1
Q
Name the military strengths of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War
A
- use of guerrilla warfare
- tactical flexibility
- morale of PLA troops
- discipline of PLA troops
- Lin Bao’s military leadership
2
Q
Explain how the Communist use of guerrilla warfare contributed to the Communist victory
A
- Communist forces already skilled in guerrilla warfare
o used it against the Japanese and knew it was perfect for fighting numerically superior opponents (like the GMD)
o also allowed forces to move more quickly and thus take the initiative faster -> dominated rural areas and could strike vital communications points easily whilst NRA and GMD isolated in city strongholds - Manchuria’s landscape was well-suited to guerrilla warfare
o hilly
o large forests - the sustained pressure from guerrilla attacks helped to sap NRA morale, exhaustion and the forces’ strength
o wouldn’t WIN the war because of guerrilla warfare alone (hence the pivot to conventionality) but prepared way towards victory
NOTE: in 1930s, Mao had written abt importance of “wear and tear” tactics (guerrilla warfare)
3
Q
Explain how the Communist tactical flexibility contributed to the Communist victory
A
- guerrilla warfare technically part of tactical flexibility, so all those points apply
- knowing when to retreat/concede ground if faced w/unbeatable force
o conserved resources, energy and soldiers for a later time when they were further strengthened and could sufficiently fight back
4
Q
What did Mao say about the nature of the tactical retreat from Yan’an?
A
“Jiang thinks that when he seizes the devil’s lair, he will win. In fact, he will lose everything. We give Jiang Yan’an. He will give us China.”
5
Q
Explain how the upkeep of PLA morale contributed to the Communist victory
A
- Mao believed morale and motivation of troops were key influencers on an army’s success, as would be more committed and thus more likely to fight well and withstand hard conditions without breaking into mutiny or fragging etc.
o as such, political indoctrination was part of their training - this political indoctrination also made the PLA key proponents of Communist propaganda simultaneously
o crucial, as PLA would be first Communists encountered by people in captured Nationalist territory
o so, needed to provide good image for Communists
o often helped residents to clean up debris etc. after the fighting concluded, and were notably kinder in comparison to the ill-disciplined, rude and rowdy NRA forces in previous Communist territory
6
Q
Explain how the PLA’s discipline contributed to the Communist victory
A
- since 1928, Mao impressed onto Communist soldiers the need to treat civilian population w/respect, and to be disciplined
o the “army and the people are one” - again, made a proponent of Communist propaganda, as presented ideal of a better future China under the Communists when came into contact with the public -> opposed to Nationalist rule and soldiers’ ill-discipline/hatred/poor morale and conviction for Jiang
7
Q
Explain how Lin Bao’s military leadership contributed to the Communist victory
A
- Lin Bao was a veteran of the Long March
o emblematic of the same sense of victory under Mao as seen in the Long March -> Comm. propaganda at work - also graduated from Whampoa military academy (1925) and had considerable skill as a commander
o contrast w/Jiang’s commanders and officials who often lacked real authority due to Jiang’s tendency to refuse delegation, as well as his prioritisation of loyalty over skill
8
Q
Explain the military weaknesses of the GMD in the Chinese Civil War
A
- corrupt officials and poor organisation
- poor morale + conviction as majority of NRA were conscripts, as well as poor/corrupt management leading to days spent w/o adequate food and water
o taken from villages by force
o roped together and marched under armed guard to their units -> many died in these marches
o in one march, 900 died (100/1000 survived)
o at night, clothes taken to discourage desertion - Jiang was a poor military leader with an inability to delegate power
o chose loyalty over ability in his officials too - sent his best troops into Manchuria before securing central and notthern China
o supply lines got far too long
o troops spread too thinly - made easier for PLA guerrilla forces to pick them off - NRA/GMD forces gained ill-repute for brutality when capturing previously Communist-held territory
9
Q
What is the number of Nationalist troops during the Civil War?
A
2,200,000
(nearly double PLA no.)
10
Q
What is the number of PLA troops during the Civil War?
A
1,560,000
11
Q
How many pieces of artillery did the NRA have during the Civil War?
A
21000
12
Q
How many pieces of artillery did the PLA have during the Civil War?
A
22800
13
Q
Name the political strengths of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War
A
- political unity
- democratic dictatorship
- peasant support and land reform
- broadening of CCP base support during Second Sino-Japanese War
- propaganda
14
Q
Explain how political unity was established and contributed to the Communist victory
A
- during the Communists’ sojourn in Yan’an, Mao established himself as ‘undisputed’ head of the Party
o worked with Chen Boda (his secretary in Yan’an) from 1938 to craft the doctrines of Maoism
o Mao Zedong Thought part of the party’s constitution - uniformity imposed - democratic centralism also important
- meant that there were very few disputes within the Party (makes more efficient), and that all were motivated by the same thoughts/ideals -> commitment and fighting for the Party
15
Q
Explain how democratic dictatorship contributed to the Communist victory
A
- all political activity and decisions made by Communist Party (higher ups)
o political uniformity, removal of confusion or ambiguity or debate about instructions - at local level, even some non-member peasants, or those in other classes (eg. petite bourgeoisie) could participate in ‘revolutionary committees’ and meetings that handled local affairs like education, health, farming, land reform and political/military training
o mass participation crucial to build up rural support for the Communists
o garnered so MUCH support bc first effective local governance system experienced - Jiang conversely was centred on the cities and had corrupt rural officials
16
Q
Explain the role of peasant support and land reform in the Communist victory
A
- majority of population rural peasants - if don’t provide better alt. to GMD and gain support, will not have any sort of mass power
- modification of land reform policies to suit political needs during Civil War and thus extract the most support possible from the peasantry
o land reform central to peasant support - reprise from the corrupt landlords etc.
