Agenda
Acquisition and Contracting Overview
Contract Types and Pricing
Cost/Price Proposal Development and Analysis
Conclusion
Acquisition Planning
Includes government acquisition activities (e.g. Milestone Decisions) as well as contracting activities (RFP development, Source Selection)
Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE)
Contract Pricing (Contractor): Using cost estimating techniques to establish a basis of estimate (BOE) as the foundation for the cost/price proposal
Cost/Price Analysis (Government): Evaluating a Contractor’s Cost/Price Proposal
Acquisition Planning and Cost Analysis
The government wants to acquire a capability at a fair and reasonable cost, while managing risk
Key questions
* What is the potential cost of a system that satisfies a set of requirements?
*Government LCCE
* Is this a good investment? Should the agency go forward contracting it out?
*What is the price of a contractor solution?
Cost/Price Proposal
This is a government contracting office view of the contracting process; we will focus on the role of Cost Estimating within this process, as highlighted on the following slide.
The government’s requirements are usually conveyed via a statement of objectives, or SOO, on the “looser” end of the spectrum; a set of specifications or specs on the more rigid end of the spectrum; or a statement of work, or SOW, in between. The acquisition strategy and acquisition plan are de rigueur government documentation establishing the approach for going out to industry in order to meet these needs. Before issuing a formal request for proposal (RFP), the government may hold one or more Industry Days to “test the waters,” find out what capabilities exist in the industrial bases
Contracting Process –Government View
Preparing the Solicitation
Preparing the Solicitation
SOO SPECs
Plan the Approach
Acquisition Strategy /Plan
Early Exchange with Industry Days
Industry Days
Draft RFP
Requirement Criteria
Release formal RFP
Contracting Process –Government View
Awarding the Contract
Receive Proposals
Past Performance/Experience/
Technical/Cost
Evaluate Proposals
Proposal in the competitive range?
Discussions with offerors (Evaluation Notices)
Request Final Proposal Revisions (FPR)
Evaluate FPR
Compare Proposals
Weigh Cost and Technical Approach
Make a Decision
Award the Contract
Debrief Offerors
As stated before, the contract pricing process is essential to both awarding the initial contract and subsequent modifications to the contract, namely Engineering Change Proposals or ECPs
The Pricing Process begins with an assessment of the requirements and statement of work written for the proposed system. After this initial assessment, if the system is new, the authorizing agency will need to determine the contract vehicle that will be used for costing the system. If the contract is already active, the modifications to the effort will use the same contract vehicle agreed upon for the baseline effort. Of course, although this is not a formal step in the ECP process, it is always appropriate to review the current contract vehicle for it’s continued suitability. Selecting the appropriate contract vehicle will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this module.
After the agency determines the technical requirements and the purchasing requirements, the next step is proposal solicitation. In the initial contract award, this formality is called a Request for Proposal, or, more commonly, an RFP. In an ECP, the solicitation is a Request for Change, or RFC.
With the formal Solicitation in hand, either the RFP or the RFC, the contractor(s) create a Proposal in response. The proposal includes a technical solution in response to the contract requirements and the cost of the effort projected to execute the solution. The contractor’s response is received by the agency and a comparative analysis conducted for pricing in the technical, cost, and schedule evaluation. The comparative analysis can be done not only between the government projected costs and the contractor’s response, but also between multiple contractors’ responses (if more than one contractor bids on the effort). The comparative analysis will be discussed in detail later in the module. The direction of these processes comes from the FAR, Section 15.4. Technical (and schedule) evaluations should not be neglected; the goal of the process is to fulfill the agency’s needs and to do so at a reasonable cost.
After analyzing the contractor’s response, the agency enters into negotiations to reconcile the differences that result from the comparative analysis of the contractor to the government cost for the solution to the given set of requirements. Finally, the contract is awarded or the ECP authorized. The contractor is then authorized to begin work on the system.
Contracting Process –Contractor View
Awarding the Contract:
Determination of Requirements and Statement of Work (SOW)
Determination of the Contract Vehicle
Request for Proposal (RFP) to Contractors – Solicitation
Creation of the Cost/Pricing Proposal by the Contractor
Cost/Price Comparative Analysis
Negotiations
Contract Award
Contracting Process –Contractor View
Modifying the Contract:
Determination of Requirements and Statement of Work (SOW)
Request for Change (RFC) to Contractors – Solicitation
Creation of the Cost/Pricing Proposal by the Contractor
Cost/Price Comparative Analysis
Negotiations
ECP Authorization
Goals of Contracting Transaction
Government
*Fair, reasonable price
*Minimize government risk
*Encourage competition
Contractor
*Acceptable profit margin
*Minimize contractor risk
*Deliver timely, cost effective solution
The type of contract can help address both sets of priorities
There can be some confusion amongst the terms fee, profit, and margin. Fee, as we have seen thus far, is the amount paid to the contractor over and above Cost. Strictly speaking, it only applies to Cost Reimbursement contracts. Fee may be expressed as an amount or as a percentage of Cost, initially the Target Cost of the contract.
