evaluation of the problems of evil

Question 1

defences

Answer 1

• only intended as a logically possible explanation as to why god permits evil
• explains a way in which gods existence might be compatible with the existence of evil

Question 2

theodicy

Answer 2

• intended to be a plausible or reasonable explanation as to why god permits evil

Question 3

how to respond to the logical problem of evil

Answer 3

a defence.

Question 4

how to respond to the evidential problem of evil

Answer 4

a theodicy

Question 5

logical problem of evil

Answer 5

• deductive argument
• if evil exists them gods existence is impossible
• evil and god are incompatible

Question 6

the evidential problem of evil

Answer 6

• non-deductive
• if evil exists, then gods existence is highly unlikely

Question 7

response 1 to the logical problem of evil

Answer 7

the free will defence

Question 8

the free will defence

Answer 8

• plantinga
• there’s a possible explanation of evil which is compatible with theism
• evil is the result of the free will of human beings
• god creates creatures with free will because free will is so morally valuable that it is worth giving/preserving no matter how much evil it leads to
• god has done the morally right thing in giving us free will and we are the ones to blame for the existence of evil
  this is how god can be omnibenevolent even though evil exists
• god can create free creatures but god cannot cause or determine them to do only what it is right because if god does, then the humans are not free at all

Question 9

counter-response to the free will defence 1

Answer 9

Mackie

Question 10

mackie

Answer 10

• mackie argues that the free will defence fails because god could have made a world that had both free will and no evil.
• if so, free will cant possibly be gods justification for the existence of evil
• Mackie argues that it is logically possible for everyone to always freely choose to do morally right actions and therefore a world in which this happens if a possible world
• P1: There is a possible world where all free choices are good (i.e. non-evil) choices (i.e. where there is free will and no evil)
  P2: For any possible world, an omnipotent God could have created it
  P3: A world where there is free will and no evil is morally better than a world where there is free will and evil and so should be preferred by a wholly good God.
  C1: Therefore, God’s existence is logically incompatible with the existence of evil (even the moral evil resulting from free will).

Question 11

plantingas response to mackie

Answer 11

• the world mackie describes might not be a possible world
• consider the proposition A “Every possible free person goes wrong in every possible world that they exist in.”
• every free person creates by god would misuse their free will on at least 1 occasion no matter which world is that
• the may be highly implausible or even false, but it is logically possible.
• if A is possible then so is the following proposition B “ It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil.”
• it is possible that any world created by God that contains some moral good will also contain some moral evil..
• therefore Mackie was wrong to think that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist because it is possible that any world created by God would have some evil in it.

Question 12

response to mackies counter-response 2

Answer 12

• it is a possible world but not one that god can guarantee
• one might agree that it is possible for all free choices by all human beings to be good choices.
• a world with free will and no evil is a possible world.
• however, whether such a world exists depends on the free decisions that humans make not god choosing to make it
• when god makes a world, he doesn’t know how it will turn out because of human freedom.
• so the world that mackie describes Is possible but cannot be guaranteed by god

Question 13

counter-response for the free will defence 2

Answer 13

natural evil: some have argued that this defence cannot explain why there is natural evil because natural evil is mot the result of free choices made by humans

Question 14

response to natural evil counter-response

Answer 14

natural evil might be required for us to have free will
- some have argued that in order for a world to exist in which different people can in some way freely choose to negatively affect each other there must be a possibility of physical/ natural evil
- the ability for people to cause evil to others relies on physical/natural causal connections which allow natural evil e.g. susie can punch the girl in the face as her fists is able to affect the other persons face But the same laws of science that allow this to happen also mean that if a tree were to fall on Tom’s face it would also cause him pain/injury. “
- in order for me to understand how I might feel when evil is occurred , I would need to learn about this through the presence of natural evil
e.g. Susie can only be free to choose whether to inflict pain on Tom because she has seen things such as trees falling which inflict pain.
- The overall idea here is that it might be impossible to have moral evil without also having natural evil. They come together. So if free will is morally good, and it requires natural evil, then natural evil can be justified.

