1
Q
ORDER A:1
Checking of CFS Striker Plate Before Closing Canopy
A
- The PC-21 aircraft is equipped with a Canopy Fracturing System (CFS) in the
front cockpit. There is a risk of an inadvertent activation of the CFS if the striker
plate (right-side of front cockpit ejection seat) is obstructed when the canopy is being closed. This may result in injuries to both aircrew and ground personnel. - The following actions are required before closing the canopy:
a. Front seat aircrew to be fully strapped-in to avoid harness straps
obstructing the striker plate.
b. Front seat aircrew must check that the CFS pin has been removed and stowed and that the striker plate is clear of obstruction. In dual sorties, the aft seat aircrew must be informed before the canopy is closed.
2
Q
ORDER A:2
Restrictions on Engine Start using Manual Mode
A
- Due to the high possibility of over-heating when the engine is started using
the Manual start mode, the following restrictions apply:
a. Actual aircraft engine starts using the Manual mode will not be
permitted on ground, unless required for maintenance issues.
Note: Manual start in the air is required only in the event of a flameout
coupled with a failure of the Auto engine start function.
b. The aircraft will be rejected on the ground if it fails to start on the Auto
mode.
c. All manual start practices will be carried out in the simulator, and all
QFIs and trainees must carry out a practiced Manual start prior to their
first solo.
3
Q
ORDER B:1
Restrictions on Spinning
A
- For spinning exercise, the following conditions must be met prior to entry to
intentional erect spin:
a. Elevator and Aileron Trims set to neutral.
b. Maximum FUEL QTY asymmetry of 55 lb difference.
c. Discernable horizon.
d. In sight of ground and clear of populace. - Spinning exercise is not permitted for trainee solo sorties.
- Intentional inverted spinning is not permitted.
- The recommended minimum entry height for PC-21 spinning exercise is
11,000ft AGL. All aircrew will adopt a standard minimum entry height of 13,000ft AMSL in the Pearce Training Area (PTA) regardless of area of operations. This is due to the different height of the terrain and obstacles in the respective area of operations. - A safety brief has to be conducted prior to the commencement of the spinning exercise.
4
Q
ORDER B:2
Set-up for Unusual Attitudes
A
Nose High U/A
1. There are no restrictions for the set-up of Nose High U/A.
Nose Low U/A Recoveries
2. QFIs will hand-over control to trainees with maximum handover airspeed of
240 KIAS.
5
Q
ORDER B:3
Training ‘G’ Limits and Management
A
- The maximum training G limit is 6Gs.
- If the training G limit is exceeded (within the structural limit and the aircrew’s
HTC certification) ONCE, the sortie can be continued. - In the event that the training G limit is exceeded for the 2nd time, the sortie is
to be terminated and RTB. The SXO must be informed. - All solo trainees will not continue the sortie if the training G limit is exceeded.
SXO must be informed and the sortie will be terminated for RTB.
6
Q
ORDER B:4
Management of Flying Operations over Water
A
- During periods of high wave heights, aircrew survivability in the event of ejection over water as well as the effectiveness of Search and Rescue Operations is reduced.
- In order to increase aircrew survivability in the event of ejection over water, the following restrictions have been formulated in consultation with RAAF Base Pearce and the Search and Rescue helicopter service:
a. Aircrew are not to operate over water when the total wave height is reported to be in excess of 4 metres. The total wave height is
computed as √(Sea State2 + Swell Height2).
7
Q
ORDER B:5
Weather Criteria for Flying Training
A
- The weather criteria for flying training are promulgated to assist the SXO in the management of flying training under different weather conditions. It sets the minimum weather conditions in terms of cloud base and visibility for which flying training can take place at either Pearce or Gingin with due consideration given to prevailing weather conditions at the diversion airfields, and runway and airfield aids’ capabilities.
- Satisfying the weather criteria itself does not constitute an arbitrary “clearance to launch”. At all times, due attention must be given to the training value, weather trend and other environmental variables such as wind and runway conditions.
