(article) How can an undeniably authoritarian ruler who was widely said to threaten democracy can simultaneously seem like a powerless buffoon?
against the odds and expectations democracy has been resilient
electing a pm/president with autocratic tendencies heigthens the risk of backsliding, but should not be taken as evidence of backsliding
- “the combination of a politically weak president, and an environment with strong checks and balances, facilitates democratic survival even under populist administrations”
- constitutional design
-> strong independent judicial system - institutional change since enactment 1988 constitution
- nature of plebiscitarian leadership typical of populism
(article) Brazil as near miss? or case of quick recovery
near misses = cases where demoracy is exposed to social political or eco forces taht could catalyse backsliding, yet somehow overcome those forces and regains its footing
- i.e. cases where democracy has been under severe threat but survived intact
cases of quick recovery = case when a minimum threshold of democratic quality into nascent competitive authoritarianism is not met
Brazil is not really either: never felt below thresholds
we characterize Brazil as a case of quick recovery with two important caveats: Brazil would never fall below a threshold of competitive authoritarianism + threat posed by Bolsonaro was real but not entirely credible in the light of Brazil’s political institutions and political dynamics
(article) about Bolsonaro
victory more bc problem in supply than in demand: main parties had corruption scandals + core authoritarian bolsonaristas are relatively small
governing without forming a coalition failed (60 impeachment requests)
Mismanagement pandemic + accusations illicit activities son -> second year looked diff: built coalition with Centrao, but bargaining power was mainly of the Centrao, not Bolsonaro
even with coalition with centrao he did not have a majority (204/513) => lowest % executive bills approved by congress among all Brazil presidents = Congress worked as veto point to block Bolsonaro’s illiberal agenda
Bolsonaro = highest nr of executive orders (take immediate effect after publication) = typical for presidents trying to bypass legislature
- were mainly due to emergency conditions pandemic
- tend to be limited to administrative issues
Bolsonaro in a pickle: forced to walk on the razor’s edge; couldn’t moderate (risks electoral support) + couldn’t be too confrontational/anti-system (would be isolated)
(article) boiling frog argument
= metaphor for the opposition’s inability to coordinate against backsliding
downplays the role of forces that countervail backsliding:
In Brazil
- high magnitude districts -> high party fragmentation -> president forced to bargain
- strengthened legislative branch (parties more autonomous vs executive)
- multiple veto points: powerful state governors countervail presidential power
- Supreme Court powerful check on the executive
-> Bolsonaro no presidential hegemony (ability to exercise political control over other institutions)
in practice = the frog jumped out of the boiling water
the case / democratization
1889 = end of empire, no major increase in democracy then: oligarchic republic (only small percentage could vote)
1930-1940s = Estada Novo of Vargas = authoritarian with some social democratic hints
1945 -> republic with general suffrage
high democracy rating, but not as high as older democracies
similar with authoritarian regimes = how politicians connect to voters with clientelism
Brazil copied much of the US system
robust federalism = much power at the subnational level (historical origins: states/regions powerful in colonial time)
culture and nation
population most dense on the east coast
- north east used to be the economic heart (sugar plantations)
- now south east (Sao Paulo) center of wealth
large BRIC country
large -> diversity
lot of people identify as mixed, much of the indigenous population was repressed or died from decease
diversity -> federal structure to accomodate regional areas
not much external aggression: little struggles over borders after decolonization (during they were protected by Portugal)
north east used to be economic heart, now it is the south east (Sao Paulo)
horizontal inequality Brazil
white groups are in the majority in the richer south.
