act before it is too late
- problem of exponential growth
54
Intersectionality
An analytical framework for assessing how factors such as race, gender, and class interact to shape individual life changes and societal patterns of stratification
POL107
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