crime Flashcards

(391 cards)

1
Q

conduct crimes

A

doing- what matters is what defendant does e.g. drink driving. no consequence is required, the AR is the prohibited conduct itself

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2
Q

consequence crimes

A

result- the AR must result in a consequence, e.g. assault

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3
Q

state of affairs crime

A

circumstances- what matters is being there in the prohibited circumstances, e.g. being in possession of a controlled drug, the D doesn’t have anything to do with the drug but is still in possession of it

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4
Q

omission

A

the general rule in criminal law is that a person is not liable for an omission (failure to act) unless under a duty to act

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5
Q

statutory duties and common law duties

A
  • duties created by parliament are called statutory instruments
  • duties created by judges are known as common law duties
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6
Q

examples of statutory duties

A
  • failing to wear a seatbelt or give a breath specimen under the Road Traffics Act 1988
  • failing to muzzle a dangerous dog in public under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
  • neglecting a child under the Domestic Violence, Crime + Victims Act 2004
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7
Q

contractual duties

A

arise through contracts of employment, e.g pittwood 1902- where a railway crossing keeper had a duty of close the gate, his omission formed the AR of manslaughter

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8
Q

official position

A

usually related to public office, e.g. Dytham 1979- where a police officer stood by while V was getting beaten up. D was guilty for failing to perform his duty while in a public position

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9
Q

special relationship

A

e.g. Gibbins + Proctor 1918 , where a father starved his 7 year old daughter to death. he had a duty to feed her and the omission formed the AR of murder

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10
Q

duty undertaken voluntarily

A

based on reliance, e.g. Stone + Dobinson 1977 where D’s took in an elderly relative and failed to look after her. D’s were liable for her death

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11
Q

creating a dangerous situation

A

e.g. miller 1983- where D failed to take reasonable steps to deal with the fire he had started. he had created a dangerous situation and owed a duty to call the fire brigade. he was therefore liable when he failed to do so

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12
Q

Airedale NHS trust vs Bland 1993

A

there can be cases where doctors decide to stop treating a patient. if discontinuing treatment is in the best interests of the patient then it is not an omission so doesn’t form the AR

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13
Q

causation

A

an essential element to establish the AR in consequence crimes. there needs to be evidence to show that the D caused the consequence

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14
Q

chain of causation

A

the prosecution has to prove:
1. D’s conduct was the factual cause of the consequence;
2. it was the legal cause of that consequence, and
3. there was no intervening act which broke the “chain of causation”

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15
Q

factual causation

A

this is the starting point in establishing the “chain of causation”. it must be proved that the unlawful consequence wouldn’t have happened “but for” D’s conduct

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16
Q

Pagett 1983

A

D was the factual cause of death when he used his girlfriend as a shield and fired at police. she wouldn’t have died “but for” his actions

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17
Q

White 1910

A

D was acquitted because although he tried to poison his mother, she actually died because of a heart attack, so he wasn’t a factual cause

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18
Q

legal causation

A

there may be more than one act contributing to the consequence. some of these acts may be made by people other than D. the key rule is that D’s conduct doesn’t need to be the only cause of the consequence. D’s contribution must be more than minimal

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19
Q

Kimsey 1996

A

D and V engaged in a high speed car chase. V lost control of the car and died. the trial judge directed the jury that D’s driving didn’t have to be “the principal, or a substantial cause of death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there were something more than a slight or trifling link.”

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20
Q

Benge 1846

A

D was a foreman during work on a train track. he failed to give adequate warning to an approaching train driver and a fatal accident occurred. it was irrelevant that the accident might have been avoided if others hadn’t also been negligent. D substantially caused the death through his negligence

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21
Q

thin skull rule

A

means that the defendant must take the victim as he or she finds them

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22
Q

Blaue 1975

A

D was responsible for V’s death when the Jehovah’s witness he stabbed refused a blood transfusion, despite the fact she would have survived if she had accepted the treatment

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23
Q

intervening acts

A

an intervening act may operate to “break the chain of causation” and prevent D from being liable for the ultimate result, even if D’s conduct was a factual and more than minimal cause.
the chain of causation was broken by:
- an unforeseeable act of nature
- the unforeseeable act of a third party
- V’s own subsequent conduct

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24
Q

victim’s own conduct

A

if D causes V to act in a foreseeable way, then V’s own act will not break the chain of causation