mixed identity mostly found in the north east
indigenous pushed back near the Amazon area = poorest area
-> dividing lines of regional wealth that overlap with ethnic identity
(but it is not a big cleavage)
historical development
pre-independence
pre-colonial = many diff populations eastern side (most fertile), were pushed back by Portuguese colonizers, it became an exploitation colony
for a long time not much interest in independence: not that many settlers, weren’t sure if they could control everything
- 1550-1830 = sugar cultivation, slave trade
- gradually replaced by minerals -> shift in economic center to the south east
1807 = Napoleon invades Portugal -> king flees to Brazil + places sun as king
-> 1815 foundation of the Kingdom of Brazil
historical dev. independence and empire
1822: Pedro 1 declares independence -> 1824 authoritarian constitution
tensions between emperors (want abolition) and plantation holders -> 1888 abolition of slavery
(after learning from civil war in US: afraid that continuing would lead to civil war)
1889 coup -> Pedro 2 into exile -> first republic until 1930
first republic = constitution after the US constitution, but oligarchic system (only small % could vote)
- divergense interest diff oligarchs: some want more protectionism agriculture, others have more industrial free trade interests
- Great depression -> loss popularity gov (urban poor loses jobs) -> military coup
1930-1945 = Estada Novo by Vargas = authoritarian leftist regime with some social welfare policies (-> support urban poor in the great depression),
!estada novo is in the model of Portugal?
- 1945 military disposes Vargas -> second republic
second republic 1945-64 = Vargas legitimately returns to power, still only small % can vote + highly polarized pro-Vargas vs pro-republic
- 1964 military coup supported by the US
Military decides to keep the power -> eco growth BUT by the 80s decline eco growth
- reading: torture, disappearances, exile
1980s = abertura = gradual/controlled transition to democracy
(eventually military regime lost control; people wanted to go faster and faster)
1988 = new constitution
1989-1992 Collor de Mello president = corruption scandals (resigned befre he could be impeached)
-> referendum if the people wanted a presidential or parliamentary system or a monarchical system -> republic with president
authoritarian developmentalism
long time discussion/consensus that democracies develop better than authoritarian regimes
BUT
70s and 80s: East Asian Tigers and Brazil major economic growth
-> idea that maybe authoritarian regimes lead to development bc they have more control/stability
- confidence producers
- no instability by switching power etc.
BUT: 1980s sharp decreases eco growth Brazil
cleavages - rural/urban
in the beginning = agriculture vs industrialization
now not that much: agriculture has become more lucrative -> same interests as industry: no protectionism
- diff in e.g. France were agriculture benefits from protectionism, but industry not
recently: agriculture more towards right-wing parties (Bolsonaro) bc they offer land in the Amazon basin
- Bancada Ruralista = group of parties for agricultural interests
it is def a cleavage and needs to be present in parliament
cleavages: class/economic
poor vs rich
- workers party Lula = broader than just the workers, it is labour but also agriculture
-> Bolsa Familia = support for poor families (regardless if they are labor or not)
high inequality (GINI) -> tensions
regional cleavages
= STRONGEST IN BRAZILIAN POLITICS
overlaps with the economic cleavage (=> horizontal inequality)
tensions federal gov and states (like in the US)
strong regional identifications and decentralized federalism, but national parties
not really a center-periphery cleavage: no calls for autonomy, federalism seems to be sufficient to appease diff regional interests (like in Germany and the US)
- there was an (the South is my country) independence movement in the south, 90% agreed, but no one showed up
- political entepreneurs have tried to make the issue salient, but this has not worked
issue is not really salient: they won’t vote for independence, they don’t vote along the lines of regions
ethnicity cleavage
overlaps with regional and economic cleavage (=> horizontal inequality)
not much tensions: little polarization across ethnic lines
- large mixed group
- fluid identity categories (you can pick which one you identify with)
political entrepreneurs: it just doesn’t work: it does not seem to resonate (even if there is discrimination)
- exception = some movements for indigeneous rights
recent years: affirmative action policies (quota policies) = controversial -> increase cleavage + polarization (white majority feels marginalized -> votes for Bolsonaro)
