1
Q
R v Riddell [2017] EWCA Crim 413
A
- established that private defence can be a defence to dangerous driving but it was rare that this would apply
- V had pursued D and then got out of his car and stood in front of hers - she nudged him continually with the car until he sat on her bonnet and she accelerated away. V sustained bruises and a cut finger
- D convicted of dangerous driving
- appeal dismissed - self-defence did not apply here but her sentence was reduced
2
Q
R v Hichens [2011] EWCA Crim 1626
A
- D can use self-defence as a defence if the force is against an innocent party to prevent an attack from another
- D slapped his girlfriend - charged with assault - tried to claim self-defence because he knew she would allow her ex to enter her flat, and there had previously been violence between the 2 men
- CofA - conviction held - self-defence did not apply
- Gross LJ - self-defence can be applicable if the force is against an innocent third party to prevent someone else from committing a crime, but it isn’t in this case due to the circumstances - likelihood of crime was low and there was other ways of resolving any issue
3
Q
A-G Ref (2 of 1983) [1984] QB 456
A
- D, whose shop had been damaged in recent riots, made petrol bombs and procured sulfuric acid with the intention of using them to defend himself, his property and others in the event of more riots
- charged with having made an explosive subject - appealed on the grounds that they were lawful objects as long as he didn’t use them and that if the did use them it would be self-defence
- “no warrant for the submission on behalf of the Attorney-General that acts of self-defence will only avail a defendant when they have been done spontaneously. There is no question of a person in danger of attack “writing his own immunity” for violent future acts of his” - you can prepare to act in self-defence, however his possession of the petrol bombs would become unlawful once the threat of further riots had passed
4
Q
R v Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514
A
- self-defence may apply where the defendant was the original aggressor if the violence by the victim was so out of proportion to what the original aggressor did that in effect the roles were reversed
- D provoked V by saying ‘what are you going to do about it’, V raised his arm and D landed a punch first
- convicted for inflicting gbh but appealed on basis on self-defence
- CofA - appeal dismissed - self-defence did not apply
- Hughes LJ - in some cases self-defence might apply where D started the fight or entered it willingly only when V does something so out of proportion to D’s original threat that the roles are reversed - not in this case
5
Q
R v Martin [2002] Crim LR 136
A
- psychiatric condition should not be taken into assessment of reasonable force unless in exceptional circumstances
- D shot 2 people who were burgling his farmhouse - he had been burgled before - both were injured and one (16 yo) died - he used an unlicensed shotgun
- convicted of murder - argued his perception of danger was affected by paranoid personality disorder
- appeal allowed - private defence was not applicable but under diminished responsibility his murder conviction was quashed and replaced with manslaughter
Lord Woolf CJ - applicability of self-defence - jury should convict if they find that D did not act in self-defence and used unreasonable force - for reasonable force, jury should consider circumstances D believes are present, whether the force used is objectively reasonable (jury’s decision) and physical characteristics of D - not psychiatric condition aside from exceptional circumstances where it makes evidence extremely probative
- current case - medical evidence of psychiatric condition not relevant to private defence but it is relevant to diminished responsibility
- “it cannot be left to a defendant to decide what force it is reasonable to use because this would mean that even if a defendant used disproportionate force but he believed he was acting reasonably he would not be guilty of an offence”
6
Q
R v Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725
A
- the question of reasonableness is in terms of whether a reasonable person would say that that the level of force used was reasonable, not whether D thought it was reasonable
- D, suffering a psychotic episode, was found ‘twitching in a strange manner’ in a cafe’s staff room - police arrived and he tried to hide in a void in the ceiling, throwing crockery at police - was taken to a police cell and attempted to escape, punching 2 officers
- claimed he believed he was being pursued by evil spirits and believed the police were evil
- convicted of 2 counts of affray and one count of gbh (broke a police officer’s jaw) - court considered defences of insanity and self-defence but ruled that his use of force was not reasonable for private defence
- appeal allowed - court was uneasy with the verdict and concluded that the defence of insanity was applicable so found him not guilty - court had powers of a special verdict under s6 Criminal Appeal Act 1968
- unclear whether this would have counted for the ‘exceptional circumstances’ which would affect whether D’s mental condition could affect the reasonableness test for private defence following the precedent set by Martin