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25
Roberts 1971
V's reaction to jump from a moving car was reasonably foreseeable when D made sexual advances towards her. the chain of causation was not broken
26
Williams 1992
V died after jumping from a moving car, allegedly to avoid having his wallet stolen, this reaction was disproportionate to the threat so broke the chain of causation
27
medical treatment
medical treatment, even if negligent, is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of D's conduct and "in itself so potent causing death" that D's acts are insignificant
28
Smith 1959
medical treatment- after being stabbed in a fight by D, V was dropped twice on the wat to the treatment centre and left untreated for some time. although the court recognised that this contributed to V's death, they still found D guilty of murder. the stab wound was still "operating" and it was a substantial cause of V's death
29
Cheshire 1991
medical treatment- D shot V in the stomach and thigh. V needed an operation to insert a tube into his throat to help him breathe more easily. Some 2 months after the shooting, V died from rare complications following this tracheotomy. although V's wounds at the time were no longer life threatening. D was still held to be liable for the death as his actions (shooting V) had contributed "significantly" to the death
30
when will medical treatment break the chain of causation?
medical treatment will only break the chain of causation if it is exceptionally bad or that it makes D's original acts insignificant
31
Jordan 1956
medical treatment- V was stabbed by D and admitted to a large hospital. V's wounds were healing when doctors gave him a large amount of anti-biotics which he was allergic to and died. the chain of causation was broken. the medical treatment was "palpably" wrong and it was the overwhelming cause of death as the original wounds had virtually healed
32
intention
this is the highest form of MR. for some offences, only intention suffices. So, if D didn't intend death or GBH, he or she will not be guilty of murder but instead the lesser crime of manslaughter
33
direct intent
this is where the result is D's aim or purpose. direct intent was defined in Mohan 1975 as a "decision to bring about the prohibited consequence," no matter whether D desired the consequence or not. In that case, D had driven his car straight at a police officer with the aim of injuring him
34
indirect intent
this is where the result isn't D's aim, yet he or she realises it is "virtually certain" to occur as a result of their actions. in this situation, the jury may conclude D has an indirect intent
35
Woollin 1998
indirect intent- a jury isn't entitled to find indirect intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was: 1. a virtually certainty as a result of D's actions and 2. that D appreciated that it was D threw his baby son across the room, he argued that he had thrown the baby towards the pram but hadn't intended to kill him
36
recklessness
recklessness is a lower level of MR, it only needs to be considered when D doesn't have intention. to prove that D is reckless, it must be shown that D is aware of a risk of the consequence happening, but deliberately goes ahead and takes it anyway. recklessness is subjective
37
cunningham 1957
recklessness- D tore a gas meter from a wall in order to steal money in the meter. gas escaped and seeped through to an adjoining property, poisoning the neighbour. since D did not realise there was a possibility of this happening, he wasn't reckless
38
R V G 2003
recklessness- criminal damage is a crime which can be committed recklessly. however, in this case the two defendants (aged 11 and 13) hadn't realised the danger of a fire spreading uncontrollably to a nearby supermarket. it was only fair to judge the boys against the risks they had foreseen
39
negligence
a person is negligent if he or she fails to meet the standards of a reasonable person. it is objective because D does not have to realise this
40
Adomako 1994
an anaesthetist was liable for gross negligence manslaughter when he took several minutes to notice a breathing tube had disconnected during an operation. a reasonable anaesthetist would have noticed within a couple seconds
41
strict liability
- do not require mens rea to be proved in relation to at least once element of the actus reus - these offences are the exception to the general rule that both AR and MR is require for criminal liability - most concern road traffic offences or breaches of health and safety legislation, but they can include issues of social concern
42
Callow V Tillstone 1900
a butcher was convicted of selling contaminated meat even though it had been certified as fit for human consumption by a vet. because it was a strict liability offence, D was guilty, even though he had taken responsible care not to commit the offence. the butcher was not at fault in any way
43
Cundy V Le Cocq 1884
strict liability- D was charged with selling alcohol to a drunk person. it didn't matter that D didn't know the person was drunk. the offence was complete when the sale took place and the person served was drunk
44
Harrow V Shah 1999
strict liability- a staff member in a newspaper place sold a lottery ticket to a 13 year old who looked much older. the owners were liable, despite telling their staff not to see tickets to anyone underage
45
Sweet V Parsley 1971
D rented a farmhouse to students who, unknown to her, used it to smoke cannabis. the court reiterated the general rule that MR is required in order for D to be guilty of a crime. parliament doesn't intend to make criminals of people who aren't blameworthy
46
B V DPP 2000
strict liability- a 15 year old boy asked a 13 year old girl on a bus to have oral sex believing she was over 14. D was charged with inciting a child under 14 to commit gross indecency, which carried a maximum sentence of 2 years. the court quashed D's conviction and said MR was needed for this serious offence
47
transferred malice
D can be guilty if he or she intends to commit a crime against A but instead commits the crime against B
48
Latimer 1886
transferred malice- D aimed a blow with a belt at a man in a pub. the belt bounce off the man and struck a woman in the face. D was guilty of an assault against the women, even though he hadn't meant to hit her. applying the principle of transferred malice the MR directed at the man was transferred to the woman
49
Gnago 2011
transferred malice- a passerby was shot in a gang shootout in which D had participated. the person who fired the shot was never caught, but would have been guilty of murder under the principle of transferred malice
50
Pembliton 1874
transferred malice- D threw a stone at V missed and smashed a window instead. D wasn't liable for the damage to the window because the MR couldn't be transferred from a crime against a person to a crime against a property
51
continuing act
this is where an initial AR. provided at some point while the AR is still going on, D forms the MR, then the AR and MR are said to coincide
52
Fagan 1986
D drove on to a police officer's foot by mistake. when D realised what he had done and refused to move the car, he gained the MR. the AR was treated as a continuing act and therefore it didn't matter if the MR was formed a little afterwards
53
serious of connected acts
this is where there is an initial MR. D then performs a series of acts which connected together from the AR. the AR and MR still said to coincide
54
Thabo Meli 1954
series of connected acts- D attacked V, intending to kill him. they then rolled what they thought was his dead body off a cliff to make it look like an accident. however, V was actually unconscious at this point and died some time later from exposure. the first act was accompanied by MR but wasn't the cause of death (so no AR)
55
manslaughter
a broad term which ranges between intentional killing and accidental death
56
voluntary manslaughter
term given to those situations in which the accused would be convicted of murder, that is, D possess the necessary mental intent at the time of the killing, but because of a special defence D is only convicted of manslaughter two special defences: - loss of control - diminished responsibility
57
involuntary manslaughter
unlawful killing where the actus reus of murder has been committed, but without the necessary mens reas for murder. two ways of committing involuntary manslaughter= unlawful act manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter
58
murder
Lord Coke gave the famous definition: "the unlawful killing of a reasonable creature in being under the King's peace with malice aforethought, express or implied
59
actus reus of murder
the unlawful killing of a human being under the King's peace within any country of the realm by an act or omission it must be shown that the defendants acts or omissions were the factual and legal cause of death
60
factual causation
but for D's conduct, V wouldn't have died
61
legal causation
D's act or omission was a more than minimal cause of V's death
62
A-G's Reference (No.3 of 1994)
it was decided a foetus killed in the womb cannot be a victim of murder. for a child to be considered a human being, they must have an existence living independently of its mother
63
Malcherek 1981
it was deiced that a brain dead person is no longer considered a reasonable creature in being
64
king's peace
this excludes killing an enemy solider in battle when the country is at war. however, enemy soldiers who have been captured or surrendered are protected by the law of murder
65
Blackman 2017
killing an enemy combatant after they were seriously injured and no longer a threat was considered a killing under the King's peace
66
within any country of the realm
this includes killing a person anywhere in the UK. exceptionally, a British citizen can be tried in British courts for a murder that was committed overseas
67
mens rea of murder
- malice aforethought - express malice aforethought means intention to kill - implied malice aforethought means intention to cause serious harm - intention to cause GBH is sufficient
68
Vickers 1957
D struck V with several bows during a burglary of V's shop. the court decided that where D intends to inflict GBH and V dies, this is enough for murder
69
foresight of consequences
in most cases of murder, a direct intention to kill or do GBH. however, situations can arise when D intends one thing but the actual consequence which occurs is another. if D foresaw the actual consequence of death or GBH, then he may be found guilty of indirectly intending murder
70
actus reus
physical element
71
mens rea
mental element, thinking part, guilty mind
72
Matthews v Alleyne 2003
Ds pushed from a bridge into a fast flowing river, knowing that he couldn't swim. he fell 25 feet and drowned.
73
loss of control
covers situations where D causes death but at the time of the killing lost self-control and reacted as a "normal person" might have in D's situation
74
s.54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009
(1) a person who kills may be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder where there exists- (a) a loss of self-control, (b) the loss of control had a "qualifying trigger", and (c) a person of D's sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self- restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or similar way to D
75
loss of self-control
this means a loss of ability to act in accordance with considered judgement or a loss of normal powers of reasoning
76
Jewell 2014
loss of self-control- D shot V point blank range using a shotgun and fled the scene. at his trial, D claimed that when he got out of his van outside V's house, "I did it because I lost control. I couldn't control my actions. I couldn't think straight. My head was f**ked up. It was like an injection in the head, an explosion in my head." the court decided that there was insufficient evidence of D having lost his self-control, but there was overwhelming evidence that this was a planned execution
77
details of loss of control