Question 15

Response to the eventual problem of evil

Answer 15

soul-making theodicy

Question 16

soul-making theodicy

Answer 16

• there is a plausible explanation of evil which is compatible with theism: evil is requires for moral/spiritual development
• hick argues that the existence of evil helps creatures improve themselves morally/spiritually to develop characteristics like courage and empathy
• god creates and allows evil because this is a chance for moral development which is morally valuable that it is worth the existence of evil that enables it.
  -therefore god has done the morally right thing im creating and allowing evil
• this is how god can be omnibenevolent even though evil exists

Question 17

counter-response to the soul making theodicy

Answer 17

• the soul making theodicy doesn’t satisfactorily account for all suffering:
  1. suffering is not fairly distributed:
  
  • there is horrendous suffering that people undergo either at the hands of others such as the holocaust or because of terminal illness such as cancer
• there is no reason why the world must contain horrendous suffering if it is to provide a good environment for the development of character in response to challenges and temptations
  2. some suffering occurs without any soul-development
  
  • e.g. when it is very severe and the suffering of animals, young children that die young.
• some have suffering so severe that it is impossible for them to develop those moral traits that involve relatioships with others.
• soul making theodicy provides no justification for the existence of any animal pain and for a world where there is predation
• the soul making theorist also provides no account of the suffering that young children and innocence go though

Question 18

hicks response to the soul making theodicy counter

Answer 18

2 points:
1. it is important that we cannot explain all suffering since this means that it is not obvious that there is a god and that makes our faith in god more meaningful.
- hidden god analogy: god is deliberately hidden from us
2. he agrees that some evil seems dysteleological but it will be justified since the soul making process continues after death and all people including those who die young will be reconciled with god eventually.
- thi means we cannot make judgment just on the basis of what we observe on earth

Question 19

counter-response to hicks response to the theodict counter

Answer 19

• Rowe claims that not only it is obnous to us that evil occurs far in excess of what an omnipotent being would have to permit for soul making, it is also obvious that there Is more evil than god would actually need there to be in order to stay hidden from us
  i.e. even if gos was aiming to stay hidden, he still could have made world with less evil than there currently is

Question 20

sceptical theism response

Answer 20

• claim that we cannot have confidence in our own capacity to think of possible or plausible morally good justifications
• they argue that the fact we think that evil cant be or is to morally justified is not a good reason to conclude that it is not
• sceptical theists claim that even if evil appears to be unjustifiable to us, it is not indicative of whether or not it is gratuitous.
• however, there is no good evidence for us to claim that such evil is actually gratuitous meaning we have no reason to endorce premise 4 in the argument of evil.

Question 21

objection with sceptical theism

Answer 21

1. implications for the divine human relationship
2. implications for moral living

Question 22

implications for the divine human relationship

Answer 22

• it eliminates the potential for a close relationship between humans and god in 2 ways:

1. if skeptics theism causes problems for arguments against the existence of god by highlighting the fact that we know very little about how god would act, then by parity of reasoning it also causes problems for arguments for the existence of god
2. skeptical theism not only appears to undercut ones knowledge of god, but it also seems to undercut ones trust in god.
   - being in a close relationship with another person requires some kind of understanding of what the other person wants and why the other person acts as they do

Question 23

implications for moral living

Answer 23

• it seems to preclude both the possibility of engaging in moral deliberation and the possibility of moral knowledge
• if for any instance of evil, we are unable to tel whether or not evil is gratuitous, then we are unable to engage in moral deliberation and arrive at a view about what is reasonable for us to do:
  e.g. a skeptical theist comes upon a young boy is drowning in a pond, his skeptical theism seems to commit him to reasoning as for all he knows, the boys death is necessary to prevent some greater evil or to secure some greater good, therefore he has no reason to intervene