Specifically, the maximum crosswind component for the appropriate runway conditions (dry or wet) and weather warnings/advisories (if any) must be taken into consideration in deciding whether to continue with flying training. - In essence, the launch criteria (weather) diagram B5A-1 as given in Annex A specifies the required weather colour states for the launch airfield and the associated diversion airfields for routine flying training. The criteria are:
a. Blue and Yellow 1 – No restriction on flying training.
b. Yellow 2 – Circuit training is allowed for both Pearce and Gingin if permitted by the SXO. Also, aircraft captain must be instrument rated. The airfield must have serviceable airfield approach aid. The designated diversion airfield weather state should be A1 or better. All recoveries must be IFR.
c. Amber 1 / Amber 2 – Flying training is permitted only if the designated diversion airfield weather state is A1 or better with a serviceable runway
approach aid. Perth International must be A1 or better; or Gingin must be Y2 or better. Gingin is the primary VFR diversion airfield.
d. Red – No flying training is permitted. - When there is presence of adverse weather, or forecast adverse weather, the Pearce SXO should station himself near the Ops room and monitor the situation closely. The SXO must be ready to limit or recall aircraft (either selectively or all aircraft) flying in the air. If the aircraft are “caught out”, the SXO should advise the aircrew to either divert or hold out until the weather condition is more favourable for recovery. To aid in his decision making, the SXO should collate and integrate the information from the following sources: Pearce weather radar picture, aircrew report and weather forecast. In addition, the Pearce SXO should advise the Gingin SXO (if there is an ongoing Gingin Phase) on the weather situation, as the latter has no access to the weather radar picture.
- Flight into Icing Conditions. The PC-21 AFM states that flight into known icing, defined as observed or detected in flight1 is prohibited. As such, aircrew shall not operate in areas with pilot reported icing. As a risk management, flights shall also not operate in areas of forecasted severe icing conditions.
8
Q
ORDER B:6
Hot Weather Operations
A
1. The following restrictions are to be adhered to when the temperature exceeds the following: a. >=36 Degrees C i. No aircraft change (if aircraft is U/S after start) ii. No first solo flight (GH 16) b. >= 38 Degrees C i. No trainee solo c. >= 40 Degrees C i. No Takeoff
9
Q
ORDER B:7
Strong Wind Operations
A
- Flying operations in strong winds increase the risks of injury in the event of ejection. Surface wind velocity directly affects the degree of injury to aircrew. When considering PC 21 operations in strong winds, authorising officers and aircraft captains should take into account the following factors:
a. The probability and degree of injury likely to be sustained from a parachute landing following ejection is shown in Figure B7-1 below.
b. The sortie profile to be flown and the likelihood of flying a PFL as an alternative to ejection.
c. The experience level of the crew.
d. Nature of terrain.
e. Operational or training necessity. - When the reported surface wind strength is 30 kts or greater, or wind gust is 35kts or greater, flying operations will cease.
10
Q
ORDER B:8
Circuit Flying Restrictions
A
- Bird Hazard Management. Pearce Air Traffic Control (ATC) does not adopt Bird Hazard State (BHS) categorisations and restrictions stated in the RSAF Safety Management Manual (RSMM). However, an arrangement with Pearce ATC was made to broadcast on ATIS the bird hazard warning for the airfield (e.g. increased/persistent bird activity) with reference to RSMM definitions to forewarn aircrew of the presence of birds in and around the airfield. When a bird warning is broadcasted, aircrew are to note the following remarks/restrictions listed in
Table B8-1: Pearce ATIS Broadcast with Reference to RSMM Definitions
RSAF Categorisation Pearce Categorisation Definition Remarks/Restrictions
Bird Hazard State 1 N.A., 20 to 30 small and medium birds, or 3 to 5 large birds in the vicinity of the airfield. Aircrew to exercise caution.
Bird Hazard State 2, Increased Bird Activity, 30 small and medium birds, or more than 5 large birds in the vicinity of the airfield. Circuit Training is not
allowed, and practice approaches are to terminate by 500ft AGL.