- judged subjectively - did D actually lose control at the time of the act or omission which caused V's death? - the loss of control need not be sudden: s.54 (2). it may follow from the cumulative impact of earlier events - however, s.54 (4) specifically excludes situations where D has acts "in a considered desire for revenge."
78
qualifying trigger
D's loss of control must be attributable to a "qualifying trigger." the qualifying triggers permitted are set out in s.55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. either trigger is sufficient or it may be a combination of both that caused D to lose control and kill
79
s.55(3): the "fear" trigger
D fears serious violence from V against D or another identified person. this is decided subjectively
80
Ward 2012
s.55(3)- D killed V after V had attacked D;s brother. D didn't fear serious violence towards himself. s.55(3) applied as D feared V would use serious violence towards his brother (who was an identifiable person)
81
s.55(4): the "anger" trigger
things said or done (or both) which are: (a) of an extremely grave character and (b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged
82
Zebedee 2012
s.55(4)- D lost control when his 94 year old father, who had Alzheimer's repeatedly soiled himself. neither conditions were satisfied
83
Hatter 2013
s.55(4)- the court decided that "the breakup of a relationship, of itself, will not normally constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character and entitle the aggrieved party to feel a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged
84
sexual infidelity
the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded
85
Clinton 2012
sexual infidelity- V told D she was having an affair and taunted him saying that she has slept with five men and gave graphic details. she also laughed after discovering he had been looking at suicide websites. the court decided that on its own sexual infidelity cannot qualify as a trigger, but it would be wrong to exclude it where sexual infidelity forms an essential part of another possible trigger
86
incitement
a person may not raise a qualifying trigger if they incited the thing done or said or the violence
87
Dawes 2013
incitement- D found his wife and V asleep on the sofa with their legs entwines. D claimed that V then attacked him with a bottle and that is why he fatally stabbed V
88
revenge
s.55(4) excludes situations where D has acted "in a considered desire for revenge."
89
normal person test
s.54 (1)(c) requires that a person of the defendant's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant, might have reacted in the same or similar way
90
degree of tolerance and self-restraint
this is a question for the jury to decide, it is an objective test as D is expected to show a normal degree of self-control. apart from sex and age, the jury cannot consider any circumstances of D that might have made him or her have less self-control
91
circumstances of the defendant
the jury must look at all of D's circumstances apart from those whose only relevance is to bear on D's general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint: s.54 (3). so a short temper, tendency to fly off the handle, or prejudices such as racism or homophobia aren't circumstances as they would only serve to lower D's capacity for tolerance below the normal level expected
92
rejmanski 2017
normal person test- D was a former solider who lost it and killed V after V made negative comments about his military service. court of appeal decided that in this case PTSD had to be excluded from the description of a normal person and there was insufficient evidence that it was relevant to D's conduct
93
asmelash 2013
circumstances of the defendant- D claimed V was abusive which made D angry and lost control, killing V. court decided that D was drunk wasn't one of his circumstances that had to be considered as it only related to D's general capacity to exercise tolerance and self restraint. however, if d had a severed problem with alcohol and was mercilessly taunted about this, to the extent it constituted a QT: it may then form part of the circumstances for consideration
94
might have reacted in the same or similar way to D
this defence will fail if the jury considers that the "normal person" might have lost control but would not have reacted in the same way
95
Christian 2018
normal person test- D stabbed 2 victims to death during an altercation in their shared living accommodation about the temp of the water in the shower. despite their being evidence of loss of control, the judge ruled that the defence shouldn't be left to the jury as D's reaction was so extreme and so protracted that no jury could conclude that a normal person might have reacted or behaved in the same or similar way
96
van dongen 2015
D repeatedly kicked V about the head and body when V was lying on the ground. while a normal person may have lost control, they would not have reacted in this way
97
diminished responsibility
defined by s.2 homicide act 1957 and amended by s.52 coroners and justice act 2009. a person who kills may be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder if he of she was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which- (a) arose from a recognised medical condition (b) substantially impaired D's ability to: i) understand the nature of his conduct; or ii) form a rational judgement; or iii) exercise self-control, and (c) provides an explanation for Ds acts and omissions in killing
98
abnormality of mental functioning
it is presumed that the test for abnormality of mental functioning is whether D's mental functioning was so different from that of an ordinary human being that the reasonable person would term it abnormal. it must also now arise from a "recognised medical condition."
99
Byrne 1960
D was a sexual psychopath who strangled and mutilated a woman. medical evidence showed his abnormality of mind meant he was unable to control his perverted desires
100
key elements of DR
1. abnormality of mental functioning 2. recognise medical condition 3. substantial impairment 4. explains the killing
101
recognised medical condition
this includes psychological and physical conditions according to established medical classification, including - psychotic condition (Golds 2016) - post-natal depression (Boots 2012) - mental disorder (Brennan 2014) - alcohol dependency syndrome (Wood 2008) - depressive illness (Dietschmann 2003) - Asperger's syndrome (Jama 2004) - battered spouses' syndrome (Hobson 1997) severe learning difficulties may also be included, but "normal immaturity" on the part of the child shouldn't qualify for a defence of diminished responsibility
102
substantial impairment
the abnormality of mental functioning must substantially impair D's ability to do one of 3 things: 1. to understand the nature of his conduct s.52 (1A) (A) e.g. D suffers from delusions and kills a person thinking he is an alien, or D's mental age is vastly lower than his or her real age 2. to form a rational judgement s.52 (1A) (b) e.g. D thinks irrationally that V is persecuting him and about to attack him (paranoia) or D suffers from schizophrenia or BSS 3. to exercise self-control s.52 (1A) (c) e.g. D know that he is strangling V, but has an uncontrollable urge to do this (Byrne) the impairment must be beyond merely trivial, but D's mental functioning need not be totally impaired. what amounts to "substantial" impairment is a matter of degree for the jury in each case Golds 2012
103
provides an explanation for D's conduct
D has to prove that the abnormality of mental functioning provided an explanation for his acts (or omissions): s.52 (1C) an abnormality of mental functioning will provide an explanation for D's conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing D to carry out the conduct. s.52 (1B) - needs to be a casual connection between the AMF and the killing. the AMF need not be the only factor which caused D to do or be involved in the killing, however it must be a significant factor. this is particularly important where D is intoxicated at the time of the killing
104
DR and intoxication
- D chose to get drunk and claims AMF - intoxication and a pre-existing AMF - intoxication due to addiction or dependency
105
unlawful act manslaughter
where D causes the death of V through an unlawful and dangerous act, without malice aforethought for murder, and with only the mens rea for the unlawful act (Newbury and Jones 1976)
106
gross negligence manslaughter
where D causes death by breaching a duty of care towards V in a grossly negligent way. D's act or omissions must fall so far below the required standard of care that it goes beyond mere compensation and amounts to a crime
107
key elements of unlawful act manslaughter
1. D must do an unlawful act 2. that act must be dangerous on an objective test 3. the act must cause the death 4. D must have mens rea for the unlawful act
108
unlawful act
there must be an act- an omission is insufficient (Lowe 1973)
109
lamb 1967
D and his friend were fooling around with a loaded revolver. unfortunately, one of them was killed, but no "unlawful act" existed because they didn't properly understand the mechanism of such a gun and hadn't expected it to fire. V wasn't therefore in fear of being short
110
dangerous
the unlawful act must be "dangerous" on an objective test, such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other people to, at least, the risk of some harm, albeit not serious harm (Church 1965)
111
goodfellow 1986
D set fire to his council house with the motive of getting rehoused. he had no intention to endanger life but unfortunately his wife, son and his son's girlfriend were all killed D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. it did not matter that his act of arson wasn't directed at anyone
112
JM + SM 2012
following a fight in a nightclub, V died from a ruptured artery that was a rare injury to have occurred the test for danger is whether a sober and reasonable person would foresee the risk of some harm. it didn't matter that they wouldn't foresee the particular type of harm that occurred
113
dawson 1985
V died from a heart attack when Ds held up a petrol station to satisfy the danger test, the risk of harm must be a risk of physical harm. a risk of emotional disturbance is NOT enough by itself
114
watson 1989
V died of a heart attack 90 minutes after being burgled the burglary became dangerous as soon as the old man's frailty would have been apparent to the reasonable person
115
bristow, dunn and delay 2013
V had been hit by vehicles used by Ds to commit burglary of a workshop that was located down a long lane. there was a risk that someone might try to intervene to prevent escape. the circumstances of the burglary meant that a reasonable and sober person would foresee the risk of some harm
116
causation
the unlawful act must cause death in fact and law. must be proven the breach of duty caused the death. this means that the usual rules on causation apply
117
kenndey 2007
d prepared an injection of heroin and water for v to inject himself. v self-injected and died v's voluntary act in injecting himself broke the chain of causation between D's supply and V's death
118
mens rea for unlawful act
D only requires the mens rea for the initial unlawful act; there is no need to prove that D realises the act is dangerous or unlawful, or even that D foresees a risk of harm
119
newbury and jones 1976
mens rea for unlawful act- youths had thrown paving slabs from a bridge onto a passing train and killed the guard. d only needs to have the MR of the unlawful act. it was not necessary to prove that D foresaw any harm from his act
120
key elements of gross negligence manslaughter
1. the existence of a duty of care owed by D to V 2. a breach of that duty of care which causes death 3. gross negligence which the jury considers to be so bad as to be criminal
121
duty of care
there must be a duty of care owed by the D to V. this is a question of law and for the trial judge to decide
122
adomako 1994
duty of care- an anaesthetist failed to notice a breathing tube had become disconnected during an operation. V had a heart attack and died. it was decided that the civil principles of negligence apply including the neighbour principle in donoghue v stevenson, a duty of care is owed to anyone it is reasonably foreseeable may be harmed by D's negligent acts or omissions
