International institutions
o Definition; rules and organisations that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations in world politics
o Types
Int. law & norms
IGO’s
International regimes
o Nota bene
Can be effective or ineffective
May be fair or unfair, morally good or bad
Can involve only states or also non-state actors
Functions of int. institutions
o Prescribe roles; define characteristics, rights and responsibilities of actors with certain identities
o Constrain activity; establish positive and negative incentives for acting in certain ways
o Shape expectations; provide ideas and information that helps actors know how others are likely to act in various situations
International law
Definition; rules and principles that are generally recognized as binding on states and other international actors
What does it do?
* Public IL; defines rights and responsibilities in relations between states and individuals and other private bodies
* Private IL; defines rights and responsibilities in relations between private bodies in different countries (companies, individuals)
Nota bene
* Int. legal system is decentralized, no world government, so it depends heavily on voluntary commitment and compliance by states and other actors
Sources of int. law
Treaties
* Definition; rules that states have agreed to follow by signing and ratifying written treaties/conventions
Custom; rules that most states follow most of the time based on a sense of legal obligation
* Sometimes unwritten; sometimes later formalised in treaties
* Diplomatic immunity
* Sub-category; jus cogens – rules that are binding on all actors, whether or not they have agreed to be bound. May be reinforced by treaties, but not required and covers 5 prohibitions = aggression, genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity and piracy
General principle; rules found in many national legal system
Int. norms
What are they?
* Informal but widely accepted standards of appropriate behaviour for international actors of a particular type
* Procedural norms; define how actors should interact, how decisions should be made
o Reciprocity
o Consultation
* Substantive norms; define outcomes that should be achieved
o Territorial integrity
o National self-determination
o Respect for human rights
Intersubjective “social facts” – exist in actors’ shared expectations and behaviour
Can be formalized, may be complied with, are often contested
Rational pursuit of joint gains
- Keohane 1982
- States accept rules that enable them to cooperate under anarchy and thus to achieve joint gains
- Examples = 1. Rules that reduce fears of non-compliance (reciprocity and consultation norms) 2. Rules that promote transparency (informationsharing or monitoring) 3. Rules that facilitate negotiation of agreements (diplomatic immunity)
- States will continue to support these rules as long as they enable cooperation and the achievement of joint gains, even if the distribution of power among states changes!
Imposition, unrestrained power
- Gruber 2000
- Strong states impose rules on the int. system that maximise self-interest
- Weak states accept these rules when rejecting them would be more costly
- When new great powers emerge, they create and impose new rules
Impositions, restrained power
- Ikenberry 2001
- After major wars, victorious powers seek to re-establish int. order by imposing formal and informal rules on int. system
- These rules will be more acceptable to other states and thus more likely to endure, when the dominant states accept limits on their own power and avoid maximising self interest
Persuasion
- Policy entrepreneurs persuade state official or mass publics that certain rules are right and desirable
- May be based on moral arguments – prohibition of slavery (Nadelmann 1990)
- May be based on causal arguments – environmental treaties (Haas 1992)
Norm life cycle
- Finnemore and Sikkink 1998
- Rules spread from new to taken-for-granted through a 3 step process
- Norm emergence -> norm cascade -> norm internalization
- Norm emergence – Individuals, NGO’s, governments seek to persuade others that a certain idea should be an international norm
- Norm cascade – more governments accept the norm. After a tipping point is reached it becomes unacceptable to reject the norm, so more accept it
- Norm internationalization – governments integrate norm into expectations, national legislation and bureaucratic procedures
Effects of int. rules
Why and under what conditions do actors comply with, evade or violate int. rule?
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of int. law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time” – Henkin 1979 How nations behave
Managerial approach
- Chayes and Chayes 1993
- Assumption; states generally intend to comply with int. law, 3 reasons = 1. Efficiency – routine compliance avoids costly calculations 2. Interests – int. law reflects states’ interests 3. Norms – states are sensitive to social pressure
- Argument; non-compliance is generally not intentional, it is due to
- Ambiguity – rules aren’t clear 2. Incapacity – states lack financial or administrative capacity to comply
- Policy implication; to increase compliance, make rules clearer and improve states’ capacity to comply
Incentives approach
- Downs et al 1996
- Assumption; compliance can be costly, so it depends on states’ deliberate calculation of incentives. 1. The likelihood that non-compliance will be observed. 2. Likely costs and benefits (both material and reputational) of compliance vs. non-compliance
- Arguments; if rules require little departure from states’ preferences, then compliance may be high even if monitoring and punishment of violators are weak. As rules require greater departure from states’ preferences, compliance becomes more dependent on the monitoring and punishment of violators
- Policy implication; to increase compliance, strengthen positive and negative incentives + monitoring
Domestic politics
- Dai 2005
- A state’s compliance with int. rules is a 2 level game = int. partners prefer the state to comply and domestic constituencies have various preferences
- Domestic politics of compliance
- Governments are accountable to domestic constituencies with different preferences on compliance and different degrees of influence.
A constituency’s ability to shape government’s choices depends upon two factors: (Electoral influence: policymakers are more responsive to larger groups and Information: it’s more costly to mislead well-informed constituencies ) - Larger & better-informed constituencies have more influence on government’s choices regarding rule compliance.
Evasion
- Buzas 2017
- What? -> “intentional compliance with the letter of the law but not its purpose in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguably legal fashion.”
- Why? -> It looks like compliance so avoids accountability and punishment, but it defies the purpose of the rule.
- When? -> Evasion is most likely when: (1) legal obligations are costly, (2) there’s a significant gap between the rule’s letter and purpose.
- Example: France’s use of financial incentives to expel Roma with EU passports.
Socialization
- Checkel 2005
- Individual states adopt rules of groups of states (int. society) to which they belong or hope to belong
- Types
- Role playing; states adjust their behaviour to fit the rules connected to their role, even if the rules don’t fit their beliefs or preferences
- Persuasion; states’ leaders or masses are persuaded by moral or causal logic underlying ant int. rule
- Bureaucratic normalization; a states’ bureaucracy incorporates int. rules into its standard routines. Over time, these routines become taken-for-granted