7
Q
DPP v Bayer [2004] Crim LR 663
A
- Ds broke into a field and attached themselves to tractors sowing genetically modified crops to stop the crops from being sown - had genuine belief that g.m crops were dangerous
- district judge concluded they had a potential defence of ‘defence of property’
- convictions of aggravated trespass held
- where defence of property is raised, courts should consider whether D used reasonable force to defend property from actual or imminent damage which constituted or could constitute an unlawful or criminal act - if no, the defence is unavailable - if yes, courts must consider what D genuinely believed the facts were and determine objectively whether the force they used was no more than reasonable in all the circumstances, given their beliefs
- the sowing of the crops was not unlawful, even if some had blown onto neighbouring land, so the defence was unavailable
8
Q
R v Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482
A
- where D uses greater force than necessary, private defence is not available to them
- D, a soldier at a checkpoint in NI, fired 4 shots at a stolen car approaching at speed - the 4th was after the car had gone through the checkpoint and that shot killed one of the passengers
- D was charged with murder, but argued that he fired in self defence and in defence of the checkpoint
- appeal dismissed (HofL) - the 4th shot was not in self-defence as the car had passed and so the use of force was excessive and unreasonable
- no distinction to be drawn between the use of unreasonable force in self-defence and the use of unreasonable force in preventing crime or arresting offenders
9
Q
R v Ray [2017] EWCA Crim 1391
A
- D was in a relationship with a woman, and was found in the home she shared with her (ex?) partner and their children by V (the ex) and the 2 men got into a fight
- D stabbed V, who died, and claimed it was only because he feared V was going to stab him
- convicted on murder - appealed on basis judge failed to adequately direct the jury on self-defence
- appeal dismissed - it was an unreasonable use of force
- could be viewed as a householder case if D saw V as a trespasser - still not reasonable
10
Q
R v Burns [2010] EWCA Crim 1023
A
- D picked up V (a prostitute) in town and drove her to a secluded area. He then changed his mind about their transaction and asked her to leave his car. She refused, as she understood that he would drive her back to town. He pushed her out of the car and drove off.
- Convicted of assault (abh)
- appealed on the basis that as the vehicle’s owner, he had the right to use force to protect himself/his property
- appeal dismissed - he used unreasonable force, V was not a threat and he could’ve had her out of the car if he drove her back like they agreed - even if it’s treated like a householder case, V was not a trespasser as he invited her into the car
11
Q
R v Hatton [2006] Crim.L.R. 353
A
- D cannot rely on self-defence if their mistaken belief was induced voluntary intoxication
- D had been heavily drinking, V (suffered manic depression) was behaving strangely, claiming to be an SAS officer and exhibiting a hatred of homosexuals. D and V went to D’s flat and D battered V to death with a sledgehammer - D denied remembering killing V but claimed he thought that V had hit him with a stick
- convicted of murder - appealed trying to use private defence, suggesting D thought V was an SAS officer trying to kill him
- appeal dismissed - the mistaken belief was brought about by voluntary intoxication so could not be relied on
12
Q
R v Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All E.R. 411
A
- a mistaken belief need not be reasonable as long as D genuinely believes it
- D saw V arresting a youth and, when V could not produce a warrant card (wasn’t a police officer but had seen the youth mug someone), D believed V was unlawfully assaulting the youth and then punched V in the face - convicted of assault occasioning abh
- appeal allowed and conviction quashed - he genuinely believed he was intervening in an assault
13
Q
R v Rashford [2006] Crim LR 547
A
- D and V had argued earlier, then later, during a fight, D stabbed V - D’s principle defence was that he killed D accidentally, but he pleaded self-defence as an alternative
- prosecution argued that D had been seeking revenge for the earlier argument so could not claim self-defence for any of V’s actions
- appeal allowed in part - if V reacts to the initial threat by D in an unreasonable way, the roles can be reversed making V the aggressor - however self-defence does not apply here because D argued that he had only been swinging the knife to ward off V’s friends so he couldn’t have believed that killing or injuring was the only reasonable means of protecting himself - sentence reduced because judge found D intended to cause gbh rather than kill
14
Q
R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273
A
- necessity or duress of the circumstances is not a defence to murder
- 3 Ds and a boy were shipwrecked with no food or water - Ds killed the boys (who was very ill) and ate him - managed to survive until rescue