17
Q
Describe CCP land reform policies during the Civil War
A
- during S.U.F, had changed from “land to the tillers” land reform policy to a series of campaigns for rent reductions
o cooperation w/GMD meant Not heavily alienating its rural supporters (richer peasants and landowners) - 1946, returned to radical policy of land confiscation (from landlords) and redistribution
o “land to the tillers”
o VERY violent process - CCP cadres organised village rallies
o essentially embryonic ‘speak bitterness’ campaigns -> landlords and rich peasants denounced, subjected to humiliation and violence
o even landlords’ children subjected, named ‘little landlords’
o implicates peasants in violence against landlords etc. -> if GMD succeeded in the Civil War, would turn to them with double the fervour -> so, more commitment for CCP to win - consolidated firm peasant support for CCP - by early 1948, violence of the terror campaign so much that some CCP members began to petition Mao to call for restraint
o so, Mao called temp. halt -> attributed unchecked excesses of violence to mistakes of low-level CCP officials
ADD TO THIS FROM WIKIPEDIA !!!
18
Q
Explain how the broadening of CCP’s support base happened and how it contributed to the Communist victory
A
- during WW2 and Second Sino-Japanese War, CCP gained wider base for its persistent patriotic image in the fight against Japanese imperialism
o by contrast, GMD sometimes took approaches that were too slow, too heavily focused on appeasement, or those which indirectly hurt Chinese citizens (eg. flooding of Yellow River 1938) - propaganda
- limited support in cities
o CCP infiltrated trade unions in cities like Shanghai -> could undermine GMD by organising strikes
o ultimately still LIMITED though
o grand majority of broadening of political support stemmed from GMD failures rather than CCP successes
19
Q
Explain how the use of propaganda contributed to the Communist victory
A
- posters, music and political indoctrination generally important
o as long as not too literary (most of rural population illiterate) - PLA forces
o as part of training, PLA politically indoctrinated and idea that must respect all Chinese people (esp. peasantry) drilled into them - CCP FOR THE PEOPLE (patriotic image of the revolution)
o in newly ‘liberated areas’, PLA often helped clear debris, were courteous to locals
o recognised in contrast to the NRA forces for their decorum and respect
20
Q
Name the GMD political weaknesses during the Chinese Civil War
A
- loss of popular support due to long-standing failure to deliver on the Three People’s Principles
- corrupt and inefficient local officials made CCP local governance seem EVEN better in comparison
- corruption amongst officials also meant that little tax revenue actually reached central gov
o Jiang forced to borrow heavily - persisting debt - peasant fear of revenge via landlord militias etc. in Communist areas where GMD could take over/back
o meant avid commitment to the CCP and very little chance of side-switching - GMD mismanagement of the economy throughout the war
21
Q
Describe landlord treatment of peasants in areas retaken from the CCP by GMD forces/landlord militias employed by the GMD
A
- redistributed land was forcibly taken back
- rent arrears collected at gunpoint
- executions
o in some cases, landlords would execute one member from each peasant family that had participated in land reform under CCP governance
22
Q
Describe the mismanagement of the Chinese economy during the Civil War under Jiang and its impacts
A
- 1946, Jiang’s gov. printed more banknotes to fund Civil War expenditure
o however, vastly devalued the currency and caused inflation to rise severely
o those living on fixed incomes or on their savings (typically middle class, including teachers etc.) were the worst hit by inflation, as their earnings did not rise in line with inflation - 1947, many demonstrations
o “students and teachers are becoming increasingly violent” -> diary of John Melby (American diplomat working in China during the Civil War)
o interestingly, Melby also noted that the strikes/riots “not economically motivated. Rather they are protests against the Guomindang and the secret police.” - instances of people resorting to eating rotten meat from the floor, selling children to get rice, etc.
- gov. did not take ANY decisive action to mitigate the impacts until 1948
o too little too late:
o withdrew old banknotes and introduced new currency (gold yuan)
o rationing of basic commodities
o controls on wages and prices introduced
o new taxes introduced - by 1949, failure of reforms meant economic collapse in Nationalist-controlled areas
23
Q
By how much had prices risen from September 1945 to May 1946?
A
+1000%
24
Q
What was the rate of inflation in:
- February 1947
- March 1947
- 1948 September
A
- February 1947
o reached 3000% - March 1947
o 14000% - September 1948
o 8,683,000%
25
Describe the consequences of the GMD's economic mismanagement during the Civil War
meant that:
o CCP's economic management in their territory during the civil war was made to look a lot better by contrast
o support in the CITIES (only places where GMD support was concentrated) swayed away from GMD -> not necessarily that CCP was favoured, just that people no longer felt they could support the GMD and the CCP thus filled the gap for political support
o of course some would have also favoured the CCP's message of being 'for the people', a sentiment directly contrasted by the GMD's economic mismanagement and failure to protect its people from the consequences (extreme poverty, starvation, etc.)