123
singh 1999
duty of care- a faulty gas fire caused the death of tenants. the landlord was held to have a duty to maintain the property
124
litchfield 1998
duty of care- a ship's captain set sail even though he knew the fuel was contaminated. the engine failed and crew members drowned. the captain owed a duty of care to the crew
125
winter 2010
duty of care- d's owed a duty of care to inform firefighters attending a fire at their premises that they were storing unlicensed fireworks. two firefighters died from an explosion
126
stone and dobinson 1977
duty of care- d's had voluntarily undertaken a duty to care for their anorexic relative, but were liable for her death when they failed to get medical help
127
evans 2009
v self injected with heroin supply by V's half sister and collapsed. she and her mother didn't seek medical help as they feared getting into trouble. the mother clearly owed a duty to her daughter. her half-sister also owed v a duty of care under the "miller principle" of creating a dangerous situation and failing to minimise it
128
wacker 2002
the bodies of 58 illegal immigrants were discovered in d's lorry. they had suffered because the driver had closed the air vents to keep the noise down and avoid detection when crossing the channel. the driver had voluntarily assumed a duty of care when he closed the vents and was in breach of it by not opening it. it was irrelevant that the decreased had entered into an arrangement. knowing it was unlawful and knowing that they were accepting a degree of risk
129
breach of duty which causes death
if d falls below the standard of the reasonable person performing the duty in question, he or she will be in breach of the duty. whether there is a breach is a factual matter for the jury to decide
130
risk of death
d's conduct must involve a foreseeable risk of death at the time of the breach. just because the breach id duty was a cause of death, it doesn't mean there was a foreseeable risk of death at the time of the breach
131
singh 1999
the tenants death from carbon monoxide poisoning was a foreseeable risk if the gas fire was not maintained properly by the land lord
132
misra 2004
risk of death- hospital doctors failed to identify and treat v for an infection after his knee operation, causing v to die. d's manslaughter conviction was upheld. the foreseeable risk related to death. a risk of serious injury would not be enough
133
batemen 1925
"gross" was defined as negligence which went beyond a mere matter of civil compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state and deserving of punishment
134
adomako 1994
it was stressed that the jury had to decide whether having regard to the risk of death involved, D's acts or omissions were so bad in the circumstances that it was criminal negligence
135
sellu 2016
during a routine knee operation, the patient suffered a perforated bowel. despite many opportunities, D failed to perform life saving procedures. the jury need to identify the line that separates serious or even very serious mistakes of lapses, from conduct which is "truly exceptionally bad" and such a departure from that standard of a reasonably competent doctor amounted to criminal
136
assault
defined in common law but charged under s.39 criminal justice act 1988
137
assault actus reus
- actions or words (smith v woking police 1983, the act was looking at a woman in her nightclothes through a window. words alone could be enough and even silent phone calls as in ireland 1999) words can also prevent an assault by making it clear that violence is not going to be used, e.g. tuberville v savage 1669, where D placed a hand on his sword and said "if it weren't assize time, I would not take such language from you..." - which cause V to apprehend immediate unlawful force (threat of violence must be "immediate." a threat to inflict harm in the future isn't assault. but, it's been widely interpreted. smith v woking, the threat of violence was considered immediate, even though D was still outside V's home
138
assault mens rea
intentionally or recklessly causing V to apprehend immediate unlawful force - logdon 1976, D pointed an imitation gun at V in jest did not realise it was a replica and was terrified. although D didn't intend to carry out the threat, he was reckless as to whether V would apprehend such violence
139
battery
defined in common law but charged under s.39 criminal justice act 1988
140
battery actus reus
- applying unlawful force to another person (collins v wilcock 1984, it was decided that "any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery." - touching someone's clothes while they are wearing them is equivalent to touching the person, e.g. thomas 1985. battery can also be committed by an indirect act such as a booby trap, e.g. DPP V K 1990, where D put acid in a hand drier - an omission can form a battery. santana-bermudez 2003, D failed to tell a police officer that he had a needle in his pocket when being searched
141
battery mens rea
- intentionally or recklessly applying unlawful force to V - MR of battery defined in venna 1976, where D was judged to have committed battery recklessly when struggling with a police officer who was trying to arrest him
142
assault occasioning actual bodily harm
s.47 offences against the person act 1861
143
ABH actus reus
- assault or battery which causes ABH - miller 1954, ABH was defined as "any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with health or comfort", provided it is more than trivial. harm is not limited to injury to the skin, flesh and bones - DPP v Smith 2006, it was held that cutting off V's ponytail amounted to ABH - T v DPP 2003, momentary loss of consciousness amounted to GBH - ABH can also include
144
ABH men’s rea
- intentionally or recklessly causing V to apprehend immediate unlawful force - intentionally or recklessly applying unlawful force to V - no need to intend or be reckless as to whether ABH is caused
145
Savage 1991
D threw beer into V’s face , however the glass slipped from her hand and cut V. It was sufficient that D had the MR of battery
146
Maliciously wounding or inflicting GBH
S.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861
147
Maliciously wounding or inflicting GBH AR
- wounding or inflicting GBH - wounding means breaking the skin, not internal bleeding as in Eisenhower in which a blood vessel was burst - any cut could be treated as wound, provided it breaks two layers of skin
148
DPP V Smith
GBH was defined as serious harm
149
Bollom 2004
The severity of injuries should be assessed according to V’s age and health
150
Brown and Stratton 1997
Several minor injuries amounted to GBH
151
Burstow 1997
D stalked V making threatening phone calls, sending hate mail, stole washing from line etc, covers serious psychiatric injury
152
Dica 2004
D infected 2 women with HIV, infecting someone with a biological diseases may be GBH
153
Wounding or causing GBH with intent MR
- intention to cause GBH or intention to resist (with foresight of some harm) - MR of S.18 usuallly occurs whose D intends to cause serious injury - intention can be direct or indirect
154
Belfon 1976
Confirms that being reckless as to causing serious injury isn’t enough. Intention to wound is not enough
155
Morrison 1989
D dived through a window to escape arrest, dragging the police officer through broken glass. D was convicted s.18. It wasn’t enough that D intended to resist arrest and was reckless as to whether this caused V some injury
156
Wounding or causing GBH with intent
s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861
157
Wounding or causing GBH with intent AR
- wounding or causing GBH - AR of s.18 is identical to s.20 so “wounding” means breaking to layers of skin and GBH means “serious harm”
158
Maliciously wounding or inflicting GBH MR
- intentionally or recklessly causing some harm - not necessary to intend serious harm or even realise there is a risk of causing serious harm
159
Paramenter 1991
D threw his baby into the air and caught him. D wasn’t guilty of s.20 because he did not realise there was a risk of any injury
160
Evaluation of assault and battery
- S.39 CJA 1988 doesn’t make it clear that assault and battery are 2 distinct offences and creates confusion by referring f to both as “common assault” - the terms “assault” and “battery” aren’t defined - judges decisions seem at odds with lay people’s assumptions. Most people would think “assault” meant a physical attack and not just a threat while most people think “battery” meant a severe beating - there should be a clear definition for lay people
161
S.47 Assault occasioning ABH evaluation
- “assault” is as misleading as battery can also form the basis of a s.47 offence - “occasioning” is an old fashioned word for “causing” - “ABH” isn’t defined in the OAP Act 1881 and the statute leaves the MR of s.47 unclear - the AR + MR don’t correspond - this is unfair because it goes against the principle of criminal law that people should only be responsible for what they foresee - constructive intent forces people to take responsibility for their conduct - the sentence jumps from 5 years even though D may not have intended or foreseen a risk of the injury caused
162
S.20 maliciously wounding or inflicting GBH evaluation
- the phrase “grievous bodily harm” is an old fashioned term and father courts rely on case law for definition - the inclusion of “wound” theoretically includes minor injuries, serious wounds could simply be treated as GBH - s.20 just says “maliciously” suggests evil intent but in common law it means intention or recklessness as to some harm - there used to be some confusion over whether the verb “inflict” required application of physical force - the AR and MR don’t correspond, D doesn’t foresee serious injury, just some harm - the sentence is the same as s.47 even though D has caused a much more severe injury
163
S.18 maliciously wounding or causing GBH with intent evaluation
- there is some overlap with the criticisms of s.20 since they have both the same AR - the verb “cause” is used in s.18, while s.20 uses the verb “inflict”. There uses it be debated over whether they mean different things or apply in different ways - in s.18, D must intend GBH while trying to resist arrest are charged with the same crime as those who set out to cause serious injury - the maximum sentence jumps to life even though the injury is the same as in s.20. This can be justified if D intended GBH but perhaps not if he or she only intended to resist arrest
164
Language problems
- language is inconsistent with the expectations of lay people, in law “assault” is apprehension of violence, but to a lay person assault may mean a physical attack and “battery” may imply a serious attack - key terms aren’t explained in the Act, courts have defined ABH in Miller and decided “assault” includes battery as well - language is out of date, instead of saying “causing”, s.47 uses the word “occasioning” which is out of date, s.20 and s.18 use the words “grievous” and “maliciously” which are not commonly used in today’s language
165
Lack of statutory definitions have enabled judges to be creative
Courts have used case law to modernise and keep the law up to date as well as fill in gaps. Dica extended GBH so that it includes biological disease, while Chan Fook and Burstow have extended injury to include psychiatric harm
166
Sentencing is illogical
Compared to common assault (6 months), 5 years for s.47 is a big step up and doesn’t reflect the level of MR needed for the offence. S.20 shares the same maximum sentence as s.47 tho it being far more serious, compared to s.20 life imprisonment for s.18 is a big step up
167
“Wounding” seems too minor
Eisenhower defines wounding as breaking 2 layers of skin. This could be relatively minor but given wounding is part of s.20 and s.18 we would expect it to be the equivalent of GBH
168
AR and MR don’t correspond
- s.47 only need MR for the assault/battery - s.20 only needs foresight of some harm or injury - s.18 can have the required MR by intending to resist arrest with foresight of some harm only
