‘The concept of agape gives no help at all in moral decision-making.’
Critically assess the view that situation ethics provides a helpful way to make moral decisions.
Assess the view that the approach taken by Fletcher’s situation ethics makes moral decision-making entirely individualistic and subjective.
Firstly, Fletcher’s reliance on agape as the SOLE GUIDING PRINCIPLE -“the ruling norm” - makes moral decision-making entirely individualistic and subjective.
Secondly, the VAGUENESS OF AGAPE, combined with the HIGHLY DEMANDING EXPECTATION to consistently “will the neighbour’s good,” makes situation ethics dangerously individualistic and subjective.
Finally, by basing morality on an agapeic outcome, Fletcher’s situation ethics depends on the INDIVIDUAL’S SUBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT ABOUT CONSEQUENCES, reinforcing its individualistic and subjective nature
‘Situation ethics should be seen as a religious ethical theory.’ Discuss
Firstly, from a TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE, situation ethics should not be seen as a religious ethical theory.
Secondly, although JUSTICE AND IMPARTIALITY reflect the biblical command to love God and one’s neighbour, agape in situation ethics is so VAGUE AND INDISTINCT FROM SECULAR MORAL IDEALS that it struggles to function as a genuinely religious ethical theory.
Finally, the idea that agape can JUSTIFY ANY OUTCOME - even the taking of innocent life - shows that situation ethics ABANDONS KEY RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES, such as the sanctity of life, calling into question its status as a genuinely religious ethical theory.
‘The four working principles are the most useful part of situation ethics.’ Discuss
Firstly, Fletcher’s claim that agape is ‘the only thing that is intrinsically good’ (first
proposition) and the ‘ruling norm’ of Christian ethics (second proposition) may be seen as more useful, as they offer a clear rationale for the principles of POSITIVISM and PERSONALISM. However, both propositions present significant challenges, especially from a traditional Christian perspective, as they appear to dismiss divine commandments and reduce morality to a single, subjective criterion.
Secondly, Fletcher’s assertion that ‘love and justice are the same’ (fourth proposition) and that agape ‘wills the neighbour’s good’ (fifth proposition) may be considered more useful, as they theoretically underpin the principle of PRAGMATISM by linking moral action to practical decision-making. However, their abstract nature and the demanding expectation to apply agape universally ultimately weaken situation ethics, offering limited practical guidance and placing an unrealistic burden on the moral agent.
Finally, the idea that agape is ‘the goal or end of the act that justifies any means’ (fifth
proposition) and must be applied ‘situationally’ rather than prescriptively (sixth
proposition) lends support to the PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVISM. However, this is arguably the least useful aspect of situation ethics, as it is deeply problematic for a Christian ethic to risk undermining consistent moral standards or
justifying morally abhorrent actions under the guise of agape.