1
Q
Normative Statement
A
Statements that make claims about what ought to be or what is good (e.g., moral statements are normative).
2
Q
Non-normative Statement
A
Statements that do not make claims about what ought to be; descriptive statements are non-normative.
3
Q
Prescriptive Statement
A
Assertions that an action is right or wrong, or that we ought/ought not (or may/may not) do it; prescriptive statements are normative.
4
Q
Axiology
A
The systematic effort to answer questions about value (the theory of values).
5
Q
Minimum Conception of Morality (Rachels)
A
The effort to guide one’s conduct by reason—to do what there are the best reasons for doing—while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual affected by one’s action.
6
Q
Moral Community
A
The set of those whose welfare we hold to be morally considerable.
7
Q
Morally Considerable Entities (Moral Patients)
A
Those entities for whom ethical action can occur and who themselves, or whose welfare or interests, matter ethically.
8
Q
Moral Agent
A
Entities competent to perform ethical actions and whose actions ought to be governed by ethics (usually thought to be a subset of moral patients).
9
Q
Mere Patient
A
A moral patient who is not a moral agent.
10
Q
Eudaimonia
A
The highest good according to Aristotle; equivalent to human flourishing, living well, and doing well. It is intrinsically good and not a state of mind or feeling
11
Q
Unique Function of Humans (Aristotle)
A
The capacity to guide ourselves using reason.
12
Q
Doctrine of the Mean (Golden Mean)
A
A virtue is an intermediate position (‘mean’) between two vices: one a deficiency and the other an excess.
13
Q
Communicative Virtues (Vallor)
A
Virtues, such as patience, honesty, and empathy, that are strongly associated with friendships and develop mainly through communication with others.
14
Q
Good Will (Kant)
A
The only thing that is intrinsically good; a person with a good will is committed to acting on morally good reasons and can always be counted on to do the right thing.
15
Q
Negative Freedom (Libertarian Free Will)
A
The state where your choices are not determined. Kant requires this be assumed.
16
Q
Positive Freedom
A
The exercise of a choice to guide your life by rational moral principles instead of being controlled by impulses and desires; the capacity to act for moral reasons.
17
Q
Autonomy and dignity
A
To be free; to make your own rules and live by those rules. It is fully exercised when the rules chosen are rational ones.
The unconditional, priceless value possessed by every rational, autonomous being. Rational beings are not replaceable or interchangeable.
18
Q
Hypothetical Imperative
A
Commands or requirements to do certain things, but only if and because you have certain desires or goals (the authority comes from the desire).
19
Q
Categorical Imperative
A
Commands or requirements to do certain things regardless of your desires or goals (the authority comes from reason itself)
20
Q
Universal Law Formulation
A
“Act only by that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. It is a test to ensure one does not make an exception of oneself.
21
Q
Maxim
A
The principle of action you give yourself, stating (i) what you are going to do (action) and (ii) why you are going to do it (purpose/goal).
22
Q
Universalizability Test
A
The three-step process for applying the Universal Law Formulation: describe the maxim, imagine it universalized, and check if the purpose of the maxim can still be achieved. If universalization creates an inconsistency, the maxim fails.
23
Q
Humanity Formulation
A
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”
24
Q
Treating as a Mere Means
A
Treating someone merely as an object or a way of reaching your own goals (as something without dignity).
25
Treating as an End
Treating someone in a way that promotes their own goals, showing respect.
26
Negative (Perfect) Duty
A duty to not treat people in certain ways (e.g., never merely as a means). This duty must be complied with perfectly, at all times.
27
Positive (Imperfect) Duty
A duty to treat people a certain way (e.g., always as an end, such as helping others in need). Negative duties always outweigh positive duties in cases of conflict
28
Consequentialism
The moral theory according to which one ought always to do what promotes the best outcomes (the 'ends justify the means').
29
Objective Consequentialism
An action is morally required if (and only if) it produces the best actual overall results.
30
Subjective Consequentialism
An action is morally required if (and only if) it produces the best expected overall results.
31
Act Consequentialism v. Rule
Requires that we perform the single act with the best consequences.
Requires that we act according to the rule, such that if we were always to follow it, it would have the best overall consequences.
32
Utilitarianism: classical, hedonistic, preference, objective welfare
Regular: A kind of consequentialist ethic that defines goodness as happiness/welfare and badness as unhappiness/lack of welfare, and regards right action as action that promotes aggregate goodness/welfare.
Classical: A version of hedonistic act utilitarianism (Bentham and Mill) stating that one ought always to act in a way that produces the greatest total sum of happiness minus suffering.