169
Ideas for reform- update confusing language
- “assault” and “battery” could be renamed as “threatened assault” and “physical assault” - the phrases “actual bodily harm” and “grievous bodily harm” could be dropped in favour of “injury” and “serious injury” - the verb “causes” should be used consistently across all offences
170
Ideas for reform- provide a clearer hierarchy of offences
- “threatened assault” and “physical assault “ should still have a max sentence of 6 months, as in the case under current common assault - law commission propose splitting s.47 into 2 new offences: aggravated assault and intentionally or recklessly causing injury - recklessly causing serious injury should replace s.20 and have a max sentence of 7 years - intentionally causing serious injury should remain as s.18 with a maximum sentence of life
171
Ideas for reform- ensure offences conform to the “correspondence principle”
- each offence should provide a clear and accurate label for the conduct in question - so the “news s.47” should require D to intend or foresee the risk of injury, a fairer way of assessing D’s blame - the “new s.20” should require D to be reckless as to serious injury. Foresight of some harm would no longer be enough - the alternative MR of resisting arrest under s.18 should be removed
172
Theft Act 1968 s.1
A person is guilty of theft if they dishonestly appropriate property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it
173
AR of theft
- appropriation - property - belonging to another
174
MR of theft
- dishonesty - intention to permanently deprive
175
Appropriation
Defined in section 3: “any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation”
176
Pitham and Hehl
D offered to sell furniture belonging to another man who was in prison at the time. The court decided that the appropriation was complete at that point, even if the furniture wasn’t sold. D has rights of the owner to offer the furniture for sale
177
Morris
D changed the price of an item in a supermarket to that of a lower priced item, but didn’t get through the checkout. Assuming any one right of the owner is enough. Theft is complete at that moment if accompanied by dishonesty and intent to permanently deprive.
178
Later appropriation
Appropriation include situations where “D has come by the property without stealing it, and later assumes the right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner, s.3 (1)
179
Consent and appropriation
An appropriation can take place even with the consent of the owner
180
Lawrence
An Italian student got into a London taxi. The journey should have cost 50p but D took £1 off the student and a further £6 from the student. The court followed that this amounted to theft.
181
Gomez
D worked in an electrical shop. His accomplice entered the shop and bought £17,000 of goods using stolen cheques. D convinced the owner ship that he was safe to accept such cheques. The court followed the decision in Lawrence and confirmed that an appropriation can take place even with the owners consent.
182
Hinks
D befriended a rich man of low intelligence. She convinced him to withdraw £300 a day and put it in her account. The £60,000 that she had received from the victim was an appropriate regardless of it being a gift.
183
Property
Defined in s.4: “property includes money and all other property real or personal including things in action and other intangible property.”
184
Property which can be stolen
- money - personal - real - things in action - other intangible property
185
Things which can’t be stolen
- confidential information, Oxford v Moss- D was a student who took an exam paper, read the questions and then returned it. D couldn’t be charged with theft of info on the paper. If he had kept the exam paper this would have been theft of the paper itself. - fungus, flowers fruit and foliage, s.4 (3) provided they are growing wild and not for sale - wild creatures: s.4 (4) provided they aren’t tamed or in captivity
186
Belonging to another
Defined in s.5: “property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having possession or control over it, or having any proprietary right or interest”
187
Possession or control
Usually the owner has possession and control, but the prosecution doesn’t have to prove who the owner is
188
Turner
D took his own car from a garage that had required it without paying. He was found guilty if theft as the garage had possession of the car and the right to retain it until the repairs were paid for
189
Woodman
A company was in control of scrap metal on its site without knowing it was there. It had been left by a purchaser who bought the scrap metal, but didn’t want that bit. D took the remaining scrap metal and was convicted of theft, even though the company was unaware there was any scrap left
190
Ricketts v Basildon Magistrates Court
D took bags of goods that had been deposited outside a charity shop as well as bags from the rear. The bags outside remained property of the give until the charity shop took possession and the bag in the bin were in possession of the charity shop were collected by waste collection services
191
Proprietary interest
Once someone has a proprietary right or interest it doesn’t matter that someone exists who has a better right
192
Webster
D was awarded a medal but the Ministry of Defence sent him two by mistake. Even though D had possession and control, the MoD retained a proprietary interest so it was theft when D tried to sell it on eBay.
193
Property received under an obligation may be treated as belonging to another
S.5 (3) provides that where property is received by D and D is under an obligation to deal with it in a particular way, it may be theft if D fails to do so
194
Hall
A travel agent took deposits for air flights but then went bankrupt. D’s obligation wasn’t clear so it was not a theft when he was unable to return the money.
195
Klineburg
D took payment for a time-share apartment to be paid into a trust company until the apartment was built. D’s obligation to pay the deposit into the trust fund was clear, so D was guilty when he failed to do this
196
Davidge v Bunnett
D was given money by flatmates to pay the gas bill, but spent it on Christmas present instas. D was guilty of theft as there was a legal obligation to deal with the property in a particular way
197
Property received by mistake
S.5 (4) provides that where a person receives a persons property by mistake and is under a legal obligation to return it to the owner, then the property is regarded as belonging to the person entitled to its return
198
A-G’s Reference (No.1 of 1983)
D was overpaid by her employers. She decided not to repay the money. The court decided D was legally obliged to return it under s.5(4), even tho she had taken ownership of the money when it was paid into their bank
199
Lost property
Lost proprrt still belongs ro the original owner and can be stolen. In the other hand, abandoned protest cannot be the subject of a theft. Whether property is lost or abandoned is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
200
Small
A car had been left in the same place for 2 weeks with its doors locked and keys in the ignition. The car had a flat battery, no petrol and a flat tyre. D helped himself to the car. The court decided there was no theft as the property had been abandoned
201
Dishonesty
When D appropriated the property, he or she must be dishonest. There is no statutory definitions of dishonesty, but s.2 identifies 3 situations that aren’t dishonest: s.2 (1) (a)- D believes he has a legal right to deprive the other s.2 (1) (b)- D believes in the others consent s.2 (1) (c)- D believes the owner can’t be found by taking reasonable steps
202
Holden
D was charged with theft theft of scrap tyres from Kwikfit where he was employed. He sad that he had seen other employees taking home scrap tyres and thought it was permitted. As the test is subjective, all D had to show was that he honestly believed he had a right to do it
203
Ivey/Barton + Booth test
If none of the above apply, the jury must use common sense in determining whether D was honest or dishonest. However, if guidance is still needed the jury must apply a 2 part test set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos
204
Barton + Booth
D’s ran a care home where over 20 years they stole money from residents. The CoA adopted the test for dishonesty from civil law: 1. What was the defendant’s actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts? 2. Was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people?
205
Section 2(2)
Makes it clear that an appropriation can still be dishonest even though the accused was willingly to pay
206
Intention to permanently deprive
An intention to permanently deprive clearly exists if D intends the owner to lose their property forever. S.6 makes clear that D mat still intend to permanently deprive “without meaning the owner to permanently deprive/lose the thing itself.” - where D intends to treat property as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights - where property is borrowed in circumstances equivalent to an outright taking
207
Velumyl
D dishonestly took £1000 from his employer’s safe. He said intended to return an equivalent amount. D was still guilty as he did intend to permanently deprive his employer of the original notes and coins
208
Lavender
D took doors from a council property and used them to replace the doors on his girlfriends council flat. He argued that there was no theft as he simply switched the doors from one property belonging to the council to another. There was an intention to permanently deprive as D’s intention was to treat the doors as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the council
209
Borrowing property in circumstances equivalent to an outright taking
In Lloyd, D was a projectionist who took a film overnight to make an illegal copy and replaced it damaged the next day
210
Conditional intent
If D picks up property to assess whether there is anything worth stealing and puts it back after deciding there isn’t, D will not have an intention to permanently deprive
211
Easom
D rummaged through a handbag and then returned it without finding anything worth taking. The court decided that a conditional intention to deprive isn’t enough for theft
212
Theft Act 1968 s.8
A person is guilty of robbery if they steal; and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being subjected to force
213
AR of robbery
- theft - use (or fear of the use) of force
214
MR of robbery
- MR for theft - intent to use force in order to steal
215
Robinson
A man owed D’s wife £7. D approached the man and threatened him. During a struggle V dropped a £5 note and D took it claiming he was still owed £2. If D held an honest belief that he had a right in law to take the property, he wouldn’t be dishonest
216
Corcoran
D hit V in the back and tugged at her bag. She let go of it and fell to the ground. D’s ran off without it. The theft was complete so D’s were guilty of robbery
217
Use of force
Only a minimal amount of force is required, provided it is on the person: Dawson and James, where the jury was entitled to decide that “nudging” in order to steal amounted to force
218
Clouden
D wrenched a shopping basket from V’s hand. Using force on the bag was effectively using force on the victim.
219
P v DPP
D snatched a cigarette from V’s hand without touching V in anyway. It couldn’t be said force was used “on a person.”
220
Fear of the use of force
The threat is sufficient, even if V isn’t actually frightened by D’s actions
221
B and R v DPP
V was surrounded by 5 other schoolboys who took his phone and money. V said that he hadn’t felt threatened. D’s had sought to put V in fear of force
222
On any person
The person threatened need not be the person stolen from
223
Force immediately before at the time of theft
There is no case on what sort of time period is covered by “immediately before”, but the courts have taken a realistic approach to “at the time of.”
224
Hale
