cosmological arguments

Question 1

what is a cosmological argument

Answer 1

• An argument for God as the one unique (first) cause/explanation of some alleged general fact about reality
• Unlike ontological arguments, cosmological arguments are not based merely on our understanding of the concept of God. They require us to use facts other than those about God or the idea of God in order to prove God’s existence.
• Cosmological and teleological arguments both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an intelligent and powerful supernatural being.
• cosmological arguments start with a general feature, such as the existence of contingent being or the presence of motion…
  Whereas….
  …teleological/design arguments start with a general feature of the cosmos that we associate with intelligence (i.e. order/purpose/function/complexity)

Question 2

what type of arguments are the cosmological argument (apart from Descartes)

Answer 2

a posteriori

Question 3

a posteriori argument

Answer 3

• Arguments for God where at least one premise is a posteriori (justified based on experience).
• These arguments suggest that the existence of God makes the best sense of what we experience.

Question 4

the Kalam argument

Answer 4

P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning
P2: The universe began to exist
C1: Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning
P3: The cause must have the following attributes that God is thought to have:
1) uncaused because an infinite series of causes is impossible
2) outside of time and space (and so non-physical) because it caused all time and space
3) hugely powerful because it created all matter and energy
4) personal because it’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning
C2: Therefore: God exists.

Question 5

kalam argument (causal/horizontal cause)

Answer 5

• he argues that the idea of a beginningless universe is absurd. The universe must have a beginning, and since nothing begins to exist without a cause, there must be a transcendent Creator of the universe

P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning (the “principle of causality”)
P2: The universe began to exist - i.e. the series of temporal* events (causes/effects in time) is finite (i.e. the universe is finitely old)
C1: Therefore, the universe has a cause of its beginning

Question 6

the principle of causality

Answer 6

The principle that everything (or at least that everything that begins) has a cause and/or a sufficient reason which explains why it happened or exists.

Question 7

argument from temporal causation

Answer 7

it involves a temporal beginning of the universe.

Question 8

ISSUE: the possibility of an infinite series (attacks premise 2) of the Kalam argument

Answer 8

• Some have argued that premise 2 of the Kalam argument is either false, or, at least, that it may possibly be false.
• In other words, it is not the case, or is not necessarily the case, that the universe began to exist.
• other words, it is not the case, or is not necessarily the case, that the universe began to exist. It may be argued that while different components of the universe may have begun to exist and were hence caused by something, the universe as a whole has always existed so there never was a first event in the universe.
• This would mean that the universe consists of a series of events that go back for an infinite duration of time, thus each discrete event that begins has been caused by a previous event without the need for a first cause or the introduction of anything supernatural.
• This infinite series of causes and events is often referred to as an ‘infinite regress’ of causes. If such a thing is possible then there would be no need to introduce anything to explain how the universe began - it didn’t begin
• If an infinite series of causes/effects is possible, this affects the strength of the Kalam argument, because we cannot be confident that P2 is true.
• In support of this, some have argued that we have no problem conceiving of this, there is no logical contradiction in an infinite regress. Furthermore, (arguably) all events are still explained/caused, so nothing is left unexplained.

Question 9

aquinas 1st way (atemporal argument from MOTION)

Answer 9

• Everything in the universe changes. Everything that changes is caused to change by something else. Something must be the first thing to cause change. This is God.

P1: The universe contains motion (i.e. change from potentially X to actually X)
P2: Nothing can change itself (because that would require it to both be potentially X and actually X which is impossible) - it must be changed by something distinct from it
P3: If there were an infinite series of changes caused by changes, there would be no first changer
P4: If there were no first changer there could not be any change - because the ‘motion’ would need to originate somewhere in order to be ‘passed on’.
C1: Therefore, given P1 (i.e. that there is change) there must be a first changer
P5: God is this first changer (God is “pure actuality”/actus purus).
C2: Therefore God exists

• motion is nothing else than the [change] of something from potentiality to actuality.
• But nothing can be [changed] from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality
• hus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.
• it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.
• It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
• Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.
• But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.
• Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Question 10

aquinas 2nd Way (atemporal argument from SUSTAINING CAUSATION)

Answer 10

• Everything in the universe is sustained in existence by something else. There must be something that sustains the whole universe. This is God. So God exists.