o people in cities tended to be more likely to be educated and to have a voice politically, unlike many rural people (teachers, academics, politicians, activists etc.) -> the GMD not only losing their support but now danger of being spoken against more openly
26
Describe American assistance to the GMD during the Chinese Civil War
- $3 bn total given to the GMD government, in addition to the arms supplied during the Second World War
o Jiang STILL pressed for more aid however
o Mao able to point to this in his propaganda as a sign that Jiang's China would always be dependent on foreign assistance and would never stand on its own (key failure of 3PP's as well as implementation of Nationalism)
- Jiang's continuing demands for financial support placed the US-Chinese relations under strain
o US increasingly regarded Jiang as an unreliable ally
- since US priorities lay with rebuilding Western Europe following WW2, November 1948 Truman suspended financial aid to the GMD
27
Describe Soviet assistance to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War
- Red Army provided vital training and equipment (captured Japanese arms) to the PLA
- at beginning of war, whilst they were occupying Manchuria, Red Army established 16 military training institutions
o airforce
o artillery
o engineering etc.
o employed Japanese prisoners of war in training Chinese pilots
- long-standing animosities between Mao and Stalin prevented more flush cooperation
o Soviet assistance NOT provided unconditionally - Soviet needs were always placed above CCP's
o Mao learned to do the same and gave up on the notion of solidarity with the USSR
o ended up playing into Mao's superior display of nationalism compared to Jiang - completely committed to serving China and not just his political goals
28
Describe Stalin's view of the CCP's success in the Civil War
- surprised
- was concerned during the war that USA would intervene to prop up Jiang's regime if Comm. victory likely
o told Mao to stop PLA's advance at the Yangzi River + est. separate Comm. republic in northern China
o ofc, Stalin was ignored
29
Give the dates for each phase of the Chinese civil war (1946-49)
PHASE 1:
July 1946 to May 1947
PHASE 2:
May 1947 to November 1948
PHASE 3:
December 1948 to October 1949
30
What happened in phase 1 of the Chinese civil war (July 1946 - May 1947)?
- GMD take initiative
o capture large cities to establish GMD controlled 'corridor' along Manchuria's coastline
o so, Communist forces in Manchuria retreat northwards
o Lin Bao moves Eighth Route Army from Yan'an to Manchuria to strengthen Communist forces
- Communists also lost/retreated from base in Yan'an, as well as their positions along the Yangzi River and their only city stronghold outside of Manchuria (Zhangjiakou)
- Oct 1946, GMD offensive against Communist stronghold in Manchuria failed to break PLA defences
- guerrilla warfare used against GMD from rural Manchuria bases
- Jan 1947, Marshall mission concludes
- March 1947, Dixie mission concludes
- by spring 1947, Communist control of northern Manchuria established
o Lin Bao decides take offensive approach for next phase
31
Who was Lin Bao?
- talents in guerrilla warfare as a commander
o used in 1930s when defending Jiangxi Soviet and then Yan'an later
- PLA commander in Manchuria during Civil War
o later in northern China also
- responsible largely for transformation of PLA from guerrilla to modern professional army
32
What happened in phase 2 of the Chinese Civil War (May 1947 - November 1948)?
- throughout 1947, pressure on GMD from Communist guerrilla attacks sustained
- May 1947, PLA full scale attacks on GMD positions
o first attacks unsuccessful, but inflicted serious GMD losses (morale down for GMD)
- 1948, PLA transitioned from guerrilla warfare to conventional battles
- April 1948, captured Luoyang (important city situated on Yellow River)
o also Communist gains in Shandong -> isolated GMD's main city stronghold (Jinan)
- June 1948, Communists capture Kaifeng (city on Yellow River - gateway from coast to western interior of China)
o easier for Communists to threaten GMD control of Xian and Sichuan (western provinces)
- Communist victories in Manchuria (October and November)
o so, isolated GMD forced there from the rest of China -> easier to take out
33
What happened in phase 3 of the Chinese Civil War (December 1948 - October 1949)?
- PLA launch 2 new offensives in northern China
o capture Xuzhou railway junction Jan 1949
o move QUICK
- 31 Jan 1949, Beijing captured
o little resistance
o established Communist control over whole of northern China
- April 1949
o key attacks on Yangzi River cities
o Nanjing captured
- Shanghai fell late May
o Wuhan also captured in May
o leaves south vulnerable
- after Wuhan capture, PLA forces divided
o Peng Dehuai led one leg of these from Wuhan westward to capture Xian and Lanzhou (taken August 1949
o Lin Bao's leg went south and captured Guangzhou in October
o part of the force sent southwestwards to finish off remaining GMD resistance in Guizhou and Chongqing (taken on the 25th of November 1949 after war concluded)
34
Track the GMD's relocation over the course of the Civil War
Nanjing -> Guangzhou -> Chongqing -> Chengdu -> Taipei (Taiwan)
35
What did Mao do following the Communist establishment of control in (most of) China?
- September, called Political Consultative Conference in Beijing
o dominated by Communists, however reps from 14 other parties present
o members of PRC central government elected, including Mao as Chairman
- 1 October 1949, Mao's speech in Tiananmen Square (Beijing) to declare PRC's establishment
36
Who owned which of the Chinese 'zones' by 1940?