Bird Hazard State 3, Persistent Bird Activity, Bird activities are persistent and assessed to affect the safe launch, recovery, or flying operations within the aerodrome. SXO may temporary hold-off departure or arrival traffic.
2. Runway Inspections. Runway inspections are conducted before tower becomes active and is usually carried out using a jeep/wagon by the tower controllers. During such time, the tower is not manned and CTAF procedures apply. To preclude the possibility of aircraft carrying out rollers or landings with the inspection vehicle on the runway, aircraft will discontinue circuit training when the vehicle enters the runway for inspection. Aircraft will recommence the circuit training only after the vehicle has vacated the runway.
3. During circuit training, the maximum number of practice “Stop And Go” exercises permitted is 2.
4. The maximum number of RSAF solo trainees conducting circuit training is 2.
11
Q
ORDER B:9
Restrictions on Low Level Circuit Training
A
- Low Level circuit training will be conducted at 500ft AGL for Day and at
circling minima height for night as per FIHA AD2 SUPP YPEA. - Solo trainees are not permitted to practise Low Level Circuits for both Day
and Night.
12
Q
ORDER B:10
PFL/Glide in Gusty Wind Conditions
A
- The following measures aim to preclude the possibility of a heavy landing during PFL / GLIDE touch-and-go in gusty wind conditions.
- When making powered approaches in gusty conditions, the approach speed is increased by half gust factor to cater for wind shear. Any sudden drop in speed can be safely arrested and a go-around initiated if necessary. However, during the flare stage in a PFL / GLIDE approach, speed decay may be adversely affected by wind shear.
- Aircrew are therefore not to conduct PFL / GLIDE touch-and-go or landings when the gust factor exceeds 10 knots. Overshoots are, however, permitted in such conditions. When the gust factor is 10 knots or less, aircrew are to exercise caution and discretion when carrying out PFL / GLIDE touch and go.
13
Q
ORDER B:11
Restrictions on number of aircraft joining the PFL pattern
A
- Pearce and Gingin CIRAs are from surface to 3,500ft AMSL. Above this height, there is no regulated pattern to fly. Moreover traffic monitoring is on Pearce/Gingin Tower frequency and Pearce Approach does not control VFR aircraft in the TMA. Henceforth, the onus is on the aircrew to see and avoid above the Pearce/Gingin CIRA vertical limit of 3,500ft AMSL.
- In order to reduce risk, PC 21 aircraft shall adhere to the following procedures.
a. PC 21 aircraft in the circuit area will not climb up and join the PFL pattern when there are already 2 or more aircraft tracking for or in the PFL pattern. In addition, PC 21 aircraft leaving the circuit area and tracking for PFL are to track on wide downwind and stay clear of the PFL pattern until ready to commence the PFL.
b. Aircraft recovering from the area for high level PFL can continue with their PFL when there are already 2 or more aircraft in the pattern. But they shall proceed with the PFL only after having identified all the other traffic and when there is no flight path conflict. If a conflict is envisaged, the aircraft is to hold-off at altitude until it is safe for further descent.
c. All solo trainees in the circuit area will not climb above 3500ft AMSL to join the high level PFL pattern. In addition, at any one time, only 1 solo
trainee is permitted to track for High Key. The second solo trainee can only track for High Key after the first solo trainee has successfully departed High Key for Low Key
d. Aircrew tracking for high level PFL into Gingin will not descend below 5000ft AMSL when they do not have the Gingin NDB traffic sighted (or 7000ft AMSL for NDB Hi). In order to continue descending, the aircrew must maintain sight of the NDB traffic. - Aircrew should not hesitate to request for traffic information from ATC if they are unable to positively identify all traffic.
14
Q
ORDER B:12
Landing on the lane runway
A
- Lane runway 18R/36L at Pearce is primarily for touch-and-go operations. For normal routine training, full-stop landings are not to be carried out on the lane runway due to its narrower width (100ft).
- However, aircrew may land on the lane runway during day flying when all other runways at Pearce are unavailable or unfavourable for landing.
- Solo trainees should always land on the primary runway. If both the primary runways at Pearce are unfavourable, solo trainees will divert to Gingin.
