Learning Objectives
10-1
Explain how a “picture in your head” created by imagining an object compares to the experience you have when you see the actual object.
10-2
Describe how damage to the brain can affect the ability to form visual images.
10-3
Identify how we can use visual imagery to improve memory.
10-4
Explain how people differ in their ability to create visual images.
10-5
Describe how aphantasia differs from typical mental imagery.
10-6
Apply mental imagery in practical settings.
visual imagery
A type of mental imagery involving vision, in which an image is experienced in the absence of a visual stimulus.
Mental imagery
Experiencing a sensory impression in the absence of sensory input.
Mental imagery is part of an umbrella cognitive function called imagination.
However, mental imagery does not have to be visual. People have the ability to imagine tastes, smells, and tactile experiences
One message of these examples is that imagery provides a way of thinking that adds another dimension to the verbal techniques usually associated with thinking. Imagery is associated with most people’s everyday experience.
Imagination
The ability of the mind to be creative and resourceful, actively generating sensory experiences, ideas, or concepts of external stimuli without their physical presence.
Notice both “imagery” and “imagination” have the root “imag-,” which implies a strong visual component to this phenomenon.
imageless thought debate
We can trace the history of imagery back to the first laboratory of psychology, founded by Wilhelm Wundt.
The debate about whether thought is possible in the absence of images.
Wundt proposed that images were one of the three basic elements of consciousness, along with sensations and feelings. He also proposed that because images accompany thought, studying images was a way of studying thinking. This idea of a link between imagery and thinking gave rise to the imageless thought debate , with some psychologists taking up Aristotle’s idea that “thought is impossible without an image” and others contending that thinking can occur without images.
Evidence supporting the idea that imagery was not required for thinking was Francis Galton’s (1883) observation that people who had great difficulty forming visual images were still quite capable of thinking
Other arguments both for and against the idea that images are necessary for thinking were proposed in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but these arguments and counterarguments ended when behaviorism toppled imagery from its central place in psychology (Watson, 1913; see Chapter 1).
The behaviorists branded the study of imagery as unproductive because visual images are invisible to everyone except the person experiencing them. The founder of behaviorism, John Watson, described images as “unproven” and “mythological” (1928) and therefore not worthy of study.
The dominance of behaviorism from the 1920s through the 1950s pushed the study of imagery out of mainstream psychology. However, this situation changed when the study of cognition was reborn in the 1950s.
Propositional
Information processed in the mind using language and symbols.
Spatial
Information processed in the mind visually in relation to particular location.
depictive
Information processed in the mind visually in relation to object qualities and recognition.
Visual information processed in the mind is said to be
Spatial and depictive
this corresponds to the two paths of visual processing: the dorsal “where” pathway and the ventral “what” pathway, respectively.
As we will discuss, some research supports the idea that information is mentally represented propositionally whereas other studies support the idea that information is represented depictively and spatially in the mind.
Joel Pearson and Stephen Kosslyn (2015)
set out with the goal of “ending the imagery debate.” Their assessment of the research through these many decades concluded that humans depend on a combination of propositional and depictive representations, and that, moving forward, the imagery debate should focus on understanding the many forms of human mental representation.
conceptual peg hypothesis
A hypothesis, associated with Paivio’s dual coding theory, that states that concrete nouns create images that other words can hang on to, which enhances memory for these words.
One example of a method that linked behavior and cognition is Alan Paivio’s (1963) work on memory. Paivio demonstrated it was easier to remember concrete nouns, like truck or tree, that can be imaged than it is to remember abstract nouns, like truth or justice, that are difficult to image. One technique Paivio used was paired-associate learning.
In a paired-associate learning experiment, participants are presented with pairs of words, like boat–hat or car–house, during a study period. They are then presented, during the test period, with the first word from each pair. Their task is to recall the word that was paired with it during the study period. Thus, if they were presented with the word boat, the correct response would be hat.
mental chronometry
determining the amount of time needed to carry out various cognitive tasks.
Whereas Paivio inferred cognitive processes by measuring memory, Roger Shepard and Jacqueline Metzler (1971) inferred cognitive processes by using mental chronometry.
In Shepard and Metzler’s experiment, which we described in Chapter 5, participants saw pictures like the ones in Figure 10.1. Their task was to indicate, as rapidly as possible, whether the two pictures were of the same object or different objects. This experiment showed that the time it took to decide that two views were of the same object was directly related to how different the angles were between the two views (review Figure 5.14). This result was interpreted as showing that participants were mentally rotating one of the views to determine whether it matched the other one.