JAPANESE:
- Manchuria
- Inner Mongolia
- northeast China
- east-central China
- Guangzhou
- Taiwan
INDEPENDENT:
- Tibet
USSR:
- Xinjiang
LOCAL WARLORD:
- most of Shanxi province
CCP:
- area around Yan'an
GMD had control over pretty much the rest of China
37
Describe how this changed by Oct. 1949
CCP has control over pretty much everything
- APART FROM:
o Tibet (independent)
o Taiwan (GMD)
o Xinjiang
38
Describe the problems posed to Mao in October 1949 by the state of territory ownership at this time
- CCP still didn't have unified and complete control over China
o in terms of Taiwan, this meant that Jiang could still pose a political threat on an international scale by challenging the legitimacy of the Communist government and swaying western allies of the GMD (by way of opposing Communism) against engagement with the PRC
o for Tibet, proximity means that China's borders possibly could be construed as less secure due to CCP's lack of control over Tibet
o in Xinjiang, many rich natural resources (coal, oil, gold, uranium) -> all EXTREMELY useful for the economic development of the PRC -> lack of control means inability to utilise these resources
39
Give some key facts about Xinjiang prior to the CCP's capture of it in 1949
- sparsely populated but with rich natural resources
o oil
o coal
o gold
o uranium
- population composition:
o majority Uighur Muslims
o Kazaks
o Mongols
o Kirghiz
o Uzbeks
o MINORITY HAN CHINESE POPULATION -> meant that CCP influence in the region was exceedingly weak
- hadn't been incorporated into Chinese territory until 1884
- held by USSR during WW2, but relinquished to China under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1945
o Stalin ordered provincial gov. to cooperate w/Mao -> didn't happen -> Mao's authority undermined -> problem
40
Describe how Mao resolved the issues of provincial/territory ownership
- regarded conquering Taiwan and Tibet as long-term objective
- CCP instead focused on first capturing Xinjiang
- Oct 1949, CCP military campaign captured Xinjiang's capital (Urumqi)
o Communist provincial gov. installed -> Mao reassert authority
HOWEVER, armed resistance to CCP rule continued until 1954
41
Describe the issues caused to the PRC by issues of regional governance
- different regions had different circumstances and political needs in terms of governance
o main split was between the 'old liberated areas' and the 'new liberated areas'
o 'old' included areas like Manchuria, northern China, northeastern China, northwest and east China (partially)
o 'new' = primarily China south of the Yangze River
- in 'old' areas, CCP already had an established presence, with strong peasant support etc., which was missing from the newly liberated areas
42
Describe how the CCP solved the differing governance issues between 'old' and 'new' liberated areas
- 'old' placed under 'people's democratic governments' Oct 1949
- 'new' placed under 'Military Control Commissions' in the early years
o had to be taken control of via military conquest in Oct 1949, as no mass support or local organisation established in these areas
o some resistance encountered from those Mao termed 'bandits' (remnant GMD forces, secret societies, ethnic minorities)
43
Describe the economic issues facing the PRC in the aftermath of the Civil War
- infrastructure SEVERELY weakened, not just due to Civil War, but the constant conflict since like. 1911
o ~half railway lines destroyed
o many rivers blocked by sunken ships -> communications and trade hampered
o electrical stations damaged/destroyed (power cuts and shortages)
- before the Red Army left Manchuria in 1945, stripped much of the factories' machinery to take back to Russia
o capital greatly reduced
o industrial production in 1949 was only 44% of what it had been in 1937
- food production in 1949 was 30% below the 1937 level
o much of the country thus faced food shortages
o as well as PRODUCTION being low, food supplies had also suffered due to the great dislocation of food supplies to feed armies etc. during the Civil War (grain requisitioning?)
- global trade declined
o particularly as a result of both the instability and the fact that Jiang was out in Taiwan spreading bad sentiments about the PRC
o great port cities of Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangzhou decayed
- hyperinflation caused many wealthy Chinese to move money to Hong Kong or Taiwan -> further economic dislocation, as well as withdrawal from the circular flow of money -> economy weakened further, lack of money for investments etc. and capital
44
Describe Mao's roles (in terms of position) in the PRC's government
- Chairman of the CCP
- Chairman of the Central People's Consultative Council
o equivalent to presidential post
- Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council
- was NOT (directly) involved in day-to-day decision making and implementing policy
o saw role instead as leading, and in implementing the 'mass line' theory of ruling through maintaining an ideological debate surrounding the underlying principles of the Party
o THROUGH IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL, CONTROLLED THE GOV AND PARTY MORE GENERALLY
45
What is the 'mass line' theory of rule?