affirmative action policies
= quota policies
= direct policies intended to alliviate inequalities between ethnic groups
directly targets specific minority groups (e.g. make it easier for African Americans to join top universities)
it is effective, but also brings tensions, can increase polarization:
- gives people advantages on basis of identity
- = controversial: people are being marginalized in their own country (transnational cleavage + nativism)
better: you want people to have one identity, not to put emphasis on multiple identities (this leads to resentment) -> indirect measures are better: you help all the poor people
- this helps the minority, but not directly -> leads to less resentment
- everyone is treated equally
thing is: this works slower
cleavages: religion
not very important: 90% christian, 70% catholic
church has a more progressive role in Latin America than in Europe: more associated with democracy,, christian values of the welfare state
- still conservative with e.g. abortion and womens rights
similar to the US: we see a rise in conservative christian movements
presidential system
analogies with US presidentialism =
- separation of powers
- directly elected president
- directly elected bicameral parliament
- independent judiciary (in the past did not have a big role, but since Bolsonaro it came back, now e.g. banned twitter)
- strongly decentralized federation
(protection of states) - veto powers
differences:
- additional constitutional checks
(some parts of the constitution can’t be changed: can’t abolish federalism, military power is curtailed, strong protection of individual rights)
(in the US only equal suffrage of the states in the Senate is unchangeable) - electoral systems:
- president = two-round
- parliament = open-list PR (-> power to individuals rather than parties)
the president
7
- directly elected (with VP)
- 4y term
- maximum 2 CONSECUTIVE terms
*you can return - appoints cabinet
- initiates legislation (80%)
- veto-powers (but can be overturned by simple majority)
*overturn used to be seen as weakness, post-Bolsonaro seen as a blessing to protect against strong presidents - emergency decrees, but limited (tend to be about administrative issues)
impeachment procedure president
Chamber of deputy can initiate it with 1/3 in favor
- Chamber of deputy vote 2/3 majority
- senate vote 2/3 majority
1992: Collor resigns before impeachment
2016 Rousseff successfully impeached
presidential elections
two-round system
- like in France and Russia
simultaneously with parliamentary elections
need for political alliances -> coalitional presidentialism
- you need support from political players across regions
- after first round alliance building to get their voters to vote for you -> cuid pro quo = they get ministerial positions or bribes, you get their voters
run-off (two largest candidates) three weeks after first round
2022 = Lula vs Bolsonaro
narrow win Lula, most support in the north (that’s where the poverty is)
bicameral legislature
chamber of deputies
= proportional, diff states have diff nr of seats depending on population size
- 513 members
- 4y terms
- less powers for parties in choosing who will represent them bc open list PR
congress elections:
- vote for candidate, not party
- voting is compulsory (they register who vote, when you don’t you e.g. can’t collect pensions)
- no electoral threshold (-> fragmentation)
federal senate
- 81 members, 8y terms (3 senators from each state)
- SMD/FPTP (like in the US senate)
- staggered elections: 1/3 one time, 2/3 next time
!!senate and house are equal: everything that is approved by the senate must also be approved by the house = robust federalism
consequences congress electoral system
- extreme fragmentation (president <20% seats parliament)
-> president relies on other parties for support -> pork-barrel politics - weak party discipline
- regional identity trumps party
- recurrent splitting, switching
- pork-barrel politics & clientelism
- gov officials allocate funds/projects to secure support
coalitional presidentialism
presidents never have parliamentary majority (as in US)
depend on broad coalition of parties in parliament
- advocates: need for bigger coalitions, consensual politics, stability
- practice: presidents have to allocate resources to supporting parties
effects:
- creates interest group dominance, corruption, bad governance?
- protects against strong presidentialism
*similar to cohabitation and US (usually in second 2y only)
judiciary
Supreme federal court
- 11 justices, max 30y term (mandatory retirement at 75)
- increasingly active e.g. in covid: led states take their own measures when Bolsonaro didn’t do shit
now e.g. going after X (fake news + hate messages)