What was important about this experiment was that it was one of the first to apply quantitative methods to the study of imagery and to suggest that imagery and perception may share the same mechanisms. (References to “mechanisms” include both mental mechanisms, such as ways of manipulating perceptual and mental images in the mind, and brain mechanisms, such as which structures are involved in creating perceptual and mental images.)
Mental scanning
A process of mental imagery in which a person scans a mental image in his or her mind.
The idea that imagery and perception may share the same mechanisms is based on the observation that although mental images differ from perception in that they are not as vivid or long lasting, imagery shares many properties with perception. Shepard and Metzler’s results showed that mental and perceptual images both involve spatial representation of the stimulus.
That is, the spatial experience for both imagery and perception matches the layout of the actual stimulus.
This idea, that there is a spatial correspondence between imagery and perception, is supported by many experiments by Stephen Kosslyn involving a task called mental scanning , in which participants create mental images and then scan them in their minds.
Kosslyn’s Mental Scanning Experiments
In one of his early experiments, Kosslyn (1973) asked participants to memorize a picture of an object, such as the boat in Figure 10.2, and then to create an image of that object in their mind and to focus on one part of the boat, such as the anchor.
Using the image in their mind, they were then asked to look for another part of the boat, such as the motor, and to press the “true” button when they found this part or the “false” button when they could not find it.
Kosslyn reasoned that if imagery, like perception, is spatial, then it should take longer for participants to find parts that are located farther from the initial point of focus because they would be scanning across the image of the object. This result is actually what happened, and Kosslyn took it as evidence for the spatial nature of imagery.
Glen Lea (1975)
However, as often happens in science, another researcher proposed a different explanation. Glen Lea (1975) proposed that as participants scanned, they may have encountered other interesting parts, such as the cabin, and this distraction may have increased their reaction time.
To answer this concern, Kosslyn and colleagues (1978) did another scanning experiment, this time asking participants to scan between two places on a map.
Kosslyn’s participants used the same procedure you just completed for the demonstration but were told to imagine an island, like the one in Figure 10.4a, that contained seven different locations. By having participants scan between every possible pair of locations (a total of 21 trips), Kosslyn determined the relationship between reaction time and distance shown in Figure 10.4b. Just as in the boat experiment, it took longer to scan between greater distances on the image, a result that supports the idea that visual imagery is spatial in nature.
As convincing as Kosslyn’s results were, however, Zenon Pylyshyn (1973) proposed another explanation, which started the imagery debate —a debate about whether imagery is based on spatial mechanisms, such as those involved in perception, or on mechanisms related to language, called propositional mechanisms.
spatial representations
A representation in which different parts of an image can be described as corresponding to specific locations in space.
Kosslyn and colleagues interpreted results from their experiment on imagery as supporting the idea that the mechanism responsible for imagery involves spatial representations.
a spatial representation would involve a spatial layout showing the cellphone, the laptop, and the desk that could be represented in a picture (Figure 10.5).
Spatial representations such as the picture of the cellphone on the desk near the laptop, in which parts of the representation correspond to parts of the object, are called depictive representations .
epiphenomenon
However, Pylyshyn (1973) disagreed, saying that just because we experience imagery as spatial, that does not mean that the underlying representation is spatial. After all, one thing that is clear from research in cognitive psychology is that we are not always aware of what is going on in our minds. The spatial experience of mental images, argues Pylyshyn, is an epiphenomenon —something that accompanies the real mechanism but is not actually part of the mechanism.
propositional representations
A representation in which relationships are represented by symbols, as when the words of a language represent objects and the relationships between objects.
Pylyshyn proposed that, rather than the spatial representations suggested by Kosslyn, the mechanism underlying imagery involves propositional representations, where relationships between objects are represented by symbols, such as an equation, or a statement, such as “The cellphone is on the desk by the laptop.”
In contrast, a spatial representation would involve a spatial layout showing the cellphone, the laptop, and the desk that could be represented in a picture (Figure 10.5).
Spatial representations such as the picture of the cellphone on the desk near the laptop, in which parts of the representation correspond to parts of the object, are called depictive representations .
We can understand the propositional approach better by returning to the depictive representation of Kosslyn’s boat
Figure 10.6 shows how the visual appearance of this boat can be represented propositionally. The words indicate parts of the boat, the length of the lines indicate the distances between the parts, and the words in parentheses indicate the spatial relations between the parts. A representation such as this one would predict that when starting at the motor, it should take longer to scan and find the anchor than to find the porthole because it is necessary to travel across three links to get to the porthole (dashed line) and four links to get to the anchor (dotted line). This kind of explanation proposes that imagery operates in a way similar to the semantic networks.
after many years of discussion and experimentation, the weight of the evidence supports the idea that imagery is served by a spatial mechanism and that it shares mechanisms with perception.