D’s forced their way into V’s house. D1 put his hand over V’s mouth to stop her screaming while D2 went upstairs and seized a jewellery box. Before leaving the house they tied up V. D’s argued that the theft was complete as soon as D picked up the jewellery box, so the use of force in tying up CV was not at the time of the stealing. There was force immediately before the theft when D1 put his hand over V’s mouth. In addition, tying V up was using force at the time of the theft as the act of appropriation can be considered continuing.
225
Lockley
D stole beer from a shop and then used force on the shopkeeper who tried to stop him from escaping
226
Force in order to steal
The force must be used in order to steal. So, if the force wasn't used for this purpose, then any later theft will not make it into robbery
227
Vinnall
Ds punches V who fell off his bike. D1 told him: "Don't try anything, I've got a knife." V ran away, chased by Ds. Ds later returned and took his bike. Force wasn't used in order to steal so there was no robbery, but 2 separate offences
228
Burglary
statutory offence under s.9 (1) Theft Act 1968
229
Section 9 (1) (a)
D enters a building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to: - steal anything in the building or - inflict GBH to any person in the building or - do unlawful damage to the building or anything in it
230
Section 9 (1) (b)
D, having entered a building or part of a building as a trespasser: - steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or - inflicts or attempts to inflict GBH on any person in the building
231
Section 9 (1) (a) AR + MR
- entry of a building or part of one as a trespasser - MR for trespass and intent to commit theft or GBH or damage
232
Section 9 (1) (b) AR + MR
- Entry of a building or part of one as a trespasser and theft or GBH - MR for trespass and MR for theft or GBH
233
Collins
It was said that trespass must involve "substantial and effective entry into a building"
234
Brown
D was standing on the ground outside but leaning in through a smashed shop window rummaging through goods. Entry only had to be effective
235
Ryan
D was trapped when trying to get through a window into a house at 2:30am. His head and arm were inside the house but the rest of his body was outside. The fire brigade had to be called to release him.
236
Building
S.9 (4) includes inhabited places such as houseboats or caravans as there is no exact definition
237
B and S v Leathley
A 25 foot long freezer container had been kept in a farmyard for over 2 years as a storage facility. It rested on sleepers, had doors with locks and was connected to the electricity supply.
238
Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings and Gould
A lorry trailer with wheels which had been used for over a year for storage, had steps providing access and was connected to the electricity supply was held not to be a building
239
Rodmell
D stole power tools from a garden shed. A garden shed is a part of a person's home
240
Part of a building
This covers situations in which D may have permission to be in one part of the building but doesn't have permission to be in another part
241
Walkington
D went into the counter area in a shop and opened a till. This amounted to entry of a part of a building as the area was clearly marked and customers weren't permitted
242
Trespasser
Where a person has permission to enter they aren't considered a trespasser
243
Collins
D went past a house where he knew a young lady lived. He climbed a ladder up to her window and peered in where she was lying naked. He took off his clothes and when the lady woke up she invited him in to have sex thinking D was her bf, when she realised it wasn't her bf.
244
Theft
Theft is under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968
245
Going beyond permission
Where D goes beyond the permission given, he or she may be considered a trespasser
246
Smith and Jones
D went to his father's house in the middle of the night and took 2 TVs without the father's permission. The father stated that his son wouldn't be a trespasser in the house; he had a general permission to enter
247
A-G's References (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979)
D admitted he intended to steal anything lying around. Conditional intent will suffice for burglary. All that is required is intent to steal at the time of the entry. It isn't necessary to prove what was the object that D intended to steal
248
What is attempts defined under
Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s.1 (1)
249
Definition of attempts
If a person with intent to commit an offence does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, they are guilty of attempting to commit the offence
250
AR of attempts
An act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence
251
MR of attempts
with intent to commit that offence
252
Gullefer
D jumped onto a race track in order to have the rece declared void to allow him to reclaim his bet. D hadn't attempted to steal his money back so his actions were merely preparatory.
253
Boyle and Boyle
Ds damaged door of the premises they were seeking entry to. Ds attempted to burgle so their actions were more than merely preparatory
254
Campbell
D was in the street outside a post office wearing dark glasses with an imitation weapon and a threatening note in his pocket. D hadn't attempted to rob the post office, his actions were only preparatory
255
A-G's Reference (No. 1 of 1992)
D dragged a young woman to a shed, lowered his trousers and interfered with her private parts. His penis remained flaccid
255
Geddes
D was found in the boys toilets at school with a knife, rope and masking tape. D hadn't attempted false imprisonment just putting himself in the position to commit the offence. The court said 2 questions should be considered: 1. Has D moved from planning or preparation to execution and implementation? 2. Has D done an act showing he was trying to commit the full offence or had he only got as far as getting ready, or putting himself in a position, or equipping himself to do so?
256
Tosti
D had driven to the scene of a planned burglary, concealed metal cutting equipment in anhedge, and approached the door of a barn and examined the lock. D had attempted to burgle, he had gone beyond mere preparation
257
Whybrow
It was decided that for attempted murder D must intend to kill (intent to cause GBH isn't sufficient)
258
Recklessness
Recklessness isn't enough, even if recklessness would suffice for the main offence
259
Millard and Vernon
Ds repeatedly pushed against a wooden fence at a football ground. Ds could only be convicted of attempting to damage property if they intended to damage it- recklessness would have been sufficient for the full offence
260
Conditional intent (attempts)
where a person intends to do something if a certain condition is satisfied
261
A-G's Reference (No.1 and 2 of 1979)
the CA said that conditional intent will suffice if provided the indictment is carefully worded so that D isn't charged with attempt to steal a specific item but with an attempt to steal some or all the contents of the bag
262
S.1 (2) Criminal Attempts Act 1981
Makes clear that a person can be guilty of an attempted crime even though on the facts the commission of the offence is impossible
263
Anderton v Ryan
D bought a cheap video recorder believing it was stolen. In actual facts the goods weren't stolen. The court decided that D wasn't guilty of attempting to handle stolen goods because, even when she had done all she set out to do, there was actually still no crime, it was legally impossible
264
Shivpuri
D received a suitcase which he thought contained prohibited drugs but was actually just harmless vegetable matter. D can attempt an offence that is legally impossible
265
Taaffe
D imported foreign currency into the UK, believing it to be a crime. In fact, it wasn't against the law, so although in his own mind Taaffe was attempting to commit an offence he could not be liable
266
S.76 (3) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be
267
Williams
D thought a youth was being attacked and intervened. In fact he was being arrested. Whether force is necessary is decided on the basis of D's genuine belief
268
S.76 (5) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
makes it clear that if D's mistake was due to voluntary intoxication D cannot rely on that mistaken belief, Taj
269
Should D retreat?
D isn't under a duty to retreat, but the possibility that D could have retreated is a factor in deciding if the degree of force was reasonable
270
Bird
D argued with her ex bf on her bday and poured a drink over him. He slapped her and pinned her against the wall. She punched him in the face and claimed she forgot she had a glass in her hand. There is not duty to retreat before using force in self defence
271
The degree of force used
Force must be reasonable, this is judged objectively. If the force is used after all danger is over, or when the attacker is running away, then self defence is unlikely to succeed
272
Martin
D shot a burglar in the back as he ran away and killed him. The threat had passed and therefore use of the gun was excessive
273
Hussain
D chased a robber who had threatened his family and beat V up with a cricket bat. The attack was so savage that the bat broke in pieces and V was left with permanent brain damage
274
S.76 (6) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
the degree of force will not be reasonable if it is disproportionate
275
s.76 (7) CJI 2008
- D isn't expected to weigh the amount of force to a 'nicety' - the fact that D honestly and instinctively thought the level of force was necessary, is strong evidence that it was reasonable
276
S.43 Crime and Courts Act 2013- householder cases
householders who use a disproportionate level of force to protect themselves or others will not automatically be regarded as having acted unlawfully
277
Grossly disproportionate
using a level of force that is grossly disproportionate in the circumstances will not be regarded as reasonable and the defence will fail
278
Collins v Sec of State for Justice
A householder caught a burglar in his home at night and held him in a headlock resulting in irreversible brain damage. No prosecution was brought against the householder. The burglar's father challenged the legality of this decision, but his claim was rejected
279
Honest mistake
Self defence is available where D is mistaken as to the need for force, even where the mistake D made is unreasonable. If it wasn't allowed where D honestly believed he or she was about to be attacked, then D is at risk of being imprisoned when he or she wasn't really at fault. This affords no protection to the innocent victim whom D has assaulted due to a mistaken belief (Gladstone Williams)
280
Pre-emptive strike
- it is sensible that there is no duty to retreat before use of force in self defence - people are allowed to defence themselves before they are attacked by delivering the 'first blow' - A-G's Reference (No. 2 of 1983) D's shop had been targeted several times during riots. D prepared petrol bombs in advance of the next attack. The court ruled that D doesn't have to wait until attacked before he or she can use force. They can act to prevent force - imminence of the attack will be crucial in determining reasonableness (Salih)
281
Excessive force
- the all or nothing approach in self defence is harsh - there is no partial defence where the use of force in self defence was justified, but D used excessive force in the circumstances - this can be unfair on a person who kills another and ends up with a life sentence for murder (Martin)
282
Householder cases evaluation
- gives householders the right to use a higher level of force against intruders, provided it isn't grossly disproportionate - some argue that a householder is morally justified in using any amount of force - In Martin, the courts wouldn't take into account D's personality disorder when considering self-defence
283
Ideas for reform of self defence