- Ds argued that killing the boy was the lesser of 2 evils because if not all 4 would’ve died - appeal dismissed - necessity is no defence to murder
15
Q
Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961
A
- Brooke LJ held that necessity can be a defence to murder in limited circumstances to avoid an inevitable and irreparable evil
- 2 conjoined 6 week old twins M and J were to be separated - M could not survive alone and was reliant on J’s blood supply but J could (she couldn’t survive if they stayed conjoined), separation would kill M but save her a few months of pain as J became more active. Parents appealed on basis that the judge had erred in his decision that the operation was in the best interests of both children (they didn’t want them separated for religious regions)
- Appeal dismissed - welfare of both children was paramount, operation was in J’s best interest as it would offer her normal life and a normal life expectancy, also in M’s interest as it would save her pain (withdrawal of J’s blood supply compared to withdrawal of nourishment in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C 789)
- Did not constitute murder of M because the evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided and the doctor did not have “murderous intent” but instead wanted to reduce pain, and they were under a duty towards J (judge questioned that if she did not survive it could be seen as manslaughter by neglect, also if they failed to operate it was virtually certain that J would die)
- “She would die, not because she was intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot sustain her life” - her death was not the purpose of the surgery - the purpose was to save J’s life
- Brooke LJ - 3 requirements for defence of necessity:
1 The act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil
2 No more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved
3 The evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided
16
Q
R v Quayle [2006] 1 All ER 989
A
- defence of necessity only applies to threats from external circumstances
- number of appeals concerning offences of possession, cultivation or production of cannabis - Ds suffered chronic pain and argued that they reasonably believed such activities were necessary to avoid suffering pain
- appeals dismissed - defence of necessity didn’t apply
- Mance LJ - no overarching principle of necessity applicable in all cases, it should be developed on a case to case basis - circumstances have to be extraneous and capable of objective scrutiny by judge and jury with other evidence - pain is largely subjective
17
Q
R v Altham [2006] Crim LR 633
A
- D had been seriously injured in a road traffic accident and after unsuccessful surgery he had been in chronic pain for years - used cannabis for pain relief
- appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled drug - tried to use article 3 ECHR (against subjection to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and defence of duress of circumstances
- appeal dismissed - defence of necessity did not apply - same reasoning as Quayle
18
Q
Pipe v DPP [2012] EWHC 1821
A
- conviction for driving over the speed limit was quashed where D raised the defence of necessity
- P drove his partner’s nephew (14yo) to hospital (speeding) after the boy sustained a broken leg and the was a considerable delay for an ambulance - appealed conviction on basis it was necessary as he was taking a child in acute pain to hospital
- appeal allowed - magistrates had failed to correctly direct themselves on duress of circumstances and failing to consider it as a defence made the conviction unsafe
19
Q
R v Conway [1989] QB 290
A
- defence of necessity/duress of circumstances is available when D or someone else is under a threat of death or serious harm
- D charged with reckless driving - was escaping from 2 men who he believed threatened the passenger, who had been the target of an attack with a shotgun - the 2 men were plainclothes policemen who wanted to interview the passenger
- appeal allowed - conviction quashed because the defence of duress of circumstances had not been left to the jury so the conviction was unsafe
- Lord Woolf CJ - ‘Whether duress of circumstances is called duress or necessity does not matter.’ - defence is only available if from an objective standpoint D can be said to be acting in order to avoid a threat of death or serious injury
20
Q
R v Martin (1989) 88 CAR 343
A
- D’s wife threatened to kill herself if D did not drive his stepson to work on time, as it would result in the son losing his job - D charged with driving without license
- appealed on grounds that D reasonably believed his wife would carry out the threat
- appeal allowed - judge should’ve allowed the jury to consider the defence of necessity
- Simon Brown J - english law does recognise a defence of necessity in extreme circumstances (called duress of circumstances) - ‘defence is available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to be acting reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or serious injury’ - jury should determine whether D acted because as a result of what he reasonably believed to be the circumstances he had good cause to fear that otherwise death or serious physical injury would result, and also should consider if ‘a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused’ would have reacted the same way