The Fixed-Price equivalent is Profit, and we use the term Profit across all contracts, since Fee is a specific form of Profit. Profit is a commercial ubiquity, whether or not a contract is involved. If McDonald’s can procure, package, and deliver a medium Coke for 30 cents and sell it for 99 cents, then they have made 69 cents profit (you figure out the percentage!) even though there was no contract with the customer on the other side of the counter.
A concept related to Profit is Margin, which is the same amount of money that is made over and above Cost, but expressed as a percentage of Cost and Profit together (known as Revenue), not just Cost.
A notional calculation for Profit Percent, also known as Return On Cost, or ROC, and Margin Percent, also known as Return On Sales, or ROS, as well as simple general formulae relating the two quantities, are shown above.
The determination of an appropriate Target Fee or Profit for a contract is a matter of some debate. Weighted guidelines are provided in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
Fee, Profit, and Margin
Fee: Amount ($) paid to contractor over and above Cost
Cost Reimbursement contracts
Profit: Amount ($) earned in excess of Cost
Fixed Price Contracts
Profit %: Profit expressed as a percentage of Cost
Also known as “Return on Cost” (ROC)
Margin %: Profit expressed as a percentage of Revenue
Revenue = Cost + Profit = also known as “Price” or “Sales”
Margin % is also known as “Return on Sales” (ROS)
Overall Observations
The firm fixed price, or FFP, contract vehicle creates a fixed price for a determined set of requirements. If this contract type is issued, the government has determined that there is adequate price competition in the market and reasonable price comparisons to prior purchases of same or similar supplies or services can be made.
The government also needs to determine that available cost or pricing information permits realistic estimates of the probable costs of performance. If these performance uncertainties can be identified and reasonable estimates of their cost impact can be made then the government may choose to issue a firm fixed price vehicle. If a contractor chooses to respond to the firm fixed price direction, the contractor accepts the risks involved. Any cost underrun (profit) or overrun (loss) is the responsibility of the contractor. On this type of contract, no statutory limits on profit apply. The contractor bears significantly more risk than the government.
Contract Types –Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience during performance of the contract.
When to use:
*Reasonable price comparisons to prior purchases of same or similar supplies or services
*Available cost or pricing information permits realistic estimates of the probable costs of performance
Before we discuss Incentive Contracts, we will introduce the share ratio. The share ratio is an integral part of the Profit Adjustment Formula. It can be a bit tricky to conceptually understand so here is a graphical representation of the impact to the Adjusted Profit when different share ratios are used.
The determination of the share ratio is based on a combination of incentivizing the contractor to manage the costs and sharing the risk between the government and the contractor.
As the share ratio is altered, the equation that yields the greatest profit when a program is underrunning, will lead to less profit when the program overruns. If the risk is high on the program, a conservative “flatter” share ratio (90/10) would be most appropriate. For maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs, an aggressive “steeper” share ratio (50/50) should be chosen. An incentive contract can have multiple share ratios: one if the contractor overruns and another if the contractor underruns.
Note that the above graph does not show a price ceiling. The price ceiling is a percentage of target cost (i.e. 150%) that limits the price to the government. If a price ceiling exists, the price to the government never exceeds it. All overruns above the price ceiling are absorbed by the contractor. If the various lines above reach the x-value of the cost ceiling, they would all start to decrease at the same steep slope: one dollar lost for every additional dollar over cost.
Incentive Contracts –Share Ratio
Target Cost = $10M
Target Profit = $1M
If Share Ratio is 80/20, it means that for every $1 the contractor saves in actual cost under the target cost, the contractor’s target fee will be increased by $0.20. And, for every $1 in actual costs that the contractor exceeds target cost, the contractor’s target fee will be decreased by $0.20.
Remember:
In Share Ratios, the Government comes first
If Share Ratio is 100/0, the Contractor gets no more and no less than the target fee. His share in the profit/loss is 0 (i.e., CPFF).
