Firewalls
- have certain rules to protect
Stateful Firewalls
action src sport dst dport state
allow $INSIDE * * 80443 NEW -> allows new connections
allow * * * * ESTABLISHED -> allow established going out
DMZ Networks
Denial-of-Service targets
CPU -> overload target with complex calculations
RAM -> consume all of memory for processing requests
Bandwidth -> exhaust network bandwidth
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
- multiple attacks traffic
ICMP/UDP Floods
SYN Floods: attack and defence
solve: SYN cookies -> cookie has an ACK so needs to wait for attacker
Reflection Attacks
- reflectors will then send to target
Amplification Attacks
- then use some protocol that needs a bigger response from server
HTTP Flood
- very low effort for attacker
Slowloris
R.U.D.Y.
Compression bombs as HTTP
- when arrives zip bomb
Water Torture Attack
- overload authoritie name server with queries
Upstream filters
- high ISPs blacklist
Anti-Spoofing
- block spoofed traffic
Detect & Block - DoS
Traffic Shaping
DNS: Name Resolution
me -> . (root): IP of syssec.mmci.uni-saarland.de
. (root) -> me: NS .de is at 194.0.0.53
me -> de.: IP of syssec.mmci.uni-saarland.de
de. -> me: NS uni-saarland.de is at 134.96.7.7
me ->:IP of syssec.mmci.uni-saarland.de?
uni-saarland.de. -> me:NS mmci.uni-saarland.de is at 139.19.1.1
me ->:IP of syssec.mmci.uni-saarland.de?
mmci.uni-saarland.de. -> me:IP of syssec.mmci.uni-saarland.de is 139.19.86.150
DNS Recursive Resolvers vs. Authoritative NS
RR A NS
serve DNS clients Server recursive resolver
Resolve any domain only replies domains that are in its zone
iterate query denies recursive domains
DNS Cache Poisoning
- can redirect, disable
DNS Cache Snooping
DNSSEC
DNSSEC criticism