Virtue Ethics Flashcards

Question

what is Aristotelian virtue ethics?

Answer 1

Aristotle declared that a virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits. These traits derive from natural internal tendencies, but need to be nurtured; however, once established, they will become stable begin with the idea that the ultimate end of practical reason is eudaimonia - for Aristotle, eudaimonia is determined by the telos of rational animals : “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence over a complete life” one attains happiness by a virtuous life & the development of reason and the faculty of theoretical wisdom - calls for intellectual excellences and excellences of character - the virtues moral virtue is a relative mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, and in general the moral life is one of moderation in all things except virtue moral virtue cannot be achieved abstractly - it requires moral action in a social environment

Answer 2

Aristotle’s own more detailed view about excellence of character is given by the ‘doctrine of the mean’ such excellences are those states of the emotional part of the soul, as manifested in action, that lie at a middle point determined by reason between excess and deficiency (each of which are vices) in the dimension of feeling that distinguishes them e.g. to be brave is to be such as to feel such fear as to choose neither recklessly (too little fear) nor cowardly (too much fear) many counterexamples: - e.g. honest action cannot always be understood as a mean between two different dishonest actions despite counterexamples, we can grasp the structure of Aristotelian virtue ethics without going into details of the doctrine / committing to it

Answer 3

Aristotle emphasises the importance of habituation in developing virtues virtues are acquired through practice & habit, not through theoretical knowledge

Answer 4

built on Aristotle, emphasises the importance of virtues for human flourishing a virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia a flourishing-based theory says a person has reason to act rightly only or ultimately because doing so will contribute to her own flourishing - if we believe that virtues are the selection of traits that an individual must possess in order to lead this sort of life, then this presents him with sufficient motivation to act in accordance with these virtues, that is, to act morally (Anscombe, 1958)

Answer 5

the flourishing account defines virtues as those traits a person needs to flourish or live well and vices as traits destructive of flourishing (Hurka, 2001) defines virtues in terms of their relationship with eudaimonia

Answer 6

egoism charge self-effacing

Answer 7

right action as one that a virtuous agent would have performed doesn’t include motive, looks at the action itself

Answer 8

connection to Kant: acting from… vs acting in accordance with… distinction between an actions moral worth and an actions rightness

Answer 9

virtue ethics is described: 1. as an ethics which is ‘agent-centred’ rather than ‘act-centred’ 2. as concerned with being rather than doing 3. as addressing itself to the question, ‘what sort of person should I be?’ rather than the question, ‘what sorts of action should I do?’ 4. as taking certain areteic concepts (good, excellence, virtue) as basic rather than deontic ones (right, duty, obligation) 5. as rejecting the idea that ethics is codifiable in rules or principles that can provide specific action guidance

Answer 10

appears to give the right answer but doesn’t account for moral worth. Decision procedure concerns account of rightness, and some sense of moral worth Hursthouse’s V are no more than mere slogans - which, like most slogans, are pretty misleading

Answer 11

amend Hursthouse’s account with Slote’s account just add condition of moral worth to Hursthouse’s account to avoid objection Hursthouse is theory of right action; and it also morally worthy if has a virtuous motive (Slote)

Answer 12

right action as one which is done from the most virtuous motive available to the agent if there are no virtuous motives available, the action cannot be right so the agent shouldn’t do it - virtue & vice is a binary distinction - only act on virtuous motives; at the very least the action must be done from virtuous motive

Answer 13

yes virtue & vice is a binary distinction - only act on virtuous motives; at the very least the action must be done from virtuous motive

Answer 14

is it possible to rank virtues? demanding - high threshold (prevents acting from motives that are not the MOST virtuous)

Answer 15

Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of an agent's motivations a right action is one which the agent does from a virtuous motive

Answer 16

'ought implies can' objection Sidgwick's prosecutor example: prosecutor tries to convict a guilty defendant but does so from malice if the prosecutor secures a deserved conviction, many will say he has acted rightly even though he has done so from a vicious motive. but Slote’s view, by requiring actual virtuous motives, must deem the prosecutor’s action wrong theory of right action gives wrong action ; claim is counterintuitive violates 'can' because both required NOT to do it (because evil motive) but at the same time require to DO it (because it is the right action)

Answer 17

egoism charge action-guiding critique (moral action indeterminacy) self-effacing

Answer 18

virtue ethics seems unattractively focused on the agent’s own flourishing take the first account of virtue based on reference to flourishing. If an agent only performs a virtuous act in the interest of his flourishing, then this surely detracts from its virtuous property - foundationally egoistic, insisting that their reasons to act & be motivated in these ways derive ultimately from their own flourishing (Hurka, 2001) - virtue has instrumental rather than intrinsic value, final end being own flourishing

Answer 19

that it rests on a misrepresentation of the relationship between being virtuous and flourishing

Answer 20

to avoid the charge of egoism define the state of flourishing simply as the state of being virtuous the agent aiming at their own flourishing is merely aiming at being a virtuous person as these ends are one and the same dispels the charge of egoism (rather, the theory is simply agent-centric), as the virtues are being pursued as ends in themselves, with ‘flourishing’ describing their collective attainment

Answer 21

no aretaic account identifies the virtues as those traits of character with an aretaic property of admirability thus can in principle unite the two properties (well-being & admirability) (Hurka, 2001) “aretaic property says a person has reason to act rightly only because doing so will express virtue on her part” (Hurka, 2001)

Answer 22

if our theory of flourishing cannot ascribe any part of its value independently of virtues, it follows that being virtuous is both necessary and sufficient to lead a good life this is NOT the case