21
Q
R v Cole [1994] Crim LR 582
A
- D charged with robbing 2 building society - said it was to repay moneylenders who had threatened him, his girlfriend and child
- appeal dismissed - duress by threats did not apply since the moneylenders had not stipulated that he commit robbery to meet their demands and duress of circumstances did not apply because he was not in ‘imminent peril’
22
Q
R v Pommell [1995] 2 CAR 607
A
- D convicted of possessing a firearm (submachine gun) and ammunition without a certificate
- appealed on the grounds that duress of circumstances applied - he only had the gun because he had persuaded another (who D thought was likely to commit an offence) to give him the weapon - however he had not immediately taken steps to surrender the weapon
- appeal allowed and retrial ordered because the judge had not left the defence to the jury and had withdrawn to see counsel in his room
23
Q
R v Rodger [1998] 1 CAR 143
A
- Ds had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison - they escaped after the Home Sec recommended the increase in their tariff
- this increased tariff led to mental instability, suicidal thoughts etc
- appealed against conviction for escaping and claimed defence of duress by necessity or duress of circumstances
- appeal dismissed - such defence could be available but the threat had be extraneous to the offender - their mental instability operated as duress and this was not extraneous - to allow it to count as a threat for the defence would make it too subjective and this wouldn’t be in the public interest
24
Q
R v Howe [1987] 2 WLR 568
A
- established that duress is no defence to murder
- an accessory can be guilty of procuring or inciting murder even where the principle has only committed manslaughter
- joint appeal for 2 murder cases - Ds alleged that they committed murder as they feared someone would kill them if they didn’t
- jury directed that duress was no defence to murder
- appeal dismissed - duress is not defence
- Lord Griffiths - “It is based upon the special sanctity that the law attaches to human life and which denies to a man the right to take an innocent life even at the price of his own or another’s life.”
- Lord Hailsham - it is not ‘good morals, good policy or good law to suggest…that the ordinary man of reasonable fortitude is not to be supposed to be capable of heroism if he is asked to take an innocent life rather than sacrifice his own’
25
R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412
- duress is no defence to attempted murder
- D (17yo) caused serious injuries when he stabbed his mother with intent to kill her - alleged that his father threatened to kill him if he did not - convicted of attempted murder
- appeal dismissed - the defence was not available to a charge of murder because the law regarded the sanctity of human life and its protection as of paramount importance so it could not justifiably be available to attempted murder
26
R v Ness [2011] Crim LR 645
- duress is an available defence for conspiracy to murder
- Ds conspired to with M to murder police officers after M wrongly believed that his ex girlfriend was dating a police officer - charged with attempt to murder and conspiracy to murder
- Ds argued that they were threatened by M such that they were under duress
- appeal dismissed and convictions held - the defence of duress is available for conspiracy to murder but did not apply on the facts of this case
27
R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570
- for duress to apply, the threat needs to be imminent but doesn’t need to be immediate
- Ds were Shia Muslims living in Sudan who feared being sent back to Iraq (which would mean certain execution) so they hijacked a plane using plastic knives and imitation hand grenades, forcing it to fly to Britain where they surrendered after 8 hours - convicted of hijacking a plane contrary to the Aviation Security Act 1982 s1(1)
- judge decided that defence of duress was unavailable as the threat of execution was not immediate
- appeals allowed - the defence of duress applied
- Rose LJ - imminent peril of death or serious injury needed to operate on D’s mind, but it didn’t have to be immediate - time period between inception of peril and D’s act was a relevant but not determinative factor - all the circumstances of the peril, including the number, identity and status of those creating it, and the opportunities (if any) to avoid it were relevant
28
R v Bowen [1996] 2 CAR 157
- D’s gender and age, but not their intelligence, are relevant to whether the defence of duress applies
- D (IQ of 68) bought items on credit but didn’t complete payments - convicted of obtaining services by deception - argued that he was unde[2000] Crim LR 109r duress from 2 men to do so by threats to petrol bomb his family
- appeal dismissed, conviction held - the defence of duress did not apply