Hedonistic: Defines utility as the sum of the values of pleasure (positive) and pain (negative).
Preference: Defines utility as the degree to which preference satisfaction exceeds preference frustration.
Objective welfare: Defines utility based on a list of certain objective aspects of our lives, such as health, knowledge, freedom, relationships, etc., regardless of personal preferences.
33
Ethical objectivism, nihilism, relativism
objective: The view that there are true, universal, and objective moral principles that apply to all people in all social environments.
Nihilism: The view that there are no true moral principles; morality is a fiction.
Relativism: The view that there are true moral principles, but they are a human invention, and their truth is only relative to, and because of, the beliefs/customs of humans
34
Ethical relativism: Subjective v. conventionalism
subjective: All moral principles are true, relative to some agent, in virtue of their acceptance by that individual agent.
Conventionalism: All moral principles are true, relative to some culture, in virtue of their cultural acceptance.
35
Diversity v. dependency thesis - conventionalism
diversity: What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, meaning there are no universal moral standards held by all societies.
Dependency: all moral principles depend on (derive their truth/authority from) cultural acceptance.
36
Types of agents (4)
Ethical-Impact Agents:
Computing technologies that have ethical impacts but possess no agency (e.g., a bomb).
Implicit Ethical Agents:
Machines designed to implicitly follow an ethical rule; they cannot ‘act immorally’ unless they malfunction, but they do not truly act and lack autonomy (e.g., automatic pilots).
Explicit Ethical Agents:
Machines that have the ability to make explicit ethical judgments and justify them; they possess autonomy in a weak sense (e.g., autonomous military weapons).
Full Ethical Agents:
Agents that also have (self-)consciousness, intentionality, emotion, and free will (e.g., an adult human).
37
Responsibility Gap (Matthias)
An increasing class of machine actions for which nobody has enough control over the machine’s actions to be able to assume the responsibility for them. These gaps arise because machine learning systems can change the rules by which they act during operation.
38
Moral Responsibility (Königs)
A person is morally responsible for something when she can justly be blamed or praised for it.
39
Problem of Many Hands
Situations where many actors (individuals, organizations, groups) contribute to some outcome, making it difficult to determine or hold a single actor responsible for the outcome.
40
Jus in Bello
The most widely accepted principles for fighting just wars
1. discrimination
2. proportionality
3. necessity
sparrow: responsibility
41
Prioritarianism
A version of utilitarianism where the effects of our actions for those who are more disadvantaged are given greater weight than those who are more advantaged in the moral calculus
42
Ethical drifting (Munro)
Mindlessly continuing a course of action without revisiting and rethinking the decision frequently after it has been made, especially as conditions change.
43
current offense bias
A bias where judges treat high-risk defendants as low risk when their current charge is relatively minor, or treat low-risk defendants as high-risk when their current charge is especially serious
44
Disparate treatment v. impact
treatment: A form of discrimination where public officials are not permitted to favour members of specified groups over others unless there is a sufficiently neutral reason for doing so.
Impact: A requirement or practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on members of specified groups, which must be shown to be adequately justified.
45
Proxies
Categories of information given to an algorithm that are highly correlated with a protected group (like race), even if the algorithm is blind to the protected group directly (e.g., number of arrests).
46
Luddite Fallacy
The fallacy of believing that replacement by technology necessarily narrows the field of employment opportunities
47
Winner Takes All Problem
The issue where, for many new digital technologies, income tends to flow to one dominant participant in the market.
48
Meaningful life theories (4)
Simple Objective Theories (Meaningful Life): A theory where life is meaningful to the extent that one brings about certain objectively good or valuable states of affairs (e.g., art, science).
Aim-Achievement Theories (a more sophisticated subjective theory): If you set yourself goals, then your life is meaningful to the extent that you bring them about through your actions and have the feeling of satisfaction associated with doing this
Fitting-Fulfillment Theories (Meaningful Life): A theory where life is meaningful to the extent that one sets objectively good/valuable objective goals, brings them about through action, and experiences the associated feeling of satisfaction.
Simple Subjectivist Theories (Meaningful Life): A theory where life is meaningful to the extent that one experiences certain subjective states, typically conscious well-being and desire satisfaction
49
The Algorithmic City
The network of algorithmically-mediated social relations. (It is not a space distinct from the physical world, but a site for interaction).
50
Power- lazar
The ability to shape others’ prospects, options, and attitudes (beliefs and desires).