If Share Ratio is 0/100, profit/loss changes dollar-for-dollar with cost (i.e., FFP).
Fixed Price Incentive, or FPI, is quite a different contract vehicle than FFP. While the firm fixed price contract lays the responsibilities and risks on the contractor, the fixed price incentive provides for the distribution of risk between the government and contractor based on a “share ratio.” The FPI contract provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost. FPI contracts also specify a ceiling price, which is negotiated as part of the overall contract. There are two types of fixed price incentive contracts: firm target and successive targets.
A Fixed Price Incentive Firm, or FPIF, contract specifies a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and shareline(s). The price ceiling is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor under the base contract conditions. When the contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the final price is established by applying the profit adjustment formula (shown on the next slide). When the final cost is less than the target cost, final profit is greater than the target profit; conversely, when final cost is more than target cost, final profit is less than the target profit. If the final negotiated cost exceeds the PTA, the contractor absorbs the difference, and final profit can be a net loss Because the profit varies inversely with the cost, this contract type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs. Examples of the FPIF final contract price calculations follow on the next few slides.
It is also possible, though uncommon, to have a Fixed Price Award Fee, or FPAF, contract. This contract type is used to incentivize contractors when performance cannot be measured objectively. In this case, a fixed price is established and any award fee earned is paid on top of the fixed price.
Contract Types –Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI)
A fixed-price incentive contract provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost
Targets may be Firm (FPIF) or Successive (FPIS) (next slide)
FPI Data Elements
Target Cost (needed for all Contract Types)
Target Profit (needed for all Contract Types)
Share line (or share lines)
Ceiling Price
Tip: Target profit and ceiling price are fixed dollar amounts, but often initially expressed as a percent of target cost
Tip: IF is for quantitative incentives; AF is for qualitative incentives
Fixed Price Incentive Contracts
The chart above steps through the Profit Adjustment Formula for FPIF contracts. Remember, the objective is to determine the degree of success that the government had in incentivizing the contractor to manage the contract effectively (managing cost).
The formula has five elements to it:
2.Target Profit, or TP. This profit amount was negotiated at the start of the contract. It is a function of the target cost (namely, the target price the government aims to pay less the target cost the contractor aims to achieve).
FPI Example –Profit Adjustment Formula
AP is Adjusted Profit
TP is Target Profit
S is Share Ratio
If Share Ratio is 80/20, the Contractor earns (loses) $0.20 of profit for each dollar that Final Cost is below (above) the Target Cost
TC is Target Cost
FC is Final Cost
FP is Final Price
FP=FC+AP
Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets contract specifies a target cost, a target profit, shareline(s) and the production point at which the firm target cost and firm target profit will be negotiated (usually before delivery or shop completion of the first item) and a ceiling price. When the negotiation production point is reached, the contract becomes either an FFP (if appropriate) or an FPIF contract (as described above). This contract is suitable for use when cost or pricing data is insufficient to determine realistic firm target cost prior to award (but will be available post award).
It is also possible, though uncommon, to have a Fixed Price Award Fee, or FPAF, contract. This contract type is used to incentivize contractors when performance cannot be measured objectively. In this case, a fixed price is established and any award fee earned is paid on top of the fixed price.
Bonus – Finding PTA
Point of Total Assumption (PTA) is the cost at which the price hits the Ceiling Price
CP is Ceiling Price 90
TP is Target Price 9
GS is Government Share 108
TC is Target Cost 70/30
PTA=(CP - TP) / GS + TC
(108 - 99) / .70 + 90 =102.85 (PTA)
Other Fixed Price Types
Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) : Firm refers to the target cost and profit. This is the most common type of Fixed Price and more information about the mathematics will be shown on the following slides.
Fixed Price Incentive Successive (FPIS) : This is similar to FPIF except that the target cost and profit are not firm when first set. Instead, a production point is determined, and when the production point is reached, the contract becomes either FFP (if appropriate) or a FPIF contract, with the initial target cost, target profit, share line(s), and ceiling defined earlier.
* This is suitable when cost or pricing data is insufficient to determine realistic firm targets prior to contract award, but will be available post award.
Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF) : This is where the fee is determined by government individuals on the basis of more subjective criteria. It is for when “the work performed is neither feasible or effective to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, schedule, and technical performance” (FAR 16.401(e)(1)(i))
*This situation does not occur frequently, and therefore FPAF contracts are rather rare. A FPAF contract will include an award-fee plan that will outline how the fee will be determined.