15
Q
ORDER B:14
Parking brakes not holding
A
- Due to the occasional characteristics of aircraft parking brakes not holding, the following procedures are to be carried out in the event that the aircraft is observed to creep forward with parking brakes applied:
a. Re-apply the brakes to preclude the possibility of improper brake application.
b. If normal operation of brakes is observed, the sortie is permitted to continue.
c. However, if the aircraft continues to creep forward after re-application of the brakes, the sortie will be terminated.
16
Q
ORDER B:15
Operations with Runway Barrier Net Raised
A
- Due to Hawk operations, there will be instances where the barrier nets at Pearce / Gingin will be raised. PC-21 shall not conduct any operations on the runway when either the approach end or departure end runway barrier net is raised.
17
Q
ORDER B:16
Hybrid Mode Error
A
- This order defines the action to be taken for Hybrid Mode Error that augment
the Flight Reference Cards (FRC) and PC-21 AFM. - Hybrid Mode error can be verified on the MFD NAV STS page after start and the illumination of the CHECK NAV caption on the MFD.
- On ground, when a Hybrid Mode error occurs:
a. Due to INS, aircrew are to taxi back (if out of weather shed) and shut down the aircraft.
b. Due to GPS, aircrew are to continue taxi to ORP/holding point and monitor the status.
c. If Hybrid Mode is successfully recovered, aircrew are to proceed with the mission.
d. If Hybrid Mode is not recovered after reaching the ORP/holding point, aircrew are to taxi back and shut down. Aircrew are required to note the number of acquired satellites on the FMS for ground debrief of the problem. - In-flight, when a Hybrid Mode error occurs:
a. Due to INS, aircrew are to select GPS source and RTB.
b. Due to GPS, aircrew are to select INS source and continue the sortie. - Refer to Annex A for a flowchart (Fig B16A-1) delineating Hybrid Mode error actions. Aircrew are to take note of the degraded operations of the FPM on the HUD when Hybrid mode is not available.
18
Q
ORDER B:17
Transient Generator Alerts on Engine Start
A
- In accordance with Pilatus response, transient GEN 1 or GEN 2 cautions and / or GENS warnings triggered during engine start should not prevent continued operation of the aircraft provided that :
a. Any triggered generator alerts (GEN 1, GEN 2 or GENS) self cancels by the time the engine start cycle has completed and the engine has reached a
steady state idle condition.
b. All electrical system indications are normal and show the system to be functioning correctly.
c. No generator alerts are triggered at any time during normal operations other than during the start cycle. - No specific aircrew action is required where any transient GEN 1 caution, GEN 2 caution or GENS warning alerts are present under the conditions defined in Para 1.
- Aircrew actions resulting from GEN 1 caution, GEN 2 caution, GENS warning alerts seen outside these conditions should be carried out in accordance with the relevant AFM entry.
19
Q
ORDER B:18
Transient Gas Generator (Ng) Alerts During Start
A
- Pilatus confirms in a serviceability statement that the engine and aircraft remain serviceable following a transient Ng caption during start provided the following conditions are met:
a. The alert is presented when the engine Ng is in the range 48% to 51% Ng during a normal start cycle.
b. The Ng alert is transient in nature.
c. The Ng alert appears only once during each start cycle.
d. There are no other engine captions or alerts during or following the engine start cycle.
e. All engine parameters (including Ng) stabilise within their normal operating limits following completion of the start cycle. - When the above conditions defined in Para 1 are met, Pilatus confirms that operation of the aircraft can continue. Therefore, all aircrew are allowed to continue with the sortie.
- Aircrew should report the Ng alert to Pilatus when returning the aircraft on completion of the sortie.
20
Q
ORDER B:19
Propeller Erosion Tape - Limits
A
- The purpose of this order is to highlight to all aircrew the information on wear limits, replacement requirements for PC-21 propeller erosion tape and the permissibility of continued flight with the tape partially or fully removed.