- Stuart-Smith LJ - only characteristics taken into account for reasonable firmness test in duress are age and gender - low intelligence (not mental impairment) did not make someone less courageous against threats
29
R v Heath [2000] Crim LR 109
- D (drug user) had a debt to his supplier who passed it on to someone else with a violent reputation - D was told his debt would be cleared if he collected a consignment, which he did and unloaded in his supplier’s house except for 3 boxes
- drove home and arrested for possession of illegal drugs - relied on defence of duress which judge rejected
- CofA - appeal dismissed, conviction upheld - he had exposed himself to unlawful violence by his voluntary act of becoming indebted to his supplier and he had multiple avenues of safe escape between the offer being made and the day of the offence
30
R v Z (also known as Hasan) [2005] UKHL 22
- D is not entitled to rely on the defence of duress where, as result of voluntary association with known criminals, he had foreseen or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of being threatened
- D associated with S, known to be a violent drug dealer - S compelled D to commit burglary and D pleaded duress
- appeal dismissed, conviction held - duress did not apply because D ought to have foreseen that by associating with S he was likely to be coerced into committing criminal acts
- Lord Bingham - limitations on duress - ‘The defendant may not rely on duress to which he has voluntarily laid himself open’ - “If a person voluntarily becomes or remains associated with others engaged in criminal activity in a situation where he knows or ought reasonably to know that he may be the subject of compulsion by them or their associates, he cannot rely on the defence of duress to excuse any act which he is thereafter compelled to do by them.”
31
GAC [2013] EWCA Crim 1472
- D flew to Jamaica with her co-accused and they carried suitcases on their return containing cocaine - D pleaded not guilty, claiming she was in a sexual relationship with her co-accused and had no idea about any offence on the trip - thought it was a wholly innocent holiday - alleged that she had a role in organising - did all the talking to customs officers, had the phone used to communicate with the people who told co-accused to smuggle drugs (one of whom was the father of her unborn child) - convicted
- appeal after a doctor suggested she was suffering from Battered Woman’s Syndrome as a result of an abusive relationship with her baby’s father
- court found lack of evidence of BWS or of circumstances of D’s relationship with her baby’s father
- duress didn’t apply - variety of options available
32
Re JTB [2009] UKHL 20
- defence of doli incapax was abolished by s34 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for children aged 10 or over
- D (12yo) was accused of causing or inciting a child under 13 to participate in sexual acts - sought to raise the defence of doli incapax (incapable of criminal activity as he didn’t understand the wrongness of his acts)
- judge ruled that doli incapax was unavailable due to s34 - D appealed on the basis that s34 abolished the presumption of doli incapax for children over 10 but did not make it unavailable as a defence
- appeal dismissed
- Latham LJ - defence and presumption of doli incapax were separate concepts but it can be deduced that parliament intended to abolish both the defence and the presumption
33
M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 2000
- D intended to murder Sir Robert Peel (PM) but killed his secretary by mistake - acquittal on grounds of insanity was discussed in HofL who then formulated rules that form the test for insanity - not a strict source of law but accepted in Sullivan
- a person must be found not guilty by reason of insanity if:
1 - because of a defect of reason caused by disease of the mind he did not know the nature and quality of his act
2 - even if he did know the nature and quality of his act, he did not know it was wrong due to a disease of the mind
34
R v Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1699
- knowing that an act was wrong under the M’Naghten rules for the insanity defence meant that D knew his act was illegal, not that it was morally wrong
- D (schizophrenic) stabbed people during delusions
- psychiatrists agreed D knew the nature of his acts and that it was against the law, but one suggested he might not be aware that it was morally wrong
- judge ruled that defence of insanity couldn’t be raised as D was aware his act was illegal - D appealed on the basis this was wrong
- appeal dismissed and conviction held - knowledge of illegality was the sole criteria of knowing what was wrong under the M’Naghten rules
35
Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277
- defence of automatism negates mens rea
- the burden of proof for the defence is on D
- D alleged he had lost consciousness due to illness when driving and couldn’t remember what happened - charged with dangerous driving (strict liability offence)
- magistrates dismissed charges - D could not have formed intent as he was not conscious of what he was doing
- Divisional Court remitted case to magistrates with a direction to convict - was convicted