Answer 23

“if a flourishing-based virtue ethics is foundationally egoistic, it seems natural to assume that the practical rationality invokes reasons only about goods in the agent’s own life. But then the account cannot justify other-regarding views such as benevolence and justice, which aim at other people’s good.” (Hurka, 2001)

Answer 24

one key task of moral philosophy is prescription - telling us what the right thing to do is virtue ethics seems overly concerned with being rather than doing and, as such, fails to provide us with proper guidance around how we are to act - does not produce 'codifiable principles (Hurka, 2001) places too much emphasis on cultivating virtuous character traits without offering clear guidance or rules for determining right or wrong actions in specific situations, or for moral dilemmas - what happens when conflicting virtues come into play? (Hurka, 2001) “virtue ethics yields only the prescription, ‘do what the virtuous agent - the one who is just, honest, charitable etc - would do in these circumstances.’ And this gives me no guidance unless I am (and know I am) a virtuous agent myself” (Hursthouse, 2001) implies that if less than fully virtuous, as most people are, will not know how to act as do not know what a ‘virtuous’ person would do ambiguity can lead to moral relativism or subjectivity - individuals may justify their actions based on their own interpretation of what constitutes virtuous behaviour

Answer 25

ambiguity can lead to moral relativism or subjectivity - individuals may justify their actions based on their own interpretation of what constitutes virtuous behaviour

Answer 26

potential ambiguity in the formulation 'what a virtuous person would do' 1. what some virtuous person would do - weaker criterion so can avoid objection 2. what every virtuous person would do - strict criterion - not obvious that all virtuous agents would agree on the same action (they are not homogenous)

Answer 27

Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics does offer practical guidance through the concept of phronesis phronesis is the ability to discern the morally right course of action in specific situations by considering various factors, inc. relevant virtues, the circumstances, and the individual’s own experience & judgement involves applying general principles and virtues to concrete situations, taking into account the particularities of each case in this way, virtue ethics does provide guidance for moral decision-making - emphasis on cultivating virtuous character traits & developing practical wisdom enables individuals to navigate complex situations and make morally sound judgements so while virtue ethics may not offer a rigid set of rules, it provides a framework that allows for nuanced and context-dependent ethical reasoning

Answer 28

an ethical theory is self-effacing if whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, cannot have been the agent’s motivation for doing it we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts if an agent aims at her own flourishing or virtue, she does not act from the required motives and so does not achieve the flourishing or virtue that is her goal

Answer 29

response (affects other ethical theories) - Stocker (1976) originally introduced the self-effacement objection as a problem for deontology and consequentialism - the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximise the general happiness reply (still affects virtue ethics) - Keller (2007) observes she won't be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what the virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics faces the same problem Woodcock response (action-and-motive-centric account) - not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011) - action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives - action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives - AMC account is not self-effacing as what it values (what rightness is based on) does include the person’s motives: in acting how the virtuous agent would act, and so performing the act that expresses virtue, a person is motivated by the virtuous agent’s motives (the virtues) Aristotelian response - self-effacement is not a problem that ethical theories need to avoid - one appealing feature of virtue ethics is the Aristotelian idea that ‘one who is learning to be virtuous may find it useful to have the explicit motive of emulating the virtuous person’ - therefore, whether self-effacement is a problem for virtue ethics depends, in part, on the developmental stage of the agent Reply (self-effacement not a problem for other ethical theories) - if self-effacement is not a problem for virtue ethics, then it is not a problem for other ethical theories either

Answer 30

action-and-motive centric account not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011) action-and motive-centric account: when someone is motivated from the X reasons by which the virtuous person would be motivated, then she is ‘motivated as the [virtuous] person would be motivated’ without being required ‘to have any explicit thoughts of the virtue itself, or of the fully virtuous person’ action-and-motive-centric account seems to avoid because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’ so the virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives AMC account is not self-effacing as what it values (what rightness is based on) does include the person’s motives: in acting how the virtuous agent would act, and so performing the act that expresses virtue, a person is motivated by the virtuous agent’s motives (the virtues)

Answer 31

self-effacement is not a problem ethical theories need to avoid one appealing feature of virtue ethics is the Aristotelian idea that ‘one who is learning to be virtuous may find it useful to have the explicit motive of emulating the virtuous person’ therefore, whether self-effacement is a problem for virtue ethics depends, in part, on the developmental stage of the agent

Answer 32

“a flourishing-based theory says the explanation is self-regarding: that the action will make his own life better or more flourishing. But this is not, intuitively, the right explanation. The right explanation is that the action will make the other’s life better” (Hurka, 2001)

Answer 33

yes commonly accepted truism that a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts & feels as she should but it is equally common, in relation to particular putative examples of virtues, to give these truisms up - generous or honest “to a fault” - someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie, in their desire to prevent hurting someone’s feelings - courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to if he were timid

Answer 34

yes forces hierarchy of values

Answer 35

both the virtuous adult & the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends - e.g. children & adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken it is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation

Answer 36

the right of a woman to control her own body does not settle the matter: it is possible to act within one’s rights whilst acting in a way that a virtuous person would not the personhood of the foetus cannot settle the issue: whether one is a good or bad person cannot depend on ability to solve problems in metaphysics the loss of human life is always a serious matter the morality of abortion turns ultimately on whether a women’s reasons are commensurate with the seriousness of the action

Virtue Ethics Flashcards

(60 cards)