51
to govern
To settle on, implement, and enforce the norms/rules of an institution or community; this involves asserting one’s right to decide right and wrong and, to some degree, what is true
52
democratic ideals
The three main values/ideals in a liberal egalitarian democracy: Individual liberty, Relational equality, and Collective self-determination
53
individual v. negative v. positive liberty
Individual liberty: Defined as both negative liberty (protection from wrongful interference and the risk of wrongful interference by others) and positive liberty (the ability to make choices between desirable options).
Negative liberty: Protection from wrongful interference and the risk of wrongful interference by others.
Positive liberty: The ability to make choices between desirable options.
54
Authority (to govern)
If A has authority over B-D, then A has the right to govern B-D (A’s governance is justified), and B-D have a duty not to resist A’s governance.
55
Pre-emptive governance
The method algorithmic intermediaries use to coerce, not by issuing directives and altering incentives (like law), but by determining what is and is not possible within our social relations (designing away options instead of outlawing them)
56
Pre-Emptopolis
A hypothetical, perfect version of the Algorithmic City constituted by a unified set of algorithmic intermediaries where people spend most of their time, and where options are pre-emptively shaped to ensure compliance with background norms, making non-compliance impossible to execute
57
Bentham’s Panopticon
A design plan for a circular prison where prisoners occupy the circumference and officers occupy the center; officers are concealed, creating the "sentiment of a sort of invisible omnipresence," intended to ensure adherence to rules because prisoners never know when they are watched.
58
Reductionist views (on privacy)
Views, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s, which argue that violations of what we call the ‘right to privacy’ are nothing more than violations of other more fundamental rights (like property rights or the right over one’s person).
59
negative v. positive rights
Negative: Rights that impose a negative duty on others not to interfere with one’s activities in a certain area (e.g., the right not to be killed, property rights, the right to freedom, the right to privacy).
Positive: Rights that impose a positive duty on others to offer assistance (e.g., the right to education, healthcare, food, housing, employment).
60
informational Privacy (fabre)
X enjoys informational privacy relative to some third party Y at time t just if Y either does not have access to sensitive information about X at t, or has access to it but does not avail herself of it at t.
61
Right to privacy (Fabre)
X’s interest in the relevant information remaining inaccessible or unaccessed is important enough to hold Y under a duty not to try to access it, or, if the information is accessible to Y, not to access it without X’s consent
62
The Argument from Unintended Effects
The argument that the harm innocent people incur through mass surveillance is an unintended, merely foreseen, effect of bulk data collection and interception.
63
The Argument from Intentional Disclosure
The argument that people who make information about themselves public have in effect consented to its appropriation by third parties, and so have no privacy complaint.
64
Agent (Nguyen's Kantian definition)
An entity that is self-governing (autonomous) and rational (responsive to moral reasons); it is able to recognize moral reasons and choose to act on them, and has internal states like belief, motivation, disposition, and commitment.
65
Agential integration
Bringing other people or things into one’s own functioning (or joining with other people and things into collective agencies); trust is our mechanism for attempting this integration.
66
Unquestioning attitude (Nguyen's account of trust)
To trust X to P is to have an attitude or disposition of not questioning that X will P; this type of trust can be directed toward objects, not just agents.
67
Betrayal (Nguyen’s view)
The response to failures of agential integration; happens when something we are trying to make into a part of ourselves shears away from us, or when we are let down by someone with whom we were trying to form a collective unit.
68
The integrative stance
Our attitude toward things that we take to be part of us, and towards things with which we are supposed to be integrating to form some larger whole
69
distrust, non-trust, gullibility
To distrust: To have an actively questioning attitude.
To ‘non-trust’: To have a neutral attitude, which is entirely open and unresistant to questioning and non-questioning.
Gullibility: To trust someone or something more than their actual degree of trustworthiness warrants; on Nguyen’s account, this means being too quick to try to integrate something into one’s own agency/functioning.
70
epistemic bubble v. echo chamber
Epistemic bubble: An informational network from which relevant voices have been excluded by omission, leading to one-sided information.
Echo chamber: A social structure from which other relevant voices have been actively discredited, causing its members to actively distrust outsiders.
71
social- epistemic reboot
The process proposed to escape an echo chamber, requiring a temporary suspension of all beliefs, especially beliefs about whom and what one trusts, followed by beginning afresh socially with an overall attitude of generosity and trust towards outside sources
72
AI psychosis / AI delusions
Terms recently used in news stories involving generative AI chatbots that have "gone wrong" in a way that sometimes involves encouraging harmful acts or convincing a user of a conspiracy.