- 1942, declared an unofficial doctrine of communism
- a system of leadership "from the masses, to the masses"
- process:
o initial policy formulated using historical analysis and theory
o policy and underlying theory revised in the context of real-world conditions when the policy is implemented
o revised theory then becomes the 'guide' for future correct action
46
Describe the structure of the CCP central body in PRC government
- CCP as central body
o top level (national) comprised of:
[] Standing Committee (5 members including Chairman Mao)
--> all key debates abt policy and decisions here
[] the Politburo (14 members)
[] the Military Affairs Committee (w/Mao as Chairman)
o national level CCP supervises second level CCP, national level of state bureaucratic body and of the PLA
o Military Affairs Committee in particular supervises the general staff (including general political dept.) of the PLA/military body of government
o second level (regional - pre-1954) comprised of First Party Secretary and the Regional Party Secretary
o second level (provincial - post-1954) = Party Secretary and Provincial Party Committee
o BOTH second levels essentially have same function just in slightly diff ways -> supervised by national level and in turn supervise the local level of the CCP, the second level(s) of state bureaucracy body and also second levels of the PLA body
- local level comprised of local party committees, which in turn supervise party branches in different administrative capacities (eg. education, local industry (factories), shops, healthcare, offices)
o party branches supervise people’s congresses and people’s councils (local level of state bureaucracy) and party branches in PLA units (local level of military body/PLA)
47
Describe the State Bureaucratic body of the PRC
- national level supervised by national level of the CCP, and supervises the regional and provincial sectors of the state bureaucracy body
o Central People’s Government Council (Mao as chair)
o State Council (premier is Zhou Enlai) - supervised by CPGC
o 24 ministries - supervised by State Council
- 2nd levels both supervised by national level of state bureaucracy, as well as the regional and provincial levels of the CCP body respectively; they =
REGIONAL LEVEL (pre-1954)
o Government chairman
o people’s congresses and people's governments
PROVINCIAL LEVEL (post-1954)
o provincial government
o provincial people’s congresses and people’s governments
- local level (arrows show supervision in descending order)
o county (supervised by prov. ppl’s congresses and governments) -> municipal district -> village -> people’s congresses and people’s councils
o the congresses and councils at local level are supervised by party branches in admin areas from CCP local level
48
Describe the military (PLA) body of the PRC
- national level supervised by the CCP national level, and supervises regional/provincial level of military body
o People’s Revolutionary Military Council w/Mao as chair (pre-1954)
o National Defence Council w/Defence Minister as Peng Dehuai (post-1954)
o both of these supervise(d) general staff/general political department in this body
o general staff/political dept. also supervised by Military Affairs Committee of CCP national level
- 2nd levels supervised by regional/provincial levels in CCP main body respectively, and supervise local level
REGIONAL
o regional military commander
o army political commissar
PROVINCIAL
o provincial military commander
o political commissar
- local level supervised by regional/provincial levels of military body
o regimental military commanders
o political commissars
o party branches in PLA units (supervised also by party branches in general administrative areas)
49
Describe generally the government structure of the PRC
- 3 main bodies
o CCP as central body, then State Bureaucracy and Military (PLA) bodies
- each divided into three main levels (national, regional(pre-1954)/provincial(post-1954), local)
- CCP levels always supervise each corresponding level of military/SB body, as well as those levels being supervised from higher levels from within the body
- Mao in the national level of each body pre-1954
o even post-1954, when the Defence Minister was Peng Dehuai instead of being headed by Mao, CCP as central party still supervised
o so had indirect control
50
Who was Gao Gang?
- 1902-1954
- virtually illiterate (one of only CCP leaders w/little formal education) but effective
- joined CCP 1926 as local Party leader in Shanxi province
- in charge of Manchuria's economic recovery during Civil War
o as a result of the experience, became head of the Central Planning Commission 1952
51
Who was Deng Xiaoping?
- 1904-1997
- son of peasant from Sichuan
- studied abroad in France and Moscow
- joined CCP 1920s
o veteran of the Long March
o long-standing Mao supporter
o military leader of PLA during Civil War
o by 1950s, recognised as leading figure in CCP hierarchy
o Party General Secretary 1957
52
Describe the role of democracy in the CCP
- Party Congresses in theory brought Party branches from throughout the country to discuss and debate policy/decisions
o in practice, Politburo would make the decisions and have the debates separately before going to the congresses and getting the Party branches to simply sign off
o also, even then the congresses did not meet regularly - first in 1949 when PRC established, and the next one in 1956
o legitimised the central authority of the CCP
- Mao/CCP tolerated the existence of other parties
o as long as they did not challenge or pose a threat to the CCP
- democratic centralism
- neither Mao nor the CCP had been elected into government
o legitimacy rested on the acceptance of them by the people
o had support, as had eliminated many of their enemies, but also because had brought peace, sovereignty and stability to a country which hadn't seen that in decades
53
Describe the role of other political parties in China
- 14 parties aside from the CCP
o most important:
[] Revolutionary Committee of China (breakaway from the main body of the GMD)
[] China Democratic League
[] China Democratic National Construction Association
[] China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party
[] China Zhi Gong Dang
o subjected to persecution during 1950s and 1960s (suppression)
- they participated in the 1949 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
- 11 of 24 ministers appointed to the State Bureaucracy in 1949 were from non-CCP parties
- only tolerated as long as they weren't a threat to the CCP's control
54
Describe 'democratic centralism' in China
- meant that, within the elite decision-makers (eg. Politburo), Party members free to discuss and debate policy/decisions fully
- however, once vote taken and decisions finalised, ALL MUST present a united front to the nation and the rest of the CCP
o must promote and implement decisions too
- despite this democracy within the Politburo, even then discussion was limited due to the inclusion of Mao Zedong Thought in Party constitution
- framing as a democracy was VERY important for Mao
o believed that China was not ready for a fully-fledged socialist system and so needed a transitional period
o this transition was provided by the gradual withdrawal of democracy, starting with democratic dictatorship
55
How many people were Party members in 1949 vs 1950?
