bounded rationality Flashcards

(35 cards)

1
Q

what are descriptive models?

A

models of how decision processes operate, irrespective of whether the outcome of the decision is good or bad

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2
Q

what are normative models?

A

evaluate a decision in terms of the goals of the decision maker

decisions can be good or bad and a decision is good if it reaches these goals

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3
Q

what is rational thinking?

A

normative - a decision is good to the extent that it enables the decision maker to reach their goals

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4
Q

what are rational decisions?

A

maximises expected value

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5
Q

what is rational choice theory?

A

assumes agent has full access to all alternatives

knows the probability of their outcomes, knows the value of their outcomes

can integrate all this information and chooses the option with highest utility

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6
Q

what is bounded rationality?

A

limited cognitive capacity and information on outcomes

human behaviour can be impulsive, habitual/conditioned, imitating others, random

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7
Q

what do we do when making choices under uncertainty?

A

given choice between two or more alternatives, rational choice is the option with the highest value or utility

if outcomes are uncertain, multiply the utility by the probability of receiving that outcome to give expected value, EV

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8
Q

what is the expected value (EV)?

A

p(outcome) * value

option A - £100 with 50% probability, EV = £50
option B - £1000 with 2% probability, EV = £20

in RCT, A is better

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9
Q

what is the St Petersburg Paradox?

A

Bernoulli (1738) - Peter tosses a coin and continues to do so until it should land on “heads” when it comes to the ground. He agrees to give Paul one ducat if he gets heads on the first throw, two ducats if he gets on the second, four if on the third, eight if on the fourth and so on, so that with each additional throw the number of ducats he must pay is doubled

EV is infinite = 1/2 * 1 + 1/2 * 2 + 1/2 * 4 ….

RCT suggests player should be willing to pay virtually any sum of money, since EV is infinite

although EV of gamble is infinite, subjective utility is low, since change to win high value is low

case where RCT fails to make sensible predictions about “rational choice”

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10
Q

how did Bernoulli explain the St Petersburg paradox?

A

EV not equal to EU instead the utility of wealth is proportional to its logarithm

consequences of this is that each additional unit of wealth is worth less that the previous one so the utility of additional currency units decreases as the number of currency units increase

extra utility of the high winnings in the St Petersburg Paradox is no longer high enough to compensate for the very low probabilites

problem with this, in turn, is that a game could enhance the “win” function so the problem persists

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11
Q

what does the St Petersburg Paradox show?

A

inherent limitation of EV

despite its seemingly plausible or trivial nature, not general enough for many situations even under assumption that decision maker behaved entirely rational (in terms of maximising their gains)

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12
Q

what is expected utility theory?

A

normative theory

clearly defines what rational choices are

expectated utility may, however, deviate from EV in that allows EU of a particular choice outcome to be situationally dependent - on the accumulated wealth

weak ordering - for any set of choices, we must always be able to say we prefer one over the other or neither

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13
Q

what was Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979, 1992) experiment 1?

A

would you prefer a certain gain of £3000 or an 80% chance of gaining £4000 or else nothing

would you prefer an 80% chance to lose £4000 otherwise nothing or a certain loss of £3000)

most people prefer a sure gain of £3000 over 80% chance to gain £4000 although EV of risky option is higher

preferences are reversed when outcomes are losses - most people now prefer risky option over certain option

participants behaviour reflects (fairly consistently) exact opposite of what RCT has predicted in both cases

moreover, and significantly, participants don’t appear to generally favour the certain option - only favour certain option when it comes to making a gain

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14
Q

what was Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979, 1992) experiment 1?

A

would you prefer a certain gain of £5 or a 1/1000 chance of gaining £5000

would you prefer a certain loss of £5 or a 1/1000 chance of losing £5000

participants again deviate from RCT and invert their choice patterns when small probabilities are involved and more extreme gains or loses

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15
Q

what is prospect theory?

A

Daniel Kahneman & Amon Tversky

developed as a descriptive model of decision making

intended to account for deviations from RCT

two main components - utility and probability

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16
Q

what is the value function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in prospect theory?

A

proposed a value function that differs for gains and losses

x-axis reflects gains to right and losses to left instead of total wealth - midpoint as person’s current reference point

y-axis is utility

function for gains and losses is asymmetric - explains why we treat losses as more serious than gains

besides the different overall slop of straight lines for gains and loses however the value - utility functions are non linear

for both gains and loses, increments near small values lead to considerably bigger increase in gains/losses whereas for large values, increase in utility is smaller

17
Q

what is the π function in prospect theory?