- in mistake cases, limit the defence to mistakes that are 'reasonable' as well as honest - proposals for reform of homicide laws in 2007 suggested a partial defence to murder of killing in response to serious violence, which would reduce the charge to manslaughter - section 55 (3) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 introduced a "fear" trigger in the defence of loss of control which may provide a partial defence for those who use excessive force in self-defence but it still needs to be proved that D lost control at the time of the killing - allow householders to use any force on intruders which they consider necessary in self defence
284
Consent
- consent is a defence to assault and battery - it isn't a defence to ABH or greater harm unless it comes within established exceptions: A-G's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) - it is never available for murder (Nicklinson 2014)
285
A-G's Reference (No.6 of 1980)
Ds had agreed to settle their differences through a street fight and tried to rely on the defence of consent
286
General rule on consent and recognised "exceptions"
consent is only available for common assault and not bodily injury unless it comes under a recognised exception in the public interest. Street fighting isn't in the public interest, but the following maybe: - reasonable surgical procedures - body art - properly conducted games and sports - horseplay - dangerous exhibitions
287
Medical procedures
if a patient who is mentally capable refuses an operation or even a blood transfusion, then such treatment cannot be given
288
Wilson
D branded his initials onto his wife's buttocks with he consent, using a hot knife. This was said to be similar to a tattoo or other forms of body art, so consent was a legitimate defence
289
R v BM
D carried out body modification procedures including the removal of a customer's ear, nipple and the division of a customer's tongue. Consent was no defence to s.20 OAPA 1861
290
Barnes
serious injury was caused by a heavy tackle in an amateur football match. Consent can be a defence in physical contact sports if within the rules of the game. The court need only intervene when the conduct is extreme or seriously grave
291
Jones
teenagers were given the "bumps" by a group of older boys and sustained serious injury. Consent was allowed for rough physical play provided there was no intent to cause injury
292
Aitken
The principle had been extended to adult horseplay. RAF officers set alight a drunk colleague who was wearing a fire resistant suit, causing serious burns. They honestly believed he would have given consent, so convictions were quashed.
293
Brown
consenting males took part in a sadomasochistic activities for sexual pleasure. They were charged with s.47 and s.20 offences. Consent wasn't permitted because of the cruelty and degradation involved.
294
Consent must be genuine or real
must consent to: - the nature and quality of the act - the identity of the person carrying out the act - consent isn't real if a patient consents to one type of treatment but a different one is carried out - consents to a medical professional carrying out a treatment but the person is unqualified
294
Tabassum
D persuaded women to allow him to measure their breasts for the purpose of preparing a database for sale to doctors. The women only consented because they thought that D had medical training, consent doesn't actually exist as the act consented to isn't the act actually done
295
Richardson
A dentist carried out work after being suspended from practice. The patients wouldn't have consented to the treatment had they known. However, the court decided the patients had consented to the treatment. D hadn't deceived the patients as to her identity as a dentist. She was still a qualified dentist albeit suspended from practice at the time
296
Patterson
A surgeon was convicted of nine counts of wounding with intent when he carried out life changing operations for no medically justifiable reason. His victims had consented to the nature of the act but not the quality of the act
297
Implied consent
consent is "implied" by the courts to minor touching to prevent this giving rise to battery
298
Mistaken belief in consent
A mistaken belief that the victim is consenting can be a defence provided the mistake is genuine, even if that belief was unreasonable (Jones and Aitken)
299
Olugboja
V submitted to sexual intercourse after having witnesses the rape of her friend. There was a difference between submission and real consent
300
Burrell v Harmer
D tattooed 2 boys aged 12 and 13. The boys had consented to the tattoo. However, it was held that the boys consent was ineffective since the court was of the opinion they were unable to comprehend the nature of the act
301
Defence of consent is necessary
- important not to criminalise activities which are socially useful such as sport or surgery - however, some sports such as boxing permit deliberate harm - surgery often involved intentional violence resulting in actual or sometimes serious bodily harm - justified as a patient's health is at risk, provided consent is given - what actually amounts to reasonable medical procedures leads to difficulties regarding cosmetic surgery and body modification (R v BM) - modifications can lead to profound long term consequences and may seek body modification are vulnerable to mental illness
302
public policy
- it could be said courts are imposing their own moral values in deciding what is in the public interest - in brown, it wasn't lawful to engage in sadomasochistic activities in wilson bottom branding was lawful even though the injury was worse than that in brown and needed medical attention - the court regarded the branding as tattooing rather than inflicting pain for sexual pleasure - the law is inconsistent and reflects the bias of the judged which favours heterosexuals over homosexuals - however, in emmett consent wasn't allowed to "high risk" sexual activity between a heterosexual couple which resulted in D's wife suffering burns to her eyes and breasts
303
s.74 sexual offences act 2003
makes it clear that consent to sexual penetration is only a defence if agreement is by choice and the person has the capacity to choose. this is decided by looking at the context in which the activity took place, whether V was targeted and their vulnerability. this places a burden on the jury to decide and its liable to result in inconsistent decisions
304
horseplay
- questionable whether consent should be allowed in cases of horseplay, especially when it results in serious injury if victims didn't actually consent - the behaviour in jones and aitken could be seen as bullying, it reinforces gender stereotypes and encourage a "lad" culture - however the courts took the view that there was no intent to injure in these cases and if D had a genuine belief in consent they should be allowed the defence - there is inconsistency in granting the defence to Ds who mistakenly believed in consent without asking, but denying it to Ds who actually sought it before acting dangerously in cases like brown or R v BM. the courts clearly condone horseplay, but "disapproved" of sadomasochism and body modification even if the behaviour was fully consensual
305
consent and euthanasia
- lots of controversy over whether people who wish to die should have the right to be helped to do so - the law recognises that people are entitles to take their own life, but if anyone helps bring about the death they may face a charge of murder or assisted suicide - in nicklinson, N suffered a catastrophic stroke which him completely paralysed. the only part of his body he was able to move was his head and eyes. the sc refused to grant a right to be killed in case it undermined the rights of other disabled persons and diminished the value of life
306
ideas for reform of consent
- the LC proposed that D should be able to rely on V's consent to an act intended to cause injury, or likely to cause injury, but not to an act intended or likely to cause serious injury - LC recommended removing the defence of consent for injuries resulting from horseplay and sexual activities - they suggested keeping surgical treatment, tattooing etc as special cases, but adopting special rules in relation to boxing - it may be preferable to leave the law to develop on a case by case basis rather than leave it to parl that may lead to injustice in some cases
307
duress
common law defence which leads to acquittal. it is available for all crimes except murder and attempted murder
308
duress by threats
it is an excuse where D was forced to commit the crime by threats of death or serious injury. although D has both AR + MR of the crime, D wasn't truly at fault
309
key test set out in Graham
1. was D forced to act as he did because he reasonably feared serious injury or death? and if so 2. would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing D's characteristics, have responded in the same way?
310
key elements of duress by threats
- a threat of death or serious injury - no safe avenue of escape - the threat was imminent - a direct link between the threat and the crime
311
threat of death or serious injury
the threat must be to D or someone for whom they reasonably fell responsible, such as their partner or immediate family. this could extend to wright, a threat to D's bf was included
312
valdarrama-vega
D imported cocaine from Colombia because of death threats, financial pressured and threats to expose his homosexuality. the threat to D's life meant he could plead duress but financial duress and threats of his homosexuality aren't enough
313
no safe avenue of escape
there must be no reasonable opportunity to avoid the crime
314
gill
D was threatened with violence unless he stole a lorry. Since D had an opportunity to raise the alarm and didn't use it, duress wasn't available as a defence
315
hudson v taylor
Ds, who were prosecution witnesses in a court case, lied on oath after threats were made to cut them if they identified the man on trial. defence was allowed for perjury on the basis that police protection might not be effective
316
immediacy of the threat
the threat must be hanging over D at the time he or she commits the offence. it doesn't have to be immediate, provided it is "imminent" or almost immediate
317
abdul hussain
6 muslims, who were fugitives in sudan, feared being deported back to iraq to face savage treatment and death. to avoid this they hijacked a plane and landed it the UK. the threats which Ds feared had to operate on their minds so as to overbear their will at the time they did the crime
318
direct link between the threat and the crime
D can only use the defence of duress if the threats are in order to make him or her commit a specific offence
319
cole
D owed money and was threatened with a baseball bat if he didn't repay it, so D carried out 2 robberies. duress wasn't allowed. must be a connection between the threat and the crime committed
320
self induced duress
duress isn't available if D brings the situation on themselves
321
sharp
D joined a gang of armed robbers but then claimed he wanted to withdraw and war was threatened with violence. D knew the gang was likely to use violence when he joined, so he wasn't allowed to claim duress
322
sheperd
D joined a gang of shoplifters but didn't know they were violent. duress was available as D had no knowledge the gang was likely to use violence
323
hasan
D was a minder for a prostitute who claimed he was forced to carry out burglary by the prostitute's violent bf. if D voluntarily associates with criminals he cannot rely on duress unless he didn't foresee they would try to make him commit an offence
324
characteristics allowed
relevant to ability to resist threats - age - pregnancy - serious disability - possibly gender - some mental health conditions
325
characteristics not allowed
- low IQ - timidity - homosexuality - self induced abuse
326
howe
D took part in killing young men under a threat to his own life. Duress isn't a defence to murder
327
ashleigh wilson
D, aged 13, helped to murder his mother because he was too frightened to disobey his father. duress is no defence to murder but vulnerable D might be to threats
328
gotts
D, aged 16, attempted to kill his mother under a threat to his own life from his father. duress shouldn't be available for attempted murder either