1949
4,448,000
1950
5,821,604
56
What was the population of China in 1950?
around 500 million
o thus, CCP very small part of the nation
57
Why was CCP membership in the vert early years of the PRC so small relative to approadch
- followed Leninist concept of 'vanguard party'
o only those who could prove commitment and ideological correctness to the Party were admitted
- in terms of Party cadres, directly carried out Party rep and ideology
58
Define and explain the significance of Party cadres
- most select group of general officials at local level
o had to be FULLY indoctrinated in CCP ideology and subordinate their own needs to the needs of the Party and the people
- often in charge of overseeing administration, making sure it works as the CCP intended as well as political education of the masses
- had privileged lifestyle compared to ordinary Chinese people under the 'iron rice bowl' system
o essentially if 'joined revolution' were guaranteed employment and income for life
o included Party + gov officials, employees of State-run firms, military personnel
o possible damage to work quality since incentives reduced? eval -> indoctrination
59
Describe how the Party was involved in the everyday lives of its people when it took power
- CCP had branches in all aspects of national life, eg.
o factories
o schools
o shops
o PLA units
o offices
- CCP members had leading roles in a lot of mass organisations
o ACWF
o ACDYF (all-China democratic youth federation)
o 'mass autonomous organisations'
- local level autonomous organisations that managed public health, policing and dispute resolution
o allowed the people to have a hand in governing themselves -> Comm. ideology -> CCP fulfilling promises
o however, all scrutinised by the CCP and overseen by Party cadres
- urban work units (danwei)
- hukou
- laogai
- dang'an
60
Define the term 'danwei'
- the work unit
o every employed Chinese citizen in an urban area belonged to one
o those who didn't were supervised by a residents' committee
- led by Party cadres
- controlled allocation of:
o housing
o grain
o cooking oil, cloth
o travel permits
o marriage permits
o army enrolment
o university employment
o work-change permits
61
Define the term 'laogai'
- labour camps
o essentially functioned as prisons for those deemed to need 'reform' by the CCP
- harsh environments, hard physical labour in fields or mines
- 1000+ camps by late 1960s
o as many as 27 million executed, committed suicide or worked to death in these camps
62
Define the term 'hukou'
- household registration system
o officially identifies permanent residents of an area
- includes data like:
o name
o parents
o spouse
o DOB
63
Define the term 'dang'an'
a permanent record/dossier of each individual's actions
64
How did the CCP and Mao justify suppression of 'counter-revolutionary elements' to consolidate control of China?
- 1950, outbreak of the Korean War
o war encourages patriotism and national unity
o also gave a sense that China's revolution was under theeat from internal and external forces
- Mao + CCP encouraged this feeling of threat and national unity against those threats
o thus fostered a greater foundation for acceptance of more extreme measures against those that threatened the CCP's authority and control
65
What did Liu Shaoqi say about the CCP taking advantage of the Korean War to justify more extreme measures of political suppression?
"Once the gongs and drums of resisting the United States and assisting Korea begin to make a deafening sound, the gongs and drums of the land reform and suppression of counter-revolutionaries become barely audible, and the latter becomes much easier to implement."
66
List and date the key counter-revolutionary campaigns in China from 1950-1952 (NOT including Party purges and campaigns against individuals)
- Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign (1950-1951)
- Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign (1950-1951)
- The Three Antis Campaign (1951-1952)
- The Five Antis Campaign (1952)
- Thought Reform Campaign (1951-1952)
67
Describe the 'Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign' (1950-1951)
- foreigners + USA identified as 'enemies' of the PRC when China joined Korean War (Oct 1950)
- Westerners in China and Chinese people with Western links became targets of persecution
o thought to be spies for Western world/USA
o many missionaries cast out
o Christian churches (often with American funds or imperial/non-Party influences from the Pope) forcibly closed -> property seized by the Party
- Chinese businesses, universities and other institutions with Western links under suspicion
- police searches
o confiscated radios, religious paraphernalia, weapons etc. from homes of suspected 'spies'
- mass rallies organised by the CCP ot encourage the building tension and paranoia in the general Chinese public
o justifies CCP measures and prevents the same people from criticising CCP action later down the line as were willing participants themselves
68
Describe the 'Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign' (1950-1951)
- focused on internal threats to the Chinese revolution and the CCP
- technically began in March of 1950
o Liu Shaoqi issued 'Directive on elimination of bandits and establishment of revolutionary new order' to order all GMD past officials etc. to register and declare their links
o promised leniency as a result, but other CCP members urged harsher treatment of these 'bandits'
o Mao did not respond to these immediately
- October 10 1950, after involvement in Korean War start, Mao issued 'Double-ten Directive'
o also known as 'Directive on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries'
o more aggressive suppression, aim to "wipe out" 'bandits' and those who would "cause harm to the people", including those in religious sects too
- Mao set quotas for executions of counter-revolutionaries depending on area population
o in some cases, areas didn't have that many counter-revs and so neglected proper trial and legal procedure to meet the quota
- February 1951, 'Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries' published
o detailed all counter-rev crimes
o eg. collaborating with imperialists, spying, bribing gov officials and participating in armed rebellion
- in less than a year, 28332 people executed
o many in public to have maximum impact -> people forced to watch these to be 'educated'
o led to a wave of suicides presumably to avoid execution, or because of the pure horror experienced
o on the flip side, many non-Party members willingly attended these rallies
o in Beijing alone, 30000 of these rallies, with 3 million+ turnout total
o in one of these, 200 simultaneous public executions
- police reports on the execution levels sent directly to Mao
o Mao tried to exercise close control over the level of executions
69
Describe the 'Three Antis Campaign' (1951-1952)
- started in Manchuria late 1951 before being extended nationally
- targeted
o corruption
o waste
o obstructionist bureaucracy
- those in firing line
o Party members
o State officials
o managers
- managers and officials denounced publicly in mass meetings, as well as investigated by Party committees
o those guilty were humiliated
- Party members forced to subject themselves to self-criticism and face group pressure to 'rectify' wrongdoing
o gave "sharp reminder" of danger of independent thought
70
Describe the 'Five Antis Campaign' (1952)
- Jan 1952
- targeted bourgeoisie for:
o bribery
o tax evasion
o economic espionage
o theft of State property
o cheating on gov contracts
- Party employed Workers' organisations to investigate employers' business affairs
o group criticism sessions for employers organised -> confess own crimes or denounce others
- 3000 mass meetings in Shanghai alone (Feb 1952)
o public denunciations
- guilty were fined extensively, property confiscated, sent to labour camps
o many of those denounced committed suicide to avoid further humiliation
o estimated 2-3 million suicides
71
Describe the 'Thought Reform Campaign' (1951-1952)
- intellectuals seen as agents of an 'imperialist cultural invasion'
o esp those educated abroad or in Chinese schools run by foreign missionaries
o also suspicious bc their Whole Thing is independent thought
o however, knew that intellectuals were vital for China to progress further as a nation
- campaign aimed to force intellectuals to study and adopt Mao Zedong Thought
o universities gained special attention
- professors forced to confess to students, attend study sessions and to self-criticise
72
What did Mao say about the nature of the CCP's use of the military?
