easy problem of consciousness
1) how the brain processes environmental stimulation
2) how the brain integrates information
3) how we produce reports on internal states
hard problem of consciousness
- why processing is accompanied by an experienced inner life
- standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work
- Chalmers obeys constraints:
1) taking the problem of consciousness seriously: (1) assuming that consciousness exists, (2) not redefining the problem by explaining how certain cognitive or behavioural functions are performed
2) taking science seriously: ideas compatible to contemporary science; not trying to dispute scientific theories in domains where they have authority
3) taking consciousness to be a natural phenomenon: falls under the sway of natural laws
consciousness
- experience is central to consciousness –> everyone has conscious experiences of their own
- ambiguous term: refers to a number of phenomena
1) Cognitive capacity (the ability to introspect or to report one’s mental states)
2) awakeness
3) ability to focus attention, 4) ability to voluntarily control behaviour - subjective matter of consciousness = subjective quality of experience
conscious experience
= internal aspect of our perceptions, actions, thoughts = phenomenal qualities
- when a bing is conscious, we say there is something it is like to be that being
- -> e.g. mental state: is conscious, if there is something it is like to be in that mental state
- this suggest that there is a qualitative feel/quality of experience
targets of explanation
- conscious experience
- existence of consciousness:
- why does conscious experience exist; how does it arise from physical systems; is it physical or accompanying physical systems - character of consciousness:
- why are individual experiences of particular nature; why is the experience one way and not another
aspects
- conscious experience
- visual/auditory/tactile/olfactory/ taste experiences
- pain
- mental imagery, conscious thought
- emotion
- sense of self
theory of consciousness
- should give conditions which physical processes give rise to consciousness
- should specify what sort of experience is associated with these processes
- explain how consciousness arises
- see consciousness as integral part of natural world
phenomenal concept of mind
= mind as conscious experience; what it feels
- first-person aspects
psychological concept of mind
= causal/explanatory basis for behaviour; what it does
- matters little whether mental state has conscious quality or not
- third-person aspects
history
1) Descartes
= mind is transparent to itself
- -> phenomenal
- every event in the mind is content of experience
- -> error of assimilating the psychological to phenomenal
history
2) Wundt + James
- introspection to investigate causes of behaviour
- psychological theories based on introspection
- -> phenomenal
history
3) Freud
- unconscious activities
- -> non-phenomenal
- mentality is independent of phenomenal notions: accessibility to consciousness is not essential to state’s relevance in explanation of behaviour
history
4) behaviourism
= behaviour is a reflex to environmental stimuli or a consequence of individual’s history
–> psychological
history
5) cognitive science
= mind as internal basis of behaviour
- explanation of behaviour is not dependent on phenomenal notions
philosophical history
1) Ryle
= all mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviours
- dispositions to behave in certain ways
- -> psychological
philosophical history
2) functionalism
= made mental states internal and standing in correct causal relation to behaviour
- mental state is defined wholly by its causal role
1) stimulation that produce it
2) behaviour it produces
3) how it interacts with other mental states - reasonable construal for many mental concepts –> BUT applied to all mental concepts
- -> error of assimilating phenomenal to psychological
double life of mental terms
- mental property is either phenomenal, psychological pr combination
- mental concepts have psychological + phenomenal components –> some lean towards one end
- whenever phenomenal property observed, needs to be communicated by psychological state
- -> sort of conscious experience that accompanies psychological property
mind-body problem
= debate concerning the relationship between consciousness in the human MIND, and the brain as part of the physical BODY
mind-body problem
1. easy part
= PSYCHOLOGICAL aspects
- organisation of the physical system (reacting to environmental stimulation) + produce behaviour
- -> DISSOLVED: smaller technical problems to science remain; no metaphysical problems
mind-body problem
2. hard part
= PHENOMENAL aspects
- how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious experience
- -> residue of mind-mind problem: link between psychological and phenomenal mind is not yet understood
psychological consciousness
= psychological properties of consciousness; repeatability and introspective accessibility of info
- psychological notions are also associated with phenomenal states
psychological notions of consciousness
1. awakeness
= not asleep = conscious
- ability to process info about world and deal with it in rational fashion
psychological notions of consciousness
2. introspection
= process by which we can become aware of the contents of our internal states
- analysed by rational processes being sensitive to info about one’s internal states + one being able to use this info
psychological notions of consciousness
3. reportability
= report of mental states
- presupposes ability to introspect + capacity of language