A

for gains, people prefer certainty - certainty effect

for losses, prefer to gamble

according to prospect theory, don’t treat probabilities as they are stated instead distorted by π function - objective p becomes subjective π

probabilities near 0 are overweighted relative to objective probabilities

probabilities near 1 (but not 1) are underweighted

weighting functions are different for losses vs gains - subjective probability of a loss is deviating more from linearity than for gain

18
Q

what is a summary of prospect theory?

A

assumes differential sensitivity to gains and losses, explaining loss aversion

assumes nonlinear functions of utility as function of value

takes into account that subjective probabilities are not a linear function of probability but sigmoid function which leads to overestimation of small probabilities and underestimation of high probabilities

descriptive model established on basis of empirical data and takes subjective factor, for both value and probability, into account

19
Q

why is prospect theory not a complete theory?

A

although describes some deviations from normative expectations by means of the pi function and value function, does not give any psychological reasons for shape of these functions

20
Q

what is regret theory?

A

we compare outcomes, particularly after decision is made

assumption is, we will regret a decision if an alternative outcome would have led to a higher payoff even when prospect was better

we rejoice if our choice led to a better outcome than other alternatives

21
Q

what is an example of inter-temporal choice?

A

would you prefer £500 now or £1000 in 10 years

most people prefer option a which has a lower value than b but has a higher utility because the utility of b is discounted by delay

22
Q

who came up with the Discounted Utility Model?

A

Paul Samuelson (1937)

23
Q

what is the normative assumption about the discount function?

A

exponential constant rate

24
Q

what is exponential discounting?

A

v = Ve^(-kd) where v = subjective discounted rate, k = discount rate, d = delay

three properties that fit empirical behaviour

if there is no delay, no discounting

as delay increases, present value decreases

as delay approach infinity, present values approach 0

25
what is hyperbolic discounting?
x = V / (1 + kD) where v = subjective discounted rate, k = discount rate, d = delay same three properties as exponential function but accommodates dynamic inconsistencies
26
why do people discount the future?
interest rates uncertainty emotion based theory
27
why do people discount the future because of uncertainty?
future is uncertain in evolutionary terms, might not survive the next several months to receive a large amount of food promised to you
28
what was Loewenstein's (1996) research into emotion-based theories of why people discount the future?
temporal and physical proximity of options that can reduce aversive states leads to disproportionate increase in attractiveness of those options people with low discount rates, rather than exhibiting self-control, are differing in the way they anticipate the emotional state of the outcome makes prediction that discount rates should be different when we make decisions on behalf of other people, depending on how much empathy we have for them
29
what was Ziegler & Tunney's (2012) research into why people discount the future?
tested prediction by estimating discount rates for decisions made when we are recipient compared to when other people who differ in social distance from ourselves are recipients discount rate varied as function of coefficient of relatedness (as a measure of social distance) with decisions made for ourselves being more impulsive than decisions made for other people expect for our close relatives and best friends decisions made for strangers are least impulsive (cold and impartial)
30
what was Stillwell & Tunney's (2011) research into discounting as impulsivity?
tested 9454 Facebook users across world to determine relationship between discounting and smoking k parameter derived from financial decisions and it appears to reflect a stable individual "trait" in impulsivity results clearly show that daily smokers discount future reward more than irregular smokers or non-smokers
31
what is the ultimatum game?
two players decide how to split a sum of money proposer is endowed with £10 but has to share with responders the proposer suggests a sum of money to the responder who must either accept or reject the offer if responder rejects the offer, both players lost all no discussion is allowed and both players are anonymous
32
what does the RCT say about the ultimatum game?
proposer should offer the minimum amount possible and that the responder should always accept any offer no matter how small because this maximises EU for each player
33
what happens in the ultimatum game?
median offer tends to be between 40-50% of the endowment offers below 20% usually rejected so people in deciding to share can be altruistic than we might expect and vindicative
34
how might the ultimatum game be explained?
humans live (and have lived) in societies that are both supportive and competitive giving the competitor a massive advantage (if given the choice to deny them this advantage) could very easily outweigh the benefit of receiving a small reward in the ultimatum game
35
how has rationality been studied in an evolutionary context?
Gigerenzer et al have considered the origin of heuristics and re-defined rationality suggest that heuristics were evolved in the Environment of Evolutionary Ancestry aka the Pleistocene period rationality of behaviour does depend to some extent on the context - factors like stability of the environment