Axiology
theory of value. What kinds of things are valuable? why are they valuable?
Naturalism
- metaphysical naturalism
axiological naturalism
all values are related to facts about the natural world, in particular facts about evolution
metaphysical naturalism
the claim that humans are not separate from non-human nature
2 goals of rolston
2. all species kinds have intrinsic value
naturalism
values are dependent on facts about nature (especially biological facts)
Rolston’s naturalistic objective value
2 senses of intrinsic value (1)
X is intrinsically valuable if Y conscoulsly values it for its own sake and not simply as a means for other values to which it might lead
- Fred values Beatles songs for their own sake
2 senses of intrinsic value (2)
X is intrinsically valuable if X has value independent of conscious valuation by any other Y and independently of its instrumental value (this is Rolston’s claim about nature)
- the redwood tree species has value separate from any conscious valuing by others
some interesting biological observations
anthropocentric value
humans are the only entites with intrinsic value
anthropogenic value
all values originate from human consciousness
dispositional anthropogenic value
to say that N is valuable means that N is able to be valued (by human valuers)
Epistemological argument (133)
Rolston’s criticism
practical worry
likely to stay focused on humans if we think humans are the source of all values (135)
challenge
to make sense of how we do know that value exists in nature, separate from human experiences and valuations
sentiocentric value (Singer)
all sentient beings (or their experiences) have i ntrinsic value)
Sentiogenic/vertebragenic value (Singer)
sentient beings are the source of all values
Dispositional
to say that N is valuable means that N is able to be valued by some sentient being
Sentient Valuers: Arguments
Argument in favor of sentiogenic approaches
summarizing the sentiogenic view
“Value, like a trickle or remorse, must be felt to be there. Its esse is percipi. Nonsensed value is nonsense” (136)
Rolston challenges the thory that says…
values are like color (relative to the perceiver) (137)