Regulation has a cost – regulators must aim to develop a system that achieves the objectives and where the benefits outweigh the cost. (optimal level = marginal benefit = marginal cost of regulation)
Regulation Direct costs
* Compliance for the regulated firms – cost for the participant
Regulation Indirect costs
The need is greater in financial services than other markets because of:
• Confidence
• Asymmetric information
• Confidence
Danger is that problems in one area spread to other parts of the system and the damage done by a systemic financial collapse.
To prevent systemic collapse or loss of confidence it is only required that the collapse of one participant does not threaten the whole system.
Regulation may be segregated by type of financial business (e.g. insurance or investment).
It will be necessary to regulate:
Info asymmetry – a party in a transaction has relevant info the others don’t.
• Def: Anti-selection: People will take out contracts when they believe their risk is higher than what is allowed for in the premiums.
• Def: Moral hazard: Risk that an insured may attempt to take unfair advantage of the insurer. (e.g. false claim)
• Information asymmetry can lead to anti-selection. E.g. options available will more likely be exercised by someone who will find it more beneficial.
• Information asymmetry can cause prospective policy holders to avoid disclosing everything (e.g. health problem)
• The area of info asymmetry of most concern: info asymmetry between provider and end user of products. There is a difference in negotiating power and expertise.
• The area of info asymmetry of most concern: info asymmetry between provider and end user of products. There is a difference in negotiating power and expertise.
o This is accentuated by the fact that fin transactions (IV, insurance and pension) have large impact on the future economic welfare of individuals.
o Many people are not financially very sophisticated and find fin solutions complex and confusing
5.2. Dealing with information asymmetry
There is no precise method of defining what customers were lead to believe (PRE – Policyholder Reasonable Expectations), main influences on policy holder expectations are:
o Statements by the provider – e.g. especially marketing material and other comms
o Past practice
o General practice of other providers
6. 1. Capital adequacy
Institutions must hold sufficient capital to cover their liabilities.
• Could be assets must be at least a specified proportion of liabilities (according to a prescribed basis)
• Sufficient assets held to ensure probability of insolvency over a specified period is below a certain level.
Ensuring this requires accurate models to monitor risk levels and that they are used with competency.
6. 2. Competence and integrity
Ensuring competence and integrity of fin practitioners and managers is a crucial role for a fin regulator.
Individuals may need to prove competence by qualification or membership to professional body.
Regulators may prevent an individual from working in a particular industry or at a senior level of they are not deemed fit and proper.
6. 3. Compensation schemes
Regulators may establish compensation schemes, funded by industry or government to compensate investors who suffered losses. E.g. losses due to fraud, bad advice or failure of service provider rather than market-related losses.
6. 4. Other protection for investors
Security market regulators want the market to be transparent, orderly and to provide proper protection to investors.
6. 5. Stock exchange requirements
Companies listed will have to fulfill certain requirements regarding financial stability and fulfill specified obligations for disclosure of financial and other info.
Regulators will monitor things like prices at which business is done and the reporting of deals.
Regulations governing the issue of new shares and take-over bids for companies.
Forms of regulation
• Prescriptive
Setting out detailed rules of what is allowed and not allowed.
• Freedom of action
Freedom of action but with rules on publicity so third parties are fully informed about the providers of financial services.
• Outcome-based
Freedom of action but prescribe the outcomes that will be tolerated.
7.1. Unregulated markets
In some markets the cost of regulation outweighs the benefits – especially markets where professionals operate. E.g. where commodity products with guaranteed benefits are sold only on price, such as term assurance.
7.2. Voluntary codes of conduct
Operate effectively in many circumstances but are vulnerable to lack of public confidence and rogue operators.
7.3. Self-regulation
Organized and operated by participants in the market without government intervention.
The incentive is that regulation is an economic good and consumers of fin services are willing to pay a premium for this.
Another incentive is the threat of statutory regulation being imposed if self-regulation is not implemented.
7.3. Self-regulation
Advantages
7.3. Self-regulation
Disadvantages