"the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."
73
By 1950, how many men did the PLA have, what percentage of the state budget was military expenditure, what did this mean for China, and what was the result?
- 5 million men
- took over 41% of total state budget
o need to cut military expenditure if want to ameliorate China's economy more widely
o free up more money for peacetime spending (healthcare, schooling etc.)
o free up more labour supply by discharging soldiers who aren't really needed during peacetime
- as a result, partial demobilisation of PLA begun in 1950
74
Describe changes to the PLA from 1950 to 1953
- in 1950, partial demobilisation of the PLA begun
o freed up gov funds
o freed up men to add to labour force (esp. in peasant heavy physical industries like agriculture and manufacturing)
- by 1953, forces decreased from 5 million to ~3.5 million
o even then, PLA received 800000 new conscripts annually
o these conscripts served for 3 years
o so, PLA still largest army in the world
o ALSO meant that millions of young Chinese men had undergone political indoctrination and training in warfare -> similar to IDF conscription
75
Describe the importance of the PLA to the CCP
- PLA conscripts/soldiers portrayed by propaganda as the ideal model of society
o epitomised Mao's most treasured values for revolutionaries:
[] discipline
[] self-sacrifice
[] endurance
[] perseverance against overwhelming odds
o propaganda slogan 'Learn from the PLA'
o these virtues idealised in the PLA and celebrated by media, film, literature, plays, music etc. ESP after/during Korean War -> mythologises PLA and makes legendary and glorified -> encourages general public to instil the same virtues in themselves -> CCP greater control over the behaviour and ideology of the public
- went through most rigorous political indoctrination of any group in China
o part of countryside role was to indoctrinate and draw in peasants to CCP ideology
- practical use: some demobilised PLA units restructured for construction and public work projects
o such as repairing damaged infrastructure (railways, roads, bridges) and ameliorating the access to resources in China for industries' use etc.
o eg. First Field Army became Production and Construction Army
o developed untapped mineral resources and agricultural land
76
Describe the CCP use of labour camps to incite terror in China and thus consolidate ideological and behavioural control
- large network of labour camps (laogai) set up
o tactic copied from USSR under Stalin
- nationwide network of danwei, streets and neighbourhood committees established
o help CCP to identify and punish counter-revolutionaries
o exert control over whole pop. (supervised)
- thus heightened feelings of suspicion, paranoia and incited terror in the Chinese of not conforming and helping the CCP achieve its aims in terms of counter-rev suppression
o the constant monitoring of interactions also meant that suspicion amongst people increased -> increasingly isolated individuals -> breaks up rebellion efforts, conspiracies against CCP etc. -> consolidates control
77
78
Describe the use of terror to consolidate control as a result of the (public) executions during the suppression campaigns of 1950-1952
- all citizens came under scrutiny from others
o people encouraged to report on each other to officials and to rat out any possible counter-revolutionaries
- Mao set quotas of executions by population for each area
o local officials in charge of overseeing the executions and meeting quotas
o could be chastised heavily if executed too many or too few 'bandits'/counter-revs
- was often hard to tell who had genuinely committed counter-rev crimes, and legal trials took too long to meet the pressure to meet quotas
o hence, selection for execution was often random or used by officials as a way to eliminate rivals/those who had personally grieved them
o unpredictability of the selection -> added terror and uncertainty and psychological pressure
o many committed suicide as a result
o isolation, divided communities -> EASIER TO CONTROL
79
Describe the CCP's approach to stamping out the vast majority of crime and illicit affairs in China
- again, utilised terror and brutality to disincentivise crime
- prostitution virtually gone by 1953
o street committees surveillance on brothels
o prostitutes + pimps sent to re-education camps
- drugs
o dealers shot dead
o addicts had their supplies taken - families and communities made responsible for keeping them off drugs
o technically, replacement given via cigarette addiction - tobacco became gov monopoly in 1949 and so people encouraged to smoke and buy cigarettes -> control supply of addictive substance
DESPITE THE BRUTALITY, it worked a treat lol
80
Describe the CCP's use of propaganda to consolidate control
- propaganda networks led by trained cadres
o these worked through the media and all lower local levels of (often non-Party) organisation to mould favourable opinion of Party
o used newspapers, literature, theatre, cinema, radio, posters
o in some cases (eg. during Five Antis, 1952) reading clubs of newspapers set up in areas with very low literacy rates
- used to create atmosphere of fear and distrust, encourage people to join CCP campaigns, demonise the targets of CCP campaigns and to sculpt positive views of the CCP's reforms and policies and ideals (eg. 'Learn from the PLA' posters and the use of the social realist style)
81
Give the name and particularities of the art style of posters popular for USSR and PRC propaganda
socialist realism
- bold, vibrant colours
- everyone is always smiling and it's lwk unnerving but yk
- warm palettes
- gives off vibe that the Party is to be Trusted and is inviting and fundamentally right
82
Why and how did Mao's approach to land reform change after 1949?
