Reflection Attack
Defence Reflection Attack
- attacker can no longer reflect to original person
Replay Attack
- if m = hans, “pay peter 200 €”; peter would get from receiver 400
Defence Replay Attack
PC (plain-cipher)
CP (cipher-plain)
CC (cipher-cipher)
PC:
b to a: nonce
a to b: {A, m, nonces}_k_AB
CP:
b to a: {A, m, nonces}_k_AB
a to b: nonces -> as acknowledgment
CC:
b to a: {B, m1, nonces}_k_AB
a to b: {A, m2, nonces}_k_ABall encrypted m can just be decrypted by a and b
TLS: Transport Layer Security - Record Protocol
TLS Handshake Protocol
C -> S: highest TLS + nonces + session ID
S -> C: chooses TLS + nonces + copied session ID from C
S -> C: server certificate + DH parameters + ask C for certificate
C -> S: certificate + DH parameter + {pre-master secret}_enc pub key of S + CV -> signs handshake with certificate
C -> S: sends changed_cipher_specs
S -> C: finished
Why ID’s in TSL?
- resume a session or add one to it; very easy
Why DH in TLS and not RSA?
- with DH -> perfect forward security
SSL 2.0 weaknesses
TLS traffic analysis
Common Name (CN)
determines domain validity
e.g. for www.google.com
or *.brainscape.com
-> wildcard, also a.b.brainscape.com
PKI / Certificate Hierarchy
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
-> chain of trust