Comparing Imagery and Perception
Size in the Visual Field
another experiment by Kosslyn. This one considers how imagery is affected by the size of an object in a person’s visual field.
If you observe an automobile from far away, it fills only a portion of your visual field, and it is difficult to see small details such as the door handle. As you move closer, it fills more of your visual field, and you can perceive details like the door handle more easily (Figure 10.7). With these observations about perception in mind, Kosslyn wondered whether this relationship between viewing distance and the ability to perceive details also occurs for mental images.
To answer this question, Kosslyn (1978) asked participants to imagine two animals, such as an elephant and a rabbit, next to each other and to imagine that they were standing close enough so that the larger animal filled most of their visual field (Figure 10.8a). He then posed questions such as “Does the rabbit have whiskers?” and asked his participants to find that part of the animal in their mental image and to answer as quickly as possible. When he repeated this procedure but told participants to imagine a rabbit and a fly next to each other, participants created larger images of the rabbit, as shown in Figure 10.8b. The result of these experiments, shown alongside the pictures, was that participants answered questions about the rabbit more rapidly when it filled more of the visual field.
mental walk task
In addition to asking participants to respond to details in visual images, Kosslyn also asked them to do a mental walk task , in which they were to imagine that they were walking toward their mental image of an animal. Their task was to estimate how far away they were from the animal when they began to experience “overflow”—when the image filled the visual field or when its edges started becoming fuzzy. The result was that participants had to move closer for small animals (less than a foot away for a mouse) than for larger animals (about 11 feet away for an elephant), just as they would have to do if they were walking toward actual animals. This result provides further evidence for the idea that images are spatial, just like perception.
Comparing Imagery and Perception
Interactions of Imagery and Perception
Another way to demonstrate connections between imagery and perception is to show that they interact with one another.
The basic rationale behind this approach is that if imagery affects perception, or perception affects imagery, this means that imagery and perception both have access to the same mechanisms.
The classic demonstration of interaction between perception and imagery dates back to 1910, when Cheves Perky did the experiment pictured in Figure 10.9. Perky asked her participants to “project” visual images of common objects onto a screen and then to describe these images. Unbeknownst to the participants, Perky was back-projecting a very dim image of this object onto the screen. Thus, when participants were asked to create an image of a banana, Perky projected a dim image of a banana onto the screen. Interestingly, the participants’ descriptions of their images matched the images that Perky was projecting. For example, they described the banana as being oriented vertically, just as was the projected image. Even more interesting, not one of Perky’s 24 participants noticed that there was an actual picture on the screen. They had apparently mistaken an actual picture for a mental image.
Comparing Imagery and Perception
Interactions of Imagery and Perception
Modern researchers have replicated Perky’s result (see Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Segal & Fusella, 1970) and have demonstrated interactions between perception and imagery in several other ways. Martha Farah (1985) instructed her participants to imagine either the letter H or the letter T on a screen. Once they had formed a clear image on the screen, they pressed a button that caused two squares to flash, one after the other. One of the squares contained a target letter, which was either an H or a T. The participants’ task was to indicate whether the letter was in the first square or the second one. Farah found that the target letter was detected more accurately when participants imagined the same letter rather than a different letter. Farah interpreted this result as showing that perception and imagery share mechanisms. Later experiments that have also shown that imagery can affect perception have come to the same conclusion (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2000; Pearson et al., 2008).
imagery neurons
Neurons that fire rapidly during perception and imagery.
Gabriel Kreiman and colleagues (2000) were able to study patients who had electrodes implanted in various regions in their medial temporal lobe, which includes the hippocampus and the amygdala. Kreiman found neurons that fired rapidly to some objects but not to others.
For example, the records in Figure 10.10a show the response of a neuron that fired rapidly to a picture of a baseball but did not respond to a picture of a face.
In addition, Figure 10.10b shows that this neuron fired rapidly in the same way when the person closed their eyes and imagined a baseball (rapid firing) or a face (base level firing). Kreiman called these neurons imagery neurons .
Kreiman’s discovery of imagery neurons is important, both because it demonstrates a possible physiological mechanism for imagery and because these neurons respond in the same way to perceiving an object and to imagining it, thereby supporting the idea of a close relation between perception and imagery.
However, instead of recording from single neurons, most research on humans has involved brain imaging that measures brain activity as participants are perceiving objects and creating visual images of these objects