- conviction held (CofA) - question of intent is irrelevant in strict liability offences but automatism could negate the actus reus - the burden was on D to prove he was in a state of automatism but he failed to do so
- Lord Goddard CJ - evidence only showed drowsiness or being asleep (insufficient for automatism)
- Pearson J - insanity defence doesn’t apply as D did not challenge the presumption of sanity - no defect of reasoning or disease of the mind - defence of insanity should not be applicable to lesser crimes such as charges in the Road Traffic Act since the verdict is given as ‘guilty but insane’ and restraint by indefinite detention at an asylum is ordered upon the defendant
36
R v Quick [1973] QB 910
- sane automatism is caused by an external factor, while disease of the mind is caused by an internal factor
- D accused of assault occasioning abh - sought to plead automatism due to hypoglycemia following an insulin injection for diabetes
- original judge (Bridge J) ruled that he had a defence of insanity, D pleaded guilty - D appealed on basis the jury should be directed to acquit for sane automatism instead
- appeal allowed (CofA) - plea of sane automatism should be left to the jury as D’s mental condition was caused by an external factor (the insulin)
- Lawton LJ - cause of impairment was the insulin injection and not eating after (an external factor) not the diabetes (internal) - ‘A malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease’
37
R v Hennessy (1989) Cr App R 10
- whether a disease is recurrent is a determining factor in whether its considered external or internal
- stress, anxiety and depression is internal
- failure to inject insulin causing hyperglycemia is an internal factor so the defence of insanity (not automatism) applies
- D was diabetic and illegally drove a car (wasn’t his and didn’t have license) whilst in a state of hyperglycemia contributed to by stress and depression
- court directed jury to acquit on basis of insanity - D pled guilty to avoid the label of insanity
- D appealed on basis that he should have the defence of automatism based on Quick
- appeal dismissed - hyperglycemia caused by high blood sugar levels was an inherent defect that was a disease of the mind
- Lord Lane CJ - though external factors can cause stress, anxiety and depression, they themselves are internal factors - lack the feature of novelty or accident
38
R v Sullivan [1984] 2 AC 156
- any disease leading to impairment of the mind was a disease of the mind, even if it is temporary or short in duration
- D had epileptic fit and attacked friend in the aftermath
- judge directed jury to give a verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ if they found D not guilty - D chose to plead guilty instead and was convicted
- appealed on basis that the judge should have left to jury the defence of non-insane automatism
- appeal dismissed and conviction upheld (HofL)
- Lord Diplock - disease of mind refers to mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding, and if a disease impairs these faculties it is a disease of the mind - ‘it matters not whether the aetiology, of the impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of commission of the act’ - ‘The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous conduct.’ - duration of temporary impairment is irrelevant, particularly if it is recurrent
39
R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92
- sleepwalking is an internal disease and thus a disease of the mind to which the defence of insanity applies
- D committed gbh while sleepwalking and sought to raise the defence of non-insane automatism - judge ruled that evidence amounted to insanity and jury ruled not guilty on grounds of insanity
- appeal dismissed - sleepwalking amounts to a disease of the mind so the M’Naghten rules applied
- Lord Lane CJ - sleepwalking raises insanity because it is internal, it might occur and it has manifested in violence - doesn’t matter if sleepwalking was transitory and unlikely to recur in the form of serious violence
- some cases don’t have separate discussions on mens rea and defences
40
A-G Ref (2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91
- D acquitted of charges of reckless driving resulting in the death of 2 persons due to automatism
- CofA held that the defence of automatism should not have been left to the jury as the condition known as ‘driving without awareness’ could not support a defence of automatism - automatism required a total lack of voluntary control, whereas ‘driving without awareness’ involved only reduced or partial control
41
R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223
- D (17yo), having smoked strong cannabis, let himself into his neighbour’s house and stabbed him several times in an altercation - claimed to have blacked out - potentially a psychotic episode induced by cannabis
- judge ruled that insanity was not available as a defence - convicted of attempted murder
- unclear boundary between voluntary intoxication and insanity as a defence
- appeal dismissed, conviction upheld - he chose to smoke cannabis, had no diagnosed mental condition and was capable of complex organised behaviour
Criminal Law
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