9. Extended Deterrence

Question 1

What are some obvious/non obsivous intensions?

in relation to US and USSR during Cold War

Answer 1

Obvious:
* We would defend the US homeland if USSR attacked it
* We will fight them if they were to attack Western Europe.
* Threats are inherlerly credible

Non Obvious:
* Unfortunately, in cases when we need to tell that we will fight, words are not enough. We have incentives to make such threats even if we do not intend to carry them out.
* Threats need to be made credible

There are threats that are inherently credible, there are threats that need to be made credible, and then there are bluffs.

Question 2

What is a paradox of deterance?

Answer 2

Threatening to hurt somebody is bound to hurt the issuer of the threat as well if the threat was to be carried out. The threatener has to convince the target that not carrying out the threat would hurt it more than carrying it out.

Question 3

How can you increase credability of your threat?

Answer 3

Sometimes appearing irrational may help the party that is issuing a threat that is of dubious credibility.

This interacts with the severity of the consequences of carrying out the threat.
* Khruschev’s behavior.
* Nixon’s deliberations during the Vietnam War.

Question 4

What is the solution to the credibilty problem?

Answer 4

Get yourself into a position where you cannot fail to react as you said you would – where you just can’t help it, or the failure to react would be associated with some overwhelming cost.

Maneuver yourself into a position where you have deprived yourself of certain choices. The old business of burning bridges.

Relinquishing the initiative and forcing the adversary to make a choice between clashing or not can be advantageous.

Costly signals vs commitment devices.

Question 5

What conditions make threats credible?

Answer 5

Geographic contiguity.

The obviousness of the detrimental effects of losing something.
* Increased vulnerability.
* Reputational costs.

Sentimental/religious/nationalistic attachments.

Cost-tolerance.
* This is related to the idea that appearing irrational may be an advantage sometimes.
* Also related to the popular idea that democracies are at a disadvantage.

Automaticity.

Question 6

What are tripwires?

Answer 6

Even if troops deployed overseas are too few in number, they can deter. Their deterrent force does not come from the ability to defeat an attack, but from the fact that the adversary cannot attack an ally without attacking you and engaging your honor.

“Even one British soldier on French soil should suffice, and we will make sure he is killed in the first battle following a German attack.”

Question 7

Are commitments credible?

Answer 7

Even if you have successfully maneuvered yourself into a commitment, the issue of credibility remains, unless your threat to respond is somehow made automatic.

The problem with the strategy of massive retaliation.

Question 8

How does the interdependence of commintments work?

in relation to US-USSR relations

Answer 8

We have to defend something even if it does not have a significant value, because if we don’t defend it, the adversary may get the idea that we will not defend something else that is valuable to us.

The domino theory.

The US convinced itself that the Soviet commitment to its periphery was much more certain.

Question 9

Can you escape commitments?

Answer 9

May not be as easy as it seems.

It the flip side of making the adversary believe that you have an interest in protecting something. Now you need to convince the adversary (and others) that you are withdrawing your commitment because you don’t care, not because you got scared.

Question 10

Deterrence vs Compellence

Answer 10

Deterrence – a threat to impose costs on the adversary if he makes a move

Compellence – a threat to impose costs on the adversary if he does not make a move.

Deterrence is easier, because it is passive: the decision to avoid a collision is the adversary’s. Deterrence is also indefinite in timing.

Compellence implies causing the collision. Compellence is also complicated by the fact that you have to continue it indefinitely until and unless the adversary complies. Compellence has to be definite.