Art. 3
“Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.”
Art 4: (1)
The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified action.”
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34
Shareholders cannot override the articles by simple majority: they have to change the articles by special resolution. Note that at the time directors could be removed by default only by special resolution
The aim is to protect minorities who entered company on basis that the company would be managed by directors not majority in GM
Directors’ management power
Very broad, includes
Making contracts, appointing agents, delegating to committees and managers
(Art 5 MAPC), litigating in the company’s name
Raising capital, including allotting shares (ss549-551)
Deciding whether to pay dividends (assuming profits are available (s830), directors include a recommendation in the directors’ report (s416(3)), shareholders declare the dividend by ordinary resolution (Art 30 MAPrivateC, Art 70 MAPublicC)
s168(1)
Shareholder power to remove directors by ordinary resolution
Default powers of shareholders?
Management power will revert to the shareholders in circumstances where the board is deadlocked, unable to act, or has ceased to exist (Barron v Potter [1914]
Appointment of directors
First directors appointed upon registration (s9(4), s12(1)(a))
Subsequent directors appointed by ord res of GM (MAPC, Art 17(1) MAPublicC, Art
20)
GM must use power to appoint ‘for the benefit of the company as a whole and not to secure some ulterior advantage: Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62
Removal of directors
By ordinary resolution of GM (s168(1))
Mandatory power may not be restricted by articles, but weighted voting is permissible (Bushell v Faith)
Removal of director may breach separate contract of employment
giving the director right to damages: Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701
Remuneration of directors
As a director
As an employee
As an independent contractor
Board decision-making
Art 7: At a director’s meeting, passed by majority
* Art 8: Outside board meetings, by unanimous written resolution
* Art 9: Board meeting called by any director by giving notice to other directors
* Art 11: Quorum two
* Art 13: Chairman has a casting vote
De facto director
A de facto director undertakes functions in relation to a company that can only be discharged by a director: Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180
For directors’ duties, as well as many other statutory provisions, de facto directors will be considered as directors
Shadow directors
Shadow director is a statutory concept, see s251(1) CA 2006: ‘a person in accordance
with whose instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act’.
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s89: amending s170(5) CA 2006
The general duties apply to a shadow director of a company, where and to the
To the extent that they are capable of so applying.’
Directors Duties Overview
s171 To act within powers (observe the constitution & use powers for proper purposes)
* s172 To act in good faith to promote the success of the company
* s173 To exercise independent judgment
* s174 To exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
* s175 To avoid conflicts of interest (including duty not to make secret profit)
* s176 Not to accept benefits from third parties
* s177 To declare interests in contracts
Duties are owed to the company
Owed to company not the shareholders individually
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421
s170(1)
This is fundamental to enforcement
Directors may come to owe duties to individual shareholders on the facts
Where director assumes responsibility for an individual shareholder
Where directors persuade dependent shareholders to sell
Under the law of misrepresentation, where they give advice
There is an Australian authority that states that if the director’s duty to the company conflicts
with a duty that has arisen in relation to individual shareholders, the duty to the
company must prevail
Remedies for breach flow to company
s178(1): ‘The consequences of breach (or threatened breach) of sections 171 to 177 are the same as would apply if the corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied.’
BJR in the UK
The UK does not have an explicit BJR, but it is implicit in our law as the courts have
shown a proper reluctance to enter into the merits of commercial decisions’
The duty of care, skill & diligence (s174)
Objective minimum standard with subjective ‘top up’ reflects modern case law in negligence, under s214 IA 1986 and directors’ disqualification
Allows a single standard to deal with all companies, large and small, and to differentiate between professional and non-professional managers
Minimum standards of care for all directors
Passive directors cannot escape liability
Directors must maintain proper accounting records
Directors have collective responsibility when they approve the accounts under s414, and should engage in critical consideration of them as part of the process
Negligence liability for ‘bad’ decisions
The quality of decision-making by the directors is a matter for the shareholders whilst the
company is solvent. The implicit BJR normally prevents negligence claims for ‘bad’
decisions.
Duty to exercise independent judgment (s173)
An express exception (173(2)(a) where directors enter a contract which restricts their future discretion
Another exception (173(2)(b) where directors act in a way authorised by the constitution (i.e. delegation under Art 5 MAPC), but this duty requires directors to exercise residual supervision
Duty to act within powers (observe the constitution & use powers for proper purposes) s171
Recall that directors not a party to s33 contract; under this section they have an obligation to adhere to limitations on their powers in the articles and to obey any special resolutions passed under Art 4 MAPC