P1: The universe contains sustaining causation which can be ordered (i.e. D causally sustains E etc.)
P2: Nothing can be the sustaining cause of itself (nothing can sustain its own existence) - it must be sustained by something distinct from it
P3: If there were an infinite series of sustaining causes, there would be no first sustaining cause
P4: If there were no first sustaining cause there could not be any other sustaining causation - because this causal power needs to originate somewhere in order to be ‘passed on’.
C1: Therefore, given P1 (i.e. that there are sustaining causation) there must be a first sustaining cause.
P5: God is this first sustaining cause.
C2: Therefore god exists

• from the nature of the efficient cause
• n the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself
• so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.
• it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.
• to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.
• But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.
• Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God

Question 11

what does Aquinas mean when talking about ‘order’

Answer 11

• he is not talking of a series stretching back into the past, but of a hierarchy of causes, in which a subordinate member is here and now dependent on the causal activity of a higher member
• not a lineal or horizontal series, so to speak, but a vertical hierarchy, in which a lower member depends here and now on the present causal activity of the member above it.
• It is the latter type of series, if prolonged to infinity, which Aquinas rejects. And he rejects it on the ground that unless there is a “first” member, … a cause which does not depend on the causal activity of a higher cause, it is not possible to explain the … causal activity of the lowest member.
• there must be a first efficient, and completely non-dependent cause. The word “first” does not mean first in the temporal order but supreme or first in the ontological order.

Question 12

Aquinas 3rd way from CONTINGENCY

Answer 12

• If everything could exist or not exist, at some point nothing would exist. But if nothing existed at one point, then nothing would exist now. So there must be something that couldn’t not exist and so has to (i.e. necessarily) exist. This is God.

P1: If everything were contingent (as some things are) then there would (/could) be a time when nothing existed.
P2: If this were so, then nothing would exist now (as nothing can come from nothing).
P3: But things do exist now.
C1: Therefore not everything is contingent - there must be something that exists necessarily.
P4: An infinite regression of necessary beings caused by other necessary beings is impossible.
C2: Therefore, there must be one first necessary being whose necessity was not caused by another, and this all people call God.

• taken from possibility and necessity
• But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.
• f this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
• Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence
• Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.
• But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not.
• it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
• Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.
• which is god

Question 13

contingent being

Answer 13

A being which exists but could possibly have not existed (does not exist in all possible worlds)

Question 14

necessary being

Answer 14

A being which exists and could not have possibly not existed (that must exist in all possible worlds)

Question 15

why has aquinas argument been heavily criticised

Answer 15

• People have argued against Aquinas claim (P1) that if everything were contingent (as some things are) then there would be a time when nothing existed.
• Firstly, each contingent thing could have not existed but at different times to the other things, so that there was never nothing existing.
• Secondly there’s a difference between “could have not existed” and “did, at some point, not exist”.

Question 16

Leibniz argument from the principle of sufficient reason (an argument from CONTINGENCY)

Answer 16

• The universe is contingent and so requires explanation in terms of a necessary being (i.e. God)

P1: All contingent events/things need a sufficient reason for why they exist (given that they might not have existed). (The “principle of sufficient reason”).
P2: If they exist as they do because of other contingent events/things (in an infinite series in the present/past), then this would not be a sufficient explanation because the infinite series is still itself contingent.
C1: Therefore, there must, ultimately, be a sufficient (i.e. non-contingent/necessary) reason for the contingent series.
C2: Therefore a necessary “substance”/being exists - this is God

• it is clear from this reading that Leibniz’s argument is intended to work regardless of whether the universe is infinitely old:
  Therefore, even if you should imagine the world [infinitely old]…it is evident that the reason [for it existing] must be sought elsewhere

Question 17

descartes cosmological arguments for the existence of god: an a priori deduction
PART 1: GOD AS CAUSE OF MY IDEA OF GOD

Answer 17

P1: All of our ideas come from our senses, or they are invented by us or they are innate.
P2: My idea of God cannot have come from my senses (it has not come to me unexpectedly as other ideas from my senses do), and I could not have invented the idea myself (because I can’t add to or take away from the idea unlike other ideas I have invented).
C1: Therefore the idea of God is innate.
P3: The innate idea of God that I have is ‘a supremely perfect infinite being’.
P4: There must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect (and this applies to the reality represented within ideas just as it does to actual objects/events) (The ‘causal adequacy principle’)
C1: Therefore, only an infinite God could be the cause of this idea.
C2: Therefore God must exist.

Question 18

descartes cosmological arguments for the existence of god: an a priori deduction
PART 2: GOD AS CAUSE OF MY CONTINUED EXISTENCE

Answer 18

P1: I exist as a being (from one moment to the next) with an idea of a supremely perfect being.
P2: I cannot be the cause of myself as I would have made myself perfect (i.e. I would be God) and I know I am not.
P3: No other finite beings could be the ultimate cause of my continued existence (e.g. my parents, or other beings) as this could not give an ultimate explanation of the idea of God that I have (even if they, with their idea of God, caused me with mine, we could then still ask where their idea of God came from, and this cannot continue forever)
P4: I cannot have just always existed with no cause, as a cause is needed to sustain anything finite from one moment to the next, and I do not myself have the power to do this (if I had this power I’d know that I had it)
C1: Therefore, the only possible cause of my continued existence (as a being with the idea of a supremely perfect being in my mind) is a supremely perfect being (i.e. God).
C2: Therefore God must exist.