- Pilatus issued a Technical Memo PILBWC-ENG-21-TM-11-026, which states that the BWC PC-21 fleet uses a layer of sacrificial erosion tape on the de-ice boots to prevent long term wear due to FOD, sand etc. Refer to Annex A for Technical Memo.
- This erosion tape is not mandatory for operations and its absence (either partially or fully from one or more propeller blades) does not affect or limit the
operation of the aircraft. It will not affect the balance of the propeller. - If the erosion tape is discovered to be damaged, it should be replaced when practical. If the erosion tape cannot be replaced immediately, any damaged or loose sections of the erosion tape will be removed prior to the next flight.
- Aircrew can continue to operation an aircraft with erosion tape missing (either partially or fully) from one or more blades.
- Aircrew should report to Pilatus whenever damaged erosion tape is found.
21
Q
ORDER B:20
MDR Map Drop Out and Storage Caption
A
- The purpose of this order is to promulgate the actions to be taken in the event of MDR related malfunction (Refer to Annex A for technical memo PILBWC-ENG21-TM-11-023 REV 1 for details).
- In the event of an MDR related malfunction (Map drop out / MDR Storage advisory caption) on the ground, the aircrew can carry out the following actions:
a. Recycle power to the MC (only on ground)
i. Move the MC/HUD switch to OFF position for 2 seconds.
ii. Switch the MC/HUD switch to MC or MC/HUD position.
b. If the map remains unavailable, INT must be available to continue the sortie.
c. If the “MDR Storage” caption persists, abort the sortie. - In the event of an MDR related malfunction (Map drop out / MDR Storage advisory caption) in the air, the aircrew can carry out the following actions:
a. If the map drops out, INT must be available to continue the sortie.
b. If the “MDR Storage” caption appears in-flight, the flight can be continued.
22
Q
ORDER B:21
Communications System Reset Procedures
A
- The purpose of this order is to promulgate the procedures to manage specific
communications System errors before and after start up. - The technical memo PILBWC-ENG21-TM-10-017 Issue 5 indicates the
applicable systems and procedures for reset. Refer to Annex A for the technical
memo. - The reset procedures can only be attempted once. If reset is to no avail,
aircrew is to snag the respective aircraft immediately.
23
Q
ORDER B:22
Non-usage of PC-21 Aircraft loaded electronic checklists
A
- The electronic checklist is deemed not suitable for operations due to the
different grouping from the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) and Flight Reference
Cards (FRC). The Man-Machine Interface (MMI) of the electronic checklist is also
not intuitive for aircrew usage. - The purpose of this instruction is to advise all aircrew not to use the electronic
checklists that are loaded into the aircraft avionic system. - All PC-21 aircrew are to be aware of this instruction and comply with this
memo with immediate effect.
24
Q
ORDER C:1
Visual Inspection for Exceeding Aircraft Structural Limits
A
- Any aircraft exceeding the structural limits shall immediately terminate the
manoeuvres. A visual inspection is required prior to recovery to base for the
following conditions:
a. If the structural ‘G’ limit is exceeded.
b. Whenever the aircraft or services speed limits are exceeded. - A visual inspection must be carried out by another RSAF aircraft. If visual
inspection reveals signs of damage, a/c controllability check must be carried out to ascertain aircraft controllability. If the visual inspection does not reveal any abnormalities, a controllability check should be carried out if practicable. - In the event that no RSAF aircraft is airborne, the visual inspection may be omitted. However, a controllability check must then be carried out.
25
ORDER D:1
List of Operations
Support Publications (OSPs)
1. This order lists the squadron’s OSPs. It is necessary for all squadron personnel
to be conversant with the publications.
2. In accordance to AFOD/C1-1.1, the Operations Support Publications will be
reviewed on a regular basis to ensure it is relevant and current. The list of squadron
OSPs are shown below in Table 1:
Table D1-1: List of Squadron OSP
S/N Squadron Operations Support Publications List Review Period
1 Detachment Management Manual (DMM) 4 Yearly
2 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 4 Yearly
3 PC-21 Student Study Guide (SSG) 4 Yearly
4 Instructor Guide (IG) 4 Yearly
BWC Knowledge
flashcards
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