What did the Kennedy Administration think about nuclear escalation?
The threat lacked credability. Yet at the same time, a conventional buildup was expensive, and it would take time. The question of nuclear options needed to be revisited.
What did Kennedy and Macnamara think about the use of nulcear weapons?
They agreed with Louis Mountbatten, that NATO should not use nuclear weapons even in the case of clear superiority. Yet, SAC had plans for using nuclear weapons.
What concern did the US have about the Soviet Union?
Wanted the US to be invulnerable to a Soviet first strike.
Evidence of the “missile gap” favoring the US eased some of the concerns.
What was wrong with the current military?
Existing SIOP was too rigid and too geared toward conventionalizing nuclear weapons.
Kennedy and Macnamara wanted to tighten civilian control over the military, and especially in the realm of nuclear weapons.
What are some concerns about nuclear war?
during Kennedy/Macnamara era
Kennedy and Macnamara believed that nuclear war could be controlled and that the SIOP should not be based on the principle of massive, uncontrolled escalation in case of a Soviet attack.
Yet Macnamara did not think that tactical nuclear weapons would make a big difference.
Macnamara also did not believe that a successful first strike could be carried out, yet he insisted that cities should not be targeted. If a war were to happen, it would be better if cities were not targeted. This was a plea for restraint.
What was Damage Limitation?
Protect command and control and do not target the Soviet’s command and control.
Multiple options: mainly military targets, but not a first strike.
The drawbacks:
Normalization of the idea of using nuclear weapons.
Shelling’s critique: nuclear weapons are not about war-fighting, they are about the ability to hurt.
Not easy to distinguish what Macnamara had in mind from a first-strike posture.
In a second-strike situation, the strikes would be targeted at empty silos.
The Air Force did not mind the Macnamara doctrine.
The Soviets were very worried about the ”no cities” doctrine, interpreting it pretty much as the US Air Force did.
What are some effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
The crisis showed that crises in general need not escalate out of control.
Brody’s argument: 1) the limitless concern about saving face was exaggerated; 2) the assumption of automaticity was exaggerated.
Kahn’s escalation ladder, and the idea of “escalation dominance”
What policy did Macnamara shift to in 1963?
Assured Destruction
What is Assured Destruction?
Assured destruction: 30 percent of Soviet population, 50 percent of industrial capacity.
Describing this level as assured implied that anything less than that could be acceptable.
The pretense was dropped.
Macnamara was not bothered by the Soviet’s own capacity to inflict assured destruction.
LBJ
What are defense systems and their effects?
Active and passive defenses.
The Ruina-Kaysen, Gell-man study, arguing that defenses could be destabilizing.
The Soviet response to the suggestion that they should not try to protect their population.
The military liked the idea of missile defenses.
Its effect on the potential for an arms race.
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1. What is revolutionary about nuclear weapons.9
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2. Deterrence and Defense16
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3. Deterrence Stability15
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4. Trade offs and Tensions4
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5. Security Dilema10
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6. Nuclear Targeting and Crisis Stability8
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7. Complex Systems, Organizations, and Accidents8
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8. The Cuban Missile Crisis6
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9. Extended Deterrence10
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10. FROM MASSIVE RETALIATION TO LIMITED OPTIONS6
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11. The Importance of Being First7
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12. Arms Control9
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13. Between Warfighting and Deterrence10
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14. Parity9
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15. Missile Defesnse6