329
duress of circumstances
where D acts under duress, not because of a specific threat from a person, but because of the surrounding circumstances
330
willer
D was forced to drive on the pavement to escape a gang of youths who had surrounded his car down an alley. D may have driven recklessly under duress
331
conway
D drove recklessly because he thought his passenger was about to be attacked. D could have a defence because it was "duress of circumstances"
332
martin
D's wife threatened to kill herself if D didn't drive her son to work. D did this even though he was disqualified. duress of circumstances was available.
333
pommell
D was found in bed with a loaded machine gun. he claimed that he had taken if off another man to prevent him using it, and was going to take it to the police in the morning. duress of circumstances was available to all crimes except murder
334
necessity
necessity involved the claim that D's conduct was lawful because, on a choice of 2 evils, the choice of avoiding the greater harm was justified
335
dudley and stephens
Ds murdered a fellow young sea man in order to save their own lives from starvation. they were found guilty of murder. killing an innocent life to save one's own doesn't justify murder
336
Ref (mental patient: sterilisation)
F had been a voluntary in-patient at a hospital for over 20 years. she developed a sexual relationship with a fellow patient. her mother and medical staff were concerned that she wouldnt cope with pregnancy and raising a child. other methods of pills werent practical for her. they sought a declaration that it would be lawful for her to be sterilised. f was incapable of giving valid consent she didnt appreciate the implications of the operation
337
Re A (conjoined twins)
the twins were both born with one having no proper heart or lungs. both would die if they werent seperated. the court had to decide whether the twins should be separated, even tho the operation would result in the death of the weaker twin. it was lawful for the doctors to operate
338
shayler
a former member of the security service disclosed secret info to the press, claiming the disclosure was necessary to safeguard members of the public. no defence was available
339
differences between duress of circumstance and necessity
DOC: - an excuse - in the circumstances d's will was overborne by fear - subject to the same rules as duress by threats - not available for murder necessity - a justification - d did not act of fear but did the right thing in the circumstances - not generally available except in a few limited cases - may be available for murder
340
insanity defence
insanity is a common law defence. it leads to a special verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
341
insanity legal definition from m'naghten
- everyone is presume sane; - d must prove that at the time of committing the act, he was "labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act or if he did, he didnt know what he was doing was wrong"
342
burden of proof
the burden of proving insanity is on the defence, on the balance of probabilities
343
key elements of insanity
1. a defect of reason 2. resulting from a disease if the mind 3. causing D not to know either the nature and quality of their act or what they did was wrong
344
defect of reason
it must be more than a momentary confusion and amount to a complete deprivation is reasoning power
345
Clarke
D claimed she didn’t realise she had put items from a supermarket in own bag whilst suffering from absent mindedness caused by depression. The trial judge said this was a plea of insanity so D changed her plea to guilty to avoid this but later appealed
346
disease of the mind
the defect of reason must be due to a disease of the mind. The disease can be mental or physical
347
Kemp
D has arteriosclerosis. This affected blood supply to d’s brain and caused temporarily unconsciousness. While in this state D attacked his wife with a hammer
348
Sullivan
D suffered from epilepsy. During a fit, d attacked an 80 year old neighbour. Especially is treated as a disease of the mind
349
Hennessy
D suffered from diabetes. D failed to take insulin and took a car without consent, while in a diabetic state. Diabetes is treated by the courts as a disease of the mind
350
has to be internal factor
- a seizure caused by the disease of diabetes is treated as insanity - a seizure caused by external factors is treated as automatism
351
Burgess
D suffered from a sleep disorder. D tried to strangle his gf in his sleep. D had a disease of the mind and the sleep disorder was internal
352
External factors
If D doesn’t know what they are doing, this could be due to an external cause and not cause D was suffering from a disease
353
Quick
D was a nurse who had diabetes. He took insulin but failed to eat and attacked a patient while in a diabetic state. D’s aggression wasn’t caused by the “disease of diabetes but caused by an external factor, insulin”
354
Voluntary intoxication
Where D suffers from a psychotic episode due to voluntarily taking an intoxicating substance, this would again amount to an external factor and insanity wouldn’t apply
355
Coley
D had a bad experience on cannabis and attacked his neighbour with a knife. D was guilty of attempted murder and couldn’t use the defence of insanity
356
Not knowing the nature and quality of the act
Includes situations where D isn’t fully conscious or, if conscious, D doesn’t understand or know what they are doing
357
Oye
D had a psychotic episode during which he stacked a police woman, believing she was a demon. The CoA substituted a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as D hadn’t known what he was doing
358
Not knowing the act was wrong
If D knows the nature and quality of their actions, they can only use the defence of insanity if they do not know their actions are legally and morally wrong
359
Windle
D’s wide constantly spoke of suicide. D gave her 100 aspirin tablets and she died. D also had a mental illness. He said, “I suppose they will hang me for this.” Even though he was morally justified, he know his actions were legally wrong so he couldn’t plead insanity
360
Keal
D was charged with attempted murder after attacking his father, mother and grandmother. He had a history of mental health problems. At the time of the attack, d’s father begged him to stop because it was killing him and d responded, “ I know, I’m sorry, I don’t want to, I’m sorry dad.” Insanity isn’t available to d who knew what they were doing was legally and morally wrong
361
automatism
common law defence which leads to acquittal
362
bratty
- an act done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflect or action or a convulsion - or an act done by a person who isn't conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or sleep walking
363
key elements of automatism
- an involuntary act - the cause of the automatism must be external
364
an involuntary act
this requires a loss of control by the "mind" over the movements of the body. reduced or partial control isn't enough for automatism
365
A-G's reference (no.2 of 1992)
d was driving a lorry on the motorway and crashed into a car on the hard shoulder, killing 2 people. d claimed he was "driving without awareness" included by the repetitive nature of motorway driving. there must be "total destruction of voluntary control"
366
external cause
examples: - a blow to the head - a fit of sneezing - an attack by a swarm of bees - ptsd
367
hill v baxter
"a person shouldn't be made liable at the criminal law who, through no fault of his own, becomes unconscious when driving, as, for example, a person who has been struck by a stone or overcome by a sudden illness, or when the car has been put temporarily out of his control owing to his being attacked by a swarm of bees"
368
R v T
D was raped. 3 days later she took part in a robbery. she claimed she was suffering from ptsd and had acted in a "dream-like" state. exceptional stress from a traumatic event could be "an external factor" which might cause automatism
369
self induced automatism
self induced means that d knows his conduct is likely to bring about an automatic state
370
bailey
d was a diabetic who hit v over the head after taking insulin and failing to eat enough
371
specific intent offences
intention must be proved, e.g. murder, s.18 and theft self induced automatism is a defence
372
basic intent offences
recklessness is enough, e.g. manslaughter, s.20 and s.47 self induced automatism isnt a defence if d was reckless
373
hardie
d took valium thinking it would calm him down. it had an unexpected effect and he set fire to the wardrobe d hadnt been reckless and should have been able to raise the defence of automatism
374
insane automatism
- internal factor - m'naghten rules apply - burden of proof on defence - special verdict - stigma
375
non insane automatism
- external factor - bratty rules apply - burden of proof on prosecution - acquittal - no stigma
376
intoxication
common law defence which is only available in limited circumstances based on failure to form mens rea due to alcohol, drugs or other substances
377
whether the defence will be available depends on:
- whether the intoxication was voluntary or involuntary, and - whether the offence is charged one of specific intent or basic intent
378
voluntary intoxication
this is where d has chosen to take an intoxicating substance. defence to specific intent offences provided d is so intoxicated they havent formed the mens rea
379
Sheehan and Moore
Ds, who were very drunk, threw petrol over a homeless person and set fire to him. They were too drunk to have formed an intent to kill him or cause GBH. Because Ds didn’t have mens rea for murder, intoxication was a defence
380
Gallagher
D decided to kill his wife and drank a lot of whisky to give himself “the bottle” to carry it out. His conviction for murder was upheld. If d has the MR then he is guilty
381
Majewski
D went on a drink and drug binge, then assaulted 3 people and the arresting police officers. Majewski was convicted of s.47 oapa 1861as its a basic intent offence he was reckless when he got drunk
382
Allen
D drank homemade wine had a much greater effect on him then he expected. While under the influence he committed sa. He claimed he was so drunk he did not know what he was doing and he hadn’t voluntarily put himself in that position as the wine was much stronger than he realised. The intoxication was voluntarily even though he hadn’t realised the strength of it
383
Involuntarily intoxication
This is where d didn’t know they were taking an intoxicating substance. It includes situations when prescribed medication is taken as directed and an unpredictable effect
384
Hardie
D took Valium tablets which had an unexpected effect. D cannot be guilty of a basic intent offence because he hadn’t been reckless in getting intoxicated
385
Kingston
D’s coffee was drugged by men intending to blackmail him. He was then showed a 15 year old boy who was asleep and invited to abuse him. D did so and was photographed by the blackmailer. D said he wouldn’t have committed this act is sober. Even though d’s drink was spiked, involuntary intoxication wasn’t a defence
386
Link between intoxication and mistake
If a mistake is induced by intoxication there is rarely a defence
387
Lipman
D took LSD and had hallucinations. He suffocated his gf to death believing she was a snake trying to attack him. D didn’t have the mens rea for murder however he was reckless in voluntarily taking the drug so was guilty of manslaughter
388
S.76 (5) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
If an intoxicated mistake is about self defence or prevention of crime, D will never have a defence whether the crime is one of specific or basic intent offence
389
Taj
D began abusing drugs and alcohol and a child which eventually brought on a psychosis that made him hear voices and become aggressive and paranoid. The psychosis would linger for a while even after the intoxication wore off. D drank heavily and layer he became convinced he saw a man trying to detonate a bomb. He attacked and nearly killed him but pleased self defence, this defence failed.