Member Goals
Re-election, institutional influence, and good public policy (?)
Rationality
Model of human behavior where 1) people have preferences and 2) act in accordance with them
Condorcet Criterion/Winner
The option that can beat any other option in pairwise comparison meets the Condorcet criterion and is thus the Condorcet winner
Condorcet’s Paradox
When there is no Condorcet winner, voting becomes cyclical.
As a result, in this situation, outcomes are influenced by who controls the agenda. Agenda can be manipulated to make any choice eventually get picked.
Strategic Voting
Choosing an outcome other than one’s true preferences in order to manipulate future vote options for an improved final outcome
Spatial Modeling
Utility received = - (ideal point - proposal)^2
Mathematical model: quadratic loss function, symmetrical, single peaked
Single-Peaked Loss Function
One point is most preferred
Non-Single-Peaked Loss Function
More than one point is preferred (EX: all or nothing)
Median Voter Theorem
When utility functions are symmetric and single peaked, the median voter’s ideal point has an empty winset (?)
Impervious to agenda effects
Under a supermajority, median voter theorem can be overcome
Preferred-to Set
The set of policies that someone prefers to another policy (assumed to be the status quo if a policy isn’t stated)
Winset
The set of all policy alternatives that will be accepted, under the decision rules, over a specific policy. (assumed to be status quo if a policy is not stated)
Reversion Point
The policy in place if no other policy is selected. This is typically the status quo.
Bad reversion point impels cooperation.
Sequential Veto Bargaining
Happens when Congress has incomplete information (thinking the president will/won’t sign)
3 Things that Have Spurred Institutional Evolution
1) Member Ambition
To consolidate power in one’s hands/party
2) Improved Organizational Operations
Increasing volume of bills as country grows, overseeing growing executive branch/beefing with it
3) Electoral Competition
Determines who is in congress, what major cleavages are in the institution, reflects relevant societal issues of the era
McKelvey Chaos Theorem
With two or more dimensions, no policy is stable.
Agenda control allows outcomes anywhere on the policy space
We don’t see this in the real world because of rules, which create structure induced equilibrium (and constrain the policy space to one dimension)
Candidate Considerations
The costs, benefits, and chances of winning
Expected Value
A statistical concept (probability of event x its payoff)
Assumes risk neutrality
Opportunity Cost
The value of what you didn’t get because you got something else. Strategic people take this into account.
Mathematics of Running
Expected Utility of Running for office = Probability*Utility - Cost
Calculus of Progressive Ambition
(Mathematics of Running Equation for Office x) < (Mathematics of Running Equation for Office Y)
Run for office y if expected utility is greater than expected utility of office x
Considerations of Running for Office (Benefits)
How do the benefits of office x compare with office y? (Scope of authority, institutional resources, pay/perks, progressive value of higher value)
Considerations of Running for Office (Chances/Probabilities)
How do my chances of winning office x compare with my chances of winning office y? (Partisan realities, partisan tides, redistricting, have I dealt with any scandals?)
Considerations of Running for Office (Costs)
How do the costs of running for office x compare with y? (Opportunity costs, challenger quality, fundraising efficiency, spending efficiency)
Incumbency Advantage
Factors in favor of incumbents:
Having good political skills, uninformed voters who will vote for the status quo, war chests (previous preparations for next campaign), and quality challenger deterrence
Those who likely won’t win, don’t run, meaning strong incumbents often run opposed.
NOT REAL. The fear of it may be its only power as it discourages funding + media attention for challengers, making them weaker