- before 1949, had to vacillate between land redistribution and simple rent reductions
o S.U.F
o CCP not in control, so couldn't be TOO too radical all the time and needed to adjust based on sentiment
- AFTER 1949, CCP in power and did not have to adjust anymore
o land reform became purely the redistribution of land and the eradication of the landlord class to prevent it being needed again
o emphasis on class struggle in the countryside
83
When was the Agrarian Reform Law passed?
1950
o set out terms and methods for land reform
o differentiated between the treatment of a landlord vs the treatment of rich peasants
o one of explicit aims was to free up 'rural productive forces' from landlord power and dictation so agricultural production could increase
84
Describe the process of land reform in the PRC
- most land reform during this period took place in southern and eastern China, as CCP did not have influence there prior
o in south China, land was owned by extended clans rather than individual landlords; poor peasants were sometimes part of the same kinship networks
o cadres thus sometimes had difficulty convincing poorer peasants that land should be expropriated at all
- teams of 30-40 Party cadres start from 'key point' villages and work out
o worked with local peasants' associations
- landlord class eradicated, and rich peasantry weakened
o 'Speak Bitterness' campaigns -> public denunciation, humiliation, beating and often execution of landlords
o peasants included in this to make them complicit -> gives reason to support the CCP regimen invariably
o 1947, Deng Yingchao emphasised that peasant women had more propensity to be bitter and engage in revolution due to their partial separation from inheriting land/feudalism
o ACWF thus encouraged more peasant women to speak out at 'Speak Bitterness' rallies, practicing with them in advance and advocating generallly
o landlords' families also cowed into submission via social denunciation, and their women were also sometimes "redistributed" as concubines or wives
- propaganda also used to advertise 'Speak Bitterness' campaigns, glorify being poor (thus discouraging landlords re-emerging in theory), the success of land redistribution in giving many peasants a plot of their own land for the first time
85
Describe opposition to land reform in the early 1950s
- since most land reform in south/east where CCP did not have established influence, cadres sent out often didn't speak local dialect, understand the local/village culture etc. and viewed as outsiders
o changes resisted slightly more bc of this
- one of first tasks was grain requisition (taxes in form of grain)
o some areas, this provoked rebellion
o suppressing these rebellions meant more violence than utilised elsewhere in China to implement land reform
- also retaliation from landlords
o during Civil War, Homecoming Legion militias comprised of landlords seeking to restore pre-CCP life to rural pop. raped and killed indiscriminately under the guise of pacification (targeted opposition still existed in name though, and these militias also worked with the GMD at a point)
o after Civil War, some landlords would poison wells, cut down forests etc. prior to the advent of the Party cadres
o CCP ultimately used these stories to construct propaganda presenting landlords to be evil as a collective
86
Describe the outcomes of land reform practices in the early 1950s
- succeeded in essentially eradicating the landlord class
- these reforms (as well as others in the period) challenged the traditional structure of Chinese society (clan loyalty, religion, landlords etc. = main powers)
o replaced with peasant associations and the CCP
- 43% land redistributed to 60% of rural pop.
- between 1.5 and 2 million killed between 1947 and 1952
- Agrarian Reform Law failed in its aim to increase agricultural productivity via land reform
o treatment of landlords and rich peasants disincentivised peasant farmers from striving to do well in agricultural industry out of fear
o slogans on propaganda like 'To be poor is to be glorious' also disincentivised efficient agricultural production -> peasants aimed to STAY poor to both align with CCP prop. and also avoid terrible denunciation and treatment
A Level History AQA
flashcards
Decks in class (19)
# Cards
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China - Chapter 1100
-
China - Chapter 286
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China - Chapter 389
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China - Chapter 40
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China - Chapter 50
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China - Chapter 60
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The Political Nation, socioeconomic and religious context44
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James I - character and court14
-
James I - Crown finance + attempts at reform39
-
James I - religion and religious division25
-
James I - Parliaments (1604-1624)32
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Charles I - character and court10
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Charles I - Crown finances + attempts at reform11
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Charles I - religion and religious division (1625-29)4
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Charles I - Parliaments (1625-29)29
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Charles I - state of Crown/Parliament relations by 16296
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Charles I - religious division by 164027
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Charles I - political divisions (Personal Rule + Short P)47
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Charles I - the Long Parliament, Pym and the outbreak of the Civil War16