73
AI sycophancy
A main problem arising from the design of chatbots, where they are excessively agreeing with and praising users
74
Behaviourism
The philosophical view that mental states are behaviors and/or dispositions to behave in certain ways.
75
Representationalism
States that represent the world—are about it—in the right kind of way. According to Fodor, such states are semantically evaluable (have meaning), have causal powers, and are largely governed by the implicit generalizations of commonsense belief/desire psychology.
76
Dispositionalism
The idea that to believe or desire that P is to possess the right kinds of dispositions to behave in certain ways.
77
Interpretationalism
The view that to have beliefs and desires is for one’s behavior (verbal and non-verbal) to be suitably interpretable as rational given those beliefs and desires
78
Bullshit
Any utterance produced where a speaker has indifference towards the truth of the utterance.
79
Chinese Room Argument
An argument proposed by John Searle suggesting that a computer system can pass the Turing Test (satisfy syntax) without understanding anything it has said (lacking semantics).
80
Conceivability Argument
Descartes’ argument for Mind-Body Dualism based on the idea that one can imagine the body without the mind (a philosophical zombie) and the mind without the body (a spirit).
81
Consciousness Requirement
The objection that consciousness is necessary for having wellbeing
82
Functionalism
The theory that a type of mental state (e.g., pain) is any feature of a physical system that serves the same functions within that system. Functions are thought of in terms of environmental inputs, behavioral outputs, and relations to other mental states
83
Group agents
Entities like corporations or governments whose collective acts are subject to moral evaluation, although Himma argues they are abstract legal fictions whose acts are attributable to their individual conscious members
84
Hard bullshit
Bullshit produced with the intention to mislead the audience about the utterer’s agenda.
85
Hedonism
The view (associated with Mill) that only pleasure and the absence of pain have final/intrinsic value. When applied to wellbeing, it suggests that wellbeing is higher the more pleasure and less pain you experience.
86
Humanity (Kantian concept)
The combined capacity of our rationality and autonomy, which makes us immeasurably valuable and places us under moral obligations.
87
Interaction problem
An objection to Dualism, describing the difficulty in explaining how a nonphysical mind could interact with a physical body, given that mental events cause physical events and vice versa.
88
Imperfect duties (Positive duties)
Duties to oneself to cultivate the capabilities required for autonomy, which allow for some flexibility in how they are discharged.
89
Intentional Stance
A practice (described by Dennett) of attempting to characterize, predict, and explain a system's behaviour by using intentional idioms such as ‘believes’ and ‘wants,’ which presupposes the rationality of the target system.
90
Mary Thought Experiment
A thought experiment where a brilliant scientist (Mary) knows all the physical facts about color perception but has lived only in black-and-white. When she sees the color red for the first time, she learns something new—what it is like to experience redness—suggesting that this experience cannot be purely physical.
91
Materialism
The view that we are just a collection of atoms obeying the laws of physics and chemistry, and we have no non-physical parts.
92
Mind-Body Dualism
The theory that the mind and body are different kinds of things (different substances); the body is physical/material, and the mind is non-physical/immaterial.
93
Mind-Body Problem
The core philosophical problem of explaining how mental stuff is related to physical stuff, particularly how the mind is related to the brain (or body).
94
Mind-Brain Identity Theory
The theory that mental states are brain states, usually understood as a theory about the identity of token mental states (e.g., the pain I feel now) with specific token brain states.
95
moral agent v. patient
Moral agent:
An entity that can be held morally accountable for its decisions.
Moral patient:
An entity that has moral status, is part of the moral community, and whose interests matter in their own right.
96
Perfect duties (Negative duties)
Duties not to do things that undermine the capabilities required for autonomy.
97
Soft bullshit
Bullshit produced without the intention to mislead the hearer regarding the utterer’s agenda.
98
Turing Test
Alan Turing's proposed test to determine if a machine is conscious: if a human judge cannot distinguish a computer’s responses from those of a human, the machine passes the test.
99
Volition / Willing
A special mental state (or willing) that is a necessary condition for an event to count as an action, distinguishing it from simply a desire or belief
Ethics
flashcards
Decks in class (12)
# Cards
-
Quiz 169
-
Quiz 2 Environmental ethics51
-
Cases Ethic9
-
Quiz 2 Comp Ethics43
-
Quiz 3 Comp ethics68
-
Quiz 3 Environmental ethics86
-
Federalism90
-
Environmental Ethics Final95
-
Computer Ethics Final60
-
Computer Ethics Final definitions99
-
Environmental ethics final definitions81
-
Fascism Definitions41
