Utilitarianism

Question 1

Critically assess the view that an ethical decision can be based on the extent to which utility is best served.

Answer 1

1. Shouldn’t due to numerous problems with Bentham’s act utilitarianism and hedonic calculus
2. Although Mill’s rule emphasises quality of pleasure and broader concern for societal wellbeing it is not without it’s faults
3. Both Bentham and Mill’s approach to utility are flawed due to its equation of good with pleasure but preference utilitarianism is also problematic

Question 2

Critically assess the view that utilitarianism provides a helpful way to make moral decisions.

Answer 2

1. Act utilitarianism is the least useful form of utilitarianism due to its excessively individualistic and rigidly quantitative approach to the principle of utility
2. Rule is too rigid or just as bad as act
3. Flawed due to its equation of good with pleasure but preference utilitarianism is also problematic

Question 3

‘In moral decision-making, act utilitarianism is the most useful form of utilitarianism.’ Discuss.

Answer 3

1. Act utilitarianism is the least useful form of utilitarianism due to its excessively individualistic and rigidly quantitative approach to the principle of utility
2. Rule is too rigid or just as bad as act
3. Flawed due to its equation of good with pleasure but preference utilitarianism is also problematic

Question 4

‘In moral decision-making, rule utilitarianism is the most useful form of utilitarianism.’ Discuss.

Answer 4

1. Rule is right to focus on quality not quantity like act
2. Rule is too rigid or just as bad as act
3. Classical rule shouldn’t equate good with pleasure/happiness

Question 5

‘It is not possible to measure good or pleasure and then reach a moral decision.’ Discuss.

Answer 5

Firstly, BENTHAM’S poor attempt to measure good/pleasure using the seven factors of the HEDONIC CALCULUS supports the claim that ‘it is not possible to measure good or pleasure and then reach a moral decision.’
Secondly, although J.S. Mill offers a more nuanced account of good/pleasure - one that aligns with deeper conceptions of human flourishing through his distinction between HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES - his approach is not without its flaws.
Finally, the very idea that pleasure can - or should - be measured as a basis for moral decision-making is FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. (META ETHICS SYNOPTIC LINKS - G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and open question argument, Hume’